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SEP
THE
RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION
1917
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
*
VOLUME II
N. N. SUKANOV
Edited, abridged and translated by
JOEL CARMICHAEL
from Zapiski O Revolutski
HARPER TORCHBOOKS T THE ACADEMY LIBRARY
HARPER 8c BROTHERS, NEW YORK
The Russian Revolution
This book was originally published in 1955 by Oxford
University Press, and is reprinted by arrangement.
First HARPER TORCHBOOK edition published 1962
CONTENTS
VOLUME II
City Map of St. Petersburg viii-ix
PART IV
THE TRIUMPH OF THE REACTION, MAY 6TH-JULY 8TH
1 6 The Coalition 345
17 In the Depths 368
1 8 The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets 378
19 The Coalition Splits under Stress 386
20 The 'July Days' 424
PART V
COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE DISSOLUTION OF
THE DEMOCRACY, JULY 8TH- OCTOBER 2OTH
2 1 After 'July' : the Second and Third Coalitions 485
22 The Scandal in Moscow 493
23 The United Bourgeoisie Demonstrates 496
24 The Dissolution of the Democracy after the Kornilov
Revolt 522
25 The Last Coalition 527
26 The Pre-Parliament 535
PART VI
THE OCTOBER INSURRECTION, OCTOBER 3RD -NOVEMBER 1ST
27 The Softening-up 547
28 The Final Review 577
29 Overture 587
30 October 24th 603
31 October 25th 620
32 October 26th, Finale 648
Index to the twaftfolutnes 669
6313961
ILLUSTRATIONS
VOLUME II
MARTOV AND DAN facing page 362
SIEGE OF THE TELEPHONE EXCHANGE in the
October Revolution 362
THREE BOLSHEVIK LEADERS : TROTSKY, LENIN,
KAMENEV 395
THE 'JULY DAYS 5 , A demonstration is fired on in the
Nevsky Prospect 442
KERENSKY ARRIVING IN MOSCOW FOR THE
STATE CONFERENCE 491
LENIN SPEAKS TO THE PEOPLE* 634
City Map of St. Petersburg
Part IV
THE TRIUMPH OF THE REACTION
May 6th-July 8th
CHAPTER 16
THE COALITION
WITH the birth of the Coalition Government events slowed down
and lost their former dizzy speed. However urgently history
continued to move forward, the revolution had begun to mark
time. Between May and October tremendous events took place,
but the phase of the revolution did not change and constituted a
single unified period. The line of development was as straight
as an arrow. Two attempts to turn it aside interrupted this
straight line, but did not change its direction: the revolution
quickly and easily returned to its previous course both after the
July Days and after the Kornilov putsch.
This evidently means that towards the beginning of May
'political relations 5 in the revolution were completely crystal-
lized, and had arrived at some sort of stable point. The bloc of
the big and petty bourgeoisie was completely stable, unshakeable ,
and even formal from the beginning of May until October;
and the policy of the united bourgeois front was the suffocation
of the proletariat, Zimmerwald, and the entire revolution. It
moved along a straight road to liquidation.
This was the obverse side of the Coalition period. The reverse
side was simply the enormous growth of discontent amongst the
masses of the people, headed by the proletariat of the capital.
Worn out by the war, hunger, and chaos, disillusioned by the
policy of the Government, thirsting for the fruits of victory the
masses of the people rallied in the struggle for the revolution and
prepared themselves for new and decisive battles.
Anyone looking at the policy of the Coalition was also seeing
the success of Lenin, for these were two sides of the same medal.
And amongst the genuine revolutionaries from the beginning of
May on it was already being said: 'Bolshevik mole, you're
digging magnificently!'
* * *
Soon after the March revolution the whole of the Russian
plutocracy was consolidated in the Cadet Party. And the Cadets,
while Miliukov was a Minister, were of course a completely
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy
Government party: any differences within the party were then
expressed externally only in the degree of exasperation with the
democracy and the Soviet.
After the April Days, with the liquidation of Miliukov and the
formation of a Coalition Government, things changed. The
Coalition was a sort of external expression of how far the
revolution had advanced.
The Coalition had been created against the will of the leading
Cadet circles. The Cadets, consequently, could in the nature of
things no longer be a Government party as before. The course
of events had left them behind the official Government. They
became the Right Opposition an officially reactionary, counter-
revolutionary force. And the differences within the Cadet Party
were now expressed externally in the degree of opposition to the
Government.
There were, to be sure, still some members of the party left in
the Cabinet. The Cadets neither could nor wanted to break
with the official Government. Since they were no longer capable
of disrupting the Cabinet, and a boycott by them could no
longer be dangerous to the revolution, the situation compelled
them to cling to the Government with the utmost tenacity.
Their opposition could only be 'diplomatically' disguised. They
had to promise the new Cabinet their confidence and support,
even though with an unmistakably sour expression. But in the
nature of things there could be no question here of any real
support since there was no confidence.
The Cadets were the big bourgeoisie, together with the liberal
professional classes who served them. The specific gravity of
this party was of course very great. It was precisely with these
strata that the revolutionary democracy had formed a Coalition.
And their relationship to the new Government was charac-
teristic.
But of course the largest party at this time was the SRs. They
were the petty-bourgeois democracy peasants, shop-keepers,
Co-operators, minor officials, the Third Estate, the great mass
of the indigent intelligentsia and all the unthinking ordinary
people and odds and ends who had been stirred and shaken up
by recent events. The intellectual SR circles, who shouted so
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 347
loudly for 'Land and Freedom 5 were based In the cities on a
dense stratum of soldiers of peasant origin and even of workers
who had not been fully digested by the cauldron of the factories.
And in the country this exclusive SR slogan had won exclusive
control of all the peasantry.
Generally speaking, in our peasant country this peasant party
occupied its rightful place, and already it seemed to have laid
the foundations of future supremacy. Growing at the beginning
of the Coalition like an immense snowball., it had lately become
the last word of fashion and begun to overflow far beyond its
natural limits, encompassing spheres completely alien both to
'Socialism' and to 'revolution'. This, the largest party, had
attracted into itself both some of the temperamental upper
bourgeoisie and some of the effusively liberal landowners, and
in the footsteps of the highly popular new War Minister,
Kerensky, solid masses of military people regular officers and
even generals had begun to enter the party. Two and a half
months before, presumably, not one of the latter would have
hesitated to shoot or hand over to the executioner any passer-by
he even suspected of being an SR. But my God ! what cannot
'public opinion' and disinterested devotion to duty do with a
man?
And now this party, the biggest and most powerful in the
revolution, was, in the person of its majority, giving the new
Government the whole weight of its confidence and support,
both in words and in deeds. . . The intermediate intellectual
strata, as we know, had from the very first days of the revolution
insisted on a coalition. Now their dreams were coming true;
the philistines were revelling in their victory, and the unattached
nondescripts wallowed in beatitude.
The SR Party, the biggest and most powerful, at that time
had two centres one more Right, the other more Left. One
centre was Kerensky, the other Chernov. In addition, there was
a tiny little centre in the person of the Bolshevik sympathizer
Kamkov. Even before this, however, people like him had been
invisible to the naked eye amidst the limitless sea of SR phili-
stinism. But the whole of this mass was drawn towards the new
Cabinet by these first two centres; for both Kerensky and
Chernov were Ministers. The biggest party, having rightfully
gathered under its banners the bulk of our petty-bourgeois
348 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
country, was giving itself up entirely to the support of the new
Government.
It would have seemed that the Coalition was standing on the
firmest of foundations. But alas! the leaders of the petty-
bourgeois SR masses proved faithful to the nature of their party.
Flabby creatures without political personality, caught between
the mighty millstones of capitalist society, they were bewildered
by the dizzying events and failed to grasp their meaning.
Buffeted by the tempest and shackled by the traditions and
fetters of capitalist dictatorship, they cravenly renounced their
own minimum programme and surrendered, with the revolu-
tion and the popular masses into the bargain, to the mercy of
the bourgeoisie. But in doing this they also lost these popular
masses, who rejected their leaders and trampled them into the
mud. When the masses saw with their own eyes that their
leaders were incompetent and deceitful, and were not leading
them forward, the petty-bourgeois political docility of the
masses turned into a petty-bourgeois elemental outburst, and
these same masses threw themselves headlong into the open
arms of the Bolsheviks.
At that time the SR Party was the biggest and the most
powerful. But it was a colossus with a head of clay; it was not
destined to become a really firm foundation for the new
Government. The SR Party gave itself up entirely to the
Coalition, it gave it everything it had. The loveliest girl in
France could have given no more. But giving everything
doesn't mean giving enough. And in the end Kerensky's and
Chernov's million-headed flock in city and country was of no
assistance to the Coalition.
The question of the Mensheviks' attitude to the Coalition was
not settled so simply. The Mensheviks, to be sure, had also given
the new Cabinet two Ministers and, what is more, one of them
was very important and the other very clever. But here of
course there could not be the same ingenuousness, the same
triumph, nor the same simple-minded confidence and support
as those with which the petty-bourgeois populists greeted the
Coalition. I've already related how during the birth-pangs of
the new Government, at luncheon in the restaurant and after-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 349
wards on the platform, Skobelev vainly appealed to his hot-
blooded heart and only under the irresistible pressure of Ms
cold-blooded mind was compelled to accept a ministerial port-
folio. Tsereteli had, one might say, simply yielded to force, and
as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs considered himself the vic-
tim of an unexpected chain of circumstances that had formed
against his will. And the Menshevik chairman of the Soviet,
Chkheidze, had resisted to the last ditch and was only reconciled
in the face of an already accomplished fact.
The then leaders of the Mensheviks, bound by international
Socialist traditions, were in general inclined to shun this whole
dubious enterprise. Perhaps the principal reason for this was
doubt as to how the Menshevik party masses would accept these
Social-Democratic portfolios. The doubt was justified; for the
Menshevik section of the ruling Soviet bloc had somehow its
special character, distinct from that of the SRs, and its own
special fate.
It's true that from the beginning of the revolution a mass of
philistine elements, 'former' people, and the casual public, with
nothing in common with the proletarian movement, had
flooded the Menshevik Party as well as the SRs. Nevertheless,
unlike the SRs, the Mensheviks had been protected up to a
point by their reputation as a proletarian class party and their
ties with the International. Hence the influx of obviously bour-
geois and reactionary elements into this party was substantially
smaller. And its proletarian core, which before the revolution
had given an enormous preponderance to the Zimmerwald
tendency in Menshevism, was incomparably stronger. And we
know that after the revolution Zimmerwald continued to domi-
nate the Menshevik Party up to the April Days themselves.
Up to that time, even during the Coalition, the organizations in
both Moscow and Petersburg were overwhelmingly Left and
Internationalist. It was only the provincial fellow-travellers who
took their line from Tsereteli and succeeded in dragging many
organizations into the quagmire of patriotism and con-
ciliationism.
The attitude of the Men&heviks to the Coalition Government
and to the acceptance of portfolios by party members was still
unclear, and aroused the fears of the Menshevik Ministers them-
selves. The decisive word was to be pronounced by the All-
35O THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Russian Conference of Mensheviks, which opened in Petersburg
on May gth.
# # #
The Conference got off to a flying start, and the very first
morning session on May gth settled the hash of the central
problem of the whole Conference, the attitude of the party to
the Coalition, and the entry of members into the Cabinet. The
debate was fierce and on both sides blows lained down heavily.
But the results were fatal.
A resolution approving of the Menshevik entry into the
Coalition and promising the new Cabinet complete confidence
and support was passed by a majority of 44 votes to n, with
13 abstentions.
This meant that the Menshevik-SR-Liberal bloc had
definitely taken shape. The Mensheviks, like the SRs, had con-
clusively and officially become a Government party. And more-
over, in spite of the passionate onslaught of the minority, the
Conference had settled its basic problem very easily and swiftly.
Conclusively and officially the hegemony of opportunism and
capitulationism in the Menshevik Party had been confirmed in
some two or three hours.
That same day I too went to the evening session of the
Menshevik Conference. At that time I had, as before, no formal
connexion with this party. To be sure, being present even as a
spectator at meetings which were to decide the fate of Men-
shevism in the revolution was far from uninteresting. But this
was not what drew me to the Conference : I went to see Martov,
whom I hadn't seen for just three years.
Martov had arrived that same day, about 2 o'clock. A rather
large group had come with him, including those eminent
leaders of our movement and future distinguished figures of the
revolution: Axelrod, Lunacharsky, 1 Ryazanov, 2 and others.
1 Lunacharsky, Anatol Vasilyevich (1875-1933): educated in Switzerland; in
the revolutionary movement from the age of seventeen; a Bolshevik from 1903, but
with highly personal opinions, especially in philosophy. People's Commissar for
Education after the October Revolution. (Ed.)
2 Ryazanov, (Goldendach) David Borisovich (1870-1935?): celebrated as
scholar of Marxism; founder and director of Marx-Engels Institute. Joined Bol-
sheviks in July 1917 together with Interdistrictites. After the 1931 Trial of the
Mensheviks he was removed from all his posts and left for the countryside, where he
died. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 351
All of them, like Lenin but more than a month later, had
passed through Germany in a 'sealed train'.
A triumphal welcome at the Finland Station had been
arranged for them, as for the leaders of the other parties. But,
though I very much wanted to, this time I couldn't get to the
station, because of their daytime arrival. For the same reason
doubtless the welcome was less crowded and impressive than
that for the SRs, and especially for the Bolsheviks. I was a little
vexed for Martov not only because of my personal weakness
for him, but also because of his incontestable objective impor-
tance. Moreover, while awaiting his arrival I had for some days
been scowling with jealous spite at the 'ministerialized' Soviet
Menshevik chiefs, who were awaiting without special en-
thusiasm or impatience, but rather with alarm and ill-will, the
appearance in the revolutionary arena of the acknowledged
ideological leader of the Mensheviks.
It had been demonstrated more than once during the pre-
ceding weeks that Martov occupied as before a consistent inter-
nationalist position, sharply inimical to the ruling Soviet bloc.
There was no doubt that he would take a firm stand against
those participating in the Coalition. Truly an untimely
guest.
Now, when the basic question was being decided at the Con-
ference and the correlation offerees was still unclear God knew
in which direction the party ship might be turned by the in-
fluence of this old, experienced, most authoritative and popular
helmsman! In any case the ministerial question appeared so
urgent that it seemed completely impossible to delay the debate
on it. Axelrod, the founder of Russian Social-Democracy, and
Martov, its leader, were faced by the Conference with a, fait
accompli just as the Conference itself had been faced with the
fait accompli of the Coalition. How could one fail to be reminded
of the Latin legal maxim: beati possidentes?
I was late for the evening session and it was already breaking
up when I arrived. The spacious hall and its corridors were
filled by a dense crowd. The external aspect of the Conference
was extremely imposing. A guest like myself might easily not
even have been allowed into the meeting-hall, but they let me
in anyhow, though without much pleasure. But Martov was sur-
rounded by a dense barrier; 'seeing each other' was clearly out
352 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
of the question, we had to limit ourselves to a handshake and a
few words, hoping to renew our former friendly relations.
It appeared that Martov had already spoken and rebuked the
Soviet majority, now the party majority as well, both for the
policy of compromise and for the Coalition. As in his telegrams
from abroad he had defended the irreconcilable proletarian
position, the position of class war, the position of a real struggle
for peace, and not sugary hypocritical lisping about peace.
But in spite of the passionate support of the minority, Mar-
tov's isolation from the compact group of Menshevik leaders, his
former followers, friends, and disciples, and simultaneously his
rupture with the party majority, stood out in full relief. Tradi-
tion prevented the partisans of Dan and Tsereteli from attacking
Martov directly: that was still left for the near future. But the
prevailing mood of hostility had already completely crystallized,
and coldness was already evident at the first reunion.
Martov, the begetter of Menshevism, its incomparable, almost
its sole theoretician, its most authoritative and popular chieftain
was now no longer the leader of his own party. Philistine
notions and their exponents had led the Menshevik Party away
from Martov far away, into neither more nor less than the
camp of the bourgeoisie. Only a small group remained with
Martov. It was a catastrophe.
It didn't shake Martov. He stood his ground, with his small
group and without the old Menshevik Party, until October.
After October a reconquest of the Menshevik Party by Martov
began, and by a year after October he had returned to his
customary position as the generally acknowledged leader of
Menshevism. But that was too late.
Martov a vast theme. I won't attempt a thorough-going
treatment of it, in view of my constant references to him : we
worked side by side both before and after October. Nevertheless
it's very tempting now to note his basic traits, to establish, so to
speak, the general pattern of this distinguished figure, not only
of our own but of the European working-class movement. All
the more so since there was relatively little interest in him
during the revolution. The fates decreed that he should not play
a prominent part in the events of these last years, but never-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1QIJ 353
theless he was and remains a star of the first magnitude, one of
the few whose names were characteristic of our epoch.
I had seen Martov for the first time in Paris in 1903. He was
then 29 years old. At that time he, with Lenin and Plekhanov,
made up the editorial board of Iskra, and he gave propaganda
lectures to the Russian colonies abroad, waging a bitter struggle
against the SRs, who were increasing in strength. He was
already famous among the expatriates and lived somewhere
on Olympus, amidst other such deities, and people in the
Russian colony, meeting his spare, hobbling figure, would nudge
one another.
Although I was not convinced by his arguments at that time,
I remember very well the enormous impression made on me by
his erudition and his intellectual and dialectical power. I was, to
be sure, an absolute fledgeling, but I felt that Martov's speeches
filled my head with new ideas ; without sympathizing with him,
I watched him emerge victorious in his bouts with the populist
chiefs. Trotsky, in spite of his showiness, did not produce a tenth
of his effect and seemed no more than his echo.
In those days Martov also revealed his qualities as an orator.
These are rather singular. He has not a single external oratorical
gift. A completely unimpressive, puny little body, standing if
possible half-turned away from the audience, with stiff mono-
tonous gestures; indistinct diction, a weak and muffled voice,
hoarse in 1917 and still so now; his speech in general far from
smooth, with clipped words and full of pauses; finally, an
abstractness in exposition exhausting to a mass audience. Tens
of thousands of people retain this impression of him. But all this
doesn't prevent him from being a remarkable orator. For a
man's qualities should be judged not by what he does but by
what he may do, and Martov the orator is, of course, capable of
making you forget all his oratorical faults. At some moments he
rises to an extraordinary, breath-taking height. These are either
critical moments, or occasions of special excitement, among a
lively, heckling crowd actively 'participating in the debate'.
Then Martov's speech turns into a dazzling firework display of
images, epithets, and similes; his blows acquire enormous power,
his sarcasms extraordinary sharpness, his improvisations the
quality of a magnificently staged artistic production. In his
memoirs Lunacharsky acknowledges this and says that Martov
354 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
was the incomparable master of the summing up. Anyone who
knew Martov the orator well can confirm this.
In our Paris days I didn't know him personally. Then, in
1904-5, cooped up in the Taganka 1 in Moscow, and carefully
studying Iskra* I perceived other qualities of Martov' s as a
remarkable writer and journalist. Our foreign, illegal, Social-
Democratic press, thought to be beyond the pale of Russian
journalism, introduced a whole group of first-rate writers
Plekhanov, Martov, Trotsky, and perhaps Lenin. All these of
course should stand in the front rank of our journalistic history.
But surely Martov must be given the palm; no one had a pen
like his; no one showed himself so completely its master in the
full meaning of the word. He was capable, when necessary, of
giving his writing the brilliant wit of Plekhanov, the striking
power of Lenin, the elegant finish of Trotsky.
One of Martov's basic traits is effectively illustrated in his
writing. Here, however, it may not appear uniquely excep-
tional; but in any personal encounter with him, whether
private or concerned with public affairs, it leaps to the eye at
once. This trait is a mind of extraordinary power and develop-
ment. In my time I've had the fortune to meet not a few remark-
able contemporaries scientists, artists, and statesmen with
world names. But I have never doubted for a moment that
Martov is the most intelligent man I've ever known.
It used to be said of our ancient magicians that they saw three
yards into the earth beneath you. Martov constantly reminds
you of this. An incomparable political analyst, he has the
capacity of grasping, anticipating, and evaluating the psycho-
logy, train of ideas, and sources of his interlocutor's argumenta-
tion. Hence a conversation with Martov always has a special
character, as with no one else in the world, and always provides
a peculiar enjoyment, however disagreeable the theme, how-
ever sharp at times the disagreement and virulent the re-
criminations. When you talk to him, it does not occur to you
that you won't be understood; you can feel no doubts on this
1 A gaol in Moscow, for both criminal and political offenders. (Ed.)
2 A Social-Democratic paper founded in 1900 by Lenin, Martov, and Potresov,
under the sponsorship of Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Vera Zasulich; after the Social-
Democratic split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903 it was in Menshevik hands
until 1905, when it ceased publication. In 1917 Martov started a bulletin also
called Jskra. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 355
score. Here the slightest hint or gesture is enough to provoke a
response that pierces to the very hub of the question and fore-
stalls any further arguments around its periphery.
Martov is an incomparable political thinker and a remarkable
analyst because of his exceptional intellect. But this intellect
dominates his whole personality to such an extent that an un-
expected conclusion begins to thrust itself on you: Martov owes
not, only his good side to this intellect, but also his bad side,
not only his highly cultivated thinking apparatus but also his
weakness in action.
Of course it's impossible to blame only his omnivorous intel-
lect for his incapacity for practical combat. A lot must be
ascribed to other general qualities. Nevertheless, in speaking of
Martov, it would be perfectly just to develop the theme of Woe
from Wit. 1
First of all, to understand everything is to forgive everything.
And Martov, who always has an exhaustive understanding of
his opponent, is to a substantial degree condemned by virtue of
this very understanding to that mildness and submissiveness to
his ideological adversaries that characterizes him. To a con-
siderable extent it is precisely Martov's breadth of view that ties
his hands in intellectual combat and condemns him to the role
of critic, of perpetual 'Opposition'.
Secondly, it must be said that since the birth of the most
famous of analysts, Prince Hamlet, analysis, as the supreme
quality of a character, is never divorced from Hamletism. That
is, an intellect that dominates everything is a source of softening
of the will and of indecisiveness in action. With Martov, who is a
thinking apparatus par excellence, the centres of restraint are too
strong to allow him the free and reckless acts of combat, the
revolutionary feats that no longer demand the reason, but only
the will.
C I knew,' Trotsky said to me much later, not long before these
lines were written, ( I knew Martov would be destroyed by the
revolution!'
Trotsky expressed himself too one-sidedly. His words actually
mean that in a revolution Martov could not occupy a place
corresponding to his specific weight, for reasons inherent in
1 A famous satirical comedy by Alexander Scrgeyevich Griboyedov (1795-1829).
(Ed.)
356 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
himself. This is not so. Reasons outside himself had much greater
significance. But it is true that Martov's sphere is theory, not
practice. And when this epoch of fabulous exploits, of the
greatest deeds in history began, then this star of the first magni-
tude of the underground period, the equal of Lenin and Trotsky,
was eclipsed by the light even of comparatively minor luminaries
like Dan and Tsereteli. There are a number of reasons for this
as we shall see later on. But again the same paradoxical reason
stands out among them : Martov was too intelligent to be a first-
class revolutionary.
His excessive, all-embracing analytical thinking apparatus
was no help and was sometimes a hindrance in the fire of battle,
amidst the unprecedented play of the elements. And later we
shall see even in my account, the account of a follower and
apprentice to what criminal inactivity Martov was con-
demned more than once by his Hamletism and his ultra-
refined analytical web-spinning at moments demanding action
and aggressiveness. These moments critical moments! will
always remain my bitterest memories of the revolution. For the
consequences of his errors in these critical moments were
enormous, if not for the revolution as a whole, at least for his
party and for himself. l
* * *
The Menshevik Conference had given the victory to the
petty-bourgeois, conciliationist Soviet majority and turned the
Mensheviks into a Government party. But the differences within
the party were too great: the internationalist minority at the
Conference, headed by Martov, stood, so to speak, on the other
side of the barricades, side by side with Lenin's party. The party
split.
This was, to be sure, more de facto than formal, and was seen
principally in the big centres, remaining unknown and obscure
to the many thousands of converts in the remote provinces.
It goes without saying that the Central Committee elected
was conciliationist. Its decisions, however, did not commit
either the party minority or its (two or three) internationalist
members to anything whatever. The extremely influential and
1 After the October Revolution, to which Martov was hostile, he was exiled (in
1921). He was one of the founders of the so-called 'aj International',, and together
with Dan edited the Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik. He died of tuberculosis. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 357
very large Petersburg organization was entirely In the hands of
the internationalist minority, and was sharply hostile to the
Central Committee. The defensist minority in the capital,, loyal
to the Central Committee, was hostile to the Petersburg Com-
mittee and didn't recognize it. In the Soviet fraction the
Internationalists were in a minority and formed a completely
independent group. They always voted with the extreme Left
against Dan and Tsereteli, who led the majority; they intro-
duced their own independent resolutions, sometimes In concert
with the Bolsheviks. And the line of the Soviet struggle the
struggle of the united big and petty bourgeoisie against the
proletariat lay at that time just between the Menshevik
majority and the Menshevik-Internationalists.
The only thing needed for a definitive formal split was the
departure of the Internationalists from the Central Committee
and the formation of an all-Russian Internationalist centre.
Throughout the whole summer there were endless debates in the
Petersburg organization about a definitive split, but fear of the
provinces delayed matters amongst the minority. Aside from
this the minority was, generally speaking, in quite a 'winning 5
position: it lost only from polemical reproaches for its formal
alliance with Tsereteli. But while it retained the possibility of a
struggle c within the party' it really enjoyed at the same time the
most complete freedom of action and didn't submit to any
decision of the majority. The position was, of course, quite false
and ridiculous, but in point of fact it was the majority who
found it intolerable. There were standing discussions amongst
them also, about excluding the Internationalists, but all the
same they weren't excluded.
All this shilly-shallying was unendurably tedious for both
Left and Right. The more resolute Internationalists carried on
an energetic agitation for a split. With Martov's arrival after the
Conference, I was personally convinced that a definitive split
was a question of the immediate future. Martov, however, who
was living with his sister, Dan's wife, although not yielding an
iota of the essence of his internationalist principles, was against
a split. In mild and cautious form, with constant references to
prematurity, he upheld the existing unnatural status. In those
days Dan would say: 'I'm working on defence night and day.
Every night I talk to Martov until four in the morning.'
358 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
A few days after the Conference, foreseeing a definitive split
of the Mensheviks, I finished at last with my 'wild' situation,
that had already dragged on so long, and registered in the
Petersburg organization of the Menshevik-Internationalists.
My party sponsor, who introduced me, was of course Martov.
Thus the Cadets, the SRs, and the official Mensheviks some
from fear, others from conscience, some with sincere feeling,
others with a sourly scornful smile brought their 'confidence
and support 5 to the cradle of the Coalition.
The Menshevik-Internationalists, in view of the particularly
strong desire to emphasize that devotion to the new Govern-
ment was nation-wide, would be disregarded as simply a party
minority. Every family, after all, has its black sheep. . .
Unfortunately, though, there still remained the Bolsheviks.
But these were in the first place also notoriously black sheep, and
secondly, black sheep outside the family, who were not worth
talking about. This was how the faithful Coalition press re-
assured itself in those days, thinking it was brushing aside a
gang of malefactors, and not the immutable course of history. . .
In the Soviet itself and the Ex. Com. things were completely
satisfactory. But beyond their walls the efforts of the Com-
promisers collided with an indifference of the masses that was no
better than downright hostility. Of course, resolutions of con-
fidence were successfully carried even in working-class districts,
but they fairly regularly alternated with enactments of this
kind : c We, tne workers of the Nevka factory, having debated in
general assembly the question of the entry of the Mensheviks and
Populists into the Coalition Cabinet, consider such entry
directly inimical to the international proletarian movement.
We consider that the right method of combating the supply crisis
and of ending the fratricidal war most rapidly is not entry into a
bourgeois imperialist Government, but the transfer of all power
to the Soviet. We demand that the representatives of the demo-
cracy leave the bourgeois Government at once.'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi? 359
Relations within the Soviet and the Ex. Com. were now con-
clusively defined. The Ex. Com. had fallen into sharply hostile
camps which never agreed on anything and one of which dic-
tatorially and mercilessly oppressed the other with all its weight.
And generally speaking in the Soviet at this time all-the Ts had
been dotted in the dictatorship of the conciliationist Menshevik-
SR Praesidium. This merely consummated a process long since
begun. But now, after the Coalition, this process was completed
by a certain formal crystallization of the dictatorship of a
narrow little circle of opportunists.
First of all, the Praesidium of the Soviet, from being an organ
of internal order, as it should have been, was definitely con-
verted into a substitute for the Ex. Com., and began to replace
it in its executive and legislative functions. Proposals to refer to
the Praesidium were very often heard both in trivial and im-
portant matters most of these proposals emanating from the
Praesidium Group itself.
Secondly, the Praesidium Group from now on was concen-
trated into a continuously operative, quasi-official though still
backstage institution, that had been given the name of Star
Chamber. It consisted not only of the members of the Prae-
sidium but also of a kind of camarilla, loyal intimates of
Chkheidze and Tsereteli. At that time I was so far from these
ruling spheres that I never knew exactly, and still don't know
just who was in this Star Chamber. The official members of the
Praesidium themselves, Chkheidze and Skobelev, were of
course in it but more ex qfficio, and they were, of course, not its
controlling personages. Its leading spirit was, of course, Tsere-
teli. Consequently half of the Soviet dictatorship and all the
corresponding honour, and all the odium must be laid to his
account.
But life in the Ex. Com. had not changed. In particular its
whole pre-Coalition organization survived. To be sure, the
Liaison Commission, now permanently transferred to the
Marian Palace, was abolished that is, as far as I recall, it died a
natural death without any special decision.
Of the new members Trotsky used to attend, though not
often. He had joined the Interdistrictites, the autonomous
Bolsheviks; together with Lunacharsky, who had not yet
appeared in the Ex. Com. at all, Trotsky had already begun
360 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
holding numerous meetings and was looking for a literary
organ. In the Ex. Com., against the grey, tedious background,
he did not attract much interest, and he himself showed even
less interest in the central Soviet institution.
At that time I personally avoided making the acquaintance of
Trotsky, for quite specific reasons : Trotsky had many grounds
for entering into more or less close relationship with the Novaya
%hitn> and he himself was counting on this. My getting ac-
quainted with him would indicate an immediate discussion of
this subject. But his contributions might prove quite unsuitable.
Indefinite rumours were circulating about him, while he was
still outside the Bolshevik Party, to the effect that he was "worse
than Lenin'. Before we could discuss the Novaya %hizn this new
star had to be inspected.
This is what the new Government said in its official statement
of May 6th: 'In foreign policy, while rejecting, in accord with
the entire nation, any thought of a separate peace, the Pro-
visional Government openly sets as its goal the attainment of a
general peace, without annexations or indemnities, on the basis
of the self-determination of nations.'
But concretely? Methods? Guarantees?
'The Provisional Government will undertake preparatory
steps towards an agreement with the Allies on the basis of the
statement of March ayth.'
That was all. Even in words, even in naked promises, the
Coalition went no further. Let anyone who can be satisfied by
that.
On the other hand, 'persuaded that a defeat of Russia and her
Allies could not only be a source of the greatest disasters, but
would also make impossible the conclusion of a general peace
on the basis indicated, the Provisional Government firmly
believes that the revolutionary army of Russia will not allow
German troops to destroy our Allies in the west and attack us
with the full force of their arms. The strengthening of the
foundations of the democratic army, and the organization and
strengthening of its fighting force for offensive as well as
defensive operations, will be the chief task of the Provisional
Government.'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 361
This was what the new Cabinet said about the first and basic
point of the immutable, indispensable, and inevitable pro-
gramme of the revolution the question of peace.
Now, in the two capitals and in the provinces, as though at a
signal, there began an orgy of chauvinism and a frenzied war-
dance of journalists and mass-meeting orators demanding an
immediate renewal of the slaughter. The whole of the big press
set up a fiendish howl, playing variations on the patriotic slogan
'Take the offensive! 5 The gallant Allies who had inspired the
campaign helped it not only with gold but with their personal
participation. In huge, specially organized meetings advertised
in the bourgeois yellow press there appeared, together with
Kerensky and various counterfeit 'sailor' adventurers, the
representatives and even ambassadors of the Allies. The agents
of Anglo-French financial interests, Thomas and the newly-
arrived Vandervelde, 1 again began turning up in the Ex. Com.,
demanding blood, and they now entered into more and more
intimate contact with the top leaders of the Soviet majority.
At army Headquarters, at an officers' meeting, Alexeyev, the
Commander-in-Chief, declared the 'Government' formula
'without annexations or indemnities' to be a Utopian phrase
and demanded an offensive for the sake of total victory-
All this began at one stroke on ihe very day the new Cabinet
was formed. And it was all directly connected with this. The
atmosphere had suddenly become imbued with a chauvinism
not hitherto seen in the revolution. Militaristic attacks rained
down from all sides with a long-forgotten effrontery.
On May i4th Kerensky published an Order to the army
concerning an offensive. Properly speaking, it was not quite an
order to attack but only a preliminary official proclamation. . .
'In the name of the salvation of free Russia,' Kerensky said,
'you will go where your commanders and your Government
send you. On your bayonet-points you will be bearing peace,
truth, and justice. You will go forward in serried ranks, kept
firm by the discipline of your duty and your supreme love for
the revolution and your country. . .' The proclamation was
written with verve and breathed sincere 'heroic' emotion.
1 Vandervelde, Emile (1866-1938) : Belgian Socialist leader. (Ed.)
362 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI*J
Kerensky undoubtedly felt himself to be a hero of 1793. And he
was of course equal to the heroes of the great French Revolu-
tion, but not of the Russian.
At this time Kerensky displayed astonishing activity, super-
natural energy, and the greatest enthusiasm. Of course he did
everything within human power. And not for nothing does the
chilly and malevolent historian Miliukov, in whose interests
Kerensky was working at this time, recall, with a shade of
tenderness and gratitude, the 'comely figure of the young man
with a bandaged arm' appearing first at one point then at
another of our limitless front (apparently everywhere at once)
and calling for great sacrifices, demanding that the wayward and
indifferent rabble should pay tribute to the impulses of idealism.
Kerensky, who as Minister of Justice had put on a dark-brown
jacket in place of his sports coat, now changed it for a light-
coloured, elegant, officer's tunic. His hand had been bothering
him nearly all that summer, and in a black sling gave him the
appearance of a wounded hero. I have no idea what was wrong
with Kerensky's hand it was a long time since I had talked
to him. But it is just like this that he is remembered by tens and
hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers from Finland to
the Black Sea, to whom he addressed his fiery speeches.
Everywhere, in the trenches, on ships, at parades, at meetings
at the front, at social gatherings, in theatres, town-halls, Soviets
in Helsingfors, Riga, Dvinsk, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev,
Odessa, Sebastopol he kept speaking about the same thing and
with the same enthusiasm, with sincere and unfeigned emotion.
He spoke of freedom, of the land, of the brotherhood of nations,
and of the imminent glowing future of the country. He called
upon the soldiers and citizens to defend and conquer all this by
force of arms, and show themselves worthy of the great revolu-
tion. And he pointed to himself as a guarantee that the sacrifices
demanded would not be in vain, and that not one drop of free
Russian blood would be shed for other, secondary goals.
Kerensky's agitation was (almost) a complete triumph for
himself. Everywhere he was carried shoulder-high and pelted
with flowers. Everywhere scenes of unprecedented enthusiasm
took place, from the descriptions of which breathed the legen-
dary air of heroic ages. Men flung their Grosses of St. George at
the feet of Kerensky, who was calling on them to die; women
MARTOV AND DAN
SIEGE OF THE TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
in the October Revolution
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION l$lj 363
stripped off their valuables and in Kerensky's name laid them
on the altar of the (for some unknown reason) longed-for
victory. . .
Of course a sizeable portion of all this enthusiasm was
generated by the middle classes, the officers and the philistines.
But even amongst the front-line soldiers, in the very trenches,
Kerensky had an enormous success. Tens and hundreds of
thousands of fighting soldiers, at tremendous meetings, vowed
to go into battle on the word of command and die for 'Land and
Freedom'.
There is no doubt that the army had been roused by the
agitation of this Minister, the 'symbol of the revolution'. The
commanding officers cheered up and said good-bye to Kerensky
with assurances that now the army would justify the hopes of the
country. . ,
By May igth Kerensky had already telegraphed the Premier:
'Report : I have seen situation on south-eastern front and come to
positive conclusions I shall communicate upon arrival. Position
in Sebastopol highly favourable. . .'
There was some 'roughness' too, some of it substantial and
important: we shall speak of it later. But there were also
grounds for Kerensky's positive conclusions. The whole bour-
geoisie had leapt to its feet: the agreeable smell of blood was in
its nostrils again, and once again almost abandoned imperialist
illusions had revived.
The Coalition had grouped itself around the offensive; it re-
garded the offensive as its central task, and it was only in the
organization of the offensive that the new Government mani-
fested itself. What with Kerensky's agitation the situation was
becoming unendurable.
As soon as the new Cabinet's statement was wired to Europe,
a question was asked in the British Parliament on the 'Russian
formula' for peace. Philip Snowden proposed that Russia's
renunciation of annexations and indemnities be welcomed.
Robert Cecil, the Foreign Secretary, replied to this with extreme
disapproval. He called it senseless and misplaced. But he added:
if there were any question of Russia's renouncing its obligations
to the Allies, Great Britain would know what to do.
364 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
The Cadet Rech was, of course, delighted. It had already
drawn the conclusion that the Coalition would never think up
anything beyond the continuation of the policy of Miliukov.
Nor did either Lvov, or Tereshchenko, or Tsereteli, or even
Skobelev, really think up anything more. And every now
and then Tereshchenko gave renewed proof of his fidelity to
Miliukov' s policy. It goes without saying that our whole Diplo-
matic Corps stayed on at their posts, as they had under the Tsar
and Miliukov. Tereshchenko's closest collaborators and advisers
were on the one hand the Star Chamber of the Soviet, and on
the other Rasputin's proteges (almost). And now, against the
background of Kerensky's agitation in the army, Tereshchenko
started direct relations with the Allied Governments. He sent a
wire to Ribot, the French Premier, in which there was not a
word about any peace, or about any requests on the part of the
new Russian Government: nothing but compliments, raptures,
and assurances of unshakeable fidelity to everything as it had
been before.
When Ribot read aloud this wire in the Chambre des Deputes
he aroused the liveliest sensation. He couldn't find appropriate
words to congratulate the Russian Government, 'made up of
prominent, bold and energetic statesmen, but subject to outside
influences'. And Ribot concluded correctly that nothing had
changed for the worse 'Coalitionary' Russia was true to the
Russia of the Tsar and of Miliukov.
The next day a similar scene took place in the British House
of Commons. Questions were put from the Left about the un-
favourable impression made in Russia by Robert Cecil's reaction
to the 'Russian formula' for peace. But this worthy gentleman
explained that (apart from intriguers and anarchists) there had
been no unfavourable impression. Quite the contrary all was
well. . .
All these facts, that deeply discredited the Russian Revolu-
tion, practically liquidated the question it had raised about
peace. They strengthened, of course, not only Allied imperial-
ism, but also that of Austria and Germany, and on the other
hand generated the deepest depression in the advanced pro-
letariat of all countries.
The overt formulation of the old rapacious war programme
of the Entente automatically placed the German command on
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 365
its own kind of 'defensive* positions, reinforced the idea of
'national self-defence' and once again rallied the masses, longing
for peace, around the Kaiser, Ktihlmann, and Hindenburg.
The aggressiveness and chauvinism of the 'great democracies 5
were extremely favourable to the German imperialists, who set
all their hopes on the naked power of arms.
The Austro-German diplomats and military chiefs did not of
course cease to be interested in an 'honourable 5 separate peace
with Russia, nor did they cease to take steps to achieve it steps
that were sometimes quite risky. A German agent, a certain
D. Rizov, Bulgarian Ambassador to Berlin, had the nerve to
write a letter to Gorky proposing that he should become
mediator for a separate peace; he gave humanitarian con-
siderations as his motive. Rizov's letter, with a postscript by
Gorky, was printed in the Novaya %hizn and caused a stupendous
sensation, which fed the whole gutter-press for several days.
A bitter struggle developed in the press. The bourgeois press
examined all the Bolshevik leaders in turn, accusing them of
every possible crime. Every day whole tubs of filth were poured
over Gorky because of Rizov's letter and for other reasons, some
connected with the Novaya %hizn and some not. I personally
became the favourite target of the Reck and was never called
anything but 'dear to the German heart', or 'so highly appre-
ciated by the Germans', I began getting letters almost every
day from the capital, the provinces or the army: some contained
admonitions and jeers, others questions: 'How much did you
get?'
An extraordinary amount was done to inflame the chau-
vinistic atmosphere by the Entente agents who had arrived in
Russia, Thomas, Vandervelde, and Henderson. 1 The first two
were quite familiar to us. We could not say that about Hender-
son at this time, since his policy speech in the Ex. Com. shed
an unexpected light on his one can't say impudence so much
as a unique kind of ndivetL Henderson, calling a spade a spade,
expounded the war programme of British finance including
the liberation of Mesopotamia, Africa, Constantinople, and
1 Socialists who supported the First World War, either participating in their
respective governments or backing them. (Ed.)
366 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Armenia from the German or Turkish yoke. For all these ideal-
istic goals he demanded from the Russian Revolution cannon-
fodder and practical self-immolation. Henderson talked for two
hours, but alas ! he merely confused even the Mamelukes.
At this same time the representatives of still another gallant
Ally, Italy, had appeared in Petersburg. I don't think there
were any Ministers in the delegation, but as Socialists' the
Italian 'patriots' who came, Arturo Labriola, Giovanni Lerda,
Orazio Raimondo, and Innocenzo Cappa, were perhaps even
more dubious than the above-mentioned trio. At the same time
the position of Italy in the World War was the most nakedly
piratical. These gentry, with nothing in their minds but the
badgering of neutral Italy into the war and the struggle against
the honest Italian Socialists, presented themselves to the Ex.
Com. only once and 'hailed' the revolution more in Ministerial
circles, but they did their bit to intensify the chauvinist atmo-
sphere by their interviews and public speeches.
The French Social-patriotic delegates, Cachin, Moutet, and
Lafont, kept the promise they had given the Ex. Com., and
after they got home insisted on the French Social-chauvinist
majority's taking part in the Stockholm Conference. 1 This
resolution was passed by the National Council of the French
Socialist Party. It was based on an effort to confine the mighty
Russian Revolution within definite limits and keep it from any
radical measures and within the sphere of Entente influence.
For this it was essential to meet the Soviet, which controlled the
army, half-way. The honourable Citizen Cachin, agitating
amongst the Socialists, tried to persuade his own ruling bour-
geoisie to get along with the Soviet and refer to it as little as
possible in public as a gang of vagabonds and German agents
which for that matter was quite untrue, since the Soviet was
now headed by quite statesmanlike patriots.
It was the same thing in England. The radical press main-
tained that it would be dangerous for the Allies to forbid the
Stockholm Conference, but the Government decided that it
would nevertheless be better not to let the British Socialists go
to the Conference. There was a united conference of the Inde-
pendent Labour Party and the British Labour Party in Leeds
1 An international conference of Zimmerwaldites scheduled for June 25th, but
never held. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQiy 367
during the last third of May. More than a thousand delegates
backed the 'Russian formula' and decided to take part in the
Conference. This was an impressive force, and it was awkward
for the Government of the 'Great Democracy 5 simply not to
'allow' it, In the face of the aroused proletariat. A slippery path
was chosen. They staged 'workers' demonstrations of protest'
against the trip of MacDonald and other delegates to Petersburg
via Stockholm. The Seamen's Union was induced to refuse to
service the ship In which MacDonald was to travel to Russia.
The trip of the British workers 3 minority was prevented, while
the majority refused of its own accord to take part in an
'International with the Germans'.
It was the same everywhere in Europe. Some parties the
British and French minorities, the German independents, the
Czech, Hungarian, Austrian, and Italian backed the Russian
formula and were ready to go to the Conference, but they were
not allowed to and were attacked in their own countries for their
attitude.
CHAPTER 17
IN THE DEPTHS
*OuR country is definitely turning into some sort of madhouse
with lunatics in command, while people who have not yet lost
their reason huddle fearfully against the walls. 5 (Rech,M.ay i yth.)
*Russia is turning into a Texas, into a country of the Far West.'
(Reck, May soth.)
The bourgeois gutter-press, without respite or repose, in
creative self-forgetfulness and patriotic rapture, played varia-
tions on this theme in all conceivable styles sorrowful,
menacing, and playful. 'Anarchy' in large letters made its
appearance as a standing headline. This press was now filled
with descriptions of every possible excess and disorder. "Arbi-
trary arrests', *lynch-law', 'collapse', 'riots'. The struggle of the
bourgeoisie against the revolution had expanded to its full scope.
There were indeed many excesses, perhaps more than before.
Lynch-law, the destruction of houses and shops, jeering at and
attacks on officers, provincial authorities, or private persons, un-
authorized arrests, seizures, and beatings-up were recorded
every day by tens and hundreds. In the country burnings and
destruction of country-houses became more frequent. The
peasants were beginning to 'regulate' land-tenure according to
their own ideas, forbidding the illegal felling of trees, driving off
the landlords' stock, taking the stocks of grain under their own
control, and refusing to permit them to be taken to stations and
wharves. The terrific destruction of a great lord's estate in the
Mtsensk district caused a special uproar in the first half of May.
Quite a few excesses were also observed amongst the workers
against factory administration, owners, and foremen. But more
than anything else of course it was the unbridled rioting soldiers
who were 'destroying law and order'.
In the idle garrisons of the capital and the provinces, in an
atmosphere of unprecedented freedom, military discipline
naturally collapsed. The iron shackles had weakened. The
ignorant wantonness of the grey mass made itself felt. All
garrison service in the rear became more or less disrupted; there
was almost no training; orders were frequently ignored, sentries
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1 917 369
not stationed. There were masses of deserters both in the rear
and at the front.
The soldiers, without leave, went off home in great floods.
They filled all the trains, hectored the administration, kicked
out the passengers, and threatened the entire transport system
with catastrophe. The deserters were given a period of time to
report back, then this time was extended and reinforced by
threats. The soldiers flowed through the countryside from the
rear and the front, recalling a great migration of peoples. In the
cities they blighted the trams and boulevards, and filled all the
public places. There were reports here and there of drunken-
ness, rowdiness, and disorder.
In Russia generally, under the Coalition, in the summer of
1917, there was very little order. The man in the street, follow-
ing bourgeois initiative, began complaining about it menacingly
and grumbling ill-naturedly about the revolution as such. It was
precisely the fact of the revolution that he held responsible for
our not having any law or stable authority. Once again Miliu-
kov's catchword came to mind : the man in the street is stupid.
The same thing took place amongst the soldiers. There were
not only excesses here, but also a profound process, a shift in
mood, a movement only the blind could fail to notice. . . We
have seen how the minds of the soldiers reflected the problem of
war and peace two months before. The mere notion of peace
would have made them impale 'traitors and openers up of the
front' on their bayonets. I have noted an embryonic shift as
early as a month after the revolution, around the time of Lenin's
arrival. Now, two months and a bit later, against the back-
ground of the Coalition, the soldiers 3 temper began turning into
its opposite.
This process was obscured in the eyes of the Soviet leaders by
the fact that the mass of the Petersburg soldiery was in this
respect far behind the provinces. In the Soviet the soldiers as
before were in an extremely patriotic mood (they were, by the
way, better protected than any of the others against despatch to
the front). But in Moscow and the provinces this upheaval in
the minds of the soldiers gradually made its presence felt. As
early as May gth Thomas met with a petty unpleasantness in the
Moscow Soviet: he was publicly told in the name of the
soldiers that our army was tired and wanted peace; that there
370 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1QIJ
was no party in Russia for a separate peace, but if the war was
going to drag on it was impossible to vouch for the con-
sequences. Thomas 'experienced an uncomfortable impression 5 .
But with Kerensky these little unpleasantnesses went still
further. While agitating at the front he began meeting with
argumentative resistance from the soldiers. It's true that these
were isolated cases, and that the impression was smoothed over
at once by patriotic enthusiasm. But after all the surroundings
were also exceptionally unfavourable for any argument against
an offensive. In the last week of May, in the loyal Twelfth Army,
Kerensky came across a minor scandal. Under the pretext of
asking a question, a soldier declared the Government ought to
conclude peace very soon. Kerensky interrupted the soldier
with a thunderous exclamation of 'Coward !' and ordered him to
be dismissed from the army. The regimental commander, how-
ever, asked permission to dismiss, together with the unsuccessful
debater, several others who 'dishonoured the whole regiment'
with these same thoughts on war and peace.
Once at the end of May, from the balcony of the Novaya hizn,
looking out on the Nevsky, we watched a strange demonstra-
tion. Its beginning and end were lost in the distance; the demon-
stration stretched for practically two-thirds of a mile. Rows of
elderly men were moving along in vaguely military uniforms.
They were walking slackly with their heads bowed, in an un-
usually deep, glum silence. They had no banners, but wretched
little signs with inscriptions: 'The land has no one to work it!'
'Our land isn't sown!' 'We can't get bread for the workers!'
'Our families are starving on the land!' 'Let the young men
fight!'. . .
These were soldiers over forty years old. For a long time they
had been demanding to be demobilized, with no success. And
now this morose demonstration, organized by no one knew
whom, showed they were beginning to lose patience. . . The
'over-forties' were on their way to the Marian Palace. There
Minister of Agriculture Chernov, closest to their hearts, was
ordered out to them. He made them a long, flowery speech
promising something and nothing at the same time. The over-
forties dispersed unsatisfied and definitely resentful.
The war was becoming more and more intolerable. The
elemental forces against war, against support of it and against
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQl^
Its entire organization, were accumulating drop by drop and day
by day.
* * *
The names of Lenin and his companions-in-arms, daily
spattered with filth, were still heard with hatred and suspicion
by the ignorant masses. At an Officers' Congress on May 20th
his arrest was demanded; it was said that otherwise the people
would kill him. But that same day Lenin appeared at the
Peasant Congress. Generally speaking Lenin held himself aloof
in those days, like some great noble. He was never seen either
at Soviet sessions or in the lobbies ; as before he was staying
somewhere Underground 5 , in intimate party circles. Whenever
he appeared at a meeting he would ask for the floor out of turn,
upsetting the agenda. An attempt of this kind a few days before
at the Peasant Congress, as though he were a Minister, had failed,
and he had to leave : it was against his principles to wait for the
floor. But now, on the soth, with the absorbed interest of the
Peasant Congress, Lenin developed his programme of 'direct
action 5 , his tactics of land seizure regardless of the legally-
appointed limits. It would seem that Lenin had landed not
merely in a camp of bitter enemies, but you might say in the
very jaws of the crocodile. The little muzhiks listened attentively
and probably not without sympathy. But they dared not show
it. . .
Around this time we in the Ex. Com. once heard that Lenin
was making a speech to the Soldiers 5 Section in the White Hall.
This was the most faithful support Chaikovsky 1 and Tsereteli
had the Praetorian Guard of the Coalition. Lenin was not
likely to get on well. I hurried over. He had already been on the
platform a long time and was making the same speech as at the
Peasants' Congress. I sat down in about the seventh row, in the
heart of the soldier audience. The soldiers were listening with
the greatest interest as Lenin berated the Coalition's agrarian
policy and proposed that they should settle the matter on their
own authority, without any Constituent Assembly. . . But the
speaker was soon interrupted by the chair: his time was up.
1 Chaikovsky, Nikolai Vasilyevich (1850-1926): prominent in Go-operative
movement. After the October Revolution he joined the 'White reaction' against
Bolshevism. (Ed.)
372 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
Some arguing began about whether to allow Lenin to continue
his speech. The Praesidium evidently didn't want to, but the
assembly had nothing against it. Lenin, bored, was standing on
the platform wiping his bald spot with a handkerchief; recog-
nising me from a distance he nodded to me gaily. I heard
comments around me: 'Talks sense, hey? Hey?' one soldier said
to the other.
By a majority vote the assembly ordered that Lenin be allowed
to finish speaking. The ice was broken: Lenin and his principles
had begun penetrating even the nucleus of the Praetorians.
Trotsky and Lunacharsky were not of course members of the
Bolshevik Party at that time, but these first-class orators had
already succeeded in the course of two or three weeks in
becoming most popular agitators. Their successes began, per-
haps, in Kronstadt, where they very often played guest roles.
By the middle of May, Kerensky, who was preparing the offen-
sive, already figured in Kronstadt under the epithets : 'Socialist-
plunderer and blood-drinker*.
The 'Bolshevik question' was coming to the surface as the
current problem of state, though the Soviet leaders in the
Tauride Palace were calmer about it than anyone else. Tsereteli
himself was blind as an owl in the dazzling light of the revolu-
tion, and he blinkered his neighbours' eyes too. In the Tauride
Palace the Soviet leaders, yawning, repeated endless platitudes
about how they personally were shaping the country's fate and
saving the revolution in the name of the < whole democracy'.
Meanwhile the facts spoke more and more eloquently for
themselves. If in the Soldiers' Section they were still no more
than listening to Lenin with sympathy, in some regiments of the
capital, recently loyal to Rodzianko, they were solidly obeying
the Bolsheviks. In particular, Lenin already had the allegiance
of the ist Machine-Gun Regiment, where a certain 2nd Lieut.
Semashko was active. At the end of May, when the latter was
accidentally arrested, the entire Machine-Gun Regiment turned
out in full formation, freed Semashko, and carried him shoulder-
high out of the Commandant's headquarters. Here already was
military power in the hands of the Bolshevik Central Committee.
But of course it was first and foremost the Petersburg pro-
letariat that rallied to the banner of Bolshevism.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I Q I *J 373
On May 3Oth a conference of the Factory Committees of the
capital and its suburbs opened in the White Hall. The Con-
ference grew up from the bottom; it was planned in the factories
without the participation either of the official organs of labour
or of the Soviet institutions. It was initiated and organized by
the Bolshevik Party, which was making an appeal to the masses
directly, and quasi-directly, obliquely, to the Soviet. It was
inspired by Lenin, and carried out primarily by Zinoviev.
Unlike the Workers' Section of the Soviet, whose composition
was changed, not very quickly, by a series of partial elections,
the members of the Factory Committee Conference had just
been elected en bloc and reflected with precision the real physiog-
nomy of the Petersburg proletariat. The Conference really
represented it, and workers from the bench in great numbers
took an active part in its labours. For two days this workers'
parliament debated the economic crisis and the ruin through-
out the country. And of course it combined economics with
politics. The Government Mensheviks, and also a few Inter-
nationalists, sponsored the organization of economy by the
State ignoring the question of just which State. But the Bol-
sheviks, Lenin and Zinoviev, with the support of the worker
speakers, now for the first time developed their slogan of
* workers 9 control'.
When the vote was taken, 335 of the 421 workers voted for the
Bolsheviks. The victory of Bolshevism was complete. In con-
clusion the Conference of the Factory Committees resolved to
'organize in Petersburg an all-city centre of the representatives
of all factory committees and trade unions; this centre must
play the leading role in the realization of all measures indicated
above (control et aL] within Petersburg'.
This centre, which fell completely into the hands of the
Bolsheviks, was naturally bound to become from now on alto-
gether the most authoritative centre for the Petersburg pro-
letariat. It was bound to supplant the conciliationist Soviet. If
this didn't happen it was for only one reason: the Soviet
Workers' Section both in Petersburg and Moscow was day
by day irresistibly filling up with Bolsheviks. They still had no
majority, and it was impossible to say when they would have.
But it would come, and in the not too distant future there
could be no doubt of that.
374 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
Meanwhile Kerensky was harvesting laurels in Moscow.
Crowds thronged into the streets he passed through. Flowers
were showered on his car. Standing up in it Kerensky hailed 'the
people 3 . He was at the peak of his popularity. He was a hero and
object of adoration for philistines and nondescripts. Meanwhile
Lenin with a firm tread was striding on and on, strengthening
each step with the steel of proletarian ranks and anchoring
himself in the sole unshakeable basis of the revolution.
One fine day during the last week of May I heard that three
generals of the revolution wanted to have a talk with the
editorial board of the Novqya %hizn about their more intimate
association with it. These were the three non-party Bolsheviks,
Trotsky, Lunacharsky, and Ryazanov. Lunacharsky and I had
had a rather intensive correspondence during the period of the
Sovremennik) for which he did a good deal of writing. I knew him
of course as a most talented writer, of great culture and many-
sided gifts. I naturally not only valued his contributions, but
actively sought him out, and in spite of the dubiousness of the
Sovremennik with respect to fees, so necessary to an Emigre,
Lunacharsky gladly responded to my suggestions. Without
any prompting from me he often sent me agreeable notes,
such as an expression of sympathy for my activity in Russia
during the war years. Accordingly I not only had a high
regard for him but also felt myself drawn to him before seeing
him.
After he arrived in Russia on May gth, together with Martov,
he at once, and quite naturally, came to the Novaya %hizn. There
we became personally acquainted and quite soon intimate. He
didn't appear immediately in the Ex. Com. and didn't come
often: he was not yet in Lenin's party and had a rather c soft'
disposition; we still felt ourselves to be comrades-in-arms in
politics as well as literary collaborators.
But we also became rather close friends on purely personal
grounds. You might say I spent almost aU my unoccupied time
with Lunacharsky. He often spent days and nights with us in the
Letopis, where my wife and I had a pied-a-terre. Sometimes at
night he would come to see me at the printer's, to have a little
more talk and look at the next day's edition. And when we were
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 375
detained In the Tauride Palace we used to spend the night at
Manukhin's and again talk away endlessly.
We discussed everything: regardless of the theme, Luna-
charsky's talk, stories, and repartee were interesting, clear and
picturesque, just as he himself was interesting and brilliant,
glittering with every hue and attractive through his culture and
the astonishing inborn talent that permeated him from head to
foot.
I remember hearing a woman I knew, who didn't know
Lunacharsky, tell of her trip home from some boring meeting.
Sitting opposite her in the train Lunacharsky, also on his way
back from the same place, was telling his neighbour about the
meeting. Though the meeting had bored her to death the entire
evening, it now, as reported by Lunacharsky, flashed and
glittered, adorned with colours whose existence had not been
suspected by the average person there. Lunacharsky's account of
it was more interesting than the reality itself. Lunacharsky was
like that always and in everything.
The great people of the revolution both his comrades and
his opponents almost always spoke of Lunacharsky with
sneers, irony, or scorn. Though a most popular personality and
Minister, he was kept away from high policy: 'I have no
influence,' he once told me himself.
In a word suum cuique. Lunacharsky is not one of those who
can create an era or an epoch. The lot of Lenin and Trotsky is
not for him. In general his historical role in world events is com-
paratively small. But it is small only in comparison with these
cosmic titans. After them, of course, for a long, long, long time
there is nothing. Then it is no longer individuals that are
visible, but groups, constellations. Among these Lunacharsky of
course is one of the first. But that is his historical role; for bril-
liance of talent, to say nothing of culture, he has no equal in the
constellation of the Bolshevik leaders.
It is said that when he became a Minister Lunacharsky more
quickly and completely than others acquired a ministerial
manner, with its negative qualities. I don't know. After the
October Revolution I completely broke with him, unlike what
happened with many others. For two and a half years, down
to this very moment, I've only had a few fleeting encounters
with him, and not very agreeable ones at that. He really took a
376 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy
ministerial air with me. But I don't know how much he was to
blame for all this, and I know very well how much I was, with
my rather disagreeable character. My continual polemics were
really bitter and unendurable, when we ceased to be com-
panions-in-arms and became political enemies.
We shall have to deal further on with the little human foibles
of this most important figure of the revolution, and with some of
his blunders, that everyone, small and great, thought ridiculous.
But these spots on the sun cannot in any way obscure for me,
now an alien, indifferent, and polemically disposed man, either
the brilliance of this remarkable figure or the attractive personal
qualities of the man with whom I spent the summer of 1917.
In order that the editorial staff might all be present, the
conference was arranged for the evening of May 25th in the
Novaya ^hi^n printing-house. I don't remember that the con-
versation was particularly interesting. I was silent, busy with an
article, and the conversation was almost over when I spoke, and
I daresay definitely turned the tide against any editorial
alliance. The talk had been chiefly about the most immediate
political perspectives and the fate of the Coalition. I said that
however negative my feelings towards it, as shown by daily
articles, I didn't think it right to hasten its liquidation and the
transfer of all power to the Socialists : it was obvious that the
country and the democracy had still not digested the idea of a
Socialist Government, while the Coalition in any case would
collapse very shortly without any urging, through the spon-
taneous course of events. In general, I said, with respect to high
policy I was closer to Martov than to Trotsky.
Trotsky spoke last and briefly; everything was clear for him.
For his part he sharply dissociated himself from Martov, who
'while in the Opposition was only on the side of the defensists',
and he considered the position of the Novaya ZJtizfl to be really
an approach to Martov, but not to 'revolutionary Socialism 5 .
Trotsky finished with some rather remarkable words, which
made a strong impression on me, and which I remember more
or less as follows :
'Now I see there is nothing left for me to do but found a
newspaper together with Lenin.'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 377
Afterwards, almost three years later, just a short while before
I wrote these lines, Trotsky corrected the wording. 1
'Not "nothing is left for me to do"/ he answered when I gave
him my account of this episode, 'but "it remains for me and
Lenin to make our own newspaper".'
Trotsky explained that he and Lenin had agreed beforehand
to make an attempt to 'conquer' the Novqya %hizn, and in case
of failure to create their own organ jointly. Of course I won't
dispute this. . .
But at that time Lenin and Trotsky did not create their joint
organ. Soon after this, to be sure, Lunacharsky started telling
me about projects for a big newspaper with Bolshevik editors
(the trio of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev) and Interdistrictites
(Trotsky and Lunacharsky). But no such newspaper saw the
light. Instead Trotsky and the Interdistrictites founded a little
magazine Vperyod (Forward), where he worked independently
of Lenin. This made a very small audience for Trotsky and was
rather thankless work for him.
I think we left the Novaya %hizn, conference without any
special regrets, at least on our side. Only Steklov, on his way to
the composing-room with me, expressed his chagrin at the
results of the talk. 'We've lost some useful collaborators/ he said.
But the question had nothing to do with acquiring new
collaborators. Lunacharsky went on working on the paper on
the old arrangement, together with many other Bolsheviks. But
Trotsky we never saw inside our walls again.
1 Trotsky corrects it still further in his own version of all this, given in Appendix
III, Volume I of his History of the Russian Revolution. (Ed.)
CHAPTER 18
THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN
CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
THIS was properly not the first, but the second Soviet Congress.
The first one assembled, as we know, at the end of March. This
March Congress, which was very far from dull, had been a
sufficiently full and authoritative exposition of the contemporary
moods of the democracy. But at that time these moods had still
been wavering, whereas now the course was quite definite
towards an unrestricted capitulation to the bourgeoisie. There
was absolutely no question but that the Compromisers and the
Praetorians of the Coalition would have a decided advantage at
the Congress. If only for this reason it was impossible to expect
anything decisive from the forthcoming Congress, or any change
in direction. All its activities would be reduced to 'support'
of the Government and a struggle against the Left 'irresponsible'
minority. Nevertheless the Congress was of enormous interest
as a large-scale review of the forces of the revolution.
The general physiognomy of the Congress and its results were
clear in advance, but the review of the revolutionary forces
might come out in various ways, depending on the specific
weight of the Opposition. The SRs were assured of a majority,
but the eyes of all the thinking elements of the Tauride Palace
were fixed on the Bolshevik and Menshevik-Internationalist
fractions. It was plainly an absorbing question, what Bolshevism
had done in the provinces.
For me, however, another question was just as interesting;
what would be the situation within the Menshevik Party?;
how many would be Right and how many Left? ; what section of
the Menshevik Swamp would join Martov's independent inter-
nationalist fraction and take the chance of splitting from the
conciliationist majority?
Alas! the reality disappointed even the pessimists. Out of 777
delegates definitely committed to a party, 105 proved to be
Bolsheviks. But with the Mensheviks the position was quite
unexpected: the Internationalists among them didn't even
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 379
number thirty-five ; all the rest were the troops of Tsereteli and
Tereshchenko. It was a stunning and bitter outrage. The whole
Menshevik-Internationalist fraction, headed by Martov and the
group that had come with him from abroad, together with those
present in an advisory capacity, didn't even amount to one-sixth
of all the Mensheviks.
Besides this there was at the Congress the fraction of the
'United Internationalists', which Steklov was trying to turn into
a party and which the Interdistrictites led by Lunacharsky and
Trotsky had joined. But this fraction didn't have more than
from thirty-five to forty people either.
* * *
The SRs had just concluded their third All-Russian Party
Conference, which had produced absolutely nothing new or
interesting. At the Soviet Congress these same SRs proved a
decisive force. They did not have an absolute majority, but
together with the Right Mensheviks they made up five-sixths
of the Congress. The Opposition fractions, taken together,
including delegates without votes, did not amount to more than
150-160; while in the voting not more than 120-125 hands were
raised against the ruling bloc. They formed a narrow strip ex-
tending from the left side of the chairman's platform along the
wall and not going further than the middle of the hall. Looking
at it from the platform itself, this strip was divided from the re-
maining mass by its external appearance also : it wore almost
exclusively civilian clothes, and especially workmeris jackets.
The remaining mass was almost all military. There were Veal'
soldiers, peasants; but there were more mobilized intellectuals.
There were more than a hundred junior officers, who still repre-
sented a great part of the army in the field. And what figures
they cut! It goes without saying that they were all 'Socialists'.
It was absolutely impossible to represent the masses or appeal to
them without this label. But judging by their sympathies, and by
quite intangible factors, it was not only the secret Cadets,
Octobrists, and anti-Semites that had joined the SRs or Men-
sheviks; there were also people there known to be liberal, and
even not very liberal lawyers, physicians, teachers, landowners,
and government officials, in the guise of 'populists' or 'Marxists'.
380 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
The Congress opened on June 3rd at 7 In the evening. On
the following day the question of the relationship to the Pro-
visional Government was taken up. The debate went on for
five whole days.
With complete naivete Lieber and Tsereteli sang the praises of
the Coalition Government, the 'all-national' Government of all
the living forces, all the responsible elements of society, the only
one possible, which had completely justified itself. This blind
and vulgar bragging about the Coalition's counter-revolu-
tionary policy did not, of course, nauseate only the Bolsheviks.
But there was nothing either novel or interesting here.
The novelty and interest began when Lenin himself spoke in
rebuttal, having left his underground cave for the light of day.
In unaccustomed surroundings, face to face with his ferocious
enemies, surrounded by a hostile crowd that looked on him as a
wild beast Lenin clearly felt himself insignificant and had no
special success. In addition, the cruel fifteen minutes allotted to
a fraction speaker weighed on him. But Lenin wouldn't have
been allowed to speak at all except for the enormous curiosity
every one of the provincial Mamelukes felt for this notorious
figure. His speech was not very well arranged and had no
central pivot, but it contained some remarkable passages for
whose sake it must be recalled.
In it Lenin gave his own solution of the question of the
Government, and also a general 'schematic' outline of the pro-
gramme and tactics of this Government. Hear ye! Hear ye!
'The citizen Minister of Posts and Telegraphs', said Lenin,
'has declared that there is no political party in Russia that
would agree to take the entire power on itself. I answer: There
is. No party can refuse to do this, all parties are contending and
must contend for the power, and our party will not refuse it.
It is ready at any moment to take over the Government*
This was novel, interesting, and very important. This was
Lenin's first open statement of what the slogan 'All Power to the
Soviets* meant in his mouth. Lenin's proletarian party was
struggling for the entire power. The other aspect of the matter
was that Lenin was ready to accept all power at any moment,
that is, when his party was known to be in a minority. This was
no less interesting and important.
In general this fragment of Lenin's speech is unusually rich in
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi? 381
content; it comprises a complete political system that now re-
placed, developed, and interpreted Lenin's original schema of
April. At that time the Bolshevik leader had enjoined his party
to learn how to be in the minority, to have patience, to win
over the Soviets, to get majorities in them and transfer all power
to them. Now Lenin, without patience, without having got a
majority or won over the Soviets, was demanding all power
against their will, and a dictatorship for his own party alone.
It's possible that in the recesses of Lenin's mind there had
never been any other interpretation of the original April slogans,
and that only now for the first time he thought it appropriate to
proclaim them.
And now what would Lenin have done if at any moment he
had found himself in power?
'The first step we should take if we had the power would be to
arrest the biggest capitalists and smash their intrigues. Without
that all the phrases about peace without annexations and
indemnities are the emptiest of words. Our second step would
be to announce to the nations, independently of their Govern-
ments, that we hold all capitalists to be plunderers, both
Tereshchenko, who is not one whit better than Miliukov, just
slightly more stupid, and the French capitalists, and the British,
and all of them. . .'
Lenin didn't enumerate any further steps, being distracted by
random ideas. He simply said further that a Bolshevik Govern-
ment would come forward with a proposal for a general peace.
But the first and the second steps in any case were enough to
make the entire hall gasp at the unexpectedness and absurdity
of such a programme. Not that the prospect of arresting a
hundred of the biggest capitalists definitely displeased the
majority of the respected gathering: let's not forget that very
many of the then Mensheviks were future 'Communists', nor
that nearly a majority of the peasant SRs became Left SRs in the
near future. Arresting capitalists that was very pleasant, and as
for calling them plunderers quite right.
Aside from junior officers, liberal lawyers, and similar people,
the class instinct of the workers* and peasants' section of the
meeting may even have been on Lenin's side, though prejudice
prevented their displaying this while their most authoritative
leaders lingered in the embraces of these same capitalists. But as
382 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQiy
a programme for a future Government, both of Lenin's 'steps' were
really absurd, and didn't seem the least bit attractive even to the
tiny Left sector, where both the faces and the talk reflected an
absolutely unambiguous bafflement at Lenin's speech.
At the end of this session 1 remember meeting Trotsky on the
stairs; as usual he had been 'with the masses' and had come after
the fair. He stopped me with 'Well, what's happening there?
Debates interesting? Have I missed much?'
"Nothing/ I said ; 'Lunacharsky was best of all; he was really
wonderful.'
'Yes?' Trotsky's eyes flashed with satisfaction. Lunacharsky,
after all, was the second biggest star in the tiny Interdistrict
group.
Peshekhonov, the Minister of Supply, was another of the
Socialist Ministers who spoke at the Congress; unlike the others,
however, he didn't touch on high policy in his speech, which was
entirely devoted to supply. Here is his philosophy of the supply
problem.
'The productivity of the working class understandably fell
after the revolution; . . . the scope of its demands is far more
than normal. With the raising of wages the value of money falls,
the cost of commodities goes up, and the situation must again be
ameliorated by raising wages. But after all, a time will come
when that will be impossible. The whole difficulty lies, not in over-
coming the resistance of the bourgeoisie, which gives way in everything,
but in winning over the toiling masses, who must be summoned to the
most exacting labour and the indispensable sacrifices. If we succeed in
overcoming these psychological difficulties of the masses, and
drawing them after us, then we shall solve our problems.'
That's what Peshekhonov said. One scarcely knows what to
be more amazed at this 'Socialist Minister's* theoretical inno-
cence or his political cynicism. No one, however, noticed any of
this in his speech, while Trotsky, who succeeded him, spoke as
follows:
*I have listened to Peshekhonov's speech with enormous
interest, since it's always possible to learn from one's theoretical
opponents. What should come next is the collaboration of the
Ministers of Labour and Industry, but Konovalov has left, after
sabotaging the organization of industry. For three weeks a re-
placement has been looked for, but can't be found. Put twelve
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 383
Peshekhonovs in power, and that would already be an enormous
step forward. Find another Peshekhonov to replace Konovalov.
'You see that I'm not proceeding from fractional considera-
tions, but only from the point of view of efficiency. The working
class must know that its own Government is at the top, and it
will not try to snatch crumbs for itself but will deal with the
Government considerately. We are not undermining your
regime, but are working to prepare tomorrow for you. We say
that your policies of procrastination may sap the foundations of
the Constituent Assembly. We criticize you because together
with you we suffer from the same pains.'
In this speech Trotsky called the Coalition Government an
Arbitration Court. But he himself spoke at the Congress as a
kind of arbitrator.
I remember very much later, when Trotsky, after reading the
first part of these Notes of mine, made fun of me :
'You had conversations with Kerensky!' he exclaimed, sar-
castically histrionic. 'You tried to "persuade" him, the known
creature of the bourgeoisie, the representative of an enemy class.
Well, don't tell me you're not a ^emstvo liberal! Only one path
is permissible for a revolutionary: to go to his own class and call
on it to fight!'
In his speech about the Government at the first Congress
Trotsky did not, as we see, follow these sage principles. On the
contrary, he generously lavished the most opportunistic,
emstvo-liberal 'persuasions' on the servants of the bourgeoisie.
In the Ex. Com. I too had recommended putting some Peshe-
khonov or other (or still better a Socialist without quotation
marks) in place of Konovalov a fortnight before this. But for
me such a Peshekhonov was only an unavoidable element, the
extreme Right wing of a democratic Government, and in my
eyes a dozen Peshekhonovs could never be the workers' 'own'
Government.
From my point of view the Government that succeeded the
Coalition would be a Government of the worker-peasant bloc,
where the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the Peshe-
khonovs, Chernovs, and Tseretelis, would be allied with the real
leaders of the proletariat, with Lenin, Martov, and Trotsky.
Even though the former would be in a majority, and would
tend as before to a 'procrastinating' bourgeois policy, still the
384 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1*/
proletariat, to make up for that, would be the master of the
revolution. The right course of events would be ensured by such
a regime, and only by such a regime.
In any case the above-quoted excerpt from Trotsky's speech
would seem to indicate very clearly that in spite of Lenin
Trotsky did not put the question of the Bolshevik seizure of
power on the order of the day. By Tower to the Soviets' he
would really seem to have meant just that. There are no signs
here of any seizure of power by the minority of the Petersburg
proletariat. In what sense are Trotsky's words to the Novaya
%hizn to be understood, that from then on his path lay solely
with Lenin? Hadn't I made a thoughtless mistake that time,,
when the three generals swooped down on our paper, in refusing
an alliance with Lunacharsky and Trotsky? 1
The concluding act of the Congress was to create a new pleni-
potentiary Soviet organ, in place of the former Petersburg
Ex. Com. The body it set up was called the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies (the Central Ex. Com.). It was to consist of 300 mem-
bers, of whom half were to be elected by the Congress from any-
one it liked of the c most worthy'. One hundred members had
to be local provincial workers: they were supposed to return
home or to specially designated points at once to carry on their
work as plenipotentiaries of the Central Soviet organ. The
remaining fifty people were to be taken from the Petersburg
Ex. Com.
The Central Ex. Corn., minus its 100 provincial members,
was to be permanently active with 200, while on special
occasions it was supposed to convoke an emergency plenum.
This was most convenient for the ruling clique : any decision it
liked could be declared so important or so controversial that
it would have to be shelved 'until the plenum of the Central
Ex. Com.'
The Central Ex. Com. membership included, of course, both
Kerensky and Lenin. But they never came once. In general a
good half was made up of dead souls, who scarcely ever appeared
1 For Trotsky's comments on this see Appendix III to Volume I of his History
of the Russian Revolution. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 385
in the Soviet centre. No importance was ascribed to it, and it
was not taken seriously; no one felt that this body could have
any effect on the destinies of the revolution.
Having left in its place its plenipotentiary organ to guard the
revolution, the Congress had finished its programme. It quietly
closed on June 24th, after working for three weeks and a few
days.
CHAPTER 19
THE COALITION SPLITS
UNDER STRESS
ALL over the country disorders, anarchy, seizures, violence, and
'republics' still continued; people took the law into their own
hands, soldiers mutinied, and regiments disbanded.
In Petersburg, among other things, the anarchists were in-
tensifying their 'activity 5 . They had a territorial base on the
Vyborg Side, in the distant and secluded villa of the former
Tsarist Minister Durnovo. They had seized this villa long before
and held it firmly. This anarchist nest enjoyed an enviable
reputation in the capital as a sort of Brocken, where the powers
of evil assembled, witches' Sabbaths were held, and there were
orgies, plots, dark and sinister and doubtless bloody doings. Of
course no one doubted that Durnovo's mysterious villa was
stocked with bombs and all sorts of weapons. The official and
Soviet authorities understandably looked askance at this in-
decent spot in the heart of the very capital, but without
sufficient courage, they waited for an excuse and meanwhile
were patient.
The anarchists had recently begun to find not a few supporters
amongst the working-class masses densely settled throughout
the Vyborg Side. At the same time they began to undertake
offensive operations. Up to then in Petersburg they had tried to
seize only dwelling-houses, from which they were quickly
evicted. But on June 5th they decided to make an attempt to set
up an anarchist regime in some industrial enterprise. For this
experiment they chose the magnificent printing-plant of the
muddle-headed yellow paper Russkqya Volya (Russian Freedom) .
About seventy armed men appeared at the printing-plant,
occupied all the entrances and exits, and told the local workers
that from now on the plant was theirs. The workers, however,
were not sufficiently sympathetic, and the authorities, in the
person of some Ex. Com. members, turned up at the spot of the
anarchist revolution.
The anarchists arrested the management, dismissed the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 387
workers, and refused to leave the plant. While negotiations were
going on they printed their own proclamation, in which they
declared they were killing two birds: liquidating a vulgar news-
paper and giving its own property back to the people. An
enormous excited mob collected around the building. Two
companies of soldiers were sent; they occupied the adjacent
street and didn't know what else to do.
Then the matter came, not very appropriately, before the
Soviet Congress itself. The Congress immediately passed an
emergency resolution condemning the seizure and suggesting
the evacuation of the occupied premises. That evening the
anarchists 'surrendered' under the double pressure of the Con-
gress and a passive siege. A few dozen men were disarmed,
arrested, and brought to the Military Academy, where they
were kept under guard. The next day the Reck flew into a rage :
why had the prisoners been brought to the Congress? Surely
there were more suitable premises? Weren't there any lawful
authorities, a lawful court and justice? But these were all empty
questions.
In any case, after this the legal authorities decided to act. On
June 7th the Minister of Justice prepared to evict the Anarchist-
Communists from the Durnovo villa. They were given twenty-
four hours' notice.
On the morning of June 8th twenty-eight factories on the
Vyborg Side came out on strike, and crowds, processions, and
armed workers' detachments began moving towards the Dur-
novo villa. An enormous mass-meeting formed, and delegates
were sent to the Ex. Com. to ask it to take steps against the
eviction and secure to the 'toiling people' the possession of the
villa. The Ex. Com. met the delegation quite coldly. Then
another delegation was sent from the Durnovo villa, this time
with a declaration that the anarchists would defend the villa
themselves, if necessary by force of arms.
This might not have been an empty threat : the Vyborg Side
was in the right mood and had enough arms. Then the Ex.
Com. once again referred the question to the Congress.
Meanwhile the direct executor of the sentence, the Procurator
Bessarabov, arrived at the Durnovo villa. He got into the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
building without much difficulty and found an unexpected
sight. He discovered nothing either dreadful or mysterious : the
rooms were in perfect order; there was nothing dilapidated or
broken, and the only disorder was that a great number of chairs
and arm-chairs had been put into the largest room and
destroyed the harmony of the ministerial background by their
heterogeneous appearance: the room was meant for lectures and
meetings.
The crowd showed no aggressiveness, giving the Procurator
another surprise. The Durnovo villa, empty and deserted, really
had been occupied by the Anarchist-Communists; but now
there were all kinds of organizations there that had nothing to
do with the anarchists: a bakers 3 trade union, a People's Militia
organization, etc. They had nowhere else to go. The villa's
enormous garden, always thronged with children, served as a
resting-place for the whole workers 3 district nearby. All this
explained a good deal of the popularity of the Durnovo villa on
the Vyborg Side.
So the 'legal authorities' had to go back on their word, ex-
plaining that the Minister's decision did not concern either the
garden or any organization except the anarchists, amongst whom
lurked 'criminal elements'. The authorities also muttered some-
thing about provocation by irresponsible people, who were
exciting the workers and attempting to force the authorities to
shed blood. But for the time being it was best to smooth over the
affair. These problematic criminal elements were obviously not
worth a wave of strikes and excitement in the capital.
But the affair was already being aired in the supreme organ
of the whole democracy. Through the efforts of the zealous ser-
vant of 'the legal authorities', the All-Russian Congress again
interrupted its labours to turn to police functions.
The hue and cry was raised. As usual it had by no means the
results counted on by the sage politicians of the petty-bourgeois
majority. The anarchists did not submit but stayed on at the
villa; and amongst the Petersburg proletariat the police exploits
of the 'Congress of the whole democracy' of course had a de-
pressing effect. In the eyes of the workers the Soviet majority
and its leaders were changing hourly from a theoretical
adversary into a class enemy. Lenin was reaping a rich harvest.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 389
The Bolshevik Central Committee controlled most of the
Workers' Section in the Soviet, as well as the majority of the
Petersburg proletariat. In addition, the organizations closest to
the workers the Factory Committees were now united in a
single centre, completely forgotten by the official Soviet and
fully in the power of the Bolsheviks. They acted as feelers among
all the working class of the capital.
But from one hour to the next a similar situation was being
produced amongst the troops of the Petersburg garrison. For
some time now the Bolshevik Military Organization had been
successfully operating under the careful supervision of Lenin
himself. This organ did not restrict itself to propaganda and
agitation: it had managed to spread a fairly good organiza-
tional network over both capital and provinces, as well as at the
front. It had also made a good many converts amongst junior
officers. And in Petersburg, in addition to the ist Machine-
Gun Regiment, the Bolsheviks now had others too : the Moscow,
the Grenadiers, the ist Reserve, the Pavlovsky, the Michael
Artillery School with its big guns, and others. There were also
Bolshevik organizations in the other regiments. If these were as a
whole against Lenin, they were not for Chernov-Tsereteli, and
even less for the Provisional Government. They were 'for the
Soviet' in general. There's no doubt of this.
In any case the Petersburg garrison was no longer fighting
material. It was not a garrison but half-disintegrated military
cadres. And in so far as they were not actively for the Bol-
sheviks, they were with the exception of two or three regi-
ments indifferent, neutral, and useless for active operations
either on the foreign or on the domestic front.
The ruling Soviet bloc had already let the masses of the soldiers
slip through its fingers : the Bolsheviks had taken a strong hold on
some sections and were hourly penetrating deeper into the others.
And now things began to happen. . . At the evening session
of the Congress on the gth Chkheidze took the floor for an
emergency statement. He said big demonstrations were
scheduled in Petersburg for the next day, Saturday June loth;
the Congress might have to sit all night; if it didn't take the
right steps the next day would be fatal.
390 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
Chkheidze's statement, though not quite clear, was extremely
impressive, and aroused the greatest excitement amongst the
delegates. There was a great hubbub, exclamations, questions
from the floor. Everyone demanded information about exactly
what had happened. To calm the delegates and give them
information privately an adjournment had to be announced.
The delegates separated into fractions and groups, and this is
what they found out about the situation in the capital.
The disturbances on the Vyborg Side had not subsided since
the day before. And indeed these disturbances had not begun
the day before, with the eviction of the anarchists: they were
tied up with the general dissatisfaction of the workers and their
distressing condition. For some days now obscure rumours had
been going around the city about some sort of 'demonstrations'
by the Petersburg workers against the Government and its
supporters. Now the unrest had seized all the working-class
parts of the capital, and especially Basil Island, where the
Congress was in session. And in the Durnovo villa there sat a
special assembly of workers' delegates, which had announced an
armed demonstration against the Provisional Government for
the next day. Kronstadt had also sent representatives to this
meeting.
But it goes without saying that matters were not restricted to
the kindling of the workers' elemental instincts. Without the
interference of solid workers' centres the situation could not
have become so acute at this moment.
And the Bolsheviks, of course, were such a centre. On June gth
proclamations signed by the Bolshevik Central Committee and
the Central Bureau of the Factory Committees were pasted up
in the working-class districts. These proclamations summoned
the Petersburg proletariat to a peaceful demonstration against
the counter-revolution at 2 o'clock on June loth.
This proclamation was very important. It won't hurt to
become familiar with it. First, in powerful fighting language it
gave an acute and accurate description of the general state of
affairs and of the Coalition Government. Then, referring to the
rights of free citizens, it called for a protest against the policy of
the Coalition. The slogans of the demonstrations were these:
'Down with the Tsarist Duma !' 'Down with the Ten Minister-
Capitalists!' 'All Power to the All-Russian Soviet of Workers',
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies! 5 'Long Live the Control and
Organization of Industry P 'End the War ! 5 'Neither a Separate
Peace with Wilhelm nor Secret Treaties with the French and
British Capitalists! 5 'Bread, Peace, Freedom! 5
I don't know whether the proclamation was in the hands of
the Congress delegates on the gth. But in any case, it was known
to them that the ist Machine-Gun Regiment, the Izmailovsky,
and some others had decided to take part in the demonstration.
Consequently, the demonstration proved in fact to be armed.
This naturally heightened the excitement.
It must be said, however, that the bulk of the delegates were
wrought up largely through the efforts of the Praesidium, the
ruling circles, and their hangers-on in the capital. These circles
had really fallen into a panic and tried to infect the Congress
with it, but they lacked enough facts. News came to the Star
Chamber that the demonstration was supposedly known to be
armed. Then there were obscure rumours about some special
plans of the Bolsheviks. The main source of this information was
said to be Lieber. But nothing at all definite was known. Mean-
while a pacific demonstration by no means seemed such a dread-
ful thing to the mass of delegates. All Russia, after all, was con-
stantly demonstrating in those days. The provinces had all
become accustomed to street demonstrations. And in Peters-
burg too, in those same days, the c over-forties' and the women
were demonstrating in general everyone was demonstrating
who wasn't too lazy! No permission was required. Up to then
the Soviet hadn't stopped anyone (aside from some special
cases in April) and any group could come out into the street and
'enjoy the rights of free citizens'.
The cause of the alarm amongst the leaders was not entirely
clear to the mass of delegates. Those who were not particularly
timid soon expressed their dissatisfaction: the All-Russian
Congress had not met to deal with one local affair after
another; if any disorders were being prepared it was up to
the local Petersburg Soviet, not to the Congress, to prevent
them.
And, of course, this was an elementary truth. Between the
masses in the capital and Soviet circles there was not only no
ideological contact or organic ties, there were no relations at all.
The Ex. Com., quietly expiring in the Tauride Palace, was
392 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij
absolutely impotent. And it was appealing to the Congress as
the last resort.
For its part the 'legal Government' , on the evening of the gth,
was taking steps. It 'enjoined calm on the populace', and pro-
mised to 'suppress 5 any attempts at violence with all the strength
of the State.
This, of course, was all nonsense. They had no strength. But
patrols were driving about the city, showing the state of alarm
in the capital.
At the same time it was asserted that it was not only a question
of the Bolsheviks, but that monarchist elements were also pre-
paring to 'come out' simultaneously. 'Rumours' kept coming
from all sides. The delegates, wandering about the rooms and
corridors, were excited and worn out in the heated atmosphere.
The Congress met again in the Military Academy at 12.30
a.m. The Bolshevik fraction showed some confusion. It was
evidently rather at sea about the affairs of the capital and of its
own leaders. And the leaders were absent. Lenin, Zinoviev and
Kamenev were busy with important matters elsewhere. Trotsky
was also absent. Krylenko 1 was on the platform of the Praesi-
dium for the Bolshevik fraction, and the Interdistrictite Luna-
charsky was acting on its behalf.
The Chairman proposed to create a bureau for resolute action
against any who declared war on the Congress. Lunacharsky
entered it, but he said he would leave if it started a direct
struggle. He added that the Bolsheviks had empowered him to
emphasize the pacific character of the proposed demonstration.
Krylenko for his part protested against the actions of the
Congress : why was it carrying out its decisions without entering
into negotiations with the Bolsheviks, who would gladly meet it
half-way?
Kerensky said unequivocally: 'The rumours about troops
drawn into Petersburg from the front, to fight against the
workers, are completely false. There is not a single soldier in
Petersburg who does not belong to the garrison of the capital.
1 Krylenko, Nikolai Vasilyevich (1885-1937); leader in the student movement
(1905-08). Repeatedly arrested; after the October Revolution, in which he played
an active part, became People's Minister of Justice, and then State's Attorney.
Was Prosecutor at many state trials, including the 1931 Trial of the Mensheviks.
Vanished in 1937. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 393
The troops, on my orders, are moving and will move only from
the rear to the front, to fight against the foreign enemies of the
revolution. But the other way round, from the front to the
rear, to fight against the workers never!'
Splendid. We'll keep that in mind. . . Martov also spoke,
against the disorganizing activities of the Bolsheviks, but ex-
horting the Congress to calm and sang-froid.
Then, of course, a new proclamation to the soldiers and
workers was passed, followed by an appeal that no one should
go to the demonstration the next day and by a ban on street
meetings and processions for the next three days.
This did not finish the work of the Congress on the eve of
June loth. The delegates were divided up among the Peters-
burg districts and sent out to the factories, regiments, and com-
panies to prevent the demonstration. The delegates worked all
night. It was agreed to meet at the Tauride Palace at 8 o'clock
that morning for an accounting. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon a
meeting was also scheduled there for all battalion committees
of the capital garrison on the question of armed troop
demonstrations.
But it will be asked what the chief heroes of the day and the
authors of the turmoil were doing at this time. To summon a
pacific demonstration with any slogans they liked was their
inalienable right. But for some hours now the sharply negative
will of the Congress and of the Soviet majority concerning their
enterprise had been absolutely clear.
Now, how were the Bolsheviks reacting to this? The activity
of the Bolshevik centres was of course cloaked in deep secrecy.
No one knew anything of what Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and
Stalin, who had been hiding away from the Congress some-
where, were doing or thinking. And, by the way, where was
Trotsky, who two days before had been calling for twelve
Peshekhonovs, and now had also vanished from the Congress to
avoid taking a stand on the question of the demonstration? None
of them, of course, was sleeping that night. But Catiline did not
report his machinations to Cicero.
Early next morning the Congress delegates learned of some
of the results of the nocturnal labours of the Bolshevik leaders.
394 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi*/
Krylenko had obviously known what he was saying that night
at the Congress: the Bolsheviks really came half-way to meet the
ruling Soviet majority. That night their Central Committee
cancelled the demonstration.
At 9 o'clock in the morning of June loth, the delegates who
had spent the night among the Petersburg masses began
crowding into the Tauride Palace : a conference opened in the
White Hall. The first part, dealing with 'principles', was brief
but extremely typical. Lunacharsky reported the cancellation
of the demonstration and told the history of the whole affair.
The demonstration had actually been Initiated at the Durnovo
villa, where a self-appointed committee representing ninety
factories was in session. As for the Bolsheviks, they were against
it, and in any case today there wouldn't be one. The incident
was liquidated; now they ought to put a stop to the inter-party
quarrel, forgetting the mistakes of the past for the sake of the
tasks ahead.
Lunacharsky's information was clearly not authentic. The
Bolshevik centre had made no bones about leading him astray.
But his conclusions were not only honest and humanly sensible
but also the only correct ones politically. However, he was
immediately attacked by Dan not for his information, but
precisely for his conclusions.
'After everything that's happened unctuousness Is out of
place, 5 declared the venerable member of the Star Chamber.
'Once for all we have to finish with a situation in which such
unexpected complications are possible. There must be a careful
investigation to show who is to blame. . .'
Dan's speech was drowned in applause. Lunacharsky tried to
explain again that it was not a question of who was responsible,
nor of the Bolsheviks, pursuit of whom would simply exacerbate
the situation. The most profound discontent among the workers
had been aroused by general causes, which ought to be paid
attention to.
Summed up before us in a nutshell were the classic inter-
relationships between the Government and the Opposition, or
between a rootless dictatorship and the champions of demo-
cracy. The situation was acute; but for the blind rulers there
was no doubt of the correctness of their path to the truth and no
obstacles except malefactors.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 395
Trotsky was now there too. He was vigorously urged to the
platform, but he held his tongue and didn't go. Why?
The second, informational part of this conference was equally
interesting. The delegates who had spent the night among the
Petersburg masses reported on the situation in the regiments and
factories. These reports seemed to leave no doubt that the
Coalition's cause could not be improved by looking for the
malefactors or taking reprisals against them. About fifteen
speakers succeeded one another on the platform supporters of
the Coalition and of the ruling Soviet bloc. They all said
roughly the same thing:
The delegates were met everywhere with extreme unfriend-
liness and allowed to pass only after lengthy disputes. On the
Vyborg Side there was nothing but Bolsheviks and Anarchists.
Neither the Congress nor the Petersburg Soviet had the slightest
authority. They were spoken of just like the Provisional Govern-
ment: the Menshevik-SR majority had sold itself to the bour-
geoisie and the imperialists ; the Provisional Government was a
counter-revolutionary gang. In particular people at the Durnovo
villa had declared that the decision of the Congress didn't mean
anything and that the demonstration would take place. On
Basil Island it was the same thing. 'Demonstrating' was ex-
tremely popular amongst the workers, and held out the only
real hopes for a change. Among the regiments the Congress was
proclaimed a gang of landlords and capitalists, or their hire-
lings; the liquidation of the Coalition Government was con-
sidered urgent. Only the Bolsheviks were trusted, and whether
the demonstration took place or not depended solely on the
Bolshevik Central Committee, The Socialist Ministers were
sneered at as traitors and hirelings.
There was hardly any information of a different character;
one or two exceptions served to confirm the rule. In any case the
delegates' impressions boiled down to this: there was no
possibility of holding back the working-class masses; if the
demonstration were prevented today, it was inevitable to-
morrow; there could be no contact, reconciliation, or agreement
between the working class of the capital and the ruling Soviet
bloc.
The foundation of the Coalition was splitting at every seam.
396 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
Nevertheless June loth passed without any demonstrations.
In the course of the day the Ex. Com. and the Star Chamber
received a whole series of reassuring reports. In many factories
and military units resolution against the scheduled demonstra-
tion were passed- There were even a few reluctant expressions of
loyalty to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
The spirits of the Star Chamber went up. It evidently took
the exceptions to be the rule, and the military organizations for
the masses of the soldiers, while the Socialist Ministers laid con-
fidence in the Congress to their own account, that is, the account
of the entire Coalition.
But did the Soviet leaders pull themselves up? Did they think
of taking advantage of the breathing-spell to change the Coali-
tion policy and proceed resolutely towards the fulfilment of a
programme of peace, bread, and land?
Alas! The wisdom of the Star Chamber was accessible to only
one kind of measure. Having overcome their panic and plucked
up their courage, the Menshevik-SR leaders flung themselves
into an offensive against the Bolsheviks.
On Sunday June nth, around 5 in the afternoon, in one
of the classrooms of the Military Academy, a closed joint
session of the highest Soviet Institutions, the Ex. Com., the
Praesidlum of the Congress, and the Bureau of each of its
fractions, was called. In all about 100 people were there, in-
cluding the majority of the Soviet party leaders. Trotsky was
there too; I don't remember Zinoviev, but Lenin of course was
absent.
It will be remembered that the object of the meeting was
known only to the intimates of the Star Chamber. But the
atmosphere was extremely tense and saturated with passion.
There was no longer merely excitement here, but also bitter
hatred. It was obvious that the ruling clique was preparing some
surprise.
At the chairman's table, the teacher's desk, sat Chkheidze; he
announced that the question of the demonstration that hadn't
taken place the day before would be debated. Some of his
intimates, or simply pushful people, were sitting on primitive
benches or standing around the chairman, in an untidy-looking
fashion. The others, distributed at the pupils' desks, were wait-
ing in concentrated silence to see what would happen.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQiy 397
It seemed that a 'Special Commission' had been formed to pre-
pare this conference. Dan spoke in its name.
'The Bolshevik action/ he said, 'was a political adventure. In
future, demonstrations of individual parties ought to be per-
mitted only with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet.
Military units as such may take part only in demonstrations
arranged by the Soviets. Parties which do not submit to these
requirements ought to be excluded from the Soviets.'
The point of all this was elementary. In the Soviets the
Bolsheviks were in a minority; by introducing a licensing system
for demonstrations the 'Special Commission 5 was putting Bol-
sheviks in the power of the Mensheviks and SRs and practically
depriving them of the right to demonstrate. This was done
to stop the Bolshevik criminals from using the right of demon-
stration for uprisings like the one in April, or for any other
schemes against the ruling bloc. It was actually a special decree
directed against the Bolsheviks.
The wisdom of the Star Chamber was incapable of devising
anything more for the salvation of the revolution. But Dan had
forgotten Camille Desnioulins's winged words : A decree cannot
prevent the seizure of the Bastille. If it was a question of an up-
rising, then good God ! how comical it was to try to fight it with
a decree, even a special one.
But Dan also forgot something else, no less vital. As ironical
exclamations, protests, sarcasms and laughter began in the hall,
a very Right-wing Menshevik, the worker Bulkin, reminded him
of this elementary fact. He said that times change, and today's
majority might turn out to be tomorrow's minority. It might
turn out that it was preparing to repress itself and introducing
into revolutionary practice methods of political struggle that
would result badly for their initiators.
This, of course, was the sacred truth, but still not all: the
transformation of the majority into a minority and vice versa was
not only possible; it was inevitable in the very near future. And
for those who knew the Bolsheviks -as well as Dan and his com-
rades knew them, one would think it must have been clear that
in the event of a real victory of Lenin the ruling bloc would not
have too good a time of it. . . But nothing was clear to the
Menshevik-SR leaders. They were blind as owls at high noon.
The conference wanted to hear the Bolsheviks themselves.
398 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
Kamenev responded. He tried to be calm, sober, and ironical
under the gaze of a majority filled with hatred and contempt.
He even tried to take the offensive. What in reality was all
the fuss about? A pacific demonstration had been scheduled,
which flowed out of the right of the revolution and had never
been forbidden before by anyone. Then the demonstration had
been cancelled, simply because the Congress wished it. Where,
in all this, was there even the shadow of illegality in the first
place, or disloyalty in the second?
I think Kamenev's argument was completely clear and con-
vincing. It evidently appeared incontestable to a very great
many. But for some reason his irony was unsuccessful. One
would have thought he knew how to be in the minority and was
used to glances of hatred, but he was strangely pale and agitated,
and his state of mind was communicated to the whole group of
Bolsheviks.
Kamenev was asked a series of questions. But Tsereteli leaped
up and demanded that the questioning should cease : it was not
a matter of details, and the entire problem required to be stated
quite differently. Tsereteli was just as pale as Kamenev, and,
agitated as never before, was hopping violently from one foot to
the other. He was plainly preparing to say something really out
of the ordinary.
And as a matter of fact it was already out of the ordinary for
Tsereteli to speak against Dan in public: in the 'Special Com-
mission 5 he had evidently been in the minority and was now
appealing to the meeting. Dan's resolution was of no use at all;
Tsereteli waved a contemptuous hand at it. What was needed
now was something else, also very much out of the ordinary.
'What has happened', he cried, the vein on his temple swell-
ing up., 'is nothing but a plot against the revolution, a conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government and the seizure of power
by the Bolsheviks, who know that they can never get this power
in any other way. The conspiracy was rendered harmless when
we discovered it. But it may be repeated tomorrow. They say
that counter-revolution has lifted its head. That's not true.
Counter-revolution has not raised its head, but lowered it.
Counter-revolution can penetrate to us only through one door:
through the Bolsheviks. What the Bolsheviks are doing now is
no longer ideological propaganda, it is a plot. The weapon of
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 399
criticism is being replaced by criticism with weapons. Let the
Bolsheviks accuse us as they will, now we shall go over to other
methods of struggle. Those revolutionaries who cannot worthily
wield their arms must have those arms taken away. The
Bolsheviks must be disarmed. We will not permit any con-
spiracies. . , 5
Tsereteli sat down, A tempest swept over the meeting com-
plete consternation. Some were overwhelmed by the extra-
ordinary content of Tsereteli's words, others by their strange-
ness and lack of clarity. The Opposition demanded an explana-
tion. Kamenev cried out: c Mr. Minister, if you're not talking
wildly don't confine yourself to words, arrest me and try me for
plotting against the revolution!'
Tsereteli was silent. The handful of Bolsheviks all noisily got
to their feet and left the hall protesting. . .
But even without the Bolsheviks there was still someone left to
pick a bone with Tsereteli. The Interdistrictite Trotsky re-
mained in the hall. Martov asked for the floor at once. But even
amongst the majority the mood was far from favourable to
Minister Tsereteli. Some officer, completely shaken up by
what had happened, let out hysterical shrieks. A general attack
was launched on two fronts: both against the Bolsheviks and
against Tsereteli.
First of all what special information had Mr. Minister in
fact? If definite information of an attempt at a coup d'tiat exists
then communicate it. If not, don't draw these conclusions.
Then, what do you mean by conspiracy? Is it the malevolence
of a clique towards the Provisional Government and the existing
order? In your blindness you can think as you please, but to
anyone with eyes it's obvious that we are faced by a vast popular
movement, that this can only be a question of an uprising on the
part of the proletarian and soldier masses of the capital, and
that no repressing of cliques or even of parties can help. What is
needed here is a change of regime, martial law and an iron hand
with the workers. The only logical thing now is a bourgeois
dictatorship, and the end of the revolution.
Tsereteli proposed 'disarming the Bolsheviks*. What did that
actually mean? Removing some special arsenal that the Bol-
shevik Central Committee possessed? Nonsense the Bol-
sheviks, after all, had no special stores of arms : all arms were in
400 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
the hands of the soldiers and workers, the great mass of whom
followed the Bolsheviks. Disarming the Bolsheviks could only
mean disarming the proletariat. More than that, it meant the
troops. This was not only bourgeois dictatorship, but also
childish nonsense. Perhaps it meant setting brother against
brother in the workers' camp, dividing the proletariat into
white and black, handing out arms according to party labels-
or perhaps creating special cadres of Praetorians for Tsereteli
and Tereshchenko?
Well, all right. Let us grant that this is a splendid programme.
But the question arises how to realise it. Was Tsereteli going to
take arms away from the proletarian-soldier masses with his own
hand, to throw them at Tereshchenko's feet? 'We shall go over
to other methods.' But how?
In Petersburg there were of course very many workers and
even more soldiers who would not take part in a Bolshevik
conspiracy, or overthrow the Coalition by armed force. But
where was there even a shadow of reason to think that with these
arms they would advance against their comrades, the soldiers
and workers of the neighbouring factories and regiments?
It was even plainer that the Bolshevik workers and units would
not willingly hand over the rifles given them by the revolution.
They could be disarmed only by force, which didn't exist,
Mr. Minister's programme was a Utopia.
In the course of the debate Martov recalled Cavour's remark
that any donkey could govern by means of a state of siege.
That's how the Bolsheviks governed later on. Alas! It would
have been beyond Tsereteli's capacity even with the help of a
siege.
I don't remember all the course of this 'historic' meeting. But
in any case it should not be thought that the Minister of Posts
and Telegraphs was left without support. Still in the same taut
atmosphere, saturated with passions, there came to his aid the
sworn Bolshevik-eater, the rabid Lieber, on the point of burst-
ing. He was undoubtedly the principal source of information
concerning the conspiracy. I have no idea where he got his
information, or just what he'd heard. But here at the meeting, in
any case, he had no more to tell than Tsereteli. His support
didn't consist of any new information but in deepening the
statesmanlike wisdom of his leader. Raising two fingers, he fell
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 40!
on the Bolsheviks with the ferocity of a famished beast, in a sort
of sensual ecstasy. Hopping on the tips of his toes, shrilling away
and working on the nerves of his audience, he frenziedly de-
manded the most 'decisive measures' the repression, eradica-
tion, and punishment of all the disobedient workers with all the
means at the State's disposal.
Suddenly, from the bench where Martov was sitting, there
was heard the word 'Merzavets!' [scoundrel].
The hall gasped and then froze, and so did the chairman and
the speaker himself. The atmosphere was incandescent, this
kind of 'exchange of ideas' in the revolution was still un-
heard of.
Later it appeared that the epithet Martov had hurled at
Lieber was not 'merzavets' but 'versalets' [i.e., Versaillean] . It
was not a term of abuse, but a description. And an absolutely
accurate one.
The debates lasted many hours, to the point of total exhaus-
tion. But the results were not clear. The meeting was interrupted
and not re-opened until night. The passage of Dan's resolution
was secured, but Tsereteli refused to be reconciled and insisted
on the acceptance of other, non-verbal measures. He fought
with characteristic energy, one might say desperately. Un-
ceremoniously abusing his ministerial position he was con-
tinually taking the floor out of order. Finally I could no longer
endure it and shouted at him some phrase like the one flung by
Louvet at Danton, when the latter began to speak without the
Chairman's permission: 'You are not yet king, Danton!'
Tsereteli was silent for a few seconds, shuffling from one foot to
the other, not knowing how to express his contempt, then he
snapped, shrugging his shoulders, 'I'm not speaking to the
SukhanovsP
Nevertheless he failed to convince the others either. I don't
recall exactly how the meeting ended, at early dawn: but the
fact is that in general it agreed with the majority of the Star
Chamber and not with its extremist leader.
At the end of the June isth session Bogdanov took the floor
for an emergency resolution in the name of the Praesidium. His
resolution was interesting; I later learned that Dan had
4O2 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1 917
originated it. It was proposed to organize an 'official Soviet'
workers' and peasants' peaceful demonstration the following
Sunday, June i8th, in Petersburg, and in other cities as far as
possible. At this tense moment of internal struggle in the Soviet
it ought to illustrate the unity of the democracy and its strength
in the face of the common enemy. The slogans of this demonstra-
tion ought to be only those common to all Soviet parties. In the
opinion of those proposing the resolution these slogans were: the
unification of the democracy around the Soviets, peace without
annexations or indemnities, and the earliest convocation of the
Constituent Assembly.
The idea of this demonstration revealed the triumph of a
softer line within the Star Chamber with respect to the Bol-
sheviks. In any case the June i8th demonstration was the tribute
of vice to virtue. The resolution was, of course, passed in the
absence of the Bolsheviks. It goes without saying that the
Bolsheviks had no grounds for objection either. Let us see what
came of it.
* * *
At that time, in the summer of 1917, the truth about the
abortive demonstration of June loth seemed to be exactly what
I have described in the preceding pages. But now, just three
years later, I can add the following. What the Bolsheviks said at
meetings, and what Pravda printed, was in any case not the
entire truth about the demonstration. A few people 'instinctively'
divined the real truth, but nobody knew it except a dozen or so
Bolsheviks. I personally learned it very much later, not before
1920.
There was no real conspiracy. Neither strategic dispositions nor
plans for the occupation of the city and its individual points and
institutions were worked out. Nor on the other hand do I think
the political intentions of the insurgents were any more de-
veloped. Nevertheless the smoke was not without fire.
It is essential to understand clearly that a Bolshevik 'plot' or
uprising, if it had taken place at that time, would have had an
irrefragable logic. What objective goal could it have had? Of its
negative aspect there could be no doubt the Coalition must be
annihilated, a thing which could not have been easier in itself.
But from a positive point of view? This was verbally ex-
pressed by the words: 'All Power to the Soviets'. But the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 403
Soviets, after all, were all at hand, In the form of the Congress.
They stood for the Coalition and were categorically refusing
power. To force power on them against their will was im-
possible. An uprising might have pushed them into taking power,
but it was more likely that it would have rallied Soviet-bour-
geois elements against the Bolsheviks and their slogans. In any
case it was obvious that if an uprising were to be started it would
have to be started not only against the bourgeoisie, but also
against the Soviet democracy, embodied in the Congress that was its
highest authority. The Petersburg proletariat and the Bolshevik
regiments, as the minority that began it all, with their slogan of
'All Power to the Soviets', would have had to advance against
the Soviets and the Congress. That meant that with the
liquidation of the Provisional Government, the power could
have passed only to the Bolshevik Central Committee, that had
initiated the uprising.
But the Bolsheviks had not begun an uprising aimed directly
at this goal. The dense smoke that went on curling around us
for a long time after June loth came from a little fire burning
around Lenin in the conspiratorial chambers of the Bolshevik
Central Committee. This was the situation: Lenin's group was
not directly aiming at the seizure of power, but it was ready to
seize it in favourable circumstances, which it was taking steps to create.
Speaking concretely, the target of the demonstration
scheduled for June loth was the Marian Palace, the residency
of the Provisional Government. That was where the working-
class detachments and the regiments loyal to the Bolsheviks
were to make their way. Specially appointed individuals were to
express 'popular discontent' while the Ministers were speaking,
and work the masses up. When that mood was at the right
temperature the Provisional Government were to be arrested on
the spot. The capital, of course, was expected to react to this
at once, and the Bolshevik Central Committee, under that or
another name, depending on the character of the reaction, was
to declare itself in power. If in the course of the 'demonstration'
the mood was sufficiently favourable and the resistance of Lvov-
Tsereteli was not great, that resistance was to be crushed by the
force of Bolshevik regiments and arms.
According to the data of the Bolshevik 'Military Organiza-
tion', it was assumed that action against the Bolsheviks would be
404 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
taken by these regiments : the Semyonovsky, the Preobrazhen-
sky, the gth Cavalry Reserve, the two Cossack regiments, and
of course the military cadets. The Bolshevik centres regarded
the four Imperial Regiments of Guards the Izmailovsky, the
Petrogradsky, the Cuxholm, and the Lithuanian as wavering
and doubtful. The Volhynian Regiment also looked unreliable.
But in any case these regiments were considered not an active
hostile force but merely neutral. It was thought they wouldn't
come out either for or against a revolt. The Finnish Regiment,
which not long before had been the chattel of non-Bolshevik
internationalists, ought to observe at least a benevolent neutrality.
The Armoured Division, an extremely important part of the
garrison and a first-class factor in an uprising, was in those days
evenly divided between Lenin and Tsereteli; but if the matter
was decided by a majority of its personnel then the workshops
definitely gave Lenin the advantage.
As for the regiments that were completely loyal to the
Bolsheviks, and ready to serve as an active force in the revolt,
they were the following: the ist and 2nd Machine-Gun Regi-
ments, the Moscow, the Grenadiers, the ist Reserve, the
Pavlovsky, the iSoth (which had a substantial number of
Bolshevik officers), the garrison of the Peter-Paul Fortress, and
rank-and-file of the Michael Artillery School, which had the
artillery. It must be remarked that all these units were located on
the Petersburg and the Vyborg Sides, around the Bolshevik
centre, Kshesinskaya's house. In addition, active support for the
uprising ought to come from the suburbs: first, Kronstadt;
then Peterhof, where the 3rd Army Reserve Regiment, which
the Bolsheviks controlled, was stationed, and Krasnoe Selo,
with the i yGth Regiment, where the Interdistrictites were
firmly established. If necessary these units could have been
summoned to Petersburg at once.
All these 'insurrectionary' regiments, taken together, were to
crush the resistance of the Soviet-Coalition armed forces,
terrorize the Nevsky Prospect and the lower middle classes of
the capital, and serve as the real support of a new Government.
The above-mentioned leader of the ist Machine-Gun Regi-
ment, 2nd Lieutenant Semashko, was appointed commander-in-
chief of all the armed forces of the c insurrectionaries'.
On the military-technical side the success of the revolt was
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQiy 405
practically assured. In this respect the Bolshevik organization
was already competent even then.
In the political core of the 'uprising 9 , the Central Committee,
the matter was put, as we have seen, conditionally, optionally.
The revolt and the seizure of power ought to be accomplished,
given a favourable conjuncture of circumstances. Here there
was embodied in action what Lenin had said at the Congress
three days before: that the Bolshevik Party was ready to take power
into its hands alone at any moment. But readiness to take power into
one's hands means only a mood, a political attitude. It still does
not mean a definite intention to take power at a given moment.
The Bolshevik Central Committee could not make up its mind
to put the question in that way. It had simply decided to create
conditions favourable to a violent reversal of the situation. And
this excellently reflected its vacillations during those days. It
was willing, but hesitant. It was both ready, and not ready; it
could and it could not.
The waverings of the Bolshevik Central Committee reflected
the position of its individual members, the focal personalities of
the Bolshevism of the time. It is understandable that the more
their temperament and will to action dominated their common
sense the less they wavered. Stalin, supported by Stasova and
also by all those who, while not in central positions, were in the
know, and thought that a whiff of powder would not pollute
the revolutionary atmosphere, stood inexorably for the over-
throw of the Government. Lenin occupied an intermediate, most
unstable and opportunistic position the same as the official
position of the Central Committee. Kamenev, of course, and
I think Zinoviev, were against the seizure of power. Of this pair
of cronies one soit dit had been a Menshevik and the other, in
addition to his great abilities, possessed the well-known qualities
of the cat and the rabbit. I don't know who else of the Bolshevik
leaders determined the fate of the overturn at that time.
On the night of the gth, when c the conspiracy was dis-
covered 5 , the persons mentioned, in accordance with the plan
they had adopted, were discussing the question of cancelling the
demonstration. Stalin was against cancellation; he thought that
the opposition of the Congress by no means altered the objective
conjuncture, and that Cicero was to be expected to 'forbid'
Catiline to act. From his point of view Stalin was right. On the
406 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
other hand, the 'cronies', of course, stood for submission to the
Congress and for cancelling the demonstration. But it was
naturally Lenin who decided the matter. In his opportunistic
mood he was given a push and indecisively held back. The
'demonstration' was called off.
What was the Interdistrictite Trotsky's role in all this busi-
ness? I don't know anything about it. Two or three days before
the 'demonstration' Lenin had said publicly that he was ready to
take the whole power into his own hands, but Trotsky said at the
same time that he wanted to see twelve Peshekhonovs in power.
There's a difference there. Nevertheless I think Trotsky was
attracted to the affair of June loth. I have no other grounds for
this than some features of his behaviour: while they may be in-
sufficient to characterize his attitude they show very clearly that
he was informed, and also that Lenin even then was not inclined
to enter a decisive battle without this dubious Interdistrictite.
For Trotsky, like Lenin, was a monumental partner in the
monumental game, and in Lenin's own party, after himself,
there was nothing for a very, very, very long time.
Such was the June loth affair, one of the most significant
episodes of the revolution. 1
It was 'favourably' liquidated by the Star Chamber with the
help of the Congress and the Petersburg Soviet. But obviously
this changed nothing in the general political conjuncture. The
leaders didn't recover their sight, the rulers did not change, the
temper of the masses remained as before. The capital was
plainly living on a volcano. The Government was 'ruling' in the
Marian Palace; the Congress and its sections were carrying on
'organic labours' in the Military Academy. All this, however,
could hide the real perspective only from the most case-
hardened philistines, while the essence of the situation lay in
this, that now, in the cracks that had split the democracy
asunder, the shadow of the barricades could be most distinctly
seen.
Passions went on seething in the Military Academy. Both sides
were preparing for a review of strength in the official Soviet
demonstration of June i8th.
1 Trotsky has some special comments on this episode in Appendix III to Vol. I of
his History. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 407
Around this time Dr. Manukhin turned up in the Military
Academy, and sought me out among the throng on urgent
business.
Manukhin, as a trustworthy and well-known figure, was the
prison physician at the Peter-Paul Fortress. There had already
been a number of instances where Manukhin, recognizing that
conditions in the Fortress were deadly for the prisoners, had
demanded the transfer of some of them to other places of deten-
tion. Now he was demanding that Vyrubova, the Tsarina's
famous lady-in-waiting, be transferred from the Peter-Paul.
The Procurator had agreed and made all the necessary arrange-
ments, but the Fortress garrison had said that regardless of what
the practice in the past had been, in the future it would not
allow any of the Tsar's servants to be transferred from the
Fortress : it didn't trust the Government and didn't see any other
guarantees that justice would be done on its hangmen than
keeping them in the Fortress, guarded by its own bayonets.
This was a sign of the times, a product of the decay of the
Coalition.
The agitated Manukhin hastily explained to me why emer-
gency measures were necessary. A mood was finally becoming
defined in the garrison in favour of dealing with the prisoners
arbitrarily. A kind of plot had been discovered, of which the
first victim was to be Vyrubova. Only that night a number of
the sentries' revolvers had been missed. A massacre was hourly
to be expected.
Manukhin heatedly insisted that I go off with him to the
Peter-Paul Fortress at once. As an Ex. Com. member I ought to
impress on the garrison the complete inadmissibility of this kind
of action, pacify it, and personally conduct Vyrubova out of the
Fortress. The excursion upset my plans, but nevertheless I
needed no lengthy urging. I had never yet set foot in the famous
Fortress. I was tempted by the opportunity of visiting it, while
the task didn't seem difficult to me. I thought the garrison would
yield before the name of the Ex. Com. For greater assurance I
invited Anisimov, a member of the Soviet Praesidium I ran
into, to go with me : as a completely official personage it was up
to him to defend Coalition law and order. A member of the
Soviet Praesidium might prove more authoritative for the 'loyaP
part of the garrison, while I might be useful as a representative
408 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
of the Left Opposition, which was protesting in my person
against the soldiers' usurpation of authority. Essentially I had
no doubt that the Government, of course, deserved no con-
fidence; as citizens, the soldiers could and should protest against
its activities and try to get rid of it, but while it was still in power,
they, as soldiers, were obliged to execute its, orders. In any case
the arbitrary behaviour of individual groups should cease;
workers and soldiers could make policy only according to the
will of the Soviet. That had always been my line.
In awe and trepidation I passed through the gates of the
Russian Bastille, past stalwart sentries who spent a long time
studying our papers. In my capacity as one of the 'authorities' I
was behind the walls where the vanguard of many a Russian
generation had drained their cups. Manukhin was very worried
about how the garrison would meet us, and what would come of
our expedition; he even doubted whether the guard would allow
us into the Trubetskoy "Bastion. But I was more occupied with
observing my surroundings.
Everything, however, went off perfectly. The commandant, a
recently-appointed, modest, young, disabled soldier, with one
arm, was summoned to the crude, gloomy commandant's
quarters. It was clear that he had no real contact with a garrison
which was inclining towards Bolshevism, and he was quite
unable to vouch for its temper. His detail hadn't expected our
arrival, and had scattered in various directions on their own
affairs. The commandant collected the representatives of the
separate sections of the garrison, and we members of the Ex.
Com. made admonitory speeches to them. Our listeners did not
argue, and if they did not agree, at any rate they were ready to
submit. It is true that they hinted, with a tinge of censure, at
the mood of their units, which, they said, got excited* over
nothing and might call them to account for taking the decision
on themselves. But they finally accepted the responsibility for
releasing Vyrubova from the fortress if the sentries in the
prison itself would only agree.
We all had to make our way at once into the Trubetskoy
Bastion. There was absolutely nothing either menacing,
frightening, or gloomy in -the broad grass-covered square or the
surrounding buildings. Led by the commandant past some
tumbledown carts, rusty kettles, and other quite prosaic objects,
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQl"J 409
we came to the crude and unimpressive gate of the Trubetskoy
Bastion. The sentry let us through quite indifferently.
Manukhin, who was used to these surroundings, was still
uneasy; he kept hurrying on and distracting me with talk
about the affair in hand. He didn't understand me; I was
completely absorbed in studying the prison, fell behind the
procession, and worried the slightly perplexed commandant
with questions. But in a way I was quite disappointed with the
prison,
We were taken to an office to which Vyrubova was also to be
brought. There were two or three rooms which looked not
merely unprisonlike, but even unofficial, with their shabby,
almost homelike furnishings. There we had to wait for some
special personage who had got lost somewhere and who was the
only one who had the right to penetrate under the sacred vaults,
to the cells themselves.
The two-storey prison building formed a triangle. At this
time only the cells of the second floor, where the office was also
located, were occupied by Tsarist dignitaries. Perhaps it was in
this cheerful little office that newcomers were searched with
extraordinary thoroughness. A triangular little garden, over-
grown with thick grass, could be seen from its windows, which
looked on the interior of the triangle. A boarded walk was laid
out along the walls of the triangle, around the little garden,
where prisoners were walking about. In the corner, under a
tree, a tiny hut could be seen, looking quite pastoral: this was
the bath-house.
While waiting for the supervisor, I expressed a strong desire
to go into the cells themselves and see the very entrails of the
prison. The guard on duty, a soldierly-looking fellow, didn't
object for his part, and merely expressed doubt that the sentry
standing at the iron gate opposite the office would let me pass.
But after a few words the latter did so. We entered a broad
corridor that went along the outer side of the triangle, and were
met by a warder who according to the old custom was in silent
felt boots. He was practically the only one in all three wings.
The duty guard suggested that we go into the cells and talk to
the prisoners. But that would perhaps have been awkward and
unsuitable, although not without interest, and I declined. But I
couldn't help looking through the peep-hole into a number of
410 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
the cells. The guard and Manukhin, who was at home here, told
me the names of their occupants.
For myself, quite used to imprisonment, this looking through
a peephole at someone caged up was also perfectly matter-of-
fact. How many friends and comrades had I seen in the course
of my life only through a peephole! And now, when my own
gaolers were before me, curiosity easily overcame squeamish-
ness. I remember that Protopopov was sound asleep with his
back to the door. Sturmer was sitting on a bunk holding a small
book. And then I heard the name of an old friend of mine,
Vlssarionov, one of the most talented and pernicious of the
Tsarist Secret Police. While he was an assistant Procurator in
Moscow he used to visit my cell In the Taganka. Later, during
the war, when he was the chief Petersburg censor, I had to turn
hastily away whenever he appeared, when I visited the censor's
office on Sovremennik and Letopis business: I was living in the
capital illegally, and the keen eye of the Secret Policeman might
have recognized me even after ten years.
Now Vissarlonov, sitting at a table, was attentively reading a
sheet of note-paper.
A denunciation! flashed through my mind, though in the
circumstances such an occupation would have been quite
meaningless.
On my request an empty cell was opened. Splendid cells in
the Peter-Paul! Light, clean, and about twice as large as in a
'model' prison.
'This isn't too bad!' I summed up my impressions. 'We've
seen a lot worse.'
Then we heard that Vyrubova was now ready to go. We went
to her cell. A pretty young woman, with a simple, typically
Russian face, got up to meet us, very excited at the imminent
change, as is always the case in prisons. She was on crutches, I
think as a result of a railway accident.
'But I haven't a coat! 5 she said, naively and confusedly.
She had to go without one. Manukhin was extremely excited :
our slow-moving procession had to get past a whole series of
sentries. Indeed, the times were such that a sentry was no less
important than the Minister of Justice. The sentries watched our
procession rather gloomily and suspiciously, but made no attempt
to detain it. Manukhin insisted that we should personally con-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
duct Vyrubova outside the gates of the fortress and into a
prison hospital. Everything went off all right.
In the preparations of the Soviet parties for the June i8th
demonstration, the ruling bloc took part without undue
urgency. First of all, it had no doubts as to its victory under an
'official Soviet* banner; secondly it had neither the proper
attraction to the masses, nor any skill in dealing with them. In
general, the Menshevik-SR bloc was at that time a model of a
decaying Government, congealed in its assurance and self-
satisfied blindness. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, were fever-
ishly busy in the entrails of the proletarian capital, ploughing up
virgin soil and forming their converts into fighting columns.
But the masses were rushing to battle. The June loth affair,
not having given their temper a vent, had only exasperated
them. An official Soviet demonstration, of course, did not
satisfy the Bolshevik workers and soldiers in the least. Objec-
tively it ought to have served as a sort of safety-valve against
explosion : an official Soviet demonstration was obviously of no
use against the Soviet. But for some reason it was subjectively
unsatisfactory: the worker-soldier masses, while accepting
June 1 8th as an excuse to display their strength, were hoping to
employ it in the near future.
I don't recall that the Ex. Com. made any special prepara-
tions for its own official demonstration; when the matter was
raised it was in the following, peculiarly characteristic manner.
On Saturday June i yth, the eve of the demonstration, in the
heat of the 'organic labour' of the Congress, the Ex. Com.
assembled in one of the uncomfortable rooms of the Military
Academy. A lot of members were there, most of them on their
feet with nowhere to sit, squeezing around a crude table and
two or three ancient benches. The heat was suffocating, and
there was an atmosphere of irritation.
I think all the leaders were present; but it was Lieber who
brought up the subject of the demonstration. Once more, with
uncontrolled fury, he began to tell us of the Bolshevik 'prepara-
tions' and the dangers that threatened freedom and the existing
order. Bolshevik detachments of workers and soldiers were pre-
paring to come armed; excesses, bloodshed, attempts to attack
412 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
the Government, were inevitable, and had to be nipped in the
bud by the most determined measures : under no circumstances
must arms be allowed in the streets. For this a reliable detach-
ment must be placed at the gates of every doubtful barracks
and every factory from which the demonstrators would come;
if they showed themselves with weapons the reliable detach-
ments must disarm them.
This is how the Menshevik-SR bankrupts of the Coalition, in
the person of Lieber, defended freedom and order. I don't recall
who else spoke for the Right in support of the Lieber recipe,
but I myself lost my calm and attacked Lieber with as much fury
as he had the Bolshevik traitors and plotters. I acknowledged
the risk of senseless bloodshed and unauthorized activities if
the streets of Petersburg were filled with arms. But it was
obvious that Lieber's statesmanlike wisdom and his methods by
no means prevented this, but on the contrary, made it all in-
evitable. After all, it was ridiculous to imagine that a detach-
ment of workers or soldiers leaving an assembly point with
arms in their hands against the Soviet's orders would hand over
these arms without a struggle to a Lieberite 'national guard'. A
clash was made absolutely inevitable by the very presence of a
detachment blocking the way. And ten such clashes would mean
tremendous bloodshed, the beginning of an absurd rebellion,
and civil war created by panic and political stupidity. This was
the purely practical side of the matter. As for the principle of it,
things were no better.
I made a practical proposal, in view of the alarming mood of
the masses, that we should at once scatter through the factories
and barracks, directly explain the significance of the next day's
demonstration, and try to persuade our hearers not to take arms
with them, in order to avoid senseless accidental bloodshed. I
was supported by many, including, if I'm not mistaken,
Chernov. And that's what was decided. 'Danger' points were
determined at once and two or three comrades assigned to each
one, the Bolsheviks also taking part. It was decided to assemble
again in the Tauride Palace that evening at 10 o'clock for each
delegation to report on its expedition.
I was sent to the most ticklish spot, the Durnovo villa. I left
for the mysterious nest of the terrible anarchists full of doubts.
Would they let me in? Would they talk? Or, if they had any
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 413
serious plans for the following day, would they not hold me as a
Soviet hostage? The mission, however, was concluded quite
safely.
We went into the shady courtyard of the villa unhindered. On
the steps there were no sentries, no passes were demanded, and
nobody took notice of us. It was evident that outsiders who
wished to could come in with complete freedom and that they
often did so. We asked where we could converse officially, in the
name of the Soviet, with the official representatives of the
anarchist organization. We were invited into the club. The news
of our arrival had spread instantaneously and we were sur-
rounded by curious faces, with rather ironical expressions. The
rooms were in order and completely furnished, though with
total confusion of styles. While we waited for the official spokes-
men we settled ourselves in a large room, converted into an
auditorium and adorned with black banners and other anarchist
emblems.
Bleichman, whom we knew as a habitual Soviet speaker,
fairly quickly appeared as the representative of the local
leaders. He had with him a number of people of different kinds,
both workers and intellectuals. I explained the purpose of our
visit, laying the main emphasis on the possibility of unfortunate
incidents, unintentional excesses, and guns going off of their
own accord. I told them what the Soviet insisted on and asked
for an account of the intentions and views of the anarchists
themselves. Bleichman replied without wasting words: for the
anarchists the Soviet was quite without authority; if the Bol-
sheviks chose to join in its decisions that meant nothing the
Soviet was essentially the servant of the bourgeoisie and the
landlords; the anarchists had no definite intentions for the next
day; they would take part in the demonstration with their
black flags; and as for their coming armed they might not,
and then again they might.
The dialogue got rather long-winded. I couldn't get a more
definite answer: had they decided to go armed or unarmed?
Nor did either my diplomacy or my attempts at persuading
them to leave their arms at home have any definite success. I
kept coming up against a quite simple and yet insurmountable
obstacle: it was, they said, just because they would not submit to
anyone but acted as the good Lord inspired them that they were
414 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi7
anarchists. It was only when the official conversation became
private that my interlocutors began to emit rather more soothing
sounds.
'Don't worry, we're not that sort; everything will go off all
right/ they said directly or obliquely.
They took us off as private guests to show us their premises.
We went out into an enormous shady garden where large groups
of workers were quietly strolling about. The lawns were over-
run with children. There was a kiosk at the entrance where
anarchist literature was sold or given away. A speaker was stand-
ing on a tall stump making a naive speech about the ideal
structure for society. Not very many people were listening to
him. There was obviously more relaxation here than concern
with politics. The very widespread popularity of this anarchist
nest amongst working-class circles in the capital was quite
understandable.
I would not have minded starting a general conversation with
the local public, or perhaps even climbing up on the stump in
my turn, but a warm, heavy shower started to fall; accompanied
by a large and benevolent group of people, we found our car and
went home.
That night the Ex. Com. reassembled in the Tauride Palace.
There was quite a large crowd. The delegates reported on their
visits to the unreliable places. All the reports were optimistic:
the mood everywhere was c loyaP; no excesses were expected;
people were not preparing to go armed. The most doubtful point
remained the Durnovo villa; but it was hoped that 'everything
would go off all right'.
I don't know just why, but suddenly, under the influence of
these favourable reports, Tsereteli triumphantly addressed the
Bolsheviks, especially Kamenev, in an indignantly didactic
speech :
'Here we have before us now an open and honest review of
the forces of the revolution. Tomorrow there will be demonstra-
ting not separate groups but all the working class of the capital,
not against the will of the Soviet, but at its invitation. Now we
shall all see which the majority follows, you or us. This isn't a
matter of underhand plots but a duel in the open arena. To-
morrow we shall see. . .'
Kamenev was discreetly silent. Was he as confident of his own
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 415
victory as Tseretell of his? Was he holding his tongue for
secrecy, or because he was not confident in the results of the
review? I myself was not quite confident in them when I left
late that night to sleep on the Petersburg Side, in the Letopis
offices.
The next day, Sunday the i8th, I left the house around noon.
As usual, I had no intention of taking part in the procession
even though it had been decided that the Congress would go in
full force. . . I left for Gorky's nearby. He or some literary friend
might go with me to watch the demonstration. But there were
no literary people around, and Gorky said: 'The demonstra-
tion's a failure. I've heard from a number of places; only hand-
fuls of people are marching. The streets are empty; there's
nothing to see. I'm not going. . .'
Hm ! Somewhere someone already had his conclusions ready.
At the same time these conclusions, if correct, could be inter-
preted in two ways. The demonstration was a 'failure' because
the revolutionary energy of the masses was drying up; they no
longer wanted to come out when the Soviet called them and
demand peace, etc., but to pass on to peaceful labour and finish
the revolution in spite of the exhortations of Soviet dema-
gogues and loudmouths. It was obvious which circles, thirsting
for the reaction, had been anticipating just these conclusions. . .
But there might be another interpretation: the democracy of
the capital remained relatively indifferent to the demonstration
because it was official, 'Soviet 5 , and its slogans did not correspond
to the mood of the masses; the revolutionary energy had perhaps
long since definitely rolled past the boundary at which the Star
Chamber had been trying to stop it.
But one moment! the failure of the demonstration might be
utter nonsense. All the Soviet parties, after all, had decided to
take part in it, and prepared for it ! I went out alone, turning
towards the Champ de Mars, through which all the columns
were to march. In the Kamenno-ostrovsky Prospect, near
Kshesinskaya's house, near Trinity Bridge, it was really rather
deserted. It was only on the other side of the Neva that detach-
ments of demonstrators were visible. It was a magnificent day,
and already hot.
416 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
There wasn't a dense crowd blocking the Champ de Mars, but
thick columns were moving towards me.
'Bolsheviks!' I thought, looking at the slogans on the banners.
I went over to the graves of those who had been killed, where
familiar Soviet people were standing in compact groups taking
the salute. Apparently the demonstration was rather behind
time. The districts had started from the assembly points later
than schedule. It was still only the first detachments of the
Petersburg revolutionary army that were parading through the
Champ de Mars. Columns were still on the way from every
part of Petersburg. There was nothing, however, to be heard of
any excesses, disorders or upsets. No arms could be seen
amongst the demonstrators.
The columns marched swiftly and in close order. There could
be no question of a 'failure*, but there was something peculiar
about this demonstration. On the faces, in the movements, in
the whole appearance of the demonstrators there was no sign
of lively participation in what they were doing. There was no
sign of enthusiasm, or holiday spirits, or political indignation.
The masses had been called and they had come. They all came
to do what was required and then go back. . . Probably some
of those called from their homes and private affairs this Sunday
were indifferent. Others thought this was a government demon-
stration, and felt that they were doing not their own business but
something compulsory and perhaps superfluous. There was a
businesslike veneer over the entire demonstration. But it was on
a magnificent scale. All worker and soldier Petersburg took part
in it.
But what was the political character of the demonstration?
'Bolsheviks again/ I remarked, looking at the slogans, 'and
there behind them is another Bolshevik column.'
'Apparently the next one too,' I went on calculating, watch-
ing the banners advancing towards me and the endless rows
going away towards Michael Castle a long way down the
Sadovoy.
'All Power to the Soviets! 5 'Down with the Ten Capitalist
Ministers!' 'Peace for the hovels, war for the palaces!'
In this sturdy and weighty way worker-peasant Petersburg,
the vanguard of the Russian and the world revolution, expressed
its wilL The situation was absolutely unambiguous. Here and
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQl*/ 417
there the chain of Bolshevik flags and columns was interrupted
by specifically SR and official Soviet slogans. But they were
submerged in the mass; they seemed to be exceptions, inten-
tionally confirming the rule. Again and again, like the un-
changing summons of the very depths of the revolutionary
capital, like fate itself, like the fatal Birnam wood there
advanced towards us : 'All Power to the Soviets !' 'Down with
the Ten Capitalist Ministers !'
An astonishing, bewitching slogan, this! Embodying a vast
programme in naive and awkward words, it seemed to emerge
directly from the very depths of the nation, reviving the un-
conscious, spontaneously heroic spirit of the great French
Revolution.
At the sight of the measured advance of the fighting columns
of the revolutionary army, it seemed that the Coalition was
already formally liquidated and that Messrs, the Ministers, in
view of the manifest popular mistrust, would quit their places
that very day without waiting to be urged by more imposing
means.
I remembered the purblind Tsereteli's fervour of the night
before. Here was the duel in the open arena! Here was the
honest legal review offerees in an official Soviet demonstration!
A few steps away from me Kamenev's stocky figure was
visible in the thin crowd, rather like a victor acknowledging a
parade. But he looked more perplexed than triumphant.
'Well, what now?' I said to him. 'What sort of Government is
there going to be now? Are you going into a Cabinet with
Tsereteli, Skobelev and Chernov?'
'We are,' Kamenev replied, but somehow without real
assurance.
The programme of action in the minds of the Bolshevik
leaders was evidently completely vague. And Kamenev himself
was vacillation incarnate.
A detachment was approaching with an enormous, heavy,
gold-embroidered banner: 'The Central Committee of the
Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks)'. The
leader demanded that, unlike the others, the detachment be
allowed to stop and go right up to the graves. Someone who was
acting as master of ceremonies tried to argue with them, but
yielded at once. Who and what could have stopped the victors
418 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
from allowing themselves this trifling indulgence, if that was
what they wanted?
Then a small column of anarchists appeared. Their black
flags stood out sharply against the background of the endless red
ones. The anarchists were armed, and were singing their songs
with a fiercely challenging look. However, the crowd on the
Champ de Mars merely greeted them with ironical merriment:
they didn't seem at all dangerous.
Such was June i8th in Petersburg. It was a stinging flick of
the whip in the face of the Soviet majority and the bourgeoisie.
It was an unexpected revelation to the Star Chamber and its
purblind leader. But as a matter of fact what could a blind
man make of a blow on the head from an axe-butt in the
dark?
The bourgeoisie and the politically-minded man in the street
evaluated things better. But what could they do? The men in
the street, tormented by forebodings, simply whispered among
themselves. And the bourgeoisie? Its Ministers, of course, didn't
retire voluntarily. In the given circumstances they would have
gained nothing by that and lost everything. It was after all
really impossible, while retaining a bourgeois dictatorship, to
take seriously the trust or mistrust of the masses of the people.
It was after all really impossible to abandon power voluntarily
when it might pass easily and painlessly into the hands of
enemies. The experiment of resigning would be permissible
only when it created difficulties, disorganized the enemy
camp, and served to strengthen the reaction and the bourgeois
dictatorship. But what could be done, when the lower
depths of the revolutionary capital appeared before their very
eyes?
It was obvious what could be done. First of all, take no
official notice. Secondly, prove by means of 'public opinion'
i.e., the big newspapers that the demonstration had been a
failure, and that the miserable fragments of the 'revolutionary
democracy 5 who had been in the streets with their demagogues
and loudmouths reflected precisely nothing. Thirdly, hide from
them behind the real 'revolutionary democracy', behind its over-
whelming majority: not the Bolsheviks of the capital, but the
All-Russian Congress; not Lenin and Trotsky, but Chaikovsky
and Tsereteli. To be sure, these must be kicked at once, to teach
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 419
them their place; nevertheless it must be hoped that they
wouldn't give up. The 'big press' harped on all these themes.
The capital was seething. The temper of the masses and the
desire for decisive action were growing daily. In the capital
there was no longer any need to agitate against the Coali-
tion.
Everywhere, in every corner, in the Soviet, in the Marian
Palace, in people's homes, in the squares and boulevards, in the
barracks and factories, everyone was talking about some sort of
'demonstrations' that were expected any day; nobody knew
exactly who was going to 'demonstrate 3 , or how or where, but the
city felt itself to be on the eve of some sort of explosion.
On Sunday July and, a splendid sunny day, I spent the
morning chatting amiably and strolling about with Luna-
charsky, who had stayed with us overnight. At this time I had
already moved from the Letopis to my own place in the Kar-
povka. That morning the Bolsheviks were arranging a mass-
meeting for their ist Machine-Gun Regiment in the huge hall
of the People's House. Lunacharsky was obliged to speak there,
with Trotsky and others: the Bolshevik powers thought this
meeting very important.
Lunacharsky went to the People's House; but after speaking
returned and we went for a walk. We admired the beauties of
Petersburg, and then the three of us Lunacharsky, my wife,
and myself went to dinner in the famous 'Vienna'. The
restaurant of literary Bohemia now swarmed with political
figures of the more or less democratic camp. I had a short talk
with Chernov, who was now very chilly towards me.
There was to be an all-city conference that day of the Inter-
district Party. Lunacharsky, one of the leaders of the group,
thought it very important. After dinner we set off on foot for
the conference, somewhere far down the Sadovoy. Lunacharsky
tried unceasingly to make a convert of me; my wife was already
converted.
The conference agenda included, among other things, the
question of uniting the Interdistrictites with Lenin's party. It
was a foregone conclusion. , . Lunacharsky had invited me to
the conference as a guest; he had no doubt that sooner or later
420 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI?
I would join the Bolsheviks; but we didn't know whether I
should be let in.
After some preliminary negotiations by Lunacharsky, they
willingly let me into the little hall, which held about fifty dele-
gates and roughly as many guests. The star performer, sitting
near a chairman I did not know, was Uritsky. Trotsky was also
among the delegates, and he was delighted to have me sit by
him. Steklov was also there as one of the guests. But the majority
were workers and soldiers unknown to me. There was no doubt
that here despite the miniature quality of the conference the
authentic worker-soldier masses were represented.
We arrived during the 'reports from the floor'. They were
listened to with interest, and really were interesting. Party work
was being feverishly carried on and its successes were perceptible
to everyone. There was one hindrance : c What distinguishes you
from the Bolsheviks, and why aren't you with them?' All the
speakers reiterated this, ending with exhortations to flow into
the Bolshevik sea.
I well remember the report of the representative of the
garrison of Krasnoe Selo. He said that they had a monopoly of
influence there; and the lyGth Regiment was fully at the dis-
posal of the central organs of the group -for any purpose , at any
time. The report was clear, full of interesting details, and
important in its implications.
The discussion of principles began. I think the question of
uniting with the Bolsheviks was settled then and there while I
was present. But I particularly recall the debates on the new
programme of the party. Here glances turned, naturally, to
Trotsky.
Around this time Lenin had composed his draft of the Bol-
shevik party programme. I don't think it had yet been pub-
lished, but it was passing through a few hands in the form of a
printed pamphlet. It contained a detailed elaboration Apolitical
questions: parliamentarism, the Soviets, the judiciary, the
remuneration of officials and specialists. Here were collected all
the elements of tLat Utopian structure of the state which Lenin
afterwards passionately defended in his pamphlet State and
Revolution, and then later still soon after the bitter lessons of
practice threw overboard as childish delusions and worthless
rubbish. It was quite remarkable. And it was even more re-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 421
markable that side by side with this detailed working out of the
political side the economic programme was allotted only the most
perfunctory attention. It hardly existed. Its place was evidently
taken simply by a proposal for 'direct creation from below' and
'expropriating the expropriators'.
I was amazed when at the Interdistrict Conference the party
programme was arrived at: Trotsky repeated Lenin, He took
Lenin's draft as a basis and introduced a few amendments. In-
comprehensible ! It's true that Trotsky, Lunacharsky, and
Uritsky were not economists. But they were highly educated and
the most advanced Socialists in Europe. Why wasn't it clear to
them that Socialism is primarily an economic system and that
without a strictly worked out programme of economic enter-
prises nothing could come of a dictatorship of the proletariat?
It was precisely from their point of view that a party programme
must necessarily contain a detailed, purely practical, and con-
crete schedule of economic reforms. For their programme was
the programme of the liquidation of capitalism.
Let us grant that at a mass-meeting this disregard of real
economic tasks was tolerable. But here, when dispositions were
being elaborated for the guidance of the revolutionary staff
itself? I, a guest, a member of another party, was itching to ask
for the floor at least to put some puzzled questions. And they
might have given it: there were no theoreticians present, and the
discussion was lackadaisical. Nevertheless it was out of place for
me to speak, and I didn't like to ask. Lenin and Trotsky, by the
way, were here disregarding just those urgent problems they
were to come up against a few months later when they were the
Government. But the political system that absorbed all their
attention wasn't the slightest use to them then. They at once
abandoned all their constructions in this field.
I had to leave : some Commission or other was to meet in the
Tauride Palace, I went out into the street alone with strange
feelings, honestly not understanding how people's minds
worked. Tired by my earlier walk, I plodded off to the distant
palace of the revolution.
The first Coalition against the revolution, not waiting to be
swept away by an explosion of popular wrath, broke up as a
422 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
result of internal crisis. It had survived exactly as long as the
first Guchkov-Miliukov Cabinet.
It goes without saying that there was only one sensible solu-
tion of the problem of power, the establishment of a dictator-
ship of the democracy. In place of the Coalition of the big and
petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat and the revolution
there must be created a new coalition : a coalition of the Soviet
parties, the proletariat, and the peasantry against capital and
imperialism. There was no other solution. But this solution could
be arrived at only by a united front, by the united will of the
Soviet.
All power had long been in its hands. The dictatorship of the
Soviet democracy could have been established -formally by
the simple proclamation of a Government of the Soviet bloc.
The overturn could have been consummated with complete
ease, without shedding a drop of blood. And the dictatorship of
the democracy would have been created as a fact simply by the
realization of the effective power and the accomplishment of
the programme of peace, bread, and land. Here the road seemed
smooth, but only if the Soviet came out for the overturn.
In any case the question was now posed in all its scope by
the internal collapse of the Coalition. But at this point, on
Sunday July 2nd, while I walked slowly to the Tauride Palace
from the Interdistrict Conference nothing was known about
this. It was not until late that evening that the rumour that the
Cadets had left the Coalition Government began to get all
over the city by 'phone.
Now, as before, the city was saturated with other rumours
about various 'demonstrations' by the Bolsheviks, the workers,
and the regiments against the Government and the Soviet.
The capital was seething. The slogan of the turbulent masses
was also C A11 Power to the Soviets 5 . It might have seemed that
events were hitting the same target from various directions.
It might have seemed that the movement of the masses, express-
ing the 'public opinion' of the worker-soldier capital, would
serve as a favourable factor for the correct solution of the
problem of power. But this wasn't so.
The elements were rising without restraint or reason. And
those who led them, by continually proclaiming these same
slogans of Soviet power, radically undermined the possibility of a
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1*J 423
correct solution of the crisis. For they were known to be acting
against their own slogans, against the Soviet, and not in a
united Soviet front against the bourgeoisie. Their aim was to
hand the power not to the Soviet, in the form of a bloc of Soviet
parties, but to an 'active minority' in the form of the Bolshevik
Party alone.
In such conditions the movement of the Petersburg 'depths'
infinitely confused the situation. Now the mounting tide of
popular passion could not serve the revolution as it had in the
April Days. Then the Soviet had ruled the elements; now they
had gone beyond any obedience. If anyone still retained some
little power over them, it was the Bolsheviks, who were mixing
up all the cards and in the name of the Soviet directing the
elements against it.
But the power of the Bolsheviks over the elements was not
great. In the heart of the capital, still invisible to the outsider's
eye, the tempest was raging irresistibly. Tens and hundreds of
thousands of workers were really plunging towards an inevitable
outbreak; it was impossible to hold them back. This outbreak
threatened to be fatal. That was just how I estimated it at that
time, in view of all the circumstances, and that is just how I
estimate it now, three years later, looking at its consequences
sub specie aeternitatis.
But then as well as now, independently of political results, it
was impossible to look on this stupendous movement of the
masses with anything but enthusiasm. Even if you thought it
fatal you could only rejoice in its gigantic elemental sweep.
Tens and hundreds of thousands of proletarian hearts
veritably burned with passion, hatred, and love combined, and
with yearning for some vast and intangible exploit. They were
rushing to sweep away all obstacles with their own hands, crush
all enemies and build a new destiny then and there. But how?
Just what destiny? This the elements did not know. But they
surged out, all aflame; they had to come out. Such was the
decree of the historical destiny that ruled the elements. It was a
magnificent spectacle; only blind men could fail to sense its
greatness.
And what came of it all? An 'episode' heavy with conse-
quences, that will go down in history as the July Days.
CHAPTER 20
THE 'JULY DAYS'
Monday ', July yd. The next day I went to the Tauride Palace
in the morning. In spite of the comparatively early hour I found
a great deal of excitement. In the Ex. Com.'s rooms there were
almost as many people as during the whole summer. There was
no session, but Mameluke and Opposition groups seemed to
have shaken off their torpor and were conferring excitedly here
and there.
Amongst these groups I also noticed the members of my own
fraction, the Menshevik-Internationalists, headed by Martov.
They had already had time to arrange an impromptu session
and even to pass an important political resolution.
Martov, having learned the night before that the Cadets had
left the Coalition, had drawn it up beforehand. The resolution
stated that it was imperative to create immediately a purely democratic
Government, made up solely of * 'Soviet* parties.
It was only now, after the 'spontaneous' collapse of the Coali-
tion, that the Menshevik-Internationalists had decided to say
this. It was only now, a month after the opening of the All-
Russian Congress of Soviets, that Martov thought it possible to
authorize this slogan for his group. He was not too late con-
trary to his habit only because from that day on events took a
very special turn.
This was the day when the famous July week began. The
story is not only very important and interesting, but very com-
plicated, and also very obscure and confused. As usual I shall
not assume the slightest obligation to disentangle it; I shall write
it down as I personally recall it.
I think it was announced that morning that a session of the
Central Ex. Com. was to be held that afternoon, when the
Socialist Ministers had finished their business in the Marian
Palace and the Star Chamber. It was said that the Star Cham-
ber already had a plan ready for settling the crisis.
The Coalition Cabinet had collapsed through internal
bankruptcy. The 'living forces of the country 3 in the person of the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 425
entire organized bourgeoisie embodied in the Cadet Party, had
now left the revolution formally, officially, and openly for the
camp of its enemies. But our revolution, after all, was 'bourgeois*.
This the Star Chamber knew very well, and that was all it knew,
Its special logic pushed these deep thinkers to the conclusion
that the bourgeoisie must be in power. And the only plan the
Star Chamber could have was this : if there was no Coalition, it
would have to be invented. If the Cabinet of May 5th had now
crumbled, a new one must be concocted in its likeness. If the
real, the organized bourgeoisie had gone, leaving in the Cabinet
only a few individuals representing no one but themselves, then
at all costs substitutes for it must be found, deceiving the
country, the democracy, the plutocracy, and oneself.
But it wasn't so easy to do all this: the desired Capitalist
Ministers were not to be picked up in the street. Meanwhile it
was impossible to prolong the interregnum in the stormy
atmosphere prevailing. The masses might take a hand; the
Opposition might take advantage of the interregnum, and who
knew what that might threaten the principle of the Coalition
with?
It was impossible to leave the situation vague. And this is
what the wily Tsereteli had thought up.
The decision of the question of the Government was to be
declared outside the jurisdiction of the available personnel of
the Central Ex. Com., when a whole third of the members
elected by the Congress were in the provinces. Loyalty, conr
stitutionality and democratic principles demanded that the
question of the future composition of the Government and pf
the replacement of the members who had left should be decided
by a plenum of the Central Ex. Com. A plenary session could be
arranged in two or three weeks; meanwhile the Star Chamber
proposed not to replace the missing Cadet Ministers at all, but
to appoint in their places suitable heads of departments for
'organic' work while the political Cabinet would be left at its
present strength, of eleven Ministers (with a 'Socialist' majority
of one!).
Rumours of this plan had spread throughout the Tauride
Palace and the delegates were hotly discussing it. The Opposi-
tion was filled with rage and contempt, and indeed the 'plan'
merited rage and contempt. It was, of course, a ruse, and
426 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
predetermined a new Coalition just as surely as two and two make
four. Objectively, to be sure, the question would be decided
with the most intimate participation of the masses of the people,
but, while it knew that those forces existed, the Star Chamber
did not believe in them, and within the confines of parliamentary
Soviet machinations its game was almost unbeatable.
The whole difficulty consisted in the one fact that there were
waverers among the majority under the influence of the
enormous movement of the rank and file; especially among the
ignorant Rightist masses of the Peasant Ex. Com,, very many
could not understand why they should strive for a bourgeois
regime; not having mastered the 'Marxist' theories of Dan and
Tsereteli they were not at all averse from taking the whole
power into their own peasant hands and personally unleashing
anarchy. After all, it was obvious that the bourgeois government
would not give the peasants land without payment; nothing had
been accomplished in the agrarian question except sabotage.
It wouldn't be at all a bad idea to seize all the power, in order to
seize all the land. Then the peasants would start to establish
exemplary order themselves, to squeeze the Kaiser's partisans,
put a stop to the unreasonable demands of the workers and
beat up the Yids.
This was how many of the 'ignorant masses* who had over-
run the central Soviet bodies thought and spoke. Speaking
generally, these little SR peasants constituted the most reliable
foundation of the Star Chamber. But specifically, in this matter of
the composition of the Government, the 'Marxist' leaders had to
be very careful with them. The whole difficulty for the Star
Chamber lay in the mood of these little peasants and the
waverings of the more Left elements of the Soviet majority.
Nevertheless the Star Chamber's game was almost un-
beatable. In the two or three weeks before the plenum met they
could do their best to convince the waverers (Right and Left).
During this interval they could rout out some sort of Capitalist
Ministers and present the plenum with an accomplished
fact.
The Star Chamber appeared around 2 o'clock, when the
small former Ex. Com. room was quite full. Members of the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 427
peasant Central Ex. Com. were also present some looking like
professors, some like seminarists, and some like shopkeepers. In
all there were about 200 people present. The hall, buzzing like a
beehive, had long since forgotten such a bustle.
Tsereteli of course took the floor. He made a short report
which included all the known facts and, at the end, the plan
described above. I immediately rose on a point of order: Tsere-
teli, by uniting two questions with nothing in common, wanted
to push one through with the help of the other; these two
questions should be decided separately. But I don't know the
fate of the point of order in the debates that it started. Un-
fortunately for a reason which had nothing to do with the
political crisis I had to leave the meeting for about an hour.
I needed a car for that hour and painfully tearing myself away
from the soit dit 'historic' meeting, excited by the great day
and the new events of the revolution, I feverishly bustled about
after one, so as not to be late for my business and to return as
quickly as possible. Hurrying through the'next room, which was
empty, I heard a ring from the telephone booth. I hurriedly
picked up the receiver.
'Is that the Ex. Com.?' said a voice, obviously a worker's.
'Call some member of the Ex. Com. Hurry up; it's urgent!'
'What's the matter? Quick! This is a member of the Ex.
Com. speaking,'
'This is the Promyot Factory. A few workers and soldiers have
just come in here, and they say that all the factories and regiments
have already demonstrated against the Provisional Govern-
ment, and others are demonstrating now. They say ours is the
only factory that isn't demonstrating. In the Factory Com-
mittee we don't know what to do. Tell us, what are the Ex.
Com.'s instructions? Should we go and demonstrate or detain
these people as provocateurs'?'
I answered: 'The Ex. Com. is unconditionally against the
demonstration. Anyone telling people to go out into the street is
acting on his own initiative, against the Soviet. The Ex. Com.
has no knowledge of any demonstrations by factories or regi-
ments. It's probably not true. The people who have come to you
talking about other factories and regiments are simply trying to
get you out into the street. Don't go anywhere till the Ex. Com.
orders you. Don't try to keep those people there, but be sure to
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
try and find out who they are and who sent them. Tell them and
the factory that the Ex. Com. is In session right now debating
just this question of the new Government and the transfer of all
power to the Soviet. Ring back again later. 5
I thought it essential to hurry back to the Ex. Com. for a
moment and tell them about this conversation. I don't recall
whether I succeeded, but at the meeting I found the whole
picture changed. The political discussion had been suspended.
In my absence Information had been received that the ist
Machine-Gun Regiment had already come out into the street
and was now making its way towards no one knew where. In a
flash the whole appearance of the meeting had changed. Most
of the faces showed anger, irritation, and boredom: this was
the old atmosphere of 'demonstrations' which had become
quite customary during the preceding weeks, and which was
supposed to have been changed by 'high policy' but was now so
inopportunely renewed.
The Ex. Com. knew by rote what it had to do, and was
already behaving by rote : it decided to send someone at once
to intercept the Machine-Gun Regiment and persuade it to go
back. But the question was, whom to send? Though I was late and
agitated, nevertheless for a few minutes I watched the meeting
lackadaisically talking things over, choosing between candidates.
Who, indeed, should be sent? Representatives of the Soviet
majority, partisans, or members of the Star Chamber? But they
were not in the least likely to persuade anybody. No one would
listen to them, and perhaps they might be arrested. Even they
themselves realized this. The Bolsheviks of course would have
been persuasive. But it was impossible to send them they
couldn't be trusted: God knew where Kamenev or Shlyapnikov
would lead the intercepted regiment to the barracks or to the
Marian Palace?
No candidate was found and nobody was sent while I was
there. The atmosphere of demonstrations had become habitual.
The minds of the leaden 'authorities' were turning over slowly
and heavily. I left, and during my mad rush in the car thoughts
were dancing about in my head, one interrupting the other,
about the political crisis and the demonstration that had begun.
Great events were beginning!
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 429
My recollections of that day begin again at about 6 or 7
in the evening. At 7 o'clock a meeting of the Workers'
Section of the Soviet began in the White Hall. The over-
whelming majority was Bolshevik. Was this meeting connected
with the movement that had begun, and what, in general, was
the Bolshevik Party's relation to it? I don't know for certain.
According to all the data, the Bolshevik Central Committee did
not organize a demonstration for July 3rd unlike what had
happened on June gth. I know that the temper of the masses was
considered somewhat 'worse*, a little softer, less well-defined,
than three weeks before. It was somewhat dejected by the fiasco
of the gth and by the official Soviet demonstration of the i8th.
An uprising, of course, was considered inevitable, for the
capital was seething and the general situation was unendurable.
The Bolsheviks were getting ready for it technically and
politically. But it was clear that they had not scheduled it for
July 3rd. And the Bolsheviks in the Soviet, after meeting during
the day, agreed to go to the factories and barracks to agitate
against the demonstration.
From various outskirts of the city, beginning with the Vyborg
Side, masses of workers and soldiers were moving towards the
centre. The workers had left their benches in thousands and
tens of thousands. The soldiers were coming out armed. Both
had banners bearing the slogans that had predominated on the
1 8th: 'Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!' 'All Power to
the Soviets!'
It was reported that some workers' detachments and two
regiments, the ist Machine-Gunners and the Grenadiers, were
approaching the Tauride Palace. An enormous agitation began
in the hall. The aisles and the seats for the public, empty
up to then, as at ordinary sessions, suddenly filled up with
people. Kamenev suddenly leaped up on to the speaker's plat-
form. And this indecisive Right Bolshevik was the first to give
official sanction to the uprising.
'We never called for a demonstration/ he cried out, 'but the
popular masses themselves have come out into the streets, to
show their will. And once the masses have come out our place is
with them. Our task now is to give the movement an organized
character. The Workers' Section must here and now elect a
special body, a Commission of twenty-five people to control the
430 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
movement. The others should go to their own districts and join
their detachments.' There was no doubt that Kamenev's
resolution would be accepted. Whether on his own initiative or
according to instructions received, Kamenev was far from
trying to isolate the Bolsheviks as the instigators of the uprising;
as always, he acted conciliatorily. But I cannot find in my
memory the slightest trace of any activities during the July
Days of the newly-elected 'Commission 5 .
Meanwhile the movement was already pouring through the
city. The tempest was unleashed. Everywhere in the factories
the same thing as had been reported by the Promyot worker on
the 'phone was going on: workers' and soldiers' delegations
would turn up, refer to 'all the others', and demand in someone's
name that they 'come out'. Only a minority, of course, demon-
strated, but everywhere work was abandoned. Trains ceased to
leave from the Finland Station. In the barracks short mass-
meetings took place, and then from all sides enormous detach-
ments of armed soldiers made their way towards the centre
some of them to the Tauride Palace. Some started shooting into
the air: the rifles went off by themselves.
From early evening, lorries and cars began to rush about the
city. In them were civilians and soldiers with rifles at the trail
and with frightened-fierce faces. Where they came hurtling from
and why no one knew.
The city fairly quickly took on the look of the last days of
February. Since then four months of revolution and liberty had
passed. The garrison of the capital, and even more the pro-
letariat, were now strongly organized. But the movement
appeared to have no more 'consciousness', discipline, or order.
Elemental/orces raged.
One of the insurgent regiments, led by a Bolshevik lieutenant,
was moving along the Nevsky, from the Sadovoy towards the
Liteiny. It was an imposing armed force. It was probably
enough to hold the city unless it came up against a similar
armed force. The head of the regiment had started to turn into
the Liteiny, when some shots were heard from Znamensky
Square. The commander of the column, who was riding in a
car, turned around and saw the heels of the soldiers, running off
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 431
In all directions. A few seconds later the car was left alone in the
middle of a jeering crowd on the Nevsky Prospect. There were
no casualties. . . I was told all this by the commander himself
now a well-known Bolshevik military leader. Something similar
was going on at this time at various points of the capital.
The insurgent army didn't know where it should go, or why.
It had nothing but a 'mood'. This wasn't enough. The soldiers
led by the Bolsheviks, in spite of the complete absence of any
real resistance, showed themselves to be really worthless fighting
material. But not only Bolsheviks led the soldiers' groups that
'came out' on July 3rd: unquestionably there were also some
completely obscure elements present.
The 'over-forties' also came out: that day their representatives
had again seen Kerensky and again pleaded to be allowed to go
home to work on the land. But Kerensky refused: after all, the
offensive against the insolent enemy still continued, for the
glory of the gallant Allies. So the 'over-forties' gladly joined the
'uprising' and in enormous numbers for some reason moved on
to the Tauride Palace.
We hurried out of the meeting of the Workers' Section,
through the crowd that filled the Catherine Hall and the ante-
chamber of the palace, into the rooms of the Central Ex. Com.
But there was no meeting, simply disorder, excitement, and in-
coherence. No Bolshevik leaders were there: after the meeting
of the Workers' Section they had hurried off to their own party
centres.
Crowds kept coming to the Tauride Palace until late at
night. But they looked 'disorganized'. They were capable of
excesses, but not of revolutionary action, conscious and purpose-
ful. They plainly did not know why they were in that particular
place. And because they had nothing to do they called for
speakers members of the Soviet. The speakers went out to
them. Chkheidze tried to persuade them to disperse, referring to
the forthcoming meeting of the Central Ex. Com., but he was
unsuccessful and was interrupted more than once by hostile
shouts. The crowd was in a nasty mood. Voices were heard:
'Arrest the Ex. Com., they've surrendered to the landlords and
the bourgeoisie!'
432 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
But there was no one to do any arresting, nor any reason for
it. They were saying in the crowd that the Provisional Govern-
ment had already been arrested. But nothing of the sort had
taken place. More than that, evidently nothing of the sort had
been intended for that day.
The remnants of the Government, with the 'Socialist 5 majority,
were having a meeting in the undefended apartments of Prince
Lvov. Any group of ten or twelve people that wanted to could
have arrested the Government. But this wasn't done. The sole
attempt at it was completely futile.
Around 10 o'clock a motor-car with a machine-gun and ten
armed men dashed up to the Premier's house, where they asked
the hall-porter to hand over the Ministers. Tsereteli was sum-
moned to negotiate with them, but before he got to the entrance
the men in the armed motor-car had vanished, contenting
themselves with taking Tsereteli's own car with them. It was
obvious that this was a completely 'private enterprise'. But
through all the July Days there were no other attacks on the
Capitalist Ministers.
In general, contrary to what had been expected on June loth,
the Marian Palace, where the Provisional Government was
supposed to be, had not proved to be at all a centre of attraction
for the demonstrating masses. It was in fact to the Tauride the
residency of the central Soviet bodies that they were attracted.
And it was precisely against these, as we see, that their ire was
directed.
Around the same time some speakers of the Soviet Opposition,
proclaiming the transfer of power to the Soviet, also came out to
the square of the Tauride Palace. These met with a completely
different reaction especially Trotsky, whose speech aroused
vociferous enthusiasm. But with the darkness the crowd thinned
out a great deal. The detachments melted away, scattered, and
went off somewhere. There were fewer people in the halls of the
Palace too. The 'uprising' seemed to be coming to an end.
Around midnight some faces from the Star Chamber finally
became visible in the Tauride Palace. They had a very trium-
phant and rather provocative air: they must have been going to
propose something special, which in fact they did.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 433
The halls were fairly empty. At a few points some soldiers,
standing or lying down, were grouped around stacks of rifles
like patrols. And the representatives of the regiments of the
capital, loyal to the Soviet majority and without the least
authority over the masses, were wandering about with nothing
to do, having been summoned by telephone messages. , .
The deputies were beginning to be summoned into the White
Hall, when news came about a brawl and the first casualties on
the Nevsky, around the Town Council. The Council session,
where Lunacharsky, among others, had also spent the evening,
had just finished. When the Town Councillors went into the
street they encountered volleys of machine-gun fire going on
without rhyme or reason between two groups of armed people
who had taken each other for enemies. Just then some motor-
cars with machine-guns also passed by. This was enough to
produce panicky and random firing. Some wounded were
brought into the Town Council. These, of course, were not part
of the 'demonstration'. The Town Councillors went back to
the meeting-hall and hurriedly got out an appeal to refrain
from further bloodshed. The total number of casualties was
unknown.
The joint session of the Central Ex. Com. probably opened
around one in the morning. The White Hall had a look unusual
in the revolution: it was not full. About 300 deputies occupied
at most half the seats, while the remaining chairs were not taken
up by the crowd. No crowds were standing about the corridors
or clustering around the platform, nor was there a soul in the
galleries. Exceptional measures had been taken to keep the
session really closed. It was sedate, as in the good old Duma.
And it was quiet.
There was a feeling of great tension in the air. The deputies
were gloomy and taciturn. Everyone was waiting to see what
surprise the Star Chamber sitting on the platform had thought
up. Chkheidze, pale and morose, was chairman. He had been
assigned the presentation of the surprise by the Star Chamber,
and opened the meeting with something like this:
'This is an exceptionally serious occasion,' he said, slowly,
with difficulty and with many pauses. "The Praesidium has
taken an exceptional decision. We declare that the decisions
which will be taken at once must be binding on every one. All
434 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
those present must undertake to carry them out. Those who
refuse to undertake this obligation should leave the meeting-
hall/
Chkheidze stopped. His assignment was evidently limited to
this. The hall was motionless for some seconds a part waiting
for something further, a part stunned by surprise.
But Chkheidze sat down. And from the benches on the
extreme right, where the Interdistrictites were located, there
began a movement towards the way out on the left Trotsky,
Ryazanov, Uritsky, and Yurenev, followed by Steklov. Not
wishing to undertake such an obligation 'in the dark' they were
obediently leaving the meeting. The hall was silent.
To my own surprise, I rushed on to the platform from the top-
most bench on the left, where I had been sitting with Martov
and others. Chkheidze failed to stop me.
'In extraordinary circumstances,' I said, 'you may take any
extraordinary steps you like. But be aware of what you're pro-
posing. You, the majority, did not appoint us to our deputies'
seats. We were sent here by the workers and soldiers. We will
answer to them for our acts, but you cannot deprive us of our
rights. You can remove us illegally without our having com-
mitted any crime. But we will not give you any promises nor
will we leave the hall voluntarily.'
My closest comrades were in accord with me, while the
Praesidium was perplexed and didn't react at all. At that point
there appeared on the platform the diminutive figure of the
famous Spiridonova. As a Left SR she had joined the Kamkov
group as soon as she got back from Siberia. The Peasant Con-
gress had elected her to its Central Ex. Com. But amongst our-
selves, in Soviet circles, she was speaking for the first time. I
didn't even know her by sight and asked who was following me
on the platform. . .
In the midst of the stillness and tension Spiridonova cried out
hysterically:
'Comrades ! A terrible crime is being prepared ! Our Minister-
leaders are demanding complete obedience from us before
explaining what is at issue. It's clear that they are going to pro-
pose a decree against the people. They are preparing to shoot
down our comrades, the workers and soldiers!'
The Praesidium group was discomfited. It was plain to every-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 435
one that the Star Chamber had blundered and that nothing
would come of its stupid trick.
In the silence and embarrassment Chkheidze's 'resolution 5 was
voted on. Hands were raised. Against it there were only twenty-
one votes ourselves, the Menshevik-Internationalists and the
Left SRs. According to the resolution and the vote we ought to
undertake the obligation required of us or leave. But of course
we didn't do one or the other. We were left in peace as, indeed,
we were bound to be. The meeting went on. Nothing had come
of this stupid enterprise.
When Tsereteli got the floor I went off to look for the Inter-
districtites who had gone out. They were conferring nearby on
what they should do. They were already coming to the con-
clusion that they had left in vain and ought to return to the
hall. I too urged them to do so, and they really did return
at once. Trotsky made the following statement in their
name:
'Chkheidze's resolution is illegal and nullifies the rights of the
minority. In order to defend the rights of their electors the
Interdistrictites are returning to the meeting and will appeal to
the proletarian masses. 3
The debates were endless. One speaker followed another, all
saying the same thing either about the crimes of the Bolsheviks
or about the salvation to be found in the Coalition. The little
peasants' demanded martial law and similar nonsense. The SR
intellectuals, finding the setting appropriate, gave vent to their
patriotic feelings.
But the meeting, on this 'exceptionally serious occasion', had
no positive content.
Meanwhile the sun came up. The hall filled with bright day-
light. The plenipotentiary organ of the revolutionary demo-
cracy was wasting its time in idle talk. . .
Bogdanov came on to the platform with a practical pro-
posal:
The meeting was to be stopped. The worker-soldier section of
the Central Ex. Com. was to remain in the Palace. All those with
any capacity at all for speaking in public were to share out the
factories and barracks at once and leave immediately on their
missions, before the city woke ^p, in order to persuade
the workers and soldiers on the spot to refrain from any
436 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
demonstrations. The deputies were to stay in the factories and
barracks as long as necessary for this purpose.
And on this the meeting dispersed.
Pale and hungry, we moved off to the rooms of the Central
Ex. Com., while the peasants dispersed homewards.
Aided by two or three people, Bogdanov, with a list of fac-
tories and barracks, peremptorily 'billeted* the deputies present
a hundred and a few on factories and troop units. There was
a furious clatter of typewriters, on which whole packets of
credentials were being written. Cars were hastily got ready.
The deputies scattered like shadows. Not only the Opposition,
but also those faithful to the Coalition showed neither en-
thusiasm n,or any desire to embark on this doubtful course after a
sleepless night.
Bogdanov called out the names two for each point. The
Interdistrictites declined to go. Gots and myself were sent to the
Preobrazhensky Regiment. But Gots had disappeared some-
where. After waiting a quarter of an hour I went alone. The
battalion I was going to was quartered quite near the Tauride
Palace, at the corner of the Zakharevsky. I went on foot and
going out under the colonnade of the porch breathed in the
fresh air with pleasure.
It was probably 7 o'clock. A magnificent morning was coming
up. The square was empty. On my left there loomed up two or
three armoured cars, with no sign of an attendant. The adjoin-
ing streets were silent. There was no sign of any uprising or
disorders.
Apparently there had been no new shooting during the night.
The crowds had dispersed and the streets were empty.
In the Preobrazhensky Regiment I forget which battalion
my task was not difficult. This regiment was considered re-
actionary and wasn't on the side of the Bolsheviks. It was likely
that it wasn't going to demonstrate and would not have demon-
strated regardless of my intervention.
Life in the battalion was just beginning. The sleepy soldiers
were just beginning to wander about the huge courtyard. I
called out the commander, asked about their mood and what
"steps' were required. The young officer, although he had stood
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 437
watch all night, was sure of his battalion. He thought there was
no need for a general meeting and we decided to assemble only
platoon representatives. Some solid, heavy-set little peasants
assembled, looking like nothing less than revolutionaries. I
explained the political situation to them and told them by what
strange methods the movement had been called forth, how dark
and obscure its origins were, and what harm it was bound to do.
I asked that no one go out into the street armed without a
summons from the Ex. Com. . . .
The soldiers' representatives listened respectfully: but none of
this was necessary they were not going anywhere.
My audience didn't show much interest in politics. The
attempts of the soldiers to get into conversation with me were
limited to a few malicious remarks aimed at Lenin and the
Bolsheviks, and at once I had to switch over to the other front
go to the defence of Lenin and his friends, as a proletarian party
that was carrying on a legal and necessary struggle for its
principles and the interests of the proletariat. The soldiers'
uncalled-for attacks were an out-and-out repetition of the filthy,
slanderous phrases in the gutter press about all internationalists
generally.
My task in the Preobrazhensky Regiment was fulfilled. I could
leave with an easy conscience. . .
It was 8 o'clock. I didn't want to start a row at Manukhin's,
and I went to the Old Nevsky to * Comrade Governor' Nikitsky's,
to rest a couple of hours. Nikitsky wasn't home: he had been at
the Town Council all night in case of an alarm. But what could
the Town Council have done about it?
While dozing off I remembered that during the night the
party Bolsheviks had not been either at the meeting or in the
Tauride Palace.
That night their Central Committee had a stormy and
feverish debate about what to do. . . In general the situation
was the same as on the night of June gth. The debates and plans
were apparently also the same. One way or the other, whether
started by the party, or spontaneously, or by some unofficial
party groups the movement had begun and assumed enormous
dimensions. Should they continue it, by placing themselves at
438 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
the head of the rebellious masses? Or should they capitulate
again to the conciliationist majority of the Soviet and deprive
the movement of their sanction?
This was the first question that confronted the Bolshevik
Central Committee.
It was apparently decided contingent on the strength and
character of the movement. This was a question of fact that is,
of judgement and calculation. And here the outlook was un-
certain. First of all, the movement had calmed down during the
night; the overwhelming majority of the masses had slept
peacefully and shown no desire for action. Secondly, the move-
ment had begun in a dubious way; the Bolshevik Party was far from
controlling it, and God knew who was at the head of a great
many detachments. Thirdly, the movement had shown quite
clearly its internal feebleness and rottenness. The uprising had
no striking power, nor any real fitness for battle. The outlook
was dubious. Now the chief hope lay in the Kronstadters, whose
arrival was expected hourly. But in general was it worth taking
this movement into one's own hands? It is true that at the session
of the Workers' Section Kamenev had already tied the Bolshevik
Party to it, but nevertheless it was quite possible to change front
as on June gth. It was a question, after all, of the following day,
Tuesday July 4th.
This was the first question that confronted Lenin and his
comrades that night. And I think it was the only one that
demanded an answer. For the second was probably already
decided. This was the question of where to lead the movement. This
was not a question of concrete fact but of party position.
And that had already been determined a month before. We
recall what it reduced itself to : the movement was beginning as a
peaceful demonstration, and if it developed adequately it would at a
favourable conjuncture pass over into the seizure of power by the
Bolshevik Central Committee, which would rule in the name of the
Soviet, with the support at the given moment of the majority
of the Petersburg proletariat and the active army units. This
question was doubtless decided this way now too : a renewal of
the debates concerning it was hardly timely now, in the smoke
of an uprising.
But how was the first point decided : Whether to take over the
movement? Speaking concretely this meant: Should they call
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 439
for a continuation of the 'peaceful demonstration 5 in the name of
the Central Committee of the Party? According to all the
evidence this point made the Bolshevik leaders go through
tormenting doubts and vacillations the whole night.
In the evening the question was decided positively. Correspond-
ing local orders were given. And a corresponding sheet was pre-
pared for the first page of Pravda. The Bolsheviks officially and
definitely put themselves at the head of the uprising.
But later the mood changed. The lull in the streets and the
districts, in connexion with the firm course of the Star Chamber,
inclined the scales to the opposite side. Irresolution came to the
fore. And in this irresolution the Bolsheviks held back once
again. The type for the first page of Pravda was not only set up,
but in the matrix: it had to be cut out of the stereotype machine.
The Bolsheviks countermanded their summons to a 'peaceful
demonstration'. They declined to continue the movement and
stand at its head. . . On July 4th Pravda came out with a
yawning blank strip on the first page.
I have been speaking of the Bolsheviks of Lenin's party. But
the Interdistrictites headed by Trotsky were in the Tauride
Palace that night. Evidently neither Trotsky nor Lunacharsky
took part in the wakeful night of the Bolshevik Central Com-
mittee or shared Lenin's torments. But during the night, I don't
remember when, I happened to run across Uritsky, one of the
Interdistrict leaders. I asked whether their group was calling
for a 'peaceful demonstration' the next day. It may be that
Uritsky yielded to my somewhat ironic tone, and he answered
with emphasis and a certain irritation:
'Yes, we're calling a demonstration tomorrow!'
Well, everyone to his taste, I thought, dropping off to sleep on
Nikitsky's bed and turning over in my mind the events of the
first 'July Day'.
Tuesday, July ^th. I went out into the street around 1 1 o'clock.
At the first glance it was obvious that the disorders had begun again.
Clusters of people were collecting everywhere and arguing
violently. Half the shops were shut. The trams had not been
running since 8 o'clock that morning. A tremendous excite-
ment was felt tinged with anger, but not with anything like
440 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
fanaticism. It was just this that distinguished July 4th from
February 2 8th in Petersburg's external aspect. They were saying
something in the groups of people about the Kronstadters. . . I
hurried to the Tauride Palace.
The nearer I got the more people there were. Around the
Palace enormous throngs, but as it were no demonstrations, no
detachments, no columns, nothing organized. A mass of armed
soldiers, but split up, solitary, with no command. The square
was so packed it was hard to pass through. Ugly black armoured
cars as before towered above the crowds.
The halls looked exactly the same as in the first days of the
revolution. But the heat was stifling. The windows were open,
and armed soldiers were climbing in. With some difficulty I
forced my way through to the rooms of the Central Ex. Com.
The open windows looked out into the luxuriant Potemkin
Garden, and armed soldiers were jostling one another to look in.
The hall was quite crowded, and very noisy. Lunacharsky,
whom I hadn't seen all the previous day, was standing at the
other end arguing violently with someone. He turned abruptly
away from his companion and hurried to my end of the room.
He was clearly excited and irritated by the argument. And as
though continuing it he flung out at me, without saying good
morning, in the angry tone of a challenge, some naive words of
justification :
'I've just brought 20,000 absolutely peaceful people from Kron-
stadt.'
In my turn I opened my eyes wide. 'Really? You brought
them? Absolutely peaceful?'
The Kronstadters were unquestionably the chief trump of
Lenin's party and the decisive factor in his eyes. Having decided
the night before to summon the masses to a 'peaceful demonstra-
tion', the Bolsheviks were of course taking steps to mobilize
Kronstadt. During the hours of nocturnal wavering, when the
movement began to die down, Kronstadt became the sole trump
of those members of the Bolshevik Central Committee who
sponsored the uprising. . . Then they countermanded the in-
surrection. But they had evidently not taken the appropriate
steps with respect to Kronstadt or else one Bolshevik hand
didn't know what the other was doing. I don't know exactly
what the facts were.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 441
But in any case this is what happened: at around 10 o'clock
in the morning there came up to the Nicholas Embankment,
where there was a tremendous concentration of people, up-
wards of forty different ships with Kronstadt sailors, soldiers,
and workers. According to Lunacharsky some 20,000 of these
'peaceful people' had landed. They were armed and their bands
came with them. Landing at the Nicholas Embankment, the
Kronstadters formed columns and made their way to Kshe-
sinskaya's house, the Bolshevik headquarters. They evidently
had no precise strategic plan, and only quite a vague idea of
where to go or just what to do. They were simply in a mood
definitely hostile to the Provisional Government and the Soviet
majority. But the Kronstadters were led by Roshal and Raskol-
nikov and led to Lenin.
Once again the chances of a new revolution had risen extra-
ordinarily high. Lenin must have very much regretted that the
summons to the Petersburg proletariat and garrison had been
cancelled as a result of his overnight vacillations. At this point it
would have been quite possible to lead the movement as far as
he liked. And it was also quite possible to bring about the desired
overturn, that is, at least to liquidate the Capitalist Ministers,
and the Socialist Ministers and their Mamelukes into the
bargain.
In any case Lenin must have begun wavering again. And
when the Kronstadters surrounded Kshesinskaya's house, ex-
pecting to receive instructions, Lenin made an extremely am-
biguous speech from the balcony. He didn't demand any con-
crete action from the impressive force standing in front of him;
he didn't even call on his audience to continue the street
demonstrations even though that audience had just proved its
readiness for battle by the troublesome journey from Kronstadt
to Petersburg. Lenin merely agitated strongly against the Pro-
visional Government and against the Social-traitors of the
Soviet, and called for the defence of the revolution and for
loyalty to the Bolsheviks.
According to Lunacharsky, he, Lunacharsky, had been pass-
ing Kshesinskaya's house at exactly that time. During the
ovation given Lenin by the Kronstadters, Lenin called him over
and suggested that he speak to the crowd. Lunacharsky, always
ablaze with eloquence, didn't wait to be urged and gave a
442 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy
speech on roughly the same lines as Lenin's. Then he led the
Kronstadters towards the centre of the city, in the direction of
the Tauride Palace. On the way this army was joined by the
workers of the Trabochny and Baltic Factories. They were in a
truculent mood. In the columns, headed by bands and sur-
rounded by the curious, there was some extremely strong
language directed at the Capitalist Ministers and the Com-
promisers of the Central Ex. Com. It was clear that Kronstadt
had come out as one man to save the revolution, bringing
ammunition and equipment; only the old and the young had
been left at home.
But just where they were going or what for, they didn't really
know. Lunacharsky had said he had 'brought' the Kronstadters*
But in my opinion they had got stuck somewhere on the Nevsky
or near the Champ de Mars. I don't think Lunacharsky brought
them to the Tauride Palace; as far as I remember they only
appeared there around 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
The movement was also pouring out again apart from the
Kronstadters. From the early morning the working-class
districts were stirring. Around n o'clock a unit of the Vol-
hynian Regiment 'came out', followed by half the i8oth, the
whole ist Machine-Gun Regiment and others. Around noon
firing began at various points of the city not skirmishes or
fights, but firing: partly into the air, partly at people. There was
shooting on the Suvorovsky Prospect, Basil Island, the Kamen-
no-ostrovsky, and especially on the Nevsky near the Sadovoy
and the Liteiny. As a rule it began with a chance shot; panic
would follow; rifles began to go off at random. There were dead
and wounded everywhere. . .
There was absolutely no sign of any plan in the movement of
the 'insurrectionaries'. But there could be no question of
systematically localizing or liquidating the movement. The
Soviet and Government authorities despatched loyal detach-
ments of military cadets, Semyonovskys, and Cossacks. They
paraded and encountered the enemy. But no one dreamed of a
serious battle. At the first shot both sides panicked and scattered
helter-skelter. Passers-by of course got the great bulk of the
bullets. When two columns met each other neither participants
nor spectators could distinguish where either side was. Perhaps only
the Kronstadters had a distinctive look. As for the rest it was all
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 443
muddle, spontaneous and irresistible. But the question is, were
the first shots that started the panic and fighting accidental or
not?
Small, isolated pogroms began. Because of shots from houses,
or with them as a pretext, mass-searches were conducted by
soldiers and sailors. The searches were a pretext for looting.
Many shops suffered, mainly wine and food shops and tobacco-
nists. Various groups began to arrest people on the streets at
random.
Around 4 o'clock, according to rumour, the number of people
wounded or killed already amounted to hundreds. Dead horses
lay here and there.
The Tauride Palace was packed, stifling and full of disorder.
Some mass-meetings were going on in the Catherine Hall, but
there were no sessions.
At 2 o'clock, in the midst of the disorder, a session of the
Soldiers' Section opened in the White Hall, packed with various
armed people. I was detained by some business in the Central
Ex. Com. and wasn't there. Dan reported on the situation and,
to judge by the newspapers, did so in definitely Rightist tones.
But there is no doubt that a good half of these old Soviet
praetorians had a contemptuous and plainly hostile attitude
towards what Dan said. The movement against the Coalition
was gathering too much momentum. The only thing that
helped the Star Chamber was that by the will of fate it was
directed simultaneously at the Soviets. It was this fact too that
ought to make the 'rebels' and their Bolshevik inspirers lose their
footing.
The Soldiers' Section dispersed without having taken any
practical decisions, and the White Hall had to be cleared for a
joint session of the Worker-Soldier and the Peasant Central
Ex. Corns. From the city, as before, came news of more and
more demonstrations, clashes, shootings, people killed.
I was not at the beginning of the meeting but stayed in the
rooms of the Central Ex. Com. It was reported that a workers'
army of 30,000 men was coming out of the Putilov Factory.
There was talk of two enormous fighting columns with artillery
and machine-guns on the Nevsky and the Liteiny. The situation
444- THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 19x7
had become extremely grave; there was no apparent way of
preventing a possible general pogrom and tremendous blood-
shed.
But suddenly a heavy downpour fell on Petersburg. One
minute two three, and the 'fighting columns' succumbed.
Officers who witnessed it told me later that the insurgent
soldiers ran off as though under fire and filled up all the doors
and gateways. Rain had routed the insurgent army. The
demonstrating masses could no longer find their leaders, nor the
leaders their sub-commanders. The officers said that the army
could no longer be reorganized and that the last chance for any
systematic operations had completely vanished after the down-
pour. But the unruly elements remained. . .
It was around 5 o'clock. Someone hurried into the Ex. Com.
rooms and reported that the Kronstadters had come to the
Palace. Under the leadership of Roshal and Raskolnikov they
filled all the square and a large part of the Shpalerny. They were
in an ugly, fighting mood. They were asking for the Socialist
Ministers, and a whole mass of them was pouring into the
Palace.
I went to the meeting-hall. From the windows of the crowded
corridor looking on to the square I saw an endless multitude
packing the entire space as far as the eye could reach. Armed
men were climbing through the open windows. A mass of
placards and banners with the Bolshevik slogans (of June gth)
rose above the crowd. As before in the left corner of the square
the black, ugly masses of armoured cars loomed up.
I forced my way into the ante-chamber, which was completely
packed; lines and groups of people, in the midst of the noise and
clanking of arms, for some reason or other were excitedly push-
ing back and forth. Suddenly someone tugged at my sleeve.
Lesha Emelyanova, an old SR friend recently back from prison
and now on the staff of Izuestiya, stood before me. She was pale
and trembling violently.
*Go quickly Chernov's been arrested the Kronstadters
here in the courtyard! Quickly, quickly. . . They may kill
him! 9
I rushed towards the doors. Just then I saw Raskolnikov push-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 445
ing his way towards the Catherine Hall. I seized him by the
arm and pulled him back with me, explaining on the way what
the trouble was : if Raskolnikov couldn't pacify the Kronstadters,
who could? But it wasn't easy to get out: there was a crush in
the porch. Raskolnikov followed me obediently, but answered
me ambiguously. I was perplexed and began to lose my temper.
We had already pushed through to the steps when Trotsky,
shouldering aside the crowd, overtook us. He was also hurrying
to Chernov's rescue.
It seemed that this was what had happened. When the
Central Ex. Com. was told that the Kronstadters were demand-
ing the Socialist Ministers, the Praesidium sent Chernov out to
them. No sooner had he appeared at the top of the steps of the
entry- way that the Kronstadters became very aggressive; shouts
arose from the armed crowd of many thousands: 'Search him!
See whether he's armed!'
'In that case I won't speak/ Chernov declared, and started
back into the Palace.
Then the crowd got relatively calm. Chernov made a short
speech about the Government crisis, sharply condemning the
Cadets who had left the Government. The speech was inter-
rupted by shouts of a Bolshevik character. And towards the end
some enterprising person in the crowd demanded that the
Socialist Ministers at once declare the land national property,
etc.
There arose a frantic din. The crowd, brandishing its
weapons, began to surge forward. A group of people tried to get
Chernov inside the Palace, but strong hands seized him and put
him in an open car standing close to the steps at the right of the
porch. Chernov was declared under arrest as a hostage.
A group of workers immediately rushed off to report all this
to the Central Ex. Com.; bursting into the White Hall they
produced a panic by shouting out: 'Comrade Chernov has been
arrested by the mob ! They're tearing him to pieces right now !
To the rescue! Everyone out into the street!'
Chkheidze, restoring order with difficulty, proposed that
Kamenev, Martov, Lunacharsky, and Trotsky should hasten to
rescue Chernov. I don't know where the others were, but
Trotsky got there in time.
Raskolnikov and I had stopped on the top step near the right
446 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
side of the porch when Trotsky, two steps below us, climbed
up on the bonnet of a car. The mob was in turmoil as far as the
eye could reach. Around the motor-car a number of sailors with
rather savage faces were particularly violent. Chernov, who
had plainly lost all presence of mind, was in the back seat.
All Kronstadt knew Trotsky and, one would have thought,
trusted him. But he began to speak and the crowd did not sub-
side. If a shot had been fired nearby at that moment by way of
provocation, a tremendous slaughter might have occurred, and
all of us, including perhaps Trotsky, might have been torn to
shreds. Trotsky, excited and not finding words in this savage
atmosphere, could barely make the nearest rows listen to him.
But what was he saying?
'You hurried over here, Red Kronstadters, as soon as you
heard the revolution was in danger! Red Kronstadt has once
again shown itself to be the champion of the proletarian cause.
Long live Red Kronstadt, the glory and pride of the revolu-
tion! . . .'
Nevertheless he was listened to with hostility. When he tried
to pass on to Chernov himself, the ranks around the car again
began raging.
'You've come to declare your will and show the Soviet that
the working class no longer wants to see the bourgeoisie in
power. But why hurt your own cause by petty acts of violence
against casual individuals? Individuals are not worthy of your
attention. . . Every one of you has demonstrated his devotion to
the revolution. Every one of you is ready to lay down his life
for it. I know that. Give me your hand, Comrade ! Your hand,
brother!'
Trotsky stretched his hand down to a sailor who was protest-
ing with especial violence. But the latter firmly refused to re-
spond, and moved his hand the one which was not holding a
rifle out of reach. If these were people alien to the revolution
or outright provocateurs, to them Trotsky was just as bad as
Chernov, or much worse: they might be waiting only for an
opportunity to settle accounts with both advocate and defen-
dant. But I think they were Kronstadt naval ratings who had,
in their own judgement, accepted Bolshevik ideas. It seemed to
me that the sailor, who must have heard Trotsky in Kronstadt
more than once, now had a real feeling that he was a traitor:
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 447
he remembered his previous speeches and was confused. Let
Chernov go? Then why had he been summoned?
Not knowing what to do, the Kronstadters released Chernov.
Trotsky took him by the arm and hurried him off into the
Palace. But I, remaining on the scene of events, made a row
with Raskolnikov.
'Take away your army at once! 5 I demanded. 'You must see
that the most senseless fights may occur. What can be the
political objective of their staying here, and of this whole move-
ment? They have made their will clear enough, and there's
nothing to be done here by violence ! You know the question of
the Government is being debated, and everything going on in
the streets is simply killing the possibility of a favourable
decision. 5
Raskolnikov looked at me angrily and mumbled some mono-
syllables. He obviously didn 5 t know just what more he could do
at the Tauride Palace with his Kronstadters, but he clearly
didn't want to take them away.
I understood quite well what a spontaneous movement was.
But I completely failed to understand Raskolnikov at that
moment. He had obviously not finished saying something he
knew but didn't want to tell me. I failed to understand him
just because at that time I didn't know the real position of his
commanders, the Bolshevik Central Committee: I didn't know
that for at least a month the Bolsheviks had been completely
prepared (not in words, but in deeds) to take all power into their
own hands e in favourable conditions'. Raskolnikov had his
instructions.
However, though the movement was tremendous, the over-
turn didn't come off. This reflected the whole futility of vacil-
lating and half-hearted decisions at critical moments. In view
of the Chernov incident and Trotsky's speech, Raskolnikov
could now no longer lead his army straight to the Central Ex.
Com. and liquidate it. The moment had passed, the mood was
destroyed, the impulse was confused; the affair might miscarry
especially in view of the armoured cars looming up to the left.
Raskolnikov and Roshal, after all, had received only con-
ditional, not direct, orders. But it was also impossible for the
crowd of many thousands, who had been fetched to 'save the
revolution', to stand still and do nothing. The mood might
448 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
easily turn against the Kronstadt generals themselves, as it
might have turned against Trotsky.
Irritated by my brush with Raskolnikov, I was on the point
of climbing up on the bonnet of the same car, even though I
knew it would do no good. But at that moment Roshal jumped
up there himself. Lisping like a child, in ingratiating language,
he extolled the Kronstadters for having performed their
revolutionary duty and then invited them to go away and rest
at points shown to them, where the army would be given food
and shelter. But the gallant Kronstadters must remain on the
alert: at any moment they might again be needed by the
revolution and they would be summoned once more.
I didn't wait for the results. I left for the room where the
Central Ex. Com. met.
But I quickly got bored and went out to e the people'. The
crowd in the Catherine Hall seemed to be getting a little thin-
ner, but generally speaking there was the same scene of
crowded, senseless fuss. The square was also emptier: the
Kronstadters really had vanished somewhere. But there were
new crowds. . .
Just then a particularly dense crowd appeared at the left-hand
gates opening on to the Shpalerny. Columns of soldiers with a
rather special appearance were entering the square. Dirty and
dusty, the soldiers, soaked by the rain, had a look of active
service, with their packs on their backs, their rolled-up great-
coats slung round their shoulders, their mess-tins and cooking-
pots. The crowd made way before their dense columns. Taking
up the whole courtyard of the palace, from one gate to the
other, the detachment halted and began settling itself in the
most businesslike way : they stacked their rifles, shook out their
wet coats, and piled up their belongings.
This was the I76th Reserve Regiment, the same as I had
heard a detailed report of two days before at the above-men-
tioned Interdistrict Conference. This was another Bolshevik
'insurrectionary 5 army. At the request of the Bolshevik organiza-
tions, the regiment had marched from Krasnoe Selo to 'defend
the revolution'.
Well, and what did this remarkable regiment intend to do?
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 449
And where were the leaders who had called it out for some
purpose or other? The leaders were invisible. And the regiment
once again had no idea of what it should do. Doubtless after its
hard march it would not object to a rest. But nevertheless it
must have been aware that this was not what it had been sum-
moned for. No one, however, ordered it to do anything.
Dan appeared at the door of the palace. It was evidently to
him that a delegation of the regiment, sent to reconnoitre, had
spoken. Dan had come out to 'welcome' the regiment. And he
gave it something to do. The regiment, of its own free will, had
performed a difficult march to defend the revolution? Splendid.
The revolution, in the person of the central organ of the Soviet,
was really in danger. Reliable protection for the Central Ex.
Com. must be organized. And Dan personally, with the co-
operation of the officers of the 'insurrectionary' regiment,
posted some of these mutinous soldiers as sentries at various
points in the Palace, for the defence of those against whom the
insurrection was aimed.
Yes, such things happen in history! But it's hardly likely that
history of that kind will repeat itself. Dan didn't know what
sort of a regiment this was and why it had come, and he found
a use for it. And the regiment didn't know what it was to do
when it reached its destination, received no other orders, and
unprotestingly put itself at the service of the enemy. Now it was
all over: the regiment was scattered, its soldiers' minds were
hopelessly muddled and it could not be turned back again into a
fighting force of the uprising.
This was around 7 o'clock. I went back to the meeting. There
was nothing new there. Suddenly like an arrow the news sped
through the meeting: the men from the Putilov Factory had
come, 30,000 of them, bearing themselves extremely aggres-
sively; some of them had burst into the Palace looking for
Tsereteli, who at that moment was not in the hall. They were
said to have hunted all over the Palace for him without finding
him. The hall was full of excitement, hubbub and frenzied
yelling. Just then a crowd of about forty workers, many of them
armed, burst in tempestuously. The deputies leaped from their
seats. Some failed to show adequate courage and self-control.
450 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
One of the workers, a classical sans-culotte> in a cap and a short
blue blouse without a belt, with a rifle in his hand, leaped up on
to the speakers' platform. He was quivering with excitement and
rage, stridently shouting out incoherent words and shaking his
rifle:
'Comrades! How long must we workers put up with
treachery? You're all here debating and making deals with the
bourgeoisie and the landlords. . . You're busy betraying the
working class. Well, just understand that the working class
won't put up with it! There are 30,000 of us all told here from
Putilov. We're going to have our way. All power to the Soviets !
We have a firm grip on our rifles ! Your Kerenskys and Tsere-
telis are not going to fool us!'
Chkheidze, in front of whose nose the rifle was dancing about,
showed complete self-control. In answer to the hysterics of the
sans-ciilotte, pouring out his hungry proletarian soul, the chair-
man tranquilly leaned down from his height and pushed into
the worker's quivering hand a manifesto, printed the evening
before:
'Here, please take this, Comrade, read it. It says here what
you and your Putilov comrades should do. Please read it
and don't interrupt our business. Everything necessary is said
there.'
The manifesto said that all those who had gone out into the
street should go back home, otherwise they would be traitors to
the revolution. The ruling Soviet clique and Chkheidze could
think of nothing else to propose to the rank-and-file at a moment
of extreme tension.
The baffled sans-culotte, not knowing what else to do, took the
appeal and then without much difficulty was got off the plat-
form. His comrades too were quickly 'persuaded' to leave the
hall. Order was restored and the incident liquidated. . . But to
this day I can still see that sans-culotte on the platform of the
White Hall, shaking his rifle in self-oblivion in the faces of the
hostile leaders of the democracy', trying in torment to express
the will, the longings, and the fury of the authentic proletarian
lower depths, who scented treachery but were powerless to fight
against it. This was one of the finest scenes of the revolution.
And with Chkheidze's gesture one of the most dramatic.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 45!
The speakers were holding forth again. It was as boring as
before in the hall : everybody was conscious of the total futility
of all these polemics.
It was interesting to watch the mood of the little peasants.
Like the praetorians of the Soldiers' Section, they were not in
the least averse from driving the bourgeoisie from power and
furthering the revolution, that is, strictly, the agrarian revolu-
tion. All power, after all, had long been in Soviet-peasant hands
so why be afraid of proclaiming the fact? This is how the little
peasants talked in intimate corners. But that was only one side
of the matter. The other was that they were mortally afraid of
the Bolsheviks and the Internationalists, traitors to the father-
land, lackeys of the Kaiser, universal destroyers, atheists, who
talked gibberish about class war and international proletarian
solidarity. The peasants were peasants, and the more
substantial they were the more clearly their speech and
whole appearance showed their old reactionary anti-Semitic
principles.
It was this fear of Bolshevism that the leaders of the Soviet
majority were playing on. They could not explain their theories
to the peasants, but it wasn't so difficult to scare them with
Lenin and anarchy. They clung tight to the Star Chamber
without understanding its politics in order not to fall into the
maw of the Bolsheviks.
I was called away from the meeting to talk to somebody. The
corridors and rooms had become much less crowded by evening.
The Putilov workers had soon gone away. On their way to the
Palace they had been caught in the rain and were wet to the
skin, and this probably influenced them more strongly than any
arguments. The great majority of the Kronstadters had also
gone directly from the Tauride Palace to the Nicholas Embank-
ment, boarded their ships and gone home. Only two or three
thousand of them were left, with Raskolnikov and Roshal in
command; they were somewhere around Kshesinskaya's house
and the Peter-Paul Fortress.
Altogether, according to the rumours that reached the c centre
of the revolution 5 , by evening the streets had quickly grown
calm. The blood and filth of this senseless day had had a sober-
ing effect by evening, and evidently evoked a swift reaction.
Nothing was heard of further 'demonstrations'. The 'uprising'
452 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
had definitely crumbled. There remained only the excesses of a
wanton mob. There were some 400 killed and wounded.
Our session still continued. The speeches dragged on. The
darkness drew on imperceptibly, and in the glass roof in-
visible little lamps began to burn brightly all round the
hall.
Martov was speaking, as intelligently as usual, and per-
suasively, but in an 'unrevolutionary' tone, trying to persuade
the Soviet majority to take power.
In the endless list of speakers my turn came. I spoke in support
of Martov, so badly, boringly, and confusedly, that it's painful
to recall.
I don't remember that Trotsky spoke, but he was there, sitting
in a small group with Lunacharsky and some others on the
extreme upper right benches. This little cluster had been the
target of savage catcalls and ferocious looks from the rest of
the hall throughout the day. But now the little group had
melted away. I saw that Lunacharsky was left alone. Some-
thing stirred in me, a spirit of protest and solidarity : under the
spiteful looks of the Mamelukes I went right across the hall
to Lunacharsky, sat down beside him and began to talk to
him.
'Why don't you speak? After all, they'll take this for the
meekness of a schoolboy who has been up to mischief.'
Tm on the list,' he replied, 'but I don't feel like speaking.
Do you think I ought to?'
'Without any doubt.'
Lunacharsky went over to Chkheidze to see whether his turn
was coming soon. Only two or three people were before him.
We sat and waited, idly chatting.
Suddenly a rifle-shot rang out, very close, and then another.
Someone yelled out hysterically from the empty galleries some-
thing about some shootings. The hall was filled with panic and
hubbub. The little peasants and the intellectuals jumped up
and dashed wildly about. It was ludicrous and disgusting to see
the scared 'leaders of the revolution'.
These shots were all that happened. It was explained later
that they were accidental : apparently some horses had broken
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 453
loose in the square and caused an alarm in the midst of which a
few rifles had gone off of their own accord.
Chkheidze gave the floor to Lunacharsky. He spoke well, as
he always did, but without conviction or fire. He attributed the
popular movement to general causes and demanded their
removal by a decision on the Government question. He looked
exhausted and dejected. He was evidently beginning to suffer a
real hangover.
A break was announced, and everyone made for the garden,
or filled the buffet and the cool rooms of the Ex. Com. It was
about 1 1 o'clock. The Tauride Palace looked as it did during
the first days of the revolution, in the dead of night. Along the
endless walls of the Catherine Hall and the ante-chamber,
soldiers slept beside their stacked-up arms.
There was a crush in the buffet, around the tea and sand-
wiches. I had squeezed myself into a seat at the table when
Lunacharsky hurried over to me. Just then I was talking to some
outsider about the day!$ events. Without sparing either irony or
merriment, I turned to Lunacharsky:
'So, Anatol Vasilievich, those 20,000 were completely peace-
ful people?'
Lunacharsky turned on his heel and walked away from me.
More than once that day I had already poked fun a bad habit
I have at his debut as a regimental commander. But just now
my joke evidently was out of tune with his mood. I followed him
and asked what it was all about.
It was something really sensational. Nothing more nor less
than that reports had been received about Lenin's connexion
with the German General Staff. The newspapers had documents
intended for publication the next day.
The Praesidium was hurriedly taking steps to prevent it
before the 'responsible' Soviet spheres considered the matter.
Tsereteli and others were feverishly conferring on the 'phone
with Premier Lvov and the newspaper editors.
It goes without saying that not one of the people really con-
nected with the revolution doubted for a moment the absurdity
of these rumours. But my God ! what talk began amongst the
majority, the hangers-on, and the average ignoramuses from
454 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
town and country. In any case our Star Chamber correctly
evaluated both the degree of seriousness and the essence of this
contemptible affair.
The session reopened. Only three or four regular speakers
were left. But there were also some emergency ones : to the stormy
patriotic raptures of the Mamelukes, with their angry glances
directed at us, there spoke c a representative of the isth Army 5 ,
just rushed in by car from Dvinsk at a summons from the
Soviet authorities. This was the fairly well-known Right Men-
shevik Kuchin, who was daring to speak in the name of the
army. Making an impression by his martial 'trench-like' appear-
ance, he called the demonstrations, organized against the
Government and the Soviet itself by irresponsible and sinister
elements, a stab in the back of the army, which was straining all
its efforts in the struggle for the freedom of the fatherland. He
spoke of the readiness of the front to c defend the revolution' by
all its means, stopping at nothing in order to liquidate the
disorders.
Oho ! The front was getting involved !
Kuchin's speech was not the only one of its kind. Other
couriers from some units stationed in the suburbs also spoke
along the same lines. . .
Around then someone reported that two or three hours pre-
viously the Bolshevik Pravda had been destroyed. It was plain
that the affair was taking an abrupt turn.
The initiator of the attack on Pravda was the conscientious
Minister of Justice, Pereverzev. He thought it timely to pick the
evening of July 4th to give an order for the liberation of the
printing-shop occupied (I think on my order) by Pravda in the
first few days of the revolution.
No sooner said than done. Then and there a detachment had
been sent to the printing-shop and offices; they arrested every-
one present, confiscated manuscripts, documents, etc. All this
was taken to the Staff in a district where the Minister of Justice
himself resided. He probably did this in connexion with the
reports at hand of Lenin's having been hired by the German
General Staff.
After the legal authorities the mob began lording it on the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 455
Pravda premises. 'War-wounded' and other Black Hundred
elements completely destroyed the editorial offices; they tore
down, smashed, and burnt everything.
It was plain that things had taken an abrupt turn.
Numerous arrests were reported to be taking place that night
throughout the city. From everywhere dozens of all kinds of
people 'suspected of shooting 5 and of inciting to riot were being
taken to the same General Staff. Soldiers, workers, and sailors
especially were being seized on the streets and at home. They
were interrogated there and sent to different prisons. Weapons
were being brought in from all sides revolvers, rifles, and
machine-guns.
The session continued. The speakers were already coming to
an end. Suddenly a noise was heard in the distance. It came
nearer and nearer. The measured tramping of thousands of feet
was already clearly audible in the surrounding halls. . . The
hall again grew agitated. Faces looked anxious, deputies leaped
from their seats. What was it? Where was this new danger to the
revolution coming from?
But Dan appeared on the platform as though out of the
ground. He was so filled with glee that he tried without success
to conceal it, at least partially, by assuming a somewhat more
serene, objective,, and balanced expression.
'Comrades!' he called out, 'be calm! There is no danger!
Regiments loyal to the revolution have arrived to defend the
Central Ex. Com.'
Just then in the Catherine Hall a powerful Marseillaise
thundered forth. Enthusiasm in the hall the faces of the
Mamelukes lit up. Squinting triumphantly at the Left, they
took hands in an outburst of emotion and standing with bared
heads ecstatically chanted the Marseillaise.
6 A classic scene of the beginning of a counter-revolution!'
Martpv snapped angrily.
The Left sat there motionless, watching with scornful faces
the triumph of the victors.
Certain 'loyal' units had indeed appeared in the Tauride
Palace I think a battalion of the Izmailovsky Regiment, and
of course the Semyonovskys and the Preobrazhenskys. As a
456 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
matter of fact this had very little value. At night, when the
capital was completely tranquil, they could be brought over to
the Tauride Palace in complete safety 'to defend the revolution
and protect the Soviet'. We know that these were units as yet
untouched by Bolshevism, who were against any 'demonstration',
in spite of the change in mood that was taking place. Bringing
them over was worth very little.
But it was also quite useless. The revolution, in the person of
its 'plenipotentiary organ', was not threatened by anyone at all.
But in case of real danger, of an attack these regiments would
doubtless not have endured a single volley. The 'classic scene of
counter-revolution 3 was not a cause but merely a symptom of the
radical change in the situation. But facts remained facts.
The commander of the newly-arrived units mounted the
platform. The deputies, with sidelong glances at our little
group, gave him an enthusiastic reception. And he replied with
a speech about their devotion to the revolution and readiness to
defend it with their blood. It was a most remarkable speech : it
reflected all the absurd contradictions and incomparable con-
fusions in the relationships of this revolutionary period.
The commander spoke of his loyalty to the Soviet and his
readiness to defend it with his life : he called the Soviet the sole
authority to which the army owed obedience. No party centres
or separate groups! Only the central Soviet organ, which was
called to decide the fate of the revolution. Not a word about the
Provisional Government, Lvov, or Tereshchenko, as though
they had never existed. All power was laid at the feet of the
Soviet. But did not the 'rebels' insist on this very point?
What was confusing here was only the form* For in essence the
'rebels' were demanding a dictatorship of the Soviet which would
carry out their immutable programme : peace, bread, and land.
They demanded all power for it, and insisted that it use that
power as a worker-peasant Government should, while the
'loyalists' acknowledged the Soviet as a dictator without con-
ditions; they blindly followed their blind leaders and were ready
to do (without risk to themselves!) absolutely everything it
commanded.
As on the evening before, the Bolsheviks were not present at
this session. Their leaders again spent the night at their Central
Committee. This was a very hard night for them. Pravda had
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 457
been destroyed; the slandering of Lenin was taking unheard-of
forms and the movement for which they had accepted practical
responsibility was obviously and very ingloriously collapsing.
That night in their Central Committee the Bolsheviks came to
the decision fi to end the demonstration, in view of the fact that
the workers' and soldiers* actions of July 4th and 5th have
forcefully emphasized the danger in which the country has been
placed by the disastrous policy of the Provisional Govern-
ment^!).
So everything was over. The Mamelukes had triumphed. For
the time being the only thing to do was disperse and go home.
Through the glass roof the hall had been full of daylight for
some time. It was about 4 o'clock.
The courtyard, drenched in the rising sun, was empty and
calm. The armoured cars were no longer there; they had been
moved into the garden behind the Palace. Nor were there any
signs on the streets of the recent tempest.
I don't remember where I spent the 'night' that morning.
Wednesday, July th. That day all the Petersburg newspapers
actually did come out without the material prepared in the
editorial offices on Lenin's treachery. Only one newspaper dis-
obeyed Lvov and Tsereteli, so that the material on Lenin
became public property that day anyhow, and on the next day
it was reprinted by the whole bourgeois gutter press.
But just what kind of material had zealots of the truth got
hold of in connexion with this monstrous affair? And what were
they called, those patriots who had unmasked Lenin as a
traitor?
One was Pankratov, an old inmate of the Schlusselburg
Fortress, now an SR, known in the '17 revolution for nothing
more than this; and the other was the Second Duma-ite
Alexinsky, 1 whose name speaks for itself and with exhaustive
1 Alexinsky, Grigorii Alexeyevich (1879- ) : an ex-Bolshevik, the most pop-
ular speaker for the Bolshevik wing of the Social-Democratic fraction in the
Second Duma and a former collaborator of Lenin's. At the outbreak of the First
World War he made a sharp turn to the Right, becoming a 'Social-patriot' and even
working with monarchists. In 1917 he was refused admission into the Soviet, and
went to extreme lengths in his struggle against the Bolsheviks. He left Russia in
1918 and became an ideologist of the * White' reaction to Bolshevism. (Ed.)
458 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij
fullness characterizes the value of the material a priori. I refer
to them to show the level of baseness of our liberal press, which
now began to speak of Lenin's venality as documentarily
established.
Messrs. Alexinsky and Pankratov were publishing a
thoroughly 'official 3 document. This was the record of the
interrogation of a certain Lieut. Yermolenko in Staff Head-
quarters, dated May i6th, 1917. Yermolenko testified that he
had been 'transferred 5 by the Germans to our rear in order to
agitate for an immediate separate peace. He accepted this
assignment on the insistence of some 'Comrades'. But he was in-
formed in the German General Staff that such an agitation
was already being carried on in Russia by other German agents,
among them Lenin. Lenin had been commissioned to try by all
his means to 'undermine the confidence of the Russian people in
the Provisional Government'. Money for agitation and instruc-
tions were being received from someone in the German Con-
sulate in Stockholm. . .
No one knows whether an obscure person by the name of
Yermolenko, who agreed to become a German agent, ever really
existed, or whether this kind of document was ever really sent
to the staff of the Minister of War, Kerensky, from the head of
the General Staff. It may have been fabricated completely in
Palace Square, where Black Hundred officers swarmed around
Kerensky. But helpful hands evidently got hold of this paper
from there for Alexinsky. He surely had an established reputa-
tion! He would surely put the paper to the right use!
And Alexinsky published the document as an incontrovertible
proof of Lenin's treachery.
It would seem to have been unusually strange for such a
'record' to serve as a proof of this kind in the eyes of the 'public'.
It would seern that any conclusions might be drawn from this
document except that of the Bolshevik leader's corruption. It
would seem, in particular, that it added precisely nothing to the
daily tubs of slander from the gutter press.
But against the background of the July events, and the frenzied
malice of bourgeois and Right-Soviet elements, against the
background of the terrible hangover of the 'insurgents' the
published document made a quite special and very powerful
impression. No one wanted to study it in substance. There was a
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 459
document about corruption and that was enough. And for the
reaction that had begun it served as just such a factor as had the
senseless bloodshed of the day before.
No further material at all was published during the days that
followed. But for the period that was beginning even this
proved sufficient. No quotations are needed for one to imagine
the war-dance that began in the bourgeois press, based on the
proof of Lenin's corruption. The Tsarist Secret Police and real
agents of the German General Staff were undoubtedly trying
to play on the July disorders. All sorts of riff-raff in the capital
were trying to exploit the confusion, muddle, brawls, and shifts
in mood of the day before. But of course it was the Bolsheviks
who were unanimously declared to be the culprits for all
crimes. And on July 5th, the first day of the reaction, the 'big
press' was filled with a campaign of Bolshevik-baiting.
That day the Novqya %hizn came out with only a few copies,
looking very miserable : the printing-shop had been seized the
night before, and another one had given us refuge. I was dis-
turbed at not going to the editorial offices for a second day.
That day I decided to appear without fail.
This is how that Wednesday reappears to me now, three and a
half years later:
There were no trams, but generally speaking the streets had
gone back to normal. There were almost no crowds or street
meetings: the shops were almost all open. Now and then
patrols, led by officers, would be met. In the shops and in the
streets there was talk of the German money Lenin had received.
Bitter anger with the Bolsheviks was sharply expressed.
The Tauride Palace also looked almost ordinary. I think
the encampment in the Catherine Hall of the evening before
was gone by around noon. But the armoured cars with their
crews and guards were still standing in the garden behind the
Palace.
There was no session of the committee, but the Bureau was to
meet. There were lots of deputies in the Central Ex. Com.'s
rooms, again unoccupied. Some reports came in that armed
people were again appearing at the factories and demanding
that work be stopped. Dan insisted that someone at once write
460 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
an appeal to the workers against strikes and new demonstra-
tions: he, Dan, was too exhausted to write the proclamation
himself.
Someone took it in hand and for about twenty minutes
plugged away at it. But Dan, without mincing his words,
declared the result unsuitable and as a last resort insisted that I
write the appeal, which I did. Dan seized the sheet of paper and
hurried off with it. I think this was the sole instance during the
six months of the Coalition in which I collaborated with the
Soviet majority.
As before there were no Bolsheviks in the Palace. As far as I
recall neither Trotsky nor Lunacharsky was visible. The Left
was weakly represented. . .
But suddenly there was an outburst of indignation amongst
the Left wing. It appeared that the summoning of the troops from the
front for the pacification of Petersburg was an accomplished fact. Some
'scratch detachment 5 , of unknown composition and leadership,
was moving on Petersburg.
We recall Kerensky's solemn declaration that troops were
moving and would move only from the rear to the front to
defend the freedom that had been won., and never in the
opposite direction, against the citizens of a free country. This
was how these phrases were now being justified.
In the Bureau an extraordinary commission was of course
appointed to investigate the events of the preceding days. The
question of calling out troops to pacify the capital was raised.
There were only two of us Menshevik-Internationalists in the
Bureau Martov and I. We fought stubbornly and well. In the
given situation, when the 'mood' might easily lead at any moment
to an anti-Bolshevik, and then an anti-Soviet pogrom, there was
no question but that front-line troops might serve as a factor in
the insurrection and the source of a blood-bath : after all, we
knew neither the composition of these troops, their leaders, nor
their 'mood'. Martov and I demanded that they should be
stopped and sent back.
Once more there were no Bolsheviks at the meeting, but
Zinoviev turned up in the midst of the debates on the troops.
Without sitting down he went straight to Chkheidze and asked
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 461
for the floor on an emergency matter. He looked wretched, up-
set and confused, and was plainly in a great hurry.
'Comrades, a horrible thing has happened. A monstrous
slander has appeared in the press and is already having its
effect on the most ignorant and backward strata of the masses.
There is no need for me to explain to you the meaning of this
piece of baseness and its possible consequences. This is another
Dreyfus affair, which Black Hundred elements are trying to
stage. But its significance is hundreds of times greater. It is
bound up not only with the interests of our revolution, but also
with the entire European working-class movement. There is no
need for me to try to prove that the Central Ex. Com. ought to
take the most resolute measures to rehabilitate Comrade Lenin
and suppress all the conceivable results of this slander. I've been
charged to come here in the name of the Central Committee of
our party.'
Zinoviev ended, and without sitting down waited for the
majority's reaction. Many faces had an ironical look, others
showed complete indifference. But the answer of the whole
Central Ex. Com. was already predetermined by the Star
Chamber's preventive measures of the night before. Chkheidze
replied that the situation was clear to all present and that all
measures within the Central Ex. Com.'s power would of course
be taken without delay. Chkheidze's tone was icy as though he
were addressing a grown-up schoolboy in disgrace. But there
was nothing left for Zinoviev to do but express satisfaction at the
assurances he had received. Then he hurried off; we never saw
either him or Lenin again in Petersburg until 'October' itself.
Yet another investigating Commission was formed then and
there, for Lenin's rehabilitation. I don't know anything about
its activities. But I recall that two days later there were dis-
cussions of some other elections to this Commission: the 'incon-
venience' emerged that its original membership consisted only
of Jews, five in all including Dan, Lieber, and Gots. The re-
habilitation of Lenin by a Commission like that could serve only
as the source of another Black Hundred campaign against the
whole Soviet for concealing high treason. . .
However, I don't think there were any new elections, and the
matter died down of itself. In any case, the Commission under-
stood that what it had to investigate was not the question of
462 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
whether Lenin had sold Russia, but only the sources of the
slander. . . There was much talk in those days, amongst other
things, about the extreme disorder of Pravda's finances; the
sources of its income in the shape of donations and collections
could not always be established with precision; and the
possibility could not be excluded that unknown elements, even
of German origin, gambling on the Bolsheviks, might palm off
some sum of money or other on them without their knowledge.
That was always possible with any party or newspaper in the
situation of the Bolsheviks and Pravda. A complete rehabilitation
in this respect too would have been an indispensable result of
the activities of an investigating commission, but as far as I
know nothing like it was ever established concerning Lenin and
his party.
Meanwhile rumours had begun to come in that the mob, with
a Black Hundred tendency, was again getting out of hand in
the city. Certain groups were beginning to seize Bolsheviks in
the streets. It was said that some had been beaten up.
Some units from the city and suburbs began to appear in Staff
Headquarters to place themselves at the disposal of the 'legal
authorities', and throughout the day these 'legal authorities'
carried out numerous arrests. Russian gaols, after a pause of
four months, were again filled with 'politicals'. And Dr. Manu-
khin, who until now had been treating only Tsarist dignitaries,
was now enriched by a great many new prison patients from
amongst the Bolsheviks.
Alarming news also came in about the Kronstadters. We
know that most of them had gone off home in their ships the
night before, but two or three thousand had remained in Peters-
burg. After hanging about in Trinity Square for a while, around
Kshesinskaya's house, the Kronstadters, led by Raskolnikov and
Roshal, decided that it would be a good idea to go to the Peter-
Paul Fortress. Of course they were not admitted, but without
much difficulty they occupied the Fortress by force and became
masters of the situation there. But exactly what was to be done
with the conquered Fortress, once again neither the army nor its
leaders had any idea. It was a 'base', just 'in case'. They broke
into the arsenal, duly armed themselves, and put their weapons
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 463
into readiness for battle. But there was nothing else to do, and
the Kronstadters spent the night quite peacefully.
Nevertheless the seizure of a fortress under the leadership of
Bolshevik fighting commanders was a manifest and very impor-
tant 'disorder'. The Fortress must be freed. And in the morning
the Soviet authorities began to busy themselves with this. In the
name of the Central Ex. Com., General Lieber was sent off to
retake and pacify the fortress; but he didn't go alone. He found
Kamenev and asked him to go too, in the firm belief that it
would be easier for him to talk to Roshal and Raskolnikov.
Kamenev went with Lieber: his Central Committee, in the
early morning atmosphere of July 5th, obviously endorsed this
without any difficulty.
But getting into the Peter-Paul was not so easy. Although the
bridges were open, the entire district from the Palace Square to
the Peter-Paul was held by troops 'loyal to the legitimate
Government' and to 'order', who wouldn't let anyone go from
any point to any other without special passes from the Staff.
This was all very impressive, but I wonder what these 'loyal'
troops would have said if they had been ordered to take the
Peter-Paul Fortress. . ,
In any case Kamenev and Lieber had to go to the General
Staff to get a pass. While Lieber was fussing about there, the
rumour spread amongst the soldiers that the famous Bolshevik
Kamenev was in their midst, and they arrested him without
thinking twice. The sensation filled practically the whole dis-
trict. They began demanding an immediate investigation and
trial there was even a danger that both might be dispensed
with. Lieber rushed to the rescue. But horribile dictu ! he was
taken for Zinoviev and also arrested; the officers behaved even
worse than the soldiers. It was with difficulty that the prisoners
were got into the Staff, where the misunderstanding was cleared
up. The square held by the 'loyal' troops remained in a state of
agitation for a long time. Kamenev and Lieber, somehow
making their way out of the Staff, went off on their mission.
They arrived at the Peter-Paul Fortress around 3 o'clock. Its
garrison had already managed to be 'assimilated' by the con-
querors and, incited by Raskolnikov and Roshal, were not
averse from showing their readiness for some warlike action.
Their hearts had simply been set on fire by the fighting speeches
464 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
of their ardent leaders. Nevertheless Kamenev and Lleber were
able to make an agreement 'honourable to both sides' with the
garrison. It was achieved at the price of the great disappoint-
ment of Raskolnikov and Roshal, but without much trouble :
Kamenev, after all, had brought instructions from the Central
Committee itself, to the effect that the game must be considered
irredeemably lost. The Kronstadt leaders declared that the
sailors, machine-gunners and all the outsiders would leave the *
Fortress and return the weapons taken from the arsenal. But at
the same time they demanded that their own arms should
be left to them, and that they should be guaranteed an un-
impeded and honourable journey home. The Central Ex. Com.
delegates made a vague reply to this. But in any case agreement
to restore order in the Fortress was considered to have been
reached.
Lieber told us all this at this same session of the Bureau,
arriving at the very end of it. He felt like a hero: he had taken
the Fortress, pacified the Kronstadters, and at the risk of his life
saved his bitter enemy from lynching.
There were reports of more fighting and bloodshed somewhere
on the Liteiny. And there was no doubt that it had been origin-
ated by certain fi loyaP units. Lunacharsky had been arrested
near the Staff. He was detained for about two hours, vouched
for and released. In general they were now arresting in the
street anyone who said a word in favour of the Bolsheviks. It
was no longer possible to say that Lenin was an honest man :
you'd be arrested.
Towards evening complete calm had been restored in the
streets. The weather was wonderful. A huge, gay, bourgeois
throng poured into the Nevsky. I can't remember at all where I
spent these hours, but around 1 1 o'clock I went back again to
the Tauride, which looked just as it had the day before. There
were not many people in the halls or at the buffet. The win-
dows were open, but the air was bad; the floor was dirty; there
was no real order; the recent presence of a crowd of outsiders
could be felt. The buffet was still selling tea and sandwiches,
but there were hardly any customers. What was happening in
the Ex. Com.?
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 465
I went in and saw something quite extraordinary. Lieber was
sitting at a table in the Chairman's place. He looked like a
conquering hero, but was trying, with very poor success, to put
on a dour, stony expression. Bogdanov, tranquil and slow-mov-
ing as usual, was sitting on Lieber's right, while Anisimov
could be seen on his left. Further off at the table or on sofas and
in arm-chairs along the walls, there were a few deputies, who
were evidently only looking on. A handful of men, huddled
together, stood facing Lieber. They were Raskolnikov, Roshal,
two or three sailors, and two or three workers.
The whole group recalled wolves at bay or, perhaps more
precisely, rabbits driven into a corner. Raskolnikov, gesticulat-
ing in his sailor's oilskins, was making an anxious, excited, and
incoherent speech on their behalf, pleading with the trio sitting
in front of him:
'Comrades, after all, you can't you must We can't do
that, comrades, you must understand Comrades, after all,
you must make some concessions. . .'
What I saw in front of me was evidently some kind of un-
precedented court of justice. The presiding judge, listening to
his victim, had an immobile, stony expression. He was trying to
appear inexorable and deaf to entreaties, but his eyes flashed
with the enjoyment of power, and his lips struggled with a
triumphant smile.
c Eh! Lieber is playing Marshal Davout,' I thought, remem-
bering Pierre's trial in War and Peace. I sat down at the end of the
table to see what would happen.
It was a question of the Kronstadters. After giving up the
weapons taken from the arsenal, some of them had stayed on in
the Fortress, while others remained in the open not far off,
waiting to be sent home. But the reaction had grown stronger,
and the material strength of the Soviet-bourgeois bloc was
growing hourly. Whatever agreement had been arrived at in the
afternoon, the 'lawful authorities' were now demanding the dis-
arming of the Kronstadters. Raskolnikov naturally refused to
agree to depriving his army of their 'military honour' and was
begging Lieber and his colleagues to let them take their arms back
with them. He swore that this would not cause the slightest
danger to anyone, and that disarming the Kronstadters could
have no practical result whatever, except their humiliation.
466 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Only Lieber spoke for the court. He was Implacable. He kept
saying the same few phrases over and over again :
*I suggest that you should consent at once and go to your
army to make them comply with our request. This decision is
final. There can be no changes or concessions. But in two hours
it will be too late. In two hours decisive steps will be taken;
they won't be in your interests.'
Lieber didn't explain exactly whose decision this was, or what
had provoked it, or what kind of steps would be taken and by
whom. This actually was more effective. Let us have mysterious
hints and frightening words ! Just let these cornered rabbits try
to argue with us !
Raskolnikov and his comrades could not oppose anything to
this but a plea for forgiveness. It was intolerable to see and hear.
Neither side, in the given situation, in fact aroused much
sympathy: all the same, for me one of them was the age-old
enemy, the other a schoolboy who had made a fool of himself.
The fruitless, hollow, and tiresome disputes had already lasted
a quarter of an hour. Suddenly Lieber announced that he had
that moment received new instructions and could no longer
give the respite of two hours he had promised before. Now
Lieber-Davout could only give ten minutes. If at the end of that
time the response was unsatisfactory, then 'decisive steps' would
be taken at once. The reaction was attaining its full strength.
Raskolnikov asked for a pause to consult with his comrades
who were present. The handful of Kronstadters huddled in a
corner. I went out to the buffet. . . There I saw a group of
Bolshevik leaders sitting at a table in the corner, Kamenev,
Trotsky, and three or four others. I never, either before or
after, saw them in such a miserable, confused, and dejected
state. They were evidently not even trying to cheer up. Kame-
nev was sitting at the table completely overwhelmed. Trotsky
came over to me: 'Well, what's going on there?'
I reported the trial in two words.
'But what do you think should be done? What would you
advise?'
I shrugged my shoulders in perplexity. I had not the slightest
idea what to do. It was impossible to say whether Lieber could
or couldn't take decisive steps involving bloodshed or the most
extreme forms of humiliation. But one ought not to go in for
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 467
bloodshed oneself or try to break through by force. Perhaps It
would be better to surrender and hand over the arms.
I don't remember that Raskolnikov and Roshal conferred
with Trotsky and Kamenev during the interval, but when the
trial was resumed, Raskolnikov, as before, would not give a
definite answer, but again made incoherent attempts at per-
suasion. He finished by saying that the Kronstadt leaders would
go off to their army at once and 'do everything possible 5 . The
judges rose again. Lleber finally gave up trying to maintain his
role and broke into a smile.
Raskolnikov looked round, perplexed, for sympathizers and
friends amongst us. His glance rested on me; he came over to
ask a favour of me. He was extremely agitated and afraid of
being arrested, if not on the spot, then in the street; he had no
hope of reaching his Kronstadters. It was essential that he
should be given an escort, or at least reliable documents to
allow him to make his way freely about the city. They had been
told that Bolsheviks were being seized and beaten up. And if
they were recognized. . .
Those around were amused by the excitement of the youthful
commanders. No escort was needed; they would get through.
But they could have passes. They went into the next room, the
office, which was dimly lit and extremely untidy. Passes were
typed out. I was stopped by Roshal, whom I hadn't known
before. Lisping and mumbling like a child, he asked me to look
after his Browning : if they caught him with a weapon it would
be worse.
A fine business indeed !
I went off to spend the night at Manukhin's. Lunacharsky
was already lying on a bed made from some arm-chairs tied
together, next to my sofa. He was very shaken by all that had
happened. Lying in the dark we had a long talk. I was irritated,
and our conversation was not especially agreeable.
'Well, Nikolai Nikolayevich/ he asked me hesitatingly: 'what
d'you think? Ought I to leave Petersburg?'
This made me furious. Leave? Why? What for? Was the
situation so clear that there was nothing left but flight from the
field of battle? Had an irresistible terror already begun? Was
anything serious threatening Bolshevik heads? And if not,
surely they must unravel the knot they had tied themselves?
468 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy
To whom will you leave the masses, whom you have just led
or dragged along after you? What will they think and feel when
they see themselves abandoned? Or will you take your masses
with you as well?
Lunacharsky made no rejoinder. For a long time we went on
tossing about on our couches.
Later I was told that the homeless Kronstadters had wan-
dered about the whole night, not knowing where to go. Their
leaders weren't with them. They were the irresolute, un-
comprehending fragments of an unsuccessful experiment, left to
the mercy of fate. . .
Thursday the 6th. From early morning on, troops withdrawn
from the front were arriving in Petersburg at the Warsaw and
Nicholas Stations. There arrived a part of the I4th Cavalry
Division, the lyyth Izborsky Regiment, the I4th Don Cossacks,
etc. in a word, quite enough to take the capital. They were
drawn up in Palace Square. They were received there by the
Socialist Minister Skobelev and someone else from the Star
Chamber. The triumphant Soviet victors admired their
Praetorian Guards and made welcoming speeches to them from
the windows.
These troops were called a 'scratch detachment 5 , and it was
quite obvious they were a very rich soil for Black Hundred
propaganda. If any enterprising groups were on hand to annoy
this beast, then the blood-bath in Petersburg might turn out to
be far from a joke.
Meanwhile, during these days Black Hundred elements
became very familiar with the whole charm and all the advan-
tages for the cause of reaction of the 'disorders' and killings.
And now, upon the liquidation of the revolt, they did every-
thing they could to prolong and renew the disorders. Looting,
violence, and shooting continued here and there in the capital
on Thursday the 6th too. . . There was still no 'pacification'.
And all the excesses, now aimed at the Left, were inspired
exclusively by the fragments of Tsarism.
The Soviet victors could rest content: once again the Coali-
tion was set on firm foundations. Moreover, it looked as though
the General Staff might at any time initiate a coup d'etat.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 469
However transitory, a great counter-revolutionary upheaval was
nevertheless quite possible. But the Soviet authorities had not
yet turned their gaze to the Right.
On the morning of that same day Gots and Avksentiev 1 had
led a scratch detachment to Kshesinskaya's house and the
Peter-Paul Fortress. The first point was the citadel of the
Bolsheviks, and Kronstadters or other pernicious elements might
still remain in the second. Crossing Trinity Bridge, they were
about to begin a regular siege, and were ready to open fire
when it turned out that the Bolsheviks had already abandoned
Kshesinskaya's house. Bursting into the quiet, empty rooms, the
soldiers arrested a dozen people who happened to be wandering
around the rooms, and thus brought the expedition to a vic-
torious conclusion. As for the Peter-Paul Fortress, there too there
was nothing to justify the campaign. The Kronstadters had left,
the garrison had lost its head and 'repented' ; the Fortress was
'taken 5 without a shot, and order was restored without the
slightest trouble.
The Durnovo villa was taken in the same fashion during the
afternoon. The anarchists had left. A few weapons and a great
deal of literature were found there.
The mood of the workers was indefinite. On the one hand
only half the factories were working; the workers were still
keeping up their previous positions by a strike. In particular the
Putilov Factory was idle, and there were even some unimportant
attempts to come out again into the streets in a demonstration.
But, on the other hand, depression was taking more and more
hold of the proletarian masses. Mass-meetings, which passed
resolutions condemning the 'instigators' of the rebellion, were
taking place in the factories. The advanced groups .were
isolated. The Petersburg proletariat was once more scattered
and unfit for battle.
It was much worse among the soldiers. These ignorant masses,
having received a stunning blow, flung themselves headlong into
the arms of the Black Hundreds. Here all shades of reactionary
agitation were already bearing rich, ripe fruit. Hundreds and
thousands of yesterday's 'Bolsheviks' had been swept out of the
1 Avksentiev, Nikolai Dmitriyevich (1878-1943) : one of the oldest SR leaders.
Very hostile to the October Revolution, he emigrated in 1919, and continued
actively fighting the new Soviet regime. (Ed.)
47O THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
reach of any Socialist parties whatever. And in the eyes of the
garrison even the Soviet banner had definitely begun to waver.
There were mass-meetings in the barracks too, where out-and-
out pogrom speeches were beginning to be heard. The whole
force of anger and 'patriotism 5 was of course coming down on
the Bolsheviks. And the other Socialist elements as well were
now definitely tacked on to the Bolsheviks.
As for the petty bourgeois, philistines, and 'intelligentsia'
there things were really abominable. These strata not only
deliberately lumped together the Bolsheviks and the whole
Soviet, but were also prepared to use any and every method of
struggle against everything Soviet. Here feigned panic and un-
feigned spite reached their extreme limits. A military dictator-
ship, perhaps even a restoration, would have been accepted, if
not with enthusiasm at least without any attempts at resistance.
The word 'Bolshevik' had already become synonymous with
scoundrel, murderer, Judas, and anybody else whom it was
essential to seize, maul, and beat up. And to make it more vivid
a charming phrase was coined in the twinkling of an eye and
put into circulation: an 'ideational Bolshevik'. This was the
unhappy creature who through naivete and obtuseness had
fallen from decent society into the clutches of a gang of bandits
and deserved to be treated indulgently. But there were extremely
few of these.
* * *
Around 9 o'clock on the evening of the 6th, Kerensky came
back from the front and went straight to the session of the
Provisional Government. At this time a formal decision had
already been taken to put all instigators of and participants in
the uprising of July 3rd~4th on trial. But although many
hundreds of people had been arrested the Bolshevik leaders were
still at large. . . On his arrival Kerensky immediately dis-
played great aggressiveness and demanded that decisive
measures should be taken against the Bolsheviks, especially their
leaders.
An order was at once issued for the immediate arrest of Lenin,
Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others. Besides this an order was drawn
up and signed by Lvov for the disbanding of all army units
which had taken part in the revolt and their reassignment at the
discretion of the Minister of War.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 471
At about 2 in the morning the militia came to Lenin's flat, but
it was empty. Lenin, like Zinoviev, had vanished.
Lenin's disappearance under the threat of arrest and trial is
noteworthy in itself. No one in the Central Ex. Com. expected
Lenin to 'get out of the situation' in just this way. His flight
produced an enormous sensation amongst us and was hotly
discussed for a long time in every possible aspect. There were
some Bolsheviks who approved of Lenin's action, but the
majority of the Soviet people were sharply against it. The
Mamelukes and the Soviet leaders loudly boomed forth their
noble indignation. The Opposition kept its opinion to itself.
But this opinion reduced itself to a definite censure of Lenin
from a political and moral point of view. And I personally was
completely in accord.
I've already said (in connexion with Lunacharsky) that first
of all in the given circumstances the shepherd's flight could
not help but be a heavy blow to the sheep. The masses mobilized
by Lenin, after all, were bearing the whole burden of responsi-
bility for the July Days. They had no means of ridding them-
selves of this burden. Some remained in their factories or in their
districts isolated, slandered, in sick depression and unspeak-
able confusion of mind. Others were under arrest and awaiting
retribution for having done their political duty according to
their feeble lights. And the c real author' abandoned his army and
his comrades, and sought personal salvation in flight !
Why was it necessary? Was he in any real danger? Absurd, in
the summer of 1917! There could be no question of lynch-law,
of the death penalty or of hard labour. However biased the
court, however minimal the guarantees of justice nevertheless
Lenin risked absolutely nothing but imprisonment.
Lenin of course may have prized not his life or health, but his
freedom of political action. But in a prison of the time could he
have been more hampered than in his underground retreat?
He could unquestionably have written his fortnightly Pravda
articles from prison, while from the point of view of the political
effect the very fact of Lenin's imprisonment would have had an
enormous positive significance. His flight had only a negative
one.
The example of Lenin's comrades completely confirms all
this. Many of them were arrested and put on trial for the same
472 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
crimes. They safely sat out six weeks or two months in prison
and went on with their writing there. With their martyrs'
haloes they served as an inexhaustible source of agitation
against the Government of Kerensky and Tsereteli. And then,
without the slightest evil consequences for anyone, they re-
turned to their posts.
From a political and moral point of view the flight of Lenin
and Zinoviev, devoid of any practical sense, was reprehensible.
And I'm not surprised that this example was not followed by
their own comrades.
But, as is well known, there was another circumstance that
heightened the odium of Lenin's flight a thousandfold. For after
all, besides the accusation of insurrection, a monstrous slander,
which was believed by hundreds of thousands and millions of
people, had been directed at Lenin. Lenin was accused of the
crime, vile and shameful from every point of view, of being in
the pay of the German General Staff. . . It was impossible
simply to ignore this. And Lenin had not ignored it; he had sent
Zinoviev to the Central Ex. Com. to defend his honour and his
party. This was not at all difficult to do. After a little time had
passed the nonsensical accusation went up like smoke. Nobody
had adduced anything in its support and people ceased to
believe it. There was no longer the slightest risk that any charge
would be brought on this count. But Lenin went into hiding with
such a charge hanging over him.
This was something quite special, unexampled, and in-
comprehensible. Any other mortal would have demanded an
investigation and trial even in the most unfavourable con-
ditions. Any other mortal would personally and publicly have
done everything possible, as energetically as he could, to re-
habilitate himself. But Lenin proposed that others, his adver-
saries, should do this, while he sought safety in flight.
I consider that the fact of Lenin's disappearance must lie at
the very root of any description of the personality of the future
ruler of Russia. In the whole world only he could have behaved
thus.
* # *
That same night the session of the Provisional Government
was succeeded by a meeting of the Soviet Star Chamber.
Towards 2 o'clock in the morning Kerensky arrived at Sko-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I$lJ 473
belev's flat, where Tsereteli was living. Dan, Gots, and
Chkheidze were also there. . . In the presence of the newly-
arrived Kerensky the Star Chamber revised its judgement of the
state of affairs.
The Right was evidently represented by Kerensky (probably
together with Gots) and the Left by Dan and Chkheidze. The
Right carried on the line of reaction and repression, the Left
the line of restraining the repressions. Kerensky insisted on the
liquidation of the Bolsheviks as a party. Dan insisted on the
freedom of parties and on the responsibility of individuals.
Tsereteli was in the centre. The result was that Dan was
formally on top, but Kerensky was given satisfaction in fact.
* * *
Friday the jth. Early in the morning the Menshevik Central
Committee met. Dan and Tsereteli probably went there straight
from the session of the Star Chamber. The Menshevik leaders
were definitely beginning to display an understanding of the
conjuncture: they continued a line of halting the counter-
revolution. And by 7 in the morning the Menshevik Central
Committee had already passed a resolution directed against
the Right. I can say with assurance that Dan initiated it.
The Provisional Government, following the lead of the ruling
Soviet bloc, also met very early, at about 8.30. I don't know
whether it was a stormy session, but in any case it was 'drama-
tic 5 : what was in question was forcing the resignation of the
revolutionary Premier, that visionary intellectual and humane
landowner, Prince Lvov.
The campaign had doubtless been prepared the night before,
at Skobelev's flat. The 'Marxist' section of the ruling group had
evidently managed to unite the entire Star Chamber.
Why had the SR part of the Star Chamber agreed to this?
I think there is only one way to explain it: Kerensky was now
convinced that it was time for him to become Chief of State.
And for him concessions to the democracy, however undesirable
and 'untimely' in themselves, were a means of exerting pressure
on Lvov which the latter, God willing, would be unable to
sustain. Thanks to this pressure from the Left, there must be
new upheavals in the Cabinet, and then Kerensky could not
fail to get the Premiership.
474 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
I even think it was precisely Kerensky, the SR, who was the
direct or indirect initiator of the 'Left 5 campaign against Lvov.
In Kerensky's present mood he was quite unconcerned with
counter-revolution or the struggle against it. He was interested
only in bringing about changes in the Government and setting
up his own Cabinet. For the 'Star Chamber' Menshevik Dan, on
the contrary, it was necessary to stop the reaction. As for changes
in the Government, it was, after all, only two days earlier that
Dan and Tsereteli together had wholeheartedly insisted, before
the entire revolutionary democracy, on the lack of authority to
decide these questions until a plenum of the Central Ex. Com.
could meet, and on the maintenance of the status quo as the last
word in statesmanship. And now, suddenly, the campaign
against Lvov!
In any case, the Star Chamber SRs and the Mensheviks had
arrived at the same 'platform' from different directions. The first
wanted changes in the Cabinet, the others a strengthening of the
Soviet 'line' against the counter-revolution. The result was the
joint campaign to force the resignation of the head of the
Government.
The session ended at about i o'clock. And it ended with the
resignation of the first revolutionary 'Premier'. Lvov had an-
nounced his resignation. Now he had to be replaced. This was
done without any delay or difficulty. I do not think I am
mistaken if I say that during the night the Star Chamber had
not only worked out its campaign but also redistributed the
portfolios.
Lvov had occupied two posts: Premier and Minister of
the Interior. Kerensky, while remaining War Minister, was
'appointed' to the first at once, and Heraklion Tsereteli,
while remaining Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, to the
second.
This was at i o'clock in the afternoon.
At 2 o'clock the Bureau slowly began to assemble in the
Tauride Palace. But the leaders were not to be seen. The
deputies dejectedly wandered about, argued lazily, or sat about
in arm-chairs, hiding behind newspapers. God knew when the
Praesidium would appear.
Just then it was reported that one of the units that had come
from the front had been fired on by machine-guns not far from
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 475
the Nicholas Station. The firing still continued; it could be
heard from the windows of the Tauride Palace.
Eh! This was a serious business, and might end badly. This
monstrous provocation could only be the work of German
agents to disorganize the Government in Petersburg in the
interests of an offensive at the front; it might have been carried
out by the Black Hundreds, the Tsarist servitors who were
already convinced of the advantages of a street brawl, and who
could not but be tempted by the possible results of a provocation
of front-line troops. A direct attack on the pacifiers might really
be a match thrown into the powder-keg. The pacifying troops
might shatter working-class Petersburg to smithereens rather
than entrust some upstart with power over them for five
minutes. Nor was this an accidental shooting: it was a well-
organized attack, complete with machine-guns.
The firing did not begin to die down until evening, and it was
renewed during the night. The militia reported shooting in
eleven different districts of Petersburg.
There is no doubt that on Friday the yth we lived through a
critical moment. The ordinary people, after all the petty
bourgeoisie, the 'intelligentsia', and the soldiery were again
blaming the Bolsheviks for the new bloodshed. The disorders on
that day did an excellent service to the profound and thorough-
going reaction. Nevertheless the acuteness of the crisis, and the
danger of a counter-revolutionary catastrophe, vanished quite
swiftly.
Around noon an important meeting of garrison representa-
tives, arranged the night before, took place in the Tauride
Palace. The delegates of the newly-arrived troops also came.
The meeting was supposed to reveal the state of mind of the
garrison of the capital after the July Days. Had the blow it had re-
ceived really thrown it back into undisguisedly bourgeois hands?
I don't know just what happened at the meeting, but its
results proved favourable enough. Both the speeches and the
resolution showed that the garrison would do its best to keep its
promise of loyalty to the Soviet. The resolution stated that the
garrison 'submitted unconditionally to the Central Ex. Com.
and would unquestioningly obey all its orders'. Even the Mame-
lukes sighed with relief.
476 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
The Bureau session probably began around 3 o'clock.
It was, of course, Tsereteli who reported on the situation. I
shall not undertake to say just how he explained the change of
front. Doubtless, while announcing the successful liquidation of
the insurrection, he pointed out the danger of a reaction which
went too far, and consequently the necessity for resolutely carry-
ing out the programme of the Ail-Russian Congress, for Lvov's
resignation, and for the formation of a new Cabinet tem-
porarily, of course, until a decision could be reached by a
plenum of the Central Ex. Com. Tsereteli also named the new
Ministers. I remember his being unable to keep back the em-
barrassed smile of a schoolboy who has distinguished himself,
when he said: 'Minister of the Interior Tsereteli. . .'
Properly speaking, nothing particularly bad had happened in
reality. But how it had all happened! A tiny handful of people
had been whirled about by the irresistible caprice of the
revolution, flung now to one side, then to the other. It was not
only the masses who had had no part in their machinations,
but even their 'authorized representatives', who had handed over
to the Star Chamber all their rights and duties, were obedient,
silent servants of their masters. This was a sign of the profound
weakness of the revolution, and the source of a profound
reaction. It was a depressing picture.
But it was interesting to look into the real nature of the affair
too. Kerensky's new Cabinet was, after all, a Soviet Government.
At its head was a member of the Central Ex. Com. Socialist
Ministers formed its most important kernel. They not only could
shape, but in fact did shape the whole Government as they saw
fit. They announced that the Government was to act in
accordance with the instructions of the Congress of Soviets. They
also formally and in practice acknowledged the Congress and
the Central Ex. Com. as the sole sources of power. Indeed, there
were now no others at all. If one adds to this that the real power
and authority were as before in their hands and in their hands
alone, then the situation would seem to be clear: no matter how
the Soviet leaders had refused power before, now they had
formally received it.
So it seemed. At the same time another side of the matter was
also plain. The new Chief of State, a member of the Central Ex.
Com., the Soviet protege Kerensky would not have anything
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 477
to do with any Soviet. He had become Chief of State not as a
representative of the organized democracy, but by himself,
seeing himself as a being above class who had been called, and
was able, to save Russia. And Kerensky, together with his 'Soviet'
colleagues, was of course using his newly acquired rights
primarily in order to return the bourgeoisie to power formally
and in fact. This 'Soviet' Government would of course make its
chief concern the creation of a new Coalition against the revolu-
tion. It was a depressing picture.
In the heat of the debates there was a sudden commotion and
tumult. The stunning news flew round the room like lightning.
It was the news of the defeat at the front of the attacking Russian
army. On the preceding day, the -6th, our lines had been
pierced on a front of twelve versts near Tarnopol to a depth of
ten versts. The enemy was continuing his advance.
No well-informed person had had any doubt that our offen-
sive was not only bound to collapse in the immediate future, but
might end in a tremendous disaster. There were many army
people amongst the Right Soviet deputies who had scented the
truth from the very beginning. But none of them had wanted to
display anything but patriotic enthusiasm. And now the news of
the rout hit the whole Tauride Palace like a thunderbolt.
It was as patriots that the Mamelukes were shaken, but the
Opposition was well aware that a defeat at the front would free
the hands of internal reaction still more. After all, no matter
how well aware Kerensky was that a wretched ending to his
enterprise was inevitable, he blamed the Bolsheviks and the July
uprising for it, both to himself and aloud. Of the Mamelukes,
the yellow press, and the petty-bourgeois mass, there is no need
to speak. For them the Tarnopol defeat and the collapse of the
whole longed-for offensive was the work of Bolshevik hands
from beginning to end. And indeed, in the official communiques
from Headquarters Bolshevik agitation was directly blamed for
the defeat.
There was consternation in the Central Ex. Com. Even the
most honest Right-wing deputies, on hearing of the collapse of
the front, turned their thoughts and glances primarily on these
same Bolsheviks. The less honest ones, greatly exaggerating the
478 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
danger of the position, definitely hinted that there was now no
reason to object to a rightful settling of accounts with the
traitors.
* * *
Towards evening a joint session of the Central Ex. Com. and
the Peasants' Central Ex. Com. was held. It was expected to
listen once more to the same old speeches on the subject of the
Government. But first it had to concern itself with other things.
During all this time arrests had been going on in the city as
before, and the prisons were being filled to overflowing. In the
working-class quarters the proletarian detachments and indivi-
dual workers were being disarmed. It was not only the spon-
taneous reaction of the masses that was in full swing, but a
governmental and police reaction as well.
The Menshevik-Internationalists did everything in their
power to fight it. Before the Central Ex. Com. got to the funda-
mental item on the agenda, the Government, Martov asked for
the floor for an 'emergency statement', and made a short speech
protesting against the arrests. A statement over our signatures
was later published in the papers. Just now it would have been
possible not to answer an 'emergency statement', but nevertheless
the brave Tsereteli spoke in reply. He said what he had said
many times before. Why did these second-class Bolsheviks exist
at all, when there were first-class ones? He, Tsereteli, pre-
ferred to have to do with Lenin rather than Martov. With the
former he knew how to deal, but the latter tied his hands. As for
the repressions and arrests, they were called for by necessities of
state and the interests of the revolution. 'Irresponsible groups'
ought to hold their tongues.
I take the responsibility for these arrests,' said the new
Minister of the Interior, clearly and distinctly, amidst the
silence.
Indeed, Citizen Tsereteli? You're very bold. You're sowing
excellent seeds. What will you reap?
Once again on a sunny morning, around 6 o'clock, I left the
Tauride Palace and went off to Manukhin's to spend the 'night'.
As usual, they had been expecting me since the evening. A bed
had been made up for me on the sofa in the study. And Luna-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 479
charsky, stretched out on his arm-chairs next to it, was sleeping
the blameless sleep of youth. He hadn't turned up that day in the
Tauride Palace, and it seemed as though I hadn't seen him for a
long time.
My coming in woke him up; he asked where I'd come from.
Full of despair and rage I congratulated him on the new
Coalition and told him of the events of the last day. We talked
over the whole of the July Days, united by our awareness of the
catastrophe and hatred of the victors. Both of us forgot about
the 'authors' of the defeat, in our preoccupation with the general
calamity. And then Lunacharsky told me the unknown details
of the July uprising. They were unexpected.
According to him, jixn^the night of July 4th Lenin was
definitely planning a coup d'etat. The Government, which would
in fact be in the hands of the Bolshevik Central Committee,
would officially be embodied in a 'Soviet 5 Cabinet made up of
eminent and popular Bolsheviks. For the time being three
Ministers had been appointed: Lenin, Trotsky, and Lunachar-
sky. This Government would at once issue decrees about peace
and land, thus attracting the sympathies of the millions of the
capital and the provinces and consolidating its power. An
agreement of this kind had been come to between Lenin,
Trotsky, and Lunacharsky. It was concluded while the Kron-
stadters were making their way from Kshesinskaya's house to the
Tauride Palace. The coup d'etat itself was to proceed in this way:
the i ySth Regiment (the same one Dan had posted on guard in
the Tauride Palace), arriving from Krasnoe Selo, was to arrest
the Central Ex. Com., and at about that time Lenin was to
arrive on the scene of action and proclaim the new Govern-
ment. But Lenin was too late. The iy6th Regiment was inter-
cepted and became disorganized. The 'rising' had failed.
This is what Lunacharsky told me that is, this is the form I
remember it in, and in this form I pass it on to anyone into
whose hands this book happens to fall. It may be that the con-
tent of this story is not a fully-established historical fact. I may
have forgotten, confused, or distorted the story. Lunacharsky
may have been 'poeticizing', confusing, and distorting the
reality. But the precise establishment of an historical fact is the
business of historians, and I'm writing my personal memoirs; I
pass this on as I recall it. . .
480 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
How things were in reality I will not undertake to say. I
didn't investigate the matter. Only once, much later, I asked
another candidate for the triumvirate Trotsky about it. He
strongly objected when I gave him Lunacharsky's version.
Among other things he brushed aside Lunacharsky as a person
completely unsuited for this kind of action.
c The belletristic side of the plot/ Martov said later, when I
reported my conversation with Lunacharsky. So be it. But if the
Bolshevik Central Committee, in organizing the coup d'etat,
had provided for the creation of a centre to direct the fighting
and take the first steps, that centre could really only have been
the triumvirate Lenin, Trotsky, and Lunacharsky.
But none of this proves in any way that on July 4th Lenin
was definitely and directly aiming at a coup d'etat, that he had
already distributed the portfolios, or that it was only because he
came too late that he did not command the lyGth Regiment!
Some elementary facts tell against Lunacharsky's version. For
instance, the Kronstadters were present in addition to the
i yGth Regiment. They undoubtedly constituted the principal
not only technical but you might say political force. And
on July 4th at 5 in the afternoon, the 'triumvir 5 Trotsky
stood face to face with them. What did he do? At the risk of
losing his popularity, if not his head, he freed Chernov, whereas
by putting the conspiracy into effect he could have stood at the
head of the Kronstadters and, to their utter joy, liquidated the
Central Ex. Com. in five minutes.
Besides, Trotsky later arranged, so to speak, a confrontation
with Lunacharsky, addressing a puzzled question to him. Luna-
charsky said that I had mixed up and distorted my conversation
with him. I'm inclined to maintain that I remember the con-
versation well, and that Lunacharsky had mixed up the events.
But let industrious historians sort it all out. 1 If in the preceding
1 As a result of Trotsky's inquiry, Lunacharsky sent me a letter, maintaining that
I had distorted his story. But I can't give his second version instead of the first. The
principle I'm adhering to in these Notes is to write down everything I recall as I
recall it. This does not become a historian; Lunacharsky is right there. But I'm not
writing a history. All I can do to 're-establish the truth' is to print his letter of
March 3Oth 3 1920, I do this gladly.
'Dear Nikolai Nikolayevich,
'Yesterday I received from Comrade Trotsky the following note: "N. N.
Sukhanov has told me that in his book on the revolution there is an account of the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 481
pages I have not described historical events, then perhaps this
page may serve as a description of historical personages.
At that time, in the early morning of July 8th, lying on my
sofa, I listened to Lunacharsky's account in utter dejection. The
devilish grimacing mask of the July Days, looming over me like
a nightmare, passed before my eyes. So then, there had been not
only the spontaneous course of events but a malevolent political
blunder.
'Peaceful demonstration' and distribution of portfolios.
'Down with the Capitalist Ministers' and an attack on the
Socialist Ministers. 'All Power to the Soviets' and the arrest
of the supreme Soviet body. And as the result blood, filth, and
the triumph of reaction. . .
At that moment, while Lunacharsky and I were talking about
the days that had just passed, in the Palace Square the dis-
arming and vilifying of the 'insurgent' Bolshevik army was
proceeding.
It was already about 8 o'clock. Lunacharsky began dressing
and left me alone.
July Days in which he relates, in your words, that in July the three of us (Lenin,
you and myself) wanted to seize power and set about doing so !?!?!?"
* It is clear, Nikolai Nikolayevich, that you have fallen into a profound error,
which may have disagreeable consequences for you as well as for the historian. In
general reference to personal conversations is bad documentation. In this instance,
if you've really written something of the kind, your memory has completely distor-
ted our conversation. It never, of course, occurred to Comrade Lenin, Comrade
Trotsky, or myself to agree on the seizure of power, nor was there even a hint of
anything in the nature of a triumvirate.
*In the minds of all the leaders of the movement the July Days had only the
meaning we put forward with complete frankness: "All power to the Soviet of
Workers*, Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies."
'Of course we did not conceal from ourselves that if the Menshevik-SR Soviet
had seized the power, it would have slipped away to more resolute revolutionary
groups further to the Left.
* Your error was probably caused by my telling you that at a decisive moment of
the July Days, I told Trotsky in conversation that I should consider it calamitous
for us to be in power just then, to which Comrade Trotsky, who was always far
more resolute than I and surer of victory, replied that in his opinion that would not
have been so bad at all, since the masses would of course have supported us.
'All this was said merely by way of weighing up the situation in a private con-
versation at a flaming moment in history.
*I beg you to take this letter of mine into account in the final version of your
history, so that you yourself do not fall into error or lead others into it.
'People's Commissar
'30-111-1920' '(signed) A. LUNACHARSKY
482 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1IJ
Yes, the reaction was triumphant. Everything gained by the
revolution in the past months had gone to rack and ruin.
Before the July Days the Coalition with the bourgeoisie had
been shaken, and had crumbled of itself. The spontaneous
course of events led immutably to the liquidation of the ruling
bourgeois bloc and to the dictatorship of the authentic worker-
peasant democracy. The conquest of the Soviets by this authen-
tic democracy was a matter of the immediate future. And the
end of the reign of the bourgeoisie was bound to come in
conditions that favoured the further course of the revolution
while preserving its enormous and still fresh energies.
But a 'political blunder* intervened naturally, a c logical' one.
The Coalition was on firm ground again and strengthened for a
long time. The vast energies of the revolution had been squan-
dered in vain and cast to the winds. The revolution had suffered
a profound strain and been flung a long way back.
MarchDecember 1920.
Part V
[COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRACY]
July Sth-October 20th
CHAPTER 21
[AFTER 'JULY': THE SECOND
AND THIRD COALITIONS]
HEROES have indeed their destiny! For Kerensky democracy
was an absolute good; he sincerely saw it as the goal of his
service to the revolution. He had selflessly served it under the
Tsarist autocracy, ever since he had appeared before the world
as the ardent champion and, if you like, the poet of the demo-
cracy.
Now, after the July Days, Kerensky had become the head of
the Government and the State. And this epoch the Kerensky
epoch was an epoch of dissolution, stifling, and destruction of the
democracy. Of this epoch Kerensky was the most active and
responsible hero.
His premiership began in an evil hour and ended badly. It
began under the sign of the birth-pangs of counter-revolution
and its attacks on the democracy. These attempts failed : the
revolution still retained too much accumulated strength and the
plutocracy lacked everything but rage, slanders, and the
miserable shattered remnants of Tsarism. The counter-revolu-
tion failed in the July riots, but a firm, stubborn, and profound
reaction set in.
There had been this reaction before, at the beginning of the
First Coalition; now, under Kerensky, the reaction became
dynamic. Before, the reactionary classes had been defending
themselves; now the bourgeois bloc had passed to the offensive.
Before the July Days the reaction expressed itself in random
sabotage; now, under Premier Kerensky, the active liquidation
of the achievements of the workers and peasants began.
The Second Coalition, created on July yth under Kerensky's
leadership, didn't last long a fortnight in all. This term was
quite inadequate either to 'save 3 or to destroy the revolution,
but quite enough to reveal itself properly.
486 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
This was done with complete success.
First of all the new Government energetically continued the
searches, arrests, disarmings, and persecutions of all kinds that
had already been begun. Self-appointed groups of officers,
military cadets, and I think the gilded youth too, rushed to the
'help' of the new regime, which was obviously trying to present
itself as a c strong Government 5 . It was not only the mutinous
regiments and battalions that were disarmed: almost more
attention was devoted to the working-class districts, where the
workers' Red Guard was disarmed. Enormous quantities of
arms were collected.
Every Bolshevik that could be found was seized and im-
prisoned. Kerensky and his military friends were definitely
trying to wipe them off the face of the earth, but the Soviet
restrained the patriotic enthusiasm of the victors, and an
attempt at the formal outlawing of Bolshevism as such was a
failure. Repressions, however, came directly down only on the
Bolshevik 'officer-corps' andrank-and-file. I think only Kamenev,
of the generals, was arrested during the July Days; then a few
days later, on her way back from Stockholm, Kolontai was
arrested at the border naturally with 'important documents'
on her; finally the same fate overtook Roshal. Lenin and
Zinoviev had officially, so to speak, gone into hiding. Trotsky,
Stalin, Stasova, and many others meanwhile avoided spending
nights at home and their whereabouts were 'unknown'. Raskol-
nikov was staying in Kronstadt, under the protection of his own
army. But it must be said that the police apparatus of this
Government of the revolution, even though it was being re-
stored, was still very weak; the authorities simply did not know
the secondary Bolshevik leaders, whose names did not appear in
the newspapers.
In one way or another all the Bolshevik leaders temporarily
vanished from the horizon after the July Days. Lunacharsky and
Ryazanov remained, and in addition Nogin, one of the most
important figures of the Moscow Soviet, and one of the oldest
Bolsheviks rather negligible, however, in substance was sent
from Moscow as a representative on the Central Committee. At
this time Steklov was disavowing the Bolsheviks right and left^
paying vigorous court to us, the Menshevik-Internationalists,
and trying to persuade us, in view of the rout of Bolshevism, to
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 487
unite with its remnants and take over the leadership of the
extreme Left. But Steklov's diplomacy was inadequate.
Nor was Steklov himself helped by his equivocations. On the
night of July loth, when a high-spirited detachment of military
cadets was looking for Lenin at Bonch's Finnish villa, they didn't
find Lenin, but were satisfied with another toothsome morsel in
the person of the famous Steklov, who was taken by a reinforced
guard directly to the General Staff in Petersburg. Since he had
'absolutely nothing in common with the Bolsheviks', he was
quickly let go. But he didn't go home. Many days later he could
be seen wandering about like a shadow in his Tauride sanctuary
at the most unseasonable hours, replying to astonished ques-
tions: Tm not budging from here night or day. They'll kill me.
You know what there is against me.'
But the military cadets didn't hunt down only Steklov, who
had 'nothing in common with Bolshevism'. After destroying the
Bolshevik organizations, which were legal, they went further
and executed a raid on the Government Mensheviks them-
selves, whose party was headed by the Minister of the Interior.
Was this excessive? But it was completely compatible with the
'general mood', and especially with the line of the bourgeois
press. This press evidently considered that the Bolsheviks were
done for; and after despatching the humiliated, fallen, and
despised enemy, the Cadet Reck and its gutter-press imitators
began striking out more and more Rightwards: at Chernov,
Tsereteli, the Mensheviks and SRs, and at the Soviet generally.
This was inevitable, quite consistent, and far-sighted. In the
interests of the bourgeois dictatorship that had become so
imminent and possible, it was precisely the Soviets that must be
wiped off the face of the earth. For after all, from the point of
view of the plutocracy, they were just what constituted the
original sin of the revolution, the source of 'dual power' and
the root of evil. The campaign had begun to develop quite
openly.
# * *
Now the question that naturally and inevitably arose was
that of a dictatorship. Indeed, three days after Kerensky's
'appointment' as Premier, the Star Chamber appeared before
the Central Ex. Com. with a demand for a dictatorship.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
The groundwork was thoroughly prepared. For after the July
Days the reaction and despondency of the masses of the people
were enormous. They had penetrated deep into the vanguard
itself, the most reliable prop of the revolution the thick of the
Petersburg workers. During the July Days themselves we had
already seen some factory resolutions against the Bolsheviks.
That was a shock. Now it was worse. A whole series of factories,
dissociating themselves from the Bolsheviks and following the
army units, ardently supported a new Coalition.
We had been thrown a long way back. The enormous store of
revolutionary energy had been scattered to the winds. The
masses were humbled and enfeebled. The bourgeoisie had
plucked up heart and was eager for battle. The atmosphere of
deep and lasting reaction could be plainly felt by everyone. The
ground was favourable for a real dictatorship.
The entire period of the Second Coalition was spent in an un-
interrupted, frenzied, self-forgetting hunt by Kerensky and Tsereteli
for new bourgeois Ministers.
The Second Coalition had organized itself *on its own autho-
rity', but it was incomplete; there were some Ministerial
vacancies. After the July blow, Kerensky, having become head
of the Cabinet, with quite childish enthusiasm set about forming
'his own' Government. Swiftly losing all sense of proportion, he
began displaying his capriciousness in these operations. Without
waiting for any 'authority' from the Central Ex. Com. he started
looking for 'supplementary' lieutenants and colleagues im-
mediately after July 7th. And when the Central Ex. Com.
formally untied his hands he had already set himself the
straightforward goal of forming a completely new cabinet the
Third Coalition to his own taste.
By the 23rd a Cabinet was ready. Kerensky had left himself
the Army and Navy Departments, and named as his deputies for
naval and military affairs Savinkov 1 and Lebedev, both SRs,
but especially offensive to the democracy. Nekrasov, Deputy
Chairman in the Council of Ministers, was given Finance.
Tereshchenko, Skobelev, and Peshekhonov stayed where they
1 Savinkov, Boris Viktorovich (1879-1925): famous SR terrorist and writer.
After the October Revolution worked against the Soviet Government; caught by
GPU on secret trip to Russia, tried and sentenced to gaol for ten years, where he
died. Winston Churchill thought him one of the most extraordinary men he had
ever met. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 489
were. Yefremov got Public Welfare, Prokopovich Industry and
Commerce, and Avksentiev Internal Affairs. The Minister of
Justice was now Zarudny, a non-party radical and a personal
friend of Kerensky's. Nikitin, a lawyer who was considered a
Social-Democrat but was actually no nearer to being one than
Prokopovich, was summoned from Moscow for Posts and
Telegraphs. Then there came four longed-for Cadets : Kokosh-
kj n Comptroller of Finances, Kartashev Procurator of the
Holy Synod, Yurenev Communications, and Oldenburg
Education. And to crown it all the Zimmerwaldite and
defeatist Chernov.
Such was the Third Coalition. It did not publish the briefest pro-
gramme or declaration.
On the night of July 22nd, in the very heat of the shuffling of
portfolios, Trotsky and Lunacharsky, accused of the July up-
rising, were arrested at home.
For the first time I tore myself away from the centre, away
from the inferno. I had not yet seen the New Russia. And as a
matter of fact I was not to see it during my 'furlough'. I stayed in
the country near Yaroslavl, giving myself over to literature, sun,
and sloth. My impressions of the province were casual and
meagre. I visited, in the Governor's house on the banks of the
Volga, the local Soviet which was in the hands of the Men-
sheviks. I did not attend any meetings, nor did I see the masses.
But I was at the Ex. Com., in the centre, the laboratory, and
with my own eyes witnessed the provincial scarcity of workers
and the extraordinary concentration of party-functions in the
hands of two or three men. It was clear that if you took them
out of the city, all the activity of the Soviet would die away,
agitation would cease, the Soviet would close down, and
candidates for the Town Council and the Constituent Assembly
would vanish. Meanwhile all local power was in the hands of the
Soviet, without which the provincial commissar and all the
other official authorities would have been mere puppets.
Generally speaking, the July disturbance had touched the
provinces very little. Its echoes were to be found in the
49O THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
psychology of the leaders; the masses, who had not seen with their
own eyes what had happened, reacted feebly. Here the 'normal 5
process of the conquest of the masses by the Bolsheviks still
went on.
More particularly I, as an inhabitant of the capital, was
astonished at the extensive street life of the ordinary people : in
this respect the capital had long since shrunk and in its e july'
atmosphere begun to resemble old Petersburg. In Yaroslavl my
eye was gladdened by free demonstrations of workers, 'pro-
hibited 5 among us and obsolete.
A provincial Menshevik conference took place there around
then. It was a rather pitiful spectacle. The handful of people
who had convened displayed an extremely low level of political
and party consciousness. Among other things the local leaders
were incapable of distinguishing between the official Men-
sheviks and the Menshevik-Internationalists. Dan was easily
distinguished from Lenin, but not from Martov. This seemed
rather strange to me: I thought that if not theoretically, then
historically, practically it was easier for them to confuse Martov
with Lenin than with Dan (as all the bourgeoisie did). But no,
it was evident that it was the word Menshevik as distinct from
Bolshevik that had the decisive significance here. They knew
the word quite well, but were unprepared for a deepening of the
concept and had no interest in it.
This was a surprise to me. And I may say I was at my wit's
end when I thought about a Menshevik schism, which in the
capital appeared to me inevitable and indispensable. It was
clear that for these provincials a schism at this moment would
have been incomprehensible, indigestible. And consequently
unrealizable. After my return to Petersburg I told Martov all
this to his great satisfaction.
The July events had destroyed Bolshevism. But a month
passed and the joint labours of Kerensky and Tsereteli revived it
again. Recuperating from the rout themselves, the masses
poured life and vigour into the Bolshevik Party. They grew
together with it: it grew together with them.
By the end of July a new Bolshevik congress had met. It was
already a 'united 3 conference where the party of Lenin, Zinoviev,
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi7 4QI
and Kamenev formally coalesced with the group of Trotsky,
Lunacharsky, and Uritsky. The leaders couldn't attend they
could only inspire the congress from afar. But somehow things
were managed even without them.
At this congress the Bolsheviks put their post-July ideology in
order. Its general framework, of course, remained as before, but
the Bolshevik fighting slogans underwent some characteristic
changes. C A11 Power to the Soviets' was discarded. This slogan,
which before 'July' the masses had become used to and regarded
as their own, was replaced by one more diffuse and less refined :
'A Revolutionary Dictatorship of the Workers and Peasants',
etc. . . The reason for this was twofold. First of all, 'All Power to
the Soviets' had become very shabby in the July events;
secondly, the contradiction between this slogan and the un-
avoidable de facto struggle against the existing Soviets had
become too flagrant. The 'Soviets', after all, in the form of the
Central Ex. Com., had definitely embarked on the support of
the counter-revolution. It was not worth while to demand power
for such Soviets.
A characteristic fact, almost the only one of its kind: Martov's
fraction addressed a welcome to this Bolshevik Congress which
underlined our differences (Bolshevik anarcho-Blanquism), but
expressed our solidarity in the struggle against the Coalition
and a protest against the persecution of the party of the pro-
letariat.
I've already mentioned that the defeat of Bolshevism in July
affected mainly the capital, touching the provinces very little.
The provincial delegates to the Congress, by their accounts of
continuing successes, poured a great deal of energy and good
cheer into the party, which again reckoned up its assets and was
once more ready to develop the struggle to its full extent. Its
seeds must have fallen on excellent soil. And the work amongst
the masses was already proceeding at full speed.
The results of this work were soon made known within the
Petersburg Soviet, too, where now only the secondary Bol-
shevik leaders were active Volodarsky, 1 Kurayev, Fedorov,
and others. The Workers* Section of the Soviet set up its own
1 Volodarsky (Goldstein), Moisei Markovich (1891-1918) : a revolutionary from
the age of fourteen. Lived in USA (1913-1917) where he was a member of the
American Socialist Party. (Ed.)
492 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
Praesidium, which it hadn't had before. And this Praesidium
proved to be Bolshevik headed by Fedorov. Actually, the
composition of the section remained as before that is, it had an
enormous majority of deputies elected under the Bolshevik
banner. But we have seen the great depression and instability
in the behaviour of the Workers' Section after the July Days.
One might have thought that the Bolshevik fraction was routed
and disorganized and that its members had betrayed the party.
But in the last analysis that had not happened. The election of
the Praesidium put the leadership of the section into firm
Bolshevik hands.
Finally, on August 7th, the second Conference of Factory
Committees opened in Smolny. It wasn't as showy and noisy as
the first one in May. Its scope was substantially less. Its formula-
tion of questions was more modest, more businesslike, less
politico-demagogic. This was a tribute to the defeat that had
compelled insurgents and Utopians to shrink into themselves.
But again the composition of the conference was Bolshevik. Once
again the leadership was completely in the hands of Lenin's
party.
In general, towards the date of the Moscow Conference, a
little over a month after the July Days, it was already quite
clear that the movement of the popular masses had resumed its
former course. The Third Coalition, like the one before it, was
hanging in the air. The Menshevik SR Soviet was being
followed by quite compact groups of burgherdom, but not by
the masses of the workers and soldiers. The rank-and-file of the
people as before were turning their eyes to the Bolsheviks alone
while Tsereteli and his friends came before bourgeois-landlord
Russia and proletarian Europe in the name of 'the whole
democracy'.
CHAPTER 22
THE SCANDAL IN MOSCOW
FROM the beginning of August the whole bourgeoisie and the
'whole democracy' were preparing for the sensational 'State
Conference'. But no one could tell why this strange and un-
wieldy affair was undertaken just then. The press was
strenuously trying to make the man in the street take an interest
in this enterprise not without success. The man in the street,
like everyone else, saw that something was decidedly out of tune
in our revolution. No matter what they tried in the Marian and
Winter Palaces still nothing happened. Well, maybe the Mos-
cow Conference would 'produce' something.
Before the Central Ex. Com. delegation actually left for
Moscow the news came out that Savinkov, Kerensky's deputy in
charge of the War Department, had resigned. Savinkov was
hand in glove with Kornilov: together they had just handed
Kerensky a report demanding that the army committees be
dissolved and capital punishment be introduced at the rear.
Kerensky was vacillating between Headquarters and the Star
Chamber, which didn't agree and was exerting pressure
through the SR Central Committee. Hence Kornilov decided
to go his own way, and Savinkov resigned. But the resignation
wasn't serious; it was simply a household mutiny, for Savinkov,
after all, was Kornilov's alter ego, and was not a Cadet but his
own man a Socialist Minister and famous SR terrorist.
On the evening of the i ith I left the Yaroslavl countryside for
Moscow. I got into a train at one of the stations before Yaroslavl,
but the train was already overflowing, and in all classes you had
to stand up all night. In Yaroslavl, by using my title of Central
Ex. Com. member, I penetrated into an almost empty military
carriage. I was delighted at my success, but something rather
disagreeable happened as a result. I was naive enough to
remove my boots, which were gone when I happened to wake
up an hour or two later. The extraordinary stupidity of my
situation prevented me from going to sleep again.
In Moscow, astounding the crowd with my stockinged feet, I
made my way to the station-master and spent about two hours
494 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
telephoning to people at random, to see whether some friend
could bring a pair of boots to the station for me. This was all
quite typical of travelling at this time.
I finally found someone with a spare pair of boots. But
bringing them proved to be more difficult than could have been
expected. The trams in Moscow had stopped, and there were
almost no drozhky-drivers in the streets either. There was a
strike, not a general one, but very impressive and sufficient to
manifest the will of the masses. A number of factories and
works were on strike, as was every municipal undertaking
except those satisfying the daily needs of the population.
Restaurants, waiters, and even half the drozhky-drivers were on
strike. This whole working-class army was following the
Bolsheviks against its own Soviet! Towards evening the demonstra-
tion would become still more perceptible: Moscow was to
be submerged in darkness, since the gas works was also on
strike.
In somebody else's enormous boots I set out on foot to look
for the Soviet delegation. En route \ dropped into the journalists'
office (somewhere near the post-office), to see the Novaya Zfd&i
correspondent assigned to the Conference. The journalists'
office was a tower of babel: whole crowds of them were
struggling, each one against all the others, for a place at the
Conference. The hubbub, excitement, and play of passions
attained absolutely extraordinary limits. In this street it was a
real holiday and a great day. And this one picture of frenzied
reporters was enough to define the historical importance of the
Moscow State Conference. A good two-thirds of its weight, after
all, depended on the journalists' interest in it.
The magnificent hall of the Bolshoi Theatre was glittering
with all its lights. From top to bottom it was filled with a
triumphal and even brilliant crowd. Oh, here in truth was all
the flower of Russian society ! Only a few accidental unfortunates
were missing from among the big and little political 'names'.
Keeping guard around the theatre was a dense column of
military cadets Kerensky's only reliable force. A niggling
control-system stopped one at every step inside the theatre too.
Nevertheless, going into the stalls, I could scarcely make my
way to my seat through the dense throng of supers crowding
round the doors. . .
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 495
I was late for the opening. But even before catching sight of
Kerensky, I heard him emotionally holding forth on the high
notes in his first speech for the Provisional Government.
I shall not, of course, follow the course of this 'State Con-
ference 5 . It was foredoomed to contribute nothing whatever to
the formation of a Government : the Government had already
been formed, everyone was content with it, and nothing more
was asked. Nor was the Conference supposed to replace a
parliament. Why should it? Kerensky and his colleagues, after
all, were responsible only to their own consciences. To discover
and say something new about "the needs of the country 5 ? Come
now, this was, after all, a time of the flowering of a thousand-
voiced press, which it was clearly unthinkable to surpass. Only
one thing was left: to crush the opinion of the 'whole demo-
cracy' by means of the opinion of the 'whole country' for the
sake of a definitive and complete liberation of the 'all-national
Government' from the tutelage of all the workers', peasants',
Zimrnerwaldite, half-German, half-Jewish, hooligan organiza-
tions. To compel the Soviets to efface themselves once and
for all before the overwhelming majority of the rest of the
populace, which demanded an 'all-national' policy. And perhaps
at the same time to enforce silence on the handful of upstarts on
the Right, who were shouting too immoderately about General
Fist as the sole recourse. It was all bizarrely trivial and naive,
but I could find no other explanation in history for this
stupidity.
CHAPTER 23
THE UNITED BOURGEOISIE
DEMONSTRATES
ELECTIONS for the central Petersburg Town Council were
scheduled for Sunday, August 20th. Up to then our 'commune'
had been composed provisionally of the delegations of the
district councils elected in May. Now its final composition was
to be determined by city-wide direct elections.
All the parties naturally ascribed enormous importance to
these elections. No one knew what turn the revolution would
take. And circumstances might arise in which the capital's
'commune' might play a decisive role, as in the time of Robes-
pierre. But at the same time indications of the fatigue and
apathy of the masses of the people came from everywhere;
many abstentions were expected. The Right Soviet elements
and newspapers pointed this out with especial frequency.
And in some strange inscrutable way the conclusion they
drew from it was that in such conditions it was impossible to
disown the Coalition or struggle against it; in such circum-
stances nothing was left but to support it. Wouldn't one have
thought the contrary? Fatigue, disillusionment, depression,
had been engendered, after all, precisely by the Coalition
policy, that had brought the revolution into an impassable
bog. One would have thought that the end of the Coalition
would mean a renaissance, towards which no other paths even
existed. But no, burgherdom and the Mamelukes reasoned
otherwise.
In any case all the parties had long been frenziedly preparing
for the elections.
The Mensheviks had a single list of candidates. And it was
entirely internationalist. On the eve of the election Larin pro-
posed that we should all go to various parts of the city to do
some electoral campaigning for the Menshevik ticket. I per-
sonally was assigned to two places: first to the proletarian
Vyborg Side, then to the bourgeois Mokhovoy. I was to speak at
one SR and one Cadet meeting. Influenced by the talk about
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 497
apathy I was in a rather slack mood. And as a matter of fact, in
spite of the animation of the dusty 'democratic 5 streets of the
Vyborg Side, I found in the meeting-hall a boring little group
of workers sleepily listening to an SR speaker. It would have
been tiresome and futile to speak. I thought the bourgeoisie
would be mobilizing far more energetically. But when I arrived
at the Tenishevsky School, I looked in vain for the meeting
scheduled there. It evidently was not taking place at all. Un-
bearably fatigued I glumly wandered back to the newspaper
offices.
The election results, however, were unexpected. The voters
were fed up with meetings, but that did not mean at all that they
were neglecting their civic duties. In all 549,400 votes were cast
on August 2Oth. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority
turned out to the poll.
But it was not the activity of the masses that was the chief blow;
that was still to come. The SRs kept the first place with 37 per
cent of the votes; in comparison with the May elections, how-
ever, this was no victory but a substantial setback. The victors of
July, the Cadets, had also held their ground since the district
elections: they got one-fifth of all the votes. Our Menshevik list
got a wretched 23,000 votes. The others simply did not come
into the reckoning.
But who was the sole real victor? It was the Bolsheviks,, so
recently trampled into the mud, accused of treason and
venality, utterly routed morally and materially, and filling
till that very day the prisons of the capital. Why, one would
have thought them annihilated for ever. People had almost
ceased to notice them. Then where had they sprung up from
again? What sort of strange, diabolical enchantment was
this?
In the August elections in the capital the Bolsheviks got just
short of 200,000 votes, i.e., 33 per cent. A third of Petersburg.
Once again the whole proletariat of the capital, the lord of the
revolution! Citizens Tsereteli and Chkheidze, leaders of the all-
powerful organ, orators of the whole democracy now do you
see the Bolsheviks? Now do you understand?
No! Still they see nothing, still they don't understand what is
going on around them, . .
498 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
Miliukov, Rodzianko, and Kornllov they saw and under-
stood something. In any case their press was stunned by the
success of the Bolsheviks. And these gallant heroes of the revolu-
tion began, at express speed, though in secret, to prepare their
own 'demonstration'. To cover it up they began shouting loudly
that the Bolsheviks were on the point of 'demonstrating'. Some-
times, it is true, their tongues slipped. For instance, the respec-
table Cadet Reck, in response to the hearty tone of the Kronstadt
Soviet newspaper, in an uncharacteristic colloquial style,
snapped back with two excellent Russian proverbs : 'the birdie
sang before the cat sprang', and 'he laughs best who laughs
last 5 .
The cat about to spring was preparing to have a good last
laugh. But this couldn't be said to be so very easy. A plot was
hatched by some monarchist elements, with the participation of
the Romanov Grand Dukes, in the middle of August, but it was
discovered in time and the participants were arrested together
with the Romanovs. The bourgeois press, for its own reasons,
didn't make anything very sensational of this plot. But the
masters of this press had been warned, nevertheless, that you
can't take a republic with your bare hands, and that they must
make solider preparations. But this slight warning had no effect
on the sleepy, half-disorganized 'national' Central Ex. Com. . .
Around then I glanced into Smolny Institute, the school for
daughters of the nobility, which the Central Ex. Com. had
started moving into on July i8th, the same day the Provisional
Government moved to the Winter Palace and the Premier took
up residence there. I wanted to see what was going on in the
new quarters of the 'all-powerful organ 5 . But I received little
satisfaction and still less benefit. I did not like Smolny at all, and
never ceased to regret the loss of the Tauride. This famous place
was located on the outskirts of the capital and consumed an
enormous amount of everyone's time in getting back and forth.
It was all right to keep 'y un g gentlewomen' in, but not for
making a revolution with the proletariat and garrison of the
capital. But I don't know whether the young ladies and the
children liked it there, either. There were, to be sure, magni-
ficent architectural monuments nearby, especially the monas-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1017 499
tery : I remember gasping and standing stockstill on seeing it for
the first time. Smolny also had a remarkable, divinely clean,
harmoniously finished assembly hall: from now on this was the
principal, as it were internal, arena of the revolution. But those
interminable, dark, gloomy, gaol-like, monotonous, stone-
floored corridors! Those arid, barrack-like classrooms, with
nothing in them to rest the eye ! It was dreary, uncomfortable,
and uninviting.
Life was concentrated for the most part on the second floor,
the lightest and most handsome. There the big assembly hall,
holding 1,500 or 2,000 people, took up the whole right wing.
This was where the Soviet sections and plenum, the Central
Ex. Com., and the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets held
their sittings. Near it there was an uncomfortable buffet with
rough tables and benches and extremely meagre food : not far
off was the office of the Praesidium. All the other classrooms
were occupied by sections of the Central Ex. Com. The furni-
ture was manifestly inadequate. There was neither order nor
cleanliness.
Remembering the Tauride, I wandered sadly around the new
citadel of the revolution. It was deserted and melancholy. Both
in the sections and in the meeting of the Bureau there were oddly
few people. But it seemed to me that amongst them there were
oddly many new faces. Chkheidze was enthroned in an extra-
ordinary wing-chair, but this failed to lend any solemnity to the
session. Why it had assembled, what it talked about I simply
don't remember. But I very well remember feeling that what
was talked about there made no difference at all.
Sunday, August 2yth, marked the end of six months of
revolution. It was a rather wretched jubilee. It was not only not
showy and noisy, but it passed almost without notice in the
repulsive atmosphere of those days. The whole affair was
limited to a few mass-meetings and a 'ceremonial 3 session of the
Central Ex. Com., which I did not attend; nor indeed did
almost anybody else.
On that day, at 10 in the morning, I was giving a workers 5
lecture in a cinema not far from the Nicholas Station. I've
just now seen in one of the newspapers that the topic of my
50O THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
lecture was 'The Moscow Conference'. This seems strange to
me. To be sure, the lecture given on the 27th had obviously been
scheduled for around the 20th, immediately after my arrival
from Moscow. But nevertheless why was it necessary, in the
midst of all that was happening, for me to speak to workers
about this silly business? It was obviously the fashion.
After the lecture, I went to the Petersburg Side to the Cirque
Moderne, where Lunacharsky was giving a lecture on Greek art.
A huge working-class audience was listening with great interest
to the popular speaker and his unfamiliar stories. The lecture
was already almost over. We had actually agreed to meet only in
order to lunch and spend the holiday together.
The two of us, together with my wife and someone else,
strolled to the 'Vienna', then wandered about the streets and
quays for a long time, talking about aesthetics and 'culture'. . .
There was a breath of autumn already in the sky. The un-
forgettable summer was ending, and the sun set early in the sea.
We could not sufficiently admire our marvellous Petersburg.
Already tired, we strolled homewards to the Karpovka across
Trinity Bridge and along the Kamenno-ostrovsky. We sat there
till dark, chatting over tea.
The 'phone rang. Someone from Smolny:
'Why are you at home? You know the Bureau's been sitting
since morning, and a plenum of the Central Ex. Com. is just
going to begin. Smolny is full. . . Why aren't you here?'
'But what's the matter?*
'What? Don't you know? Kornilov is moving on Petersburg
with troops from the front. He's got an army corps. . . Things
are being organized here. . .'
I dropped the receiver. In two minutes Lunacharsky and I
had already left for Smolny. I related to him the few words I'd
heard on the 'phone; they gave both of us an equal shock. We
scarcely discussed the stupefying news. Its meaning was in-
stantly apparent in its full scope and in the same light to both
of us. A deep, extraordinary sigh of relief escaped from both of
us. We felt excitement, exaltation, and the joy of liberation.
Yes, this was a threat that would clear the unbearably oppres-
sive atmosphere. This was the starting point for a radical
transformation of the whole conjuncture. And in any case it was
a full revenge for the July Days. The Soviet might be reborn !
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 501
The democracy might take new heart, and the revolution might
swiftly find its lawful course, long lost. . .
That Kornilov could attain his goal we didn't believe for a
single second. That he might get as far as Petersburg with his
troops and there establish a real dictatorship we so thoroughly
disregarded that I don't think we even mentioned it on our way
to Smolny. There was still enough powder left in the magazine
to prevent that ! If not one Tsarist echelon got to Petersburg at the
moment of the March revolution, in the complete chaos of ideas
and in spite of the old discipline, the old officers, the age-old
inertia, and the terrible and unknown novelty a Tsarist general
could not now seize the army and the capital. Now we had a
new, democratically organized army and a powerful pro-
letarian organization in the capital. Now we had our own com-
manders, ideological centres, and traditions. . .
Kornilov, the Tsarist general, had of course all the organized
bourgeoisie behind him. He might also have behind him a small
military apparatus in Petersburg, with its centre in the Staff and
controlled by his accomplices. 1 But he had no real power.
Kornilov could have had only a scratch detachment, even
though a very big one. But Petersburg would meet him as it
should if the field army did not settle him on the spot.
There was no danger from this quarter. Here the revolution
would lose nothing; but how much it would gain from the fact
that Kornilov, Rodzianko, and Miliukov behaved like Lenin,
Zinoviev, and Stalin! In July, to be sure, the Bolsheviks had
been in a hurry to pluck the unripe fruit and got poisoned. The
fruit would have ripened, and then have benefited the revolu-
tion. The Kornilovites had not committed so gross a blunder:
their fruit was quite ripe, but it might turn rotten, or the
revolution might at any moment pull the tree up by the roots.
Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Kornilovites had reason to be afraid
of allowing the moment to pass, and to consider the present
conjuncture the most favourable for a 'demonstration 5 .
But this subjective side of the matter has no meaning.
Objectively Kornilov and his friends, when they lost the game,
1 General Lukomsky, in his memoirs (Vol. 5 of the Archives of the Revolution),
reports that the Staff really did have a military apparatus in Petersburg consisting of
officer and cadet cadres, which even numbered many thousands. This would have
been an adequate force, if only . . .
5O2 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1J
would accept all its consequences, like the Bolsheviks in July.
The coup of the generals and financiers, with the consequent
opening of the front to the Kaiser, shifted the centre of gravity
of the whole situation to the opposite side a feat which the
Bolsheviks could not accomplish a millionth part of. And as for
the rest. * . It's true that the rest was still unknown, but after all
it depended to an enormous extent on ourselves alone. . . To
Smolny, then, as quickly as possible !
Smolny was indeed full. Strings of people were scurrying
about the corridors, dimly lit as always. Only the assembly hall,
with its snow-white columns, was shining brightly. This was
now the centre of Smolny. But there was no meeting of the
Central Ex, Com., though a great many deputies and nearly all
the leaders were there. There were impromptu meetings in the
hall, groups formed, people wandered about in pairs. Tsereteli,
downcast and dejected, was walking up and down with one of
the Bolsheviks. As I appeared I heard him say listlessly: 'Well !
Now you have a holiday in your Bolshevik alley, you'll be taking
the bit between your teeth again. . .'
Indeed! So Lunacharsky and I hadn't been mistaken. Tsere-
teli felt depressed, foreseeing the same results of the Kornilov
rising as we had. So we really could pluck up heart again.
Rumours of the Kornilov coup had reached Smolny that
morning, I think while I was giving my lecture in the cinema
near the Nicholas Station. There were a few people there at this
time who were about to set out for mass-meetings to celebrate
the first six months of the revolution.
They tried to call the Bureau together. It proved to be
a miserable session with scarcely a quorum. It 'completely
approved the decision of the Provisional Government and the
steps taken by A. F. Kerensky*. Just what steps these were I
don't know, and the Bureau, in concrete, must also be thought
not to have known. But the 'decision' that had been approved
referred to Kornilov's dismissal.
The Bureau, assembled in a small casual conclave, actually
couldn't take any other decision. Not only because it was its
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ17 503
natural 'line 5 to support the Coalition and associate itself with it
in every way, but also because it did not, after all, even suspect
the real state of affairs. In Smolny only one thing was known:
that General Kornilov, who had just surrendered Riga to the
Germans, had 'come out' against the Provisional Government as
a pretender to power, while Kerensky had declared him a rebel
and was taking decisive steps against him. Obviously, this could
only be approved.
Kornilov, with his civilian and military friends, had been
crystal clear to us from the very beginning. He was the 'mathe-
matical centre' of the bourgeois dictatorship, relieving the sham
dictatorship in order to liquidate the revolution. It was only
Premier Kerensky, the head of the Third Coalition, who
baffled us. But even this perplexity had only a partial and local,
not a general, character. His general role, of course, needs no
clarification, hardly even a brief formulation.
Kerensky, just like Kornilov, had set himself the goal of intro-
ducing a bourgeois dictatorship (even though, also like Kornilov,
he didn't understand this).
These two 'mathematical centres 3 had fallen out over the
question of which could be the bearer of this dictatorship. One
represented the Stock Exchange, capital, and the rentiers; the
other the same, plus the still to a large extent indeterminate
groups of petty-bourgeois democratic artisans, intelligentsia, the
Third Estate, and the paid managers of home industry and
commerce.
But Kornilov and Kerensky each needed the other, so great
was the yet undissipated power of the masses. The contending
sides had been forced into an alliance, but they still remained
contending sides.
Each was trying to use the other for his own aims. Kornilov
was striving for a pure dictatorship of finance, capital, and
rentiers, but had to accept Kerensky as hostage of the demo-
cracy. Kerensky was aiming at a dictatorship of a bloc of the big
and petty bourgeoisie, but had to pay heavy tribute to his ally as
the wielder of the real power. And each was trying to ensure that at
the finishing post he would be the actual and formal master of
the situation.
Hence came all the 'interrelationships* of the two enemy allies,
which were sometimes strange, absurd, and incomprehensible.
504 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
This was the source of the 'lack of clarity 5 of this dirty but not
obscure business.
Now the Central Ex. Com. came on the scene. I have a rather
dim recollection of the night session to which Lunacharsky and I
had hurried. I recall only a certain amount of hubbub in the
hall and disorder in the conduct of the meeting. One would
have thought the deputies ought to have got ready, pulled
themselves together, and been filled with revolutionary energy
and consciousness of the gravity of the moment. But none of this
was to be seen. No one here believed in any real danger, and
since the revolution people had become accustomed and inured
to dramatic situations. The Commander-in-Chief's march on
Petersburg and the beginning of a civil war under the nose of the
advancing German Army had neither more nor less effect on the
imagination than at one time a street demonstration against
Tsarist arbitrariness.
The debates proceeded along two lines. The first led to the
formation of a new Government, the second to the organization
of the defence of the capital against Kornilov's troops.
The second was by far the more important and interesting.
Only the night before, the Right Menshevik Weinstein had pro-
posed, in the name of his fraction, that a special 'committee for
the struggle against the counter-revolution' be formed. But
what should this special committee do? Its initiators were not
quite clear about that. In any case it must give every kind of
technical aid to the official organs of government in the struggle
against Kornilov.
The Menshevik resolution was of course passed. Later the
new body received the name of Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee. It was this institution that bore the whole brunt of the
struggle against the Kornilov campaign. It was this, and only
this, that liquidated the conspiracy (if we leave aside the
generally unfavourable atmosphere that precluded Kornilov's
success, independently of the activity of any institutions at
all). . .
But, in spite of the exceptional role of the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee in liquidating the Kornilov revolt, we must
assume that the Soviet bloc would not have taken on itself the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1J 505
initiative in the matter if it had foreseen what that role would be
in the future. From now on we shall do our best not to lose sight
of this Military Revolutionary Committee, which did not die
after the Kornilov revolt, but simply fell into a state of sus-
pended animation, to revive on different foundations later on
and tower aloft in October.
Anyone capable of penetrating the general situation at this
time must grasp a basic point: the Bolshevik attitude towards
this new body. It was precisely the Bolsheviks who were to
define its whole character, fate, and role. The Star Chamber
and its Mamelukes more or less failed to see this, but so it was.
The Military Revolutionary Committee, in organizing the
defence, had to set in motion the masses of workers and
soldiers, and these masses, in so far as they were organized,
were organized by the Bolsheviks and followed them. At that
time theirs was the only organization that was large, welded
together by elementary discipline, and united with the demo-
cratic rank-and-file of the capital. Without them the Military
Revolutionary Committee was impotent; without them it could
only have passed the time with makeshift proclamations and
flabby speeches by orators who had long since lost all authority.
With the Bolsheviks, however, the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee had at its disposal all organized worker-soldier strength,
of whatever kind. What attitude, then, did the Bolsheviks adopt?
The evening before, the Bolsheviks had declared that their
party had already taken steps to inform the masses of the
danger that threatened them, and had set up a special com-
mission for the organization of defence. This commission would
establish contact with the newly created organ of the Central
Ex. Com. The Bolsheviks sent their representatives into the
Military Revolutionary Committee, although they were bound
to find themselves in a negligible minority there. And then, in
the morning, when a resolution to give Kerensky a free hand
was being voted on, the Bolsheviks, voting against it, declared
that if the Government was really going to fight against the
counter-revolution, they were ready to co-ordinate their entire
activity with that of the Provisional Government, and conclude
a military-technical alliance with it.
The beginning was excellent. The Bolsheviks had shown*
extraordinary tact and political wisdom, to say nothing of
506 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI*J
devotion to the revolution. To be sure, when they entered into
an uncharacteristic compromise they were pursuing certain
special goals their allies did not foresee, but this made their
acumen all the greater.
The same night and morning of the s8th the Central Ex. Com.
issued a series of proclamations and instructions to the various
organizations of the democracy. First of all to committees and
Soviets of the army and at the front. Then to the railwaymen,
the postal and telegraph workers, and the Petersburg garrison.
These addresses gave an account of what had happened and
asked people not to obey orders from Headquarters, to watch
the movement of counter-revolutionary troops and put every
kind of obstacle in their way, to detain the conspirators 5 letters,
and to obey at once the orders of the Soviet organs and the
Provisional Government. They also pointed out that the con-
spiracy lacked deep roots and could be overcome by solidarity
and dash. And then the Provisional Government, which was of
course taking most resolute steps and hence ought to be the
centre of such solidarity, was given a puff.
The Military Revolutionary Committee, speaking generally,
had not a particularly brilliant array of names, but the com-
position of the collegium was rather typical: the Right Soviet
bloc, in the person of their stars of the first magnitude, con-
tinued to operate primarily in the sphere of 'higher policy 5 on the
parquets of the Winter Palace; while in the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee the well-known names were Leftists. And
despite their being in the minority it was quite clear that in the
Military Revolutionary Committee control was in the hands of the
Bolsheviks. This followed from the nature of things. First of all, if
the committee wanted to act seriously, then it had to act revolts
tionarily, that is, independently of the Provisional Government,
of the existing constitution, of the acting official institutions.
Only the Bolsheviks could operate like this, not the Soviet Com-
promisers. Secondly, only the Bolsheviks had the material means
for revolutionary activity, in the form of control of the masses.
On August 28th the Military Revolutionary Committee began
with the investigation and localization of all possible Kornilov
bases in Petersburg: these were, of course, all the military
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 507
academies and officers' organizations undoubtedly strong
counter-revolutionary cells that had to be paralysed. To the
Soviet emissaries, however, the gallant military cadets ener-
getically painted themselves in coalitionary and Right-Soviet
colours. Arrests were still exceptional. . .
Then steps were taken to cut off the Kornilov troops. Some
orders to this effect may have been given by Kerensky, though
this is more than doubtful. In any case, however, the railway-
men's organizations were completely at the disposal of the
Soviet.
But perhaps the most effective measures taken that day were
for arming the workers. It goes without saying not only that
this was on the initiative of the Bolsheviks but also that they
issued an ultimatum on the subject. As far as I know it was a
condition of their participation in the Military Revolutionary
Committee. The majority of the committee could not help
accepting this condition, if it took a serious view of its tasks. But
it had an excellent appreciation of the principled significance of
this measure, and did not yield without a struggle. The Military
Revolutionary Committee resolved, in view of the necessity of
'opposing the armed forces of the counter-revolution by
mobilizing the forces of the workers, that the arming of indivi-
dual groups of workers for the defence of the workers' districts
and factories, under the closest guidance of the district Soviets
and the control of the Committee, be considered desirable.
In case of necessity these groups would join field army units and
be completely subject to the general army command.'
The swiftness and thoroughness with which the Military
Revolutionary Committee entered into the role of the real
headquarters and core of the besieged capital may be seen, for
instance, in the following manifestations of its 'organic labours'
on that same August 28th: it received reports on the supply
situation in the capital from Nikitsky, the 'Governor', and Groh-
man, the chairman of the Central Supply Committee. It also
ordered the mobilization of all supply organs for especially
intense activity under the control of the corresponding trade-
unions and the reduction of the bread ration in the capital to half a
pound per food-card.
The democratic, military, and trade-union organizations in
the suburbs of Petersburg wired the Military Revolutionary
508 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
Committee their readiness to place themselves completely at its
disposition. Without any superfluous words the Kronstadt
Soviet eliminated the post-July authorities and installed their
own commander in the fortress. The Central Committee of the
Fleet also went over to a revolutionary position and was ready
for battle on sea or land at the first demand from the Central
Ex. Com.
That same night and early morning the Bolsheviks had begun
to display a feverish activity in the workers' districts. Their
military apparatus organized mass-meetings in all the barracks.
Everywhere instructions were given, and obeyed, to remain
under arms, ready to advance. By and large Smolny was meet-
ing Kornilov with all its lights blazing.
But what was going on in the Winter Palace? Was the head
of the State, the sole hope of the revolution, doing anything at
this terrible hour?
Kerensky, to save the revolution and liquidate the Kornilov
rising as quickly as possible, insisted on a Directory. And there
and then, on August s8th, as a beginning, 1 he conferred Direc-
tory portfolios on the following indubitable Kornilovites
Savinkov, Tereshchenko, and Kishkin. 2
But the same irritating and tiresome people, who actually had
no business having been born at all, even if they were party
comrades, kept interfering. Tsereteli and Gots turned up from
Smolny and began arguing again: 'How can you? 5 said they.
Kerensky's 'superhuman' wisdom was impossible for simple
people to grasp. As far as can be judged from a great deal of
evidence, he answered at first : 'Well, all right we can leave a
sixth place in the Directory for some representative of the
revolutionary democracy, say Nikitin'. But the tiresome people
from Smolny persisted in demanding closer relations with the
Soviet and the representation of SRs and Mensheviks in the
Directory.
But the deal was spoilt, and the head of the State appointed
1 Later Kerensky also declared himself Commander-in- Chief. (Ed.)
2 Kishkin, Nikolai Mikhailovich (1864-1930): physician; Cadet; member of
Provisional Government; Commissar of Moscow in summer of 1917. Arrested a
number of times for political reasons after the October Revolution, but spent last
years of his life in the People's Commissariat for Health. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 509
Savinkov Governor-General of Petersburg and its suburbs. In
addition, all troops in the area were subject to him. Thus the
entire official weight of the struggle against Kornilov rested on
Savinkov, while on Kerensky rested the entire responsibility for
this incomprehensible choice. Kerensky, after all, knew Savin-
kov to be a Kornilovite; the latter had very often declared his
solidarity with the General, and handed his resignation to the
Premier, who disagreed, and even now, on August 28th, con-
tinued to insist on the Kornilov programme. Let us allow that
the head of the State was really incapable of regarding Teresh-
chenko or Maklakov (both frequenters of Supreme Head-
quarters) as Kornilovites, but you would have thought there
could be no possible doubt about Savinkov.
All this only seems unnaturally absurd. As a matter of fact it
was the logic of Kerensky 5 s position, which he himself, of course,
was unaware of. For he really couldn't, after all, start a serious
struggle against Kornilov instead of this unworthy and distaste-
ful game. He felt this without understanding it, for he himself
was a Kornilovite on condition that he himself head the
Kornilov rising and all the people he looked to for support
were unconditional and unqualified Kornilovites. In these
circumstances Kerensky could do nothing else in fighting the
plot but appoint someone known to be one of the plotters, as the
fully authorized and official commander of all the forces
mobilized for its liquidation.
But why didn't Smolny declare that this was manifest treason?
Or was the Star Chamber top in the plot with Kornilov? Oh no
it was decidedly not guilty of that. The point is that Smolny
didn't know anything about the quibbling and pettifogging in
the Winter Palace. As before it knew only one thing: that
Kornilov was marching on Petersburg with troops to set up a
military dictatorship, while Kerensky had declared him a rebel
and was taking decisive steps to defend the revolution. It was
only by degrees that the truth began, in the midst of the
tumult, to filter through, and then only in the following days.
But it's time to take a look at how the 'revolt' was getting on.
What was being done at the Headquarters and on the new
Petersburg front of the civil war on August 2 8th?
510 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
* Coming out openly' on the night of the syth, the official chief
of the rebels immediately set about consolidating the whole
field army behind him. He sent a proclamation and an order
throughout the front to the commanding generals to support his
coup. For the front commanders there was undoubtedly nothing
unexpected in this ; there was probably not one non-Kornilovite
among them. Nevertheless it was evident that a majority had
not been calculating on a war with the Government, but on the
destruction of the revolution with the 'maximum of legality*.
Kornilov's appeal was responded to at once by Kaledin, the
Cossack ataman, then by the even better-known Denikin, the
commander of the south-western front. Finally the commander
of the very important north-western front. General Klem-
bovsky, Kerensky's worthy choice, appointed by Kerensky
himself to Kornilov's post, came over to the side of the rebels.
But it would seem that the dissemination of Kornilovism in
the army ended there. At least there seemed to be no other
outward show of it. Here, of course, it was Kerensky's demon-
strative action that played the primary role; in declaring the
Kornilov coup to be a rebellion against the legitimate Govern-
ment and in outlawing it, Kerensky was demanding an open
active insurrectionary move from the Kornilovite generals. The
majority couldn't make up their minds to this, and this intro-
duced confusion, vacillation, and disorganization into the
Kornilovite milieu. However they may have sympathized with
Kornilov and despised the Premier, they had not expected to
take such a form of action and were not prepared to do so.
The highest command did not place itself at Kornilov's
disposal, and this inflicted a cruel blow on the Kornilov revolt
at the most decisive hour. Other commanders began asking
Petersburg what they were to do. Some went back on their word
immediately and began to work in contact' with the Govern-
ment commissars, while the official Kornilov adherents simply
undertook no action and lost precious moments.
But the army itself? The rest of the commanders? The officers?
The soldiery ? We know that on the night of the 27th the Central
Ex. Com. had already circulated instructions to its army
organizations, which forestalled the Kornilov coup in the army
as a whole. Kornilov's orders were in the hands only of the staffs
at the front, where they were held up by Soviet agency and
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 511
didn't reach the army. On the contrary, the position of the
supreme Government and of the Soviet was widely popularized
amongst the officers and soldiers by the concerted efforts of the
army organizations from the morning of the 28th on. Here the
results were manifest. The army units took no action against
Kornilov, since they had received no instructions, but there
could be no question of any support for the revolt. If Head-
quarters cannot be said to have been isolated,, at any rate its
rebellion was localized at the very first, decisive moment.
In the last analysis the practical calculations of the rebels
could be based now only on the 3rd Cossack Corps, which was
marching on Petersburg. The Corps should have been stationed
in the suburbs of Petersburg by the evening of the zyth. Those
were the directives given to Krymov, the commanding officer.
But they were not carried out: Krymov was late for technical
reasons. In particular the 'Savage Division' got stuck at the Dno
junction.
With the morning of the 2 8th the Kornilov echelons began
arriving in the town of Luga. There were eight echelons in all,
led by Krymov himself. The troops occupied the town, the
municipal and government offices, the premises of the Soviet;
but everything was orderly and calm. There was no resistance.
The Soviet didn't show itself. There was nothing there for
Krymov to do, but it was impossible to go any further because
the line had been torn up.
The newly-arrived units mingled with the Luga garrison. The
local party and Soviet elements at once started most extensive
agitation amongst the Kornilovites; while Krymov, out of
touch with Headquarters, hesitated to liquidate them and begin
on his own personal initiative a serious policy of iron rule.
Amidst the inaction and agitation Kornilov' s Cossacks naturally
became disorganized, and it was fairly simple to get at
them.
It goes without saying that their commanders, in so far as they
had prepared them for the march, had cited riots started in
Petersburg by the 'Bolshevik German agents'. But the Soviet
agitators had documents to show that the rebel general was
leading the 3rd Corps against the legitimate Government, and
that there had been no riots in Petersburg. The complete
bewilderment of the Kornilovites was inevitable. Decisive
512 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
action, with no time to think) might have helped, but there were
no instructions for that.
The local Soviet authorities had quickly begun to raise their
heads. Around 8 o'clock in the evening the local Ex. Com.
assembled, together with delegates from the army units. It
became clear that more echelons were on their way to Luga.
It was decided to stop them at all costs, even by joining battle.
It was already too late to liquidate now the Luga Soviet and
garrison. It was no longer possible with the available echelons.
Krymov was in quite an absurd position.
So on the morning of the 2 8th the echelons of the Savage
Division left Dno Station on another line. At 4 o'clock in the
afternoon two echelons had got within forty-two versts of
Petersburg, where the line was cut and timber-wagons had
been overturned, A small reconnaissance detachment left the
Kornilov train. From the other direction a special delegation of
Muslims and Caucasians, specially sent by the Central Ex.
Com., went to meet them, to influence their kinsmen in the
Savage Division. The delegates suggested that they be taken
to the echelons. The detachment willingly agreed, and gave
their word of honour that those sent to parley should not be
touched. En route they had time to talk, always on the same
simple theme.
But a group of Kornilovite officers who had left the train
refused to allow the delegation to see the echelons. After long
and stormy arguments the delegates had to go back, since it was
already after 9 o'clock. But they had already done enough to
undermine the morale of the detachment: the 'Savages' had
been informed of the real state of affairs. Later they told of
how they had been lured to Petersburg: first they had been told
they were being taken north of Riga to repel the Germans ;
after Dno they were assured that the Bolsheviks were slaughter-
ing people in Petersburg, and that these traitors had to be
repressed. To make things more convincing a provocateur
threw a bomb at the echelon not far from Dno, which
heightened morale. But simple information made it fall again.
After August 28th, while Miliukov and Kornilov were asserting
they had all the real power, that real power, in the form of an
isolated Corps, was already coming apart at the seams.
On the evening of the 28th all roads were barred to Kornilov
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 513
not only by the destruction of all the railways, but also by men.
The garrisons of all the nearby cities Gatchina, Pavlovsk,
Tsarskoe, Krasny having been put under arms, were spread
out in a fighting front on the railways and roads. Units of the
capital garrison were stationed around Petersburg, mixed in
with the workers' Red Guard. The Military Revolutionary
Committee had called out a few units from Finland to reinforce
them. I myself watched them arrive at the Finland Station, and
mingled with the mob of soldiers; a part of them, apparently
the smaller, were consciously going to the defence of the revolu-
tion ; the others, with a businesslike look, were simply carrying
out orders. The thinking proletarians were in the minority:
most of them were rugged, clumsy country boys; but the
minority served as a sufficient cement for the whole army.
The Petersburg suburbs had been turned into an enormous
camp. Smolny commissars visited the regiments. Intense, un-
flagging activity continued day and night in the heart of
Petersburg itself. The workers were being armed. Where had
the weapons come from? From wherever they could be found.
Nobody asked about legal principles. It was quite enough that
the arming went on systematically under the direction of the
Military Revolutionary Committee agents. Quite a lot of
weapons were found, especially in the Putilov Factory, which
gave them all to Smolny to arm the Red Guard. The official
authorities of the General Staff, around the Kornilovite Savin-
kov, grumbled, snorted, became indignant, and lost their tem-
pers. But this had no importance; people had other things to
think about. Not the slightest excesses were observed in
Petersburg.
It was quite clear that Kornilov's hours were numbered. On
the morning of the sgth news came that he had been arrested
with his staff. Then it was learned that Pskov, Vitebsk, and Dno
were in the hands of troops loyal to the Government. And,
finally, the advance on Petersburg had definitely been stopped.
A favourable turn in the revolution, a thorough revenge for
the July Days, and especially the strengthening of Bolshevism,
as a result of the Kornilov uprising, not only were obvious to
Lunacharsky, Tsereteli, and myself, but now, after the collapse
514 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1QIJ
of the adventure, had become obvious for Kerensky, Miliukov,
and the whole reaction too. Now, in the eyes of the united pluto-
cracy, this Bolshevik 'peril' came to the fore.
While Kornilov was still at the gates, the newspapers were
already making a bogey of the Bolsheviks, as once again seizing
the streets, calling for battle and arming the workers. 'In the
streets', Rech announced with horror, 'groups of armed workers
have already appeared, frightening peaceful citizens. In the
Soviet the Bolsheviks are energetically demanding the release of
their arrested comrades. In connexion with all these facts every-
one is profoundly convinced that as soon as General Kornilov's
enterprise is definitely liquidated, the Bolsheviks, whom the
Soviet majority has now once again ceased to consider traitors
to the revolution, will use all their energy to force the Soviet to
embark on the realization, even though partial, of the Bolshevik
programme.'
In these rather naive terms the general conjuncture is depicted
not at all badly. But the conclusions? Obvious. Barrages,
bastions, barricades must be built at once. There must be
emergency reinforcement of the positions adopted after July, at
the Moscow Conference, before the Kornilov revolt. How could
this be done? The details would become clear later, but for the
time being it was necessary at all costs to retain a maximum of
power in the hands of the post-July, i.e., Kornilovite elements.
And the Cadets, at the head of the stock-marketeers, business
men, industrialists, and generals, pestered the remains of the
Government, demanding power. They clamoured that they
would not refuse to make this sacrifice for their country, and
presented their conditions: (i) that representatives of the army
should be invited to accept the military posts in the Cabinet,
i.e., the generals should be given political power; (2) that
representatives of commerce and industry (over and above the
Cadets themselves) should be invited into the Cabinet; (3) that
the Kornilov revolt should be crushed without destroying the
unity of the army, i.e., without reprisals against the counter-
revolutionary generals. It was all very consistent.
Only a few small illustrations of the Directory's great deeds
are warranted.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 515
The day after it began ruling a report appeared in the
papers, as a 'rumour', that the Government was moving to
Moscow.
This idea was far from new. The Petersburg proletariat was
the most dangerous internal enemy during the revolution as
well as before and after the fall of Riga the danger from with-
out was a good pretext. It was essential for the all-national
Government to get away from the Bolshevik city. During the
State Conference Moscow, to be sure, showed that it was not
benevolent either nevertheless . . .
For some days the theme of evacuating the Government was
harped on in every key. But on September yth the Moscow
Soviet also passed a Bolshevik resolution [like one passed by the
Petersburg Soviet on September ist]. The ancient capital was
in the hands of the Bolsheviks too. There was no place to flee to.
A denial of the 'rumours' followed : the Government was not
preparing to go anywhere.
But then the same goals were approached by other routes.
The removal of excess manpower from Petersburg was taken up in
detail for some weeks. If it was impossible to escape from the
enemy was it also impossible to remove the enemy?
This was a long-drawn-out business, but it didn't have much
success. Led by the Bolsheviks, the workers, both in the
Workers' Section and in the Government institutions, resisted
firmly. The political lining of the project was swiftly and easily
unmasked; its technical unfeasibility and economic incoherence
were explained while incidentally a mass of spicy details about
the ruses and speculations of the industrial and financial mag-
nates was disclosed. No workers were removed, but this affair
has its place among the good intentions of the Directory.
On August 3ist, at Smolny, I learned that Palchinsky, the
'Governor-General', had ordered two Petersburg newspapers,
Rabochii (The Worker) and Novaya %/iizn, to be shut down. The
first was the central organ of the biggest proletarian party, the
Bolsheviks, and the other was a non-party independent organ
that had been carrying on a consistent policy of internationalism
and of proletarian class struggle. They had been shut down at the
moment when the revolution was being defended from the
516 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
attacks of Tsarist generals and Stock-Exchange magnates, at a
moment of solidarity of the whole Soviet democracy.
There had been no formal occasion, no apparent reason, for
shutting down the papers. It was such a blatant and impudent
affront that it brought protests from quite disinterested circles
remote from the proletariat. It was an affront first to the whole
Russian working class, which had rallied as one man to the
defence of the revolution and of Kerensky himself, and secondly
to the entire free, independent press. The next day even the
Izjiestiya called this act of the Government, in black and white, a
filthy provocation. Meanwhile it soon became clear that Mr.
Palchinsky was simply the executor of instructions given by
Kerensky. Wonderful !
On the morning of September ist I went to Smolny, prin-
cipally on Novaya ^hi^n business. I was met on the stairs by
Karakhan, who said by way of greeting: 'Aha! One of the best
representatives of the petty-bourgeois democracy!' I goggled,
but Karakhan laughed and passed on. The same thing happened
when I met various other people. Upstairs it was cleared up : a
copy oFRabochii was thrust into my hand, with a long article by
Lenin devoted to me, which started off by calling me one of the
'best representatives of the petty-bourgeois democracy'. My
Novaya %hizn articles had given Lenin, in his hiding-place, an
opportunity for some lofty theoretical constructions.
At that time the article, entitled the 'Root of Evil 5 (a shot at
me), did not seem of any special interest. But now, on the
contrary, it seems to me instructive in the highest degree; per-
haps I shall still return to these thoughts of the great revolu-
tionary later on.
In the small hall where the Bureau usually sat I saw
Avksentiev, the Minister of the Interior, and decided to ques-
tion him about the Novqya %hizn. Round him stood a group
of people asking about what was going on in the Winter
Palace.
'And what d'you think of Kerensky's treachery?' one of the
Left workers naively blurted out.
Avksentiev, quite taken aback, was silent for a moment.
'Treachery? I don't understand. How can there be any question
of treachery? 5
Avksentiev, from the Winter Palace, really failed to grasp
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 517
something generally acknowledged in the working-class suburbs
of the capital.
He was also in complete confusion concerning the Novaya
ZJd&i. Not only had he had no part in closing it down, but he
had no information about it and was in no position to give any
help. I ought to discuss it with the 'Governor-General', Pal-
chinsky. I knew that myself. I was also being urged to do so
on the paper. But I didn't want to. To go and talk to an am-
biguous parvenu from the semi-Kornilovite Staff, an impotent
dummy impudently playing at supreme command for me, a
member of the Central Ex. Com. etc. was decidedly out of
harmony with my dignity and self-esteem. I refused as long as
possible. However, pressure was put on me, and I left Smolny
for the General Staff where the so-called Governor-General was
to be found.
Philippovsky, the chairman of the Military Revolutionary
Committee, and I went off together by car. And I was given one
more opportunity to convince myself of the acute shift the
Kornilov revolt had brought about in the minds of the 'loyal'
elements.
'When you get to the Staff', said Philippovsky, 'you'll see the
insolent vileness of the place. Talking to Palchinsky will get you
nowhere. But why do you hesitate? After all, Rabochii has
come out again. You just take 30 Kronstadt sailors and get the
paper out tomorrow. They will be very willing to go, . .
Anarchy? Inconsistency? The hell with all that! That's over
with now. . .'
At the Staff I was immediately plunged into an atmosphere of
the most impudent bare-faced counter-revolution. First I went
to the room of our Soviet delegation, where two or three of our
Smolny military people were on duty. These were people from
the majority, my opponents. And they surprised me by their
friendly reception, which I explained by the fact that here, on
the territory of the Winter Palace, they felt they were in a pro-
foundly hostile atmosphere. Here these people, who were break-
ing their necks on 'support and confidence' for the 'unrestricted'
Coalition, were definitely thrown back on the united democratic
front of Smolny.
They were on 'duty' in the Staff; but they actually did nothing
they simply grew depressed and spiteful at their impotence.
518 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Here on the terrain of the supreme legal authority they were
ignored and even slighted just as this sham supreme authority
was ignored and slighted throughout the territory of Russia.
The rooms were noisy and disorderly, and somewhat faded
since the revolution. Inscrutable, exquisitely polite cadet
sentries. Long-forgotten, sulky, arrogantly obsequious, ancien-
rtgime functionaries' faces. Glossy, brilliant officers slithering
over the dubious parquet. Inquisitive glances of contempt were
shot at me from all sides, as though I were some alien body. I
mechanically drew myself up at once and assumed an extremely
haughty air. I gave my name to the adjutant who had turned up
at my elbow and asked that it be given to Palchinsky, refusing to
explain the point of my visit. Much whispering; the looks
multiplied. I was pointed out to the passing officers and
generals by glances. . . But Palchinsky did not keep me waiting.
Visibly aware of the fullness of his power, he was sitting at a
desk, somewhat strangely placed in the front of a huge study. I
sat down opposite. The conversation was extremely brief, but
not without some characteristic features.
'D'you intend to cancel your order to close down the Jiovqya
*No, that order was actually given at the Premier's personal
request. Your paper can't be tolerated. In these difficult hours
it's carrying on its former bitter opposition to the State, and
appealing for out-and-out disorders. . . And your methods!
Somehow your paper is always emphasizing
Palchinsky resorted to a gesture; his face showed unfeigned
hatred of the newspaper which had hounded him personally
quite often. . . However, there was no reason for me to main-
tain the conversation on this level.
'Well,' I said, 'after all, you know we can publish the same
newspaper tomorrow under another name. And of course we
will. Consequently if anyone loses it will be . . .'
Palchinsky looked rather pleased at this.
'Aha! You want to publish again? But have you read the
decree which I signed specially for such a case? According to
that decree you'd be liable . . .'
I hadn't read any decree but in any case it was obviously
futile to continue the conversation. I got up without hearing the
end of the speech about the punishments lying in wait for me.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Just then the 'phone rang, and Palchinsky, not without
triumph, as though concluding an audience, told me: 'The
Premier wants me to go to him/
We went out of the study at the same time and separated.
When I had reported to the office the question stood thus:
whether to publish the Novaya %hizri next day under the old
name, or change the name for the same paper. In either case (in
view of the new 'decree') an indispensable condition of publica-
tion was an armed detachment at the printing-press. This could
be got at Smolny without any difficulty. . . The person formally
responsible, Gorky, was not in Petersburg. To act in a sharply
revolutionary manner could only be done with his knowledge and
consent. So it was decided to act more mildly to publish the
paper in spite of the decree, but under another name. . .
A concluding act of the Kornilov episode was taking place just
then at Smolny. Going there around 8 o'clock in the evening I
met Mar to v on the stairs.
'Hurry,' he said, 'there's an interesting spectacle. The Savage
Division has arrived with a confession of guilt. The Praesidium
and others are receiving delegates from it.'
The 'Bureau' was packed tight with Caucasian greatcoats, fur
caps, felt cloaks, galoons, daggers, glossy black moustaches,
astounded prawn-like eyes, and the smell of horses. This was the
elite, the cream, headed by 'native' officers in all perhaps 500
men. The crowd kept the deepest silence while the delegates of
the individual units, with their caps in their hands, made
broken speeches in the names of those who had sent them. On
the whole they all said one and the same thing. In naively
grandiloquent language they extolled the revolution and talked
about their devotion to it to the tomb, to the last drop of their
blood. Not one man in their units, not one of their people had
gone or would go against the revolution and the revolutionary
Government. A misunderstanding had taken place, dissipated
by the simple establishment of the truth. The 'Savages' were the
bearers of solemn vows.
Not one of the speakers missed a chance of emphasizing their
special pride, that the Russian Revolution was headed by their
countrymen, who were now receiving them in the name of the
'great' Soviet. Every one of them devoted a part of his speech,
and sometimes a good half of it, to the * Chairman Chkheidze,
520 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
and especially to Tseretell ; some of them even addressed him as
*thou', calling him 'great leader . . .'. Tsereteli answered his
countrymen in a very sympathetic speech. His characteristic
oratorical quality, and the very poverty of his vocabulary, which
to my mind reflected his entire intellectual range, was this time
compensated for by an extraordinary warmth of tone. And of
course Tsereteli also spoke not only as a Soviet leader; he wel-
comed the 'Savages' also as Caucasians, as natives of those same
hills he came from himself.
Kamenev was also sitting at the Praesidium table, and behind
him Ryazanov was standing in a group of Soviet people. I
elbowed my way through the crowd and tried to persuade
Kamenev that he absolutely must speak for the Bolsheviks. He
too was aware that that was vital, but couldn't make up his
mind. The 'Savages', now in contact with the Soviet and identi-
fying it with the legitimate Government' and with the revolu-
tion, still, as before, imagined that the Bolsheviks were evil-doers
from some alien universe. They would have been ready to fling
themselves on the Bolsheviks with their former violence even now.
It was essential, then and there, while the air was being cleared,
to expose the hollo wness of the bogey to them; they must be
given a rudimentary understanding of the Bolshevik Party,
which represented the interests of the working class; and it was
especially necessary to emphasize the united Soviet front with
the Bolsheviks in the face of the Kornilov revolt. As far as I
recall, Kamenev didn't speak, but Ryazanov made a very
emotional and explosive speech.
This was how the Kornilov 'manifestation' was liquidated.
The Winter Palace farce retained its previous character; as
before, the bourgeoisie was advancing, attempting to strengthen
its pre-Korailov and post-July positions, and convert its formal
dictatorship into a real one. The Kerensky and Tereshchenko
clique were aiming as before at liquidating any influence of the
organized democracy and establishing the dictatorship of
capital. . . While Smolny, the Star Chamber, and the Soviet
majority were as before betraying the revolution into the hands
of the bourgeoisie.
Both the Winter Palace and Smolny retained their positions
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 521
after the Kornilov campaign. But this was merely on the surface,
and shouldn't conceal from us the essence of the matter. The
enormous impetus from the Right given by Kornilov definitely
disengaged the revolution from the atmosphere of the July
reaction; it threw it far to the Left and gave it a big push
forward.
CHAPTER 24
THE DISSOLUTION OF
THE DEMOCRACY AFTER THE
KORNILOV REVOLT
THE course of the revolution had been defined even before the
Kornilov rebellion, but this gave it a tremendous push forward.
And the wretched floundering of the c reigning' capitulators and
reactionaries merely formed the setting of a basic historical
process the mass movement of the people.
The news of the bourgeois coup profoundly stirred the surface
and the depths of Russia. The entire organized democracy rose
to its feet. All Soviet Russia bristled and took up arms, not only
metaphorically but quite literally. Hundreds of thousands and
millions of workers, soldiers, and peasants rose up in arms, for
defence and for attack, against the class enemy.
Their desire for a decisive battle grew irresistibly, hour by
hour. Here there was class instinct, a small portion of class
consciousness, and the influence of the ideas and organization of
the gigantically growing Bolsheviks: but more than that there
was weariness of war and other burdens; disappointment in the
fruitlessness of the revolution, which up to then had given the
masses of the people nothing; bitter resentment against the
masters and the wealthy rulers; and a yearning to make use of
the sovereignty that had been won.
In any case, directly after the Kornilov upheaval the mood
grew extraordinarily firm; and the formation of fighting
columns correspondingly began at a feverish tempo against
the Coalition and the bourgeoisie, against Kerensky and the
Compromisers, against the official regime and its loyal servants,
the traitors to the working class.
In the provinces the Bolsheviks already controlled a great
many Soviets. That is, the administrative authority, which
moreover was quite unlimited, was virtually in the hands of
Lenin's party. In such cities the bristling Soviets formed purely
Bolshevik local Military Revolutionary Committees, which
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 5*3
during the Kornilov revolt put out their sharp, though clumsy
claws, and refused to pull them in again afterwards.
At this time the Bolshevik centres revived their slogan of 'All
Power to the Soviets!' It was a matter of course in these con-
ditions for the general Kornilov situation to be reflected in the
simple minds of the local Bolshevik leaders. Almost mechanic-
ally, without any clear conception of the significance of their
own actions, the local Bolshevik-Soviet organs began to 'annul'
the official 'power' and make use of their opportunities on the
widest possible scale. This, from the point of view of the 'Direc-
tory' and all the loyal elements, was a vast new explosion of
'anarchy'. But whatever the process is called, one thing is clear:
after the Kornilov revolt Bolshevism began blossoming luxuri-
antly and put forth deep roots throughout the country.
Even before the Kornilov mutiny, before the fall of Riga and
after the Moscow Conference, the entire bourgeois press had
sounded the alarm about the Bolshevik peril, in connexion with
'reliable reports' about forthcoming 'demonstrations' by the
Bolsheviks. But that was a false alarm, with the object of putting
public opinion on to a false scent and covering up the conspiracy
of Headquarters.
Now the press was once more full of panic and rage. But now
this panic and rage were quite sincere. The peril was at hand.
By now it was not only the central Soviets of the capital and the
leaders of all the others that were in Lenin's hands that alone
now had decisive importance. But the army in the field! And
the garrisons in the rear! All this, after all, meant a brimming
over of all real power and State sovereignty no longer even
to the tame, enfeebled, and self-stultifying Soviets, but into the
hands of the Bolshevik 'outsiders' firmly united with the masses.
There was something to sound a real alarm about.
The Kornilov incident, however, not only accelerated the
Bolshevization of the Soviets and the worker-peasant masses,
but was also sharply reflected in the current policies of Lenin's
Soviet opponents. The Mensheviks and SRs who ruled in the
Central Ex, Com. were just as far from Bolshevism as before;
but they too had shifted their positions and swung further Left.
Martov's group, the Menshevik-Internationalists, still had
524 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
nothing in common with the central organ of the Mensheviks,
but we had no ideological grounds for moving Left under the
influence of the Kornilov revolt. Our fraction had already stood
for a long time for a dictatorship of the Soviet democracy. We were
divided from the Bolsheviks not so much by theory, as by
practice, which made itself felt later on; we were divided not so
much by slogans as by a profoundly different conception of their
inner meaning. The Bolsheviks reserved that meaning for the
use of the leadership and didn't carry it to the masses. This had
to do not with Lenin's Leftism, but with his methods. The
Kornilov episode could not graft these on to us.
However, it did not pass without having had some effect on
the Menshevik-Internationalists. They had in their hands the
entire Menshevik organization of the capital: the Petersburg
Committee consisted of Martovists only. The working-class
districts, especially Basil Island, had long since insisted on a
formal split with official Menshevism. The affair dragged on all
summer, and you might say was sabotaged by the efforts of old
and influential Mensheviks, close to Martov. But now Tsereteli
& Co. became unendurable to many Petersburg leaders and to
the solid working-class cadres in the districts. A mass exodus
from the organization began. An example was set by Larin, who
was followed by more than ten active figures. Almost all of
them went directly over to the Bolsheviks. And then, in the
first part of September, a split took place in the strongest of our
working-class organizations, on Basil Island. At the time of the
Democratic Conference practically the entire district went into
Lenin's party. This provoked a ferment in other districts too,
which was carried into the provinces. The crisis of Menshevism
began all along the line and developed rapidly.
It was reflected rather strongly in the political c new forma-
tion' familiar to us in the party of the Novaya hizn people,
officially the United Internationalists. This 'party' (of which the
renowned Steklov was also a member from now on) began
growing quite strongly at the expense of the Mensheviks, thanks
to that irreplaceable medium^ a big and widely read newspaper.
Our editorial board began intensifying its 'party 5 activity. And
in the near future an All-Russian conference of provincial
Novaya %hizn groups was being prepared.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 525
As for the Bolsheviks, they also had nowhere to shift Left-
wards. Their business was simply to gain time to form the ranks
of their army, which was growing by the hour. But after the
Kornilov revolt it was possible for an attentive eye to observe
that the Bolsheviks had again begun to anticipate, you might
say touch, the power snatched away in July. Lenin and Zino-
viev, taking advantage of their leisure, began deepening their
current programme and tactics tactics of finished Jacobinism
and a programme of general explosion, as an example to pro-
letarian Europe.
In one of the first numbers of Rabochii Put (Workers' Way)
(which had replaced Rabochii^ Proletarii, and Pravda) y Lenin pro-
posed a 'compromise'. Let the Menshevik-SR bloc, having driven
out the bourgeoisie, set up a regime unconditionally responsible
to the Soviets. The Bolsheviks would not create any obstacles on
condition, first of all, of complete freedom of agitation, and
secondly, of the transfer of all power to the local Soviets. It is
quite clear that for the knights of the Coalition this was a 'com-
promise 5 , but what Lenin's 'compromise 5 amounted to, on the
other hand, is not particularly clear. The principal perspectives,
however, that presented themselves to Lenin's mind are quite
obvious. If the Bolshevik Party was now growing like a snowball
and becoming a decisive force, Lenin was assured of a majority
in the Congress of Soviets in the very near future. Apart from
'freedom of agitation' this would be furthered by the entire
objective course of events, and especially by the inevitable
marking time to please the bourgeoisie that the Mensheviks
and SRs would undertake if they agreed to the 'compromise 3 .
Then it would be possible to drive the ruling bloc out of power
(or even further) without resorting to the risky experiments of
June loth and July 4th. Lenin's party would have 'full power'
painlessly and safely. Well, and what would it do? We are
familiar with its programme in general. But now, in Rabochii Put
Zinoviev filled it out and made it concrete : One of the first
steps of any Government which had broken with the bourgeoisie
would be to refuse to pay any debts contracted in connexion
with the war. The second step would be the partial expropria-
tion of the 'richest people 5 in favour of the State.
This was unquestionably highly alluring. And note in the
absence of an elementary economic programme, and given the
526 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
systematic replacement of Marxist concepts by anarchist
slogans ('organized seizure', 'workers' control', etc.) what
terms are used by Citizen Zinoviev: Rich people! This is both
scientific and statesmanlike, and it can be understood by any
lumpen-proletarian. This is why the Bolsheviks' correct theore-
tical formulas about the worker-peasant dictatorship could not
draw into Lenin's party the extreme Left Marxist elements.
During those days I personally used to say that if it hadn't been
for these persistent suspicious and nasty notes in their 'ideology'
then I too might have entered the Bolshevik Party. But I didn't,
and a good thing too. . .
CHAPTER 25
THE LAST COALITION
THE 'Democratic Conference 5 should have opened on the isth,
but was postponed until September 1 4th, just a month after the
Moscow State Conference. It proceeded on its futile, tiresome
business : a debate on whether we should have a Coalition or a
purely democratic Government. Not one of the speeches de-
serves to be expounded here. Everything had been heard or read
already.
We were back in the old post-July, pre-Kornilov situation. A
fourth, irresponsible Coalition was revived, which once again
confirmed the formal dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. This
'sovereign' bourgeois regime was formed exactly two months
after the Third Coalition, one month after the Kornilov coup
and one month before but let's not anticipate, events. I shall
simply recall something that apparently does not require any
special explanation. The dictatorship of the Stock Exchange
was formally evident, though as before this was nothing but a
sham. But, unlike the last time, when some attributes of power
were in the hands of the friends and accomplices of the bourgeois
'dictators' now the whole power was in the hands of their
known class enemies. In July and August the petty-bourgeois
Soviet had still preserved some fragments of its power; but now
all the power, and the Soviets into the bargain, had gone over
to the Bolsheviks. The whole situation was more absurd and
intolerable than before. There was no state power, and no
State.
This was so clear that even the yellow bourgeois press did not
exult. The new Coalition was greeted without enthusiasm. The
Right wing of the democracy demonstratively, though not con-
vincingly, rejoiced over its infant. To make up for this the Left,
Internationalist section set to work at once and, without giving
it a breathing spell, took a direct line toward the overthrow of
the new 'Government'.
* * *
Trotsky had been released from prison on September 4th, just
as suddenly and causelessly as he had been arrested on July 23rd.
528 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
Now he became chairman of the Petersburg Soviet; there was a
hurricane of applause when he appeared. Everything had
changed ! Since the April Days the Soviet had gone against the
revolution and been the mainstay of the bourgeoisie. For a
whole half-year it had served as bulwark against the people's
movement and their wrath. It had been the Praetorian Guard
of the Star Chamber, at the disposal of Kerensky and TseretelL
Now it was once again a revolutionary army inseparable from
the popular masses of Petersburg. It was now Trotsky's guard,
ready at a sign from him to storm the Coalition, the Winter
Palace and all the citadels of the bourgeoisie. The Soviet, re-
united with the masses, had once again recovered its enormous
energies.
The conjuncture, however, was no longer the same as it had
been before. Trotsky's Soviet did not act like an acknowledged
State power carrying on a revolution. It did not act by methods
of opposition, pressure, and 'liaison'. It was a latent potential
revolutionary force, gathering together the elements for a
general explosion. This hidden potentiality blinded the
wretched sham 'rulers', the man in the street, and the old Soviet
majority. But that didn't alter anything: the success of the forth-
coming explosion was assured. Nothing could withstand the
new destructive power of the Soviet; the only question was
where Trotsky would lead it. For what did it contain but
destruction? Well, we shall live and learn.
In his first speech as chairman Trotsky said that actually
he had not taken Chkheidze's place, but, on the contrary,
Chkheidze had been occupying his (Trotsky's) place: in the
1905 Revolution the chairman of the Petersburg Soviet was
Trotsky. Now, however, the perspectives were different; the new
Praesidium had to form part of a new upsurge of the revolution,
which would lead to victory. . .
But then he added a few words, not thinking that in time he
would have to disregard them and create a theory to justify
their opposite. He said:
'We are all party people, and we shall have to cross swords
more than once. But we shall guide the work of the Petersburg
Soviet in a spirit of justice and complete independence for all
fractions; the hand of the Praesidium will never oppress the
minority.'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 529
Heavens! What liberal views! What self-mockery! But the
point is that about three years later, while exchanging re-
miniscences with me, Trotsky, thinking back to this moment,
exclaimed dreamily:
'What a happy time! 5
Yes, wonderful! Perhaps not one person in the world, not
excluding himself, will ever recall Trotsky's rule with such
feelings.
At the session on September 25th the Soviet passed this
resolution on the new Government by an enormous majority:
'The new Government will go down in the history of the
revolution as the Government of the civil war. The Soviet
declares : "We, the workers and the garrison of Petersburg, re-
fuse to support the Government of bourgeois autocracy and
counter-revolutionary violence. We express the unshakeable
conviction that the new Government will meet with a
single response from the entire revolutionary democracy:
'Resign!' 5 "
Such was the unusual greeting of the Petersburg Soviet to the
new Government.
As we went down the Smolny stairs, discussing the new
events, someone called up from below: *Eh, Volodarsky, where
is it tomorrow?'
'Tomorrow?' answered Volodarsky, who was going out with
me, 'at the Patronny plant.'
Yes, the Bolsheviks were working stubbornly and without let-
up. They were among the masses, at the factory-benches, every
day without a pause. Tens of speakers, big and little, were
speaking in Petersburg, at the factories and in the barracks,
every blessed day. For the masses they had become their own
people, because they were always there, taking the lead in details
as well as in the most important affairs of the factory or
barracks. They had become the sole hope, if only because since
they were one with the masses they were lavish with promises
and sweet though simple fairy tales. The mass lived and breathed
together with the Bolsheviks. It was in the hands of the party of
Lenin and Trotsky.
* * *
Around this time new elections on a proportional basis took
place for the Petersburg Ex. Com. Of the forty-four members
530 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
elected two-thirds were Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks numbered
five in all, whereas our group, the Menshevik-Internationalists
the group that had made up the fundamental core of the first
Ex. Com., which had begun the revolution did not get a single
seat.
This may have been distressing for us, but it was not at all
surprising.
It was not actually because we had to take the blame for
official Menshevism, with which the Martov group had not yet
conclusively broken, or because the group still didn't have a
literary organ, a basic instrument of agitation. Nor was it,
finally, that we, the leaders, had abandoned work in the
Soviet, hardly showed ourselves in Smolny and were separated
from its rank-and-file.
The cause was something basic: our position, at least in its
positive part, was superfluous for the masses. In its negative,
critical part we Martovites and Novaya %hizn people were in
accord with the Bolsheviks. In the arena of the struggle going on
at that time against the Coalition and the bourgeoisie we stood
at their side. We did not fuse with them because a number of
features of the positive creative strength of Bolshevism, as well
as its methods of agitation, revealed to us its future hateful
countenance. It was based on an unbridled, anarchistic, petty-
bourgeois elemental explosion, which was only smothered by
Bolshevism when once again it was not followed by the masses.
We were afraid of this elemental explosion.
But the masses were not afraid of it, for they could neither
perceive it nor appreciate its significance.
Our Marxist theories were incomprehensible and irritating to
the masses, which had just barely tasted the blessing of free
political development. Our logical proletarian class ideology
was useless and offensive to the workers and soldiers of our
petty-bourgeois country. The disappointed, weary and hungry
masses swept over our heads from SR-opportunist philistinism
to the devastating fury of Bolshevism. Our proletarian Marxist
outlook did not find a place for itself amidst the turbulent
elements. Our 'interstitial' group was easily pounded to bits
by the gigantic oncoming billows of the imminent civil
war.
In the new Petersburg Ex. Com., where we had once played a
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 531
leading role, we now did not get a single seat. However, in the
kaleidoscope of the dizzying events, the masses not only did not
remember, they did not know about our role in the first period
of the revolution. Only the leaders knew about it, and, evidently
in remembrance of the first magnificent weeks, the Bolshevik
Ex. Com. at its first session resolved to co-opt our group with a
consulting voice: Sokolov, Kapelinsky, Sokolovsky, our leader
Martov, I think Steklov, and myself.
During those days I remember one session of our Martovite
'centre' devoted to the elections for the Constituent Assembly.
We had gathered in a place that was new to me on the third
floor of Smolny, near the galleries giving on to the big hall. I
raised the question of a bloc with the Bolsheviks. There were
some sympathetic responses, but Martov rebelled outright and
said, among other things:
*At the present moment a drift to the Bolsheviks is absolutely
out of place. Now the revolution is endangered not by the
Right, but by the Left I 9
Martov may have shown great acumen here, but I must admit
that to me personally, after the Kornilov coup, the Democratic
Conference, and the restoration of the bourgeois dictatorship, a
movement from the Left did not seem a peril but salvation.
As far as I recall, the question of a bloc with the Bolsheviks
was never finally settled: it came up against the consideration
that under no circumstances would the Bolsheviks agree to
enter a bloc with us ; they were too strong and 'self-sufficient' for
that, and were carrying on their preparation for the elections
too energetically, having already put forward everywhere
prepared lists of candidates, headed in most instances by
Trotsky himself.
I don't think it superfluous to remark that my differences
with Martov at this time had become more or less systematic.
Two tendencies had begun to reveal themselves in our group.
Martov had with him the group of old Menshevik emigres
Semkovsky, Astrov, Martynov who had gravitated to the old
core of the party. But on the Left, together with me, were the
Petersburgers and especially the active workers of the old Ex.
Com. Martov rather jealously guarded his influence and the
532 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
representation of the entire organization by elements close to
him.
On the day, I think, when we discussed the Constituent
Assembly, I went to Smolny after working in the evening on the
newspaper. I wanted to see Trotsky and 'feel out the ground'
concerning an electoral bloc of the Bolsheviks and the Martov-
ites. Trotsky was at Smolny, but at a meeting in the Bureau, at
a council of 'Elders' of the forthcoming Pre-Parliament. 1
I went into the committee-room to see Trotsky, my hated face
shocking all these 'Elders' so familiar to us. Didn't this Sukhanov
want to put something indiscreet into his paper? The Bolsheviks
(Trotsky and Kamenev) were sitting to one side, in their usual
places to the right of the chairman. Trotsky looked a bit
different from usual, in a long grey overcoat and spectacles with
metal rims instead of pince-nez.
He spoke politely of the bloc with the Menshevik-Inter-
nationalists, but with such reserve that the outcome was clear.
I sat down at his side to listen to what the 'Elders' were saying
and hear Tsereteli's philippics. Even the Stolypin Duma under
Rasputin's boot seemed the ideal of an all-powerful Parliament,
filled with grandeur, compared with the Pre-Parliament, that
unspeakable product of stupidity and treachery.
I recall this evening very well. I had never yet suffered such a
sharp and unendurable feeling of dejection and shame: to what
a point they had led the great revolution! I remember that I
began choking, partly with anger, and partly with something
else, that blocked up my throat.
'What's going on?' I said, naively and 'unconsciously' turning
to Trotsky.
But Trotsky merely laughed his soundless laugh with his
mouth half-open. At the time I didn't understand his in-
difference, but actually it was obvious. For Trotsky, after all, all
questions had by then been settled. He was already living on the
other side, and as for what was being done on this side that
didn't concern him. Perhaps the worse it was, the better.
I returned to the Novaya %hiw in the Shpalerny to get out the
1 Decided on at the Democratic Conference. Sukhanov uses the word 'Elders'
ironically. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi7 533
paper. At this time we were implacably and with unusual
energy bombarding Kerensky, the Konovalovs, and their whole
beneficent Government. There was an excellent atmosphere on
the paper, and more and more attention was being paid us
by both enemies and friends.
In general, as far as I recall, I derived some satisfaction from
the paper, more than previously. But I also remember the
physical strain. I was still living on the Karpovka, and the end-
less trips there in the damp Petersburg autumn nights after
publication now come to mind quite differently from the en-
chanting walks through the streets of the Petersburg Side into
the roseate, carolling mornings of that unforgettable spring. . .
'Disorders' were taking on absolutely unendurable, really
menacing proportions in Russia. Anarchy was really getting
under way. The city and the countryside were both in revolt.
The first was demanding bread, the second land. The new
Coalition was met with hunger riots and savage pogroms
throughout Russia. I happen to have in front of me reports of
such riots in Zhitomir, Kharkov, Tambov, Orel, Odessa, etc.,
etc. Troops were sent everywhere, Cossacks whenever possible.
There were repressions, shootings, martial law. But nothing
helped. Petersburg was quiet; it simply hungered and waited.
But the peasants, finally losing patience, began settling the
agrarian question at first hand by their own methods. It was
impossible not to give them land : it was impossible to torture them
any longer by uncertainty. It was impossible to make speeches to
them about the 'regulation of rural relations without the
destruction of the existing forms of land-holding. . .'
But this was the essence of the Coalition. And the peasants began
acting on their own. Estates were divided up and tilled, herds
were slaughtered and driven off, country-houses were destroyed
and set on fire, arms were seized, stores were plundered and
destroyed, trees and orchards were chopped down, there was
murder and violence. These were no longer Excesses', as they had
been in May and June. It was a mass phenomenon tidal waves
heaving and billowing throughout the country.
Worst of all, however, was the position in the field army.
This was as before the root and core of the entire situation.
534 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
Famine was assuming horrifying proportions at the front. It was
obvious to any honest observer that our army, even though it
was pinning down 130 German divisions on the Eastern front,
could not hold out the winter, nor even the autumn.
As early as September 2ist at a Petersburg Soviet session an
officer who had been at the front made a speech saying:
"The soldiers in the trenches don't want either freedom or land
now. They want only one thing now the end of the war.
Whatever you may say here, the soldiers are not going to fight
any more. . .'
This caused a sensation even in the Bolshevik Soviet. Ex-
clamations were heard: 'Even the Bolsheviks don't say that!'
But the officer, no Bolshevik, calmly waited, conscious of duty
done.
'We don't know and we don't care what the Bolsheviks say.
I'm reporting what I know and what the soldiers have sent me to
tell you. 5
It was impossible to go on like this. This 'Government' had to
be torn out by the roots. I harped on this over and over again,
every day, in the paper. And I was right.
But how could such a situation be ended? Martov said,
during those days : 'I know only two methods of forming a
Government: either the citizen's gesture of throwing his ballot
into the voting urn, or the citizen's gesture of loading his rifle.'
It happened that the last Coalition had been created by a third
method, but now we were confronted by the two first. In the
immediate future one of these was going to decide matters.
The Pre-Parliament was going to open powerless, sickly,
alien, and repugnant to every revolutionary principle. But
compared with the comic-opera Government it was a de facto
power. It could have decided the fate of the 'ruling' Coalition by
the first method the parliamentary method. The results were
another question. But there could be no doubt as to the
possibility.
And if not? Then the capitulationism of Smolny and the
provocative attitude of the Winter Palace would do their work.
The real democracy of Russia, after all, had already loaded its
guns.
CHAPTER 26
THE PRE-PARLIAMENT
THE official title conferred on the Pre-Parliament was: 'The
Provisional Council of the Russian Republic'. The opening was
scheduled for October yth. Premises were looked for. Something
fitting was wanted not too primitive or provincial, for the
Government itself and the most respectable social elements (not
workers or soldiers) would have to be there often. But not too
ceremonial or official either, for this wasn't the State Duma or
any plenipotentiary organ. The Rech thought the Smolny
Institute would be a very suitable location. And as a matter of
fact, it was quite free: only the Central Ex. Com. and the
Petersburg Soviet, which should never have seen the light of
day, were there. But could the Bolsheviks be cleared out of
Smolny. . .? The row of dots meant: c Oh, for Kornilov! 3 But
suitable premises couldn't be found, and the Marian Palace had
to do.
The 'democratic 5 majority consisted of 308 people, of whom
sixty-six were Bolsheviks, about sixty official Mensheviks, and
1 20 SRs, about twenty of whom were Leftist. Then there were
some Co-operators in the 'democracy', who included extreme
Right Mensheviks and SRs.
Our fraction, the Menshevik-Internationalists, numbered
about thirty. We had never had so many ; with such a 'mass' we
could at any rate produce enough of an uproar, or start verbal
obstruction.
At the beginning the bourgeois representatives demanded 120
seats, but then they increased that to 150. Then I think they
did some more bargaining, of no particular interest to us. They,
like the democracy, had heaped up the most improbable social
classes, strata, and groups, and the unlikeliest combinations.
Well-to-do peasants were affiliated with propertied elements. . .
There were about seventy-five Cadets. The majority of the rest,
sent by every possible organization of industrialists and land-
owners, was more Right: old Octobrists and Nationalists. For
some reason they were still stubbornly fighting against formally
pouring their streamlets into the Cadet sea. But in practice they
536 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
acknowledged Cadet hegemony and had the same programme :
the iron dictatorship of the plutocracy.
But there were also 'intellectuals* amongst the propertied
elements, for instance the 'academic' delegation. Others were
divided up this way: the Society of Journalists was represented
in the democracy, while the Society of Editors got a place
amongst the propertied elements.
This Pre-Parliament was officially powerless, a concoction
unworthy of the revolution and pathetic as an institution. But it
had an interesting quality, unlike perhaps most real parlia-
ments. Its composition was exceptionally brilliant. It concen-
trated within itself, indeed, the flower of the nation. It owed this
precisely to the unprecedented method of its selection. All the
political parties and other associations sent their best people, with-
out subjecting them to the risk of losing their place in an
election to the popular but insignificant hero of some provincial
ant-hill. Hence there were rather few people who did not have
an ail-Russian reputation. And all the 'names' were included.
All the party Central Committees were represented in the Pre-
Parliament in corpore; exceptions were few, accidental and un-
important. This in itself proclaimed the concentration of all the
country's political strength and the quintessence of all its political
thought.
Some individuals were absent. Plekhanov, old, ill, and
ignored by events, wasn't there; he had played no part in the
revolution. Nor was Lenin there: our powerful and forthright
Government kept renewing its orders for his arrest every week;
as before he was hiding 'underground', though unlike Plekhanov
he played a part, a very powerful part, in current events. But
Lenin's place was successfully taken by Trotsky. The time had
now passed when in the Bolshevik Party, as in the First Inter-
national, after the Thunderer himself there was nothing for a
long, long, long time. Now Trotsky was side by side with him.
He was quite different, and speaking generally quite unfitted to
replace Lenin, but, I'm inclined to think, he was no less impor-
tant a man, whom Lenin could not have replaced either, and
without whom the forthcoming events could not have come
about.
There was one other who was absent Tsereteli. He had
gone away to the Caucasus to rest for 'a few weeks'. He was
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 537
not to return politically. His role was played out, finished. He
had botched and ruined as much as one able man could. And
he had gone away. . . Enough of him; I shall not speak of him
again it has all been said. 1
On October yth at 5 o'clock, amidst rain and slush, Kerensky
opened the Pre-Parliament. This was no mere democratic con-
ference! This time Kerensky wasn't late. Also, something un-
heard of in the revolution happened: the Pre-Parliament
opened on time. No one could have foreseen that. And that, it
was said, was why there were not very many people in the hall
and it was just as boring and dreary in the Marian Palace as in
the streets of Petersburg.
It was quite late, and happening for some reason to go in by a
way I didn't know, I wandered about for a long time through
the endless corridors and rooms of the Palace. I came out some-
how into the Press Gallery, from which I heard the end of the
speech from the Throne. The head of the Government and the
State was speaking in hollowly official but loftily patriotic tones.
I don't remember, nor can I extract from the newspaper
accounts, one living concrete idea. In any case the entire speech
was full of the *war dangers' under the impact of the latest
events at the front and the news, just received, that the Germans
were threatening Reval. . . But really, all the political interest
of the opening of the Pre-Parliament revolved around the
Bolsheviks.
Their whole large fraction arrived late, almost at the same
time as I did. They had had an important and stormy meeting
at Smolny, which had only just ended. They had been making a
final decision on what to do about the Pre-Parliament: stay or
go? After a first session, at which the question was left hanging
in the air, they had had a bitter dispute. This, as a piquant
incident in Smolny circles, was of great interest. The opinions of
the Bolsheviks were almost evenly divided, and it wasn't known
which way the majority would go. It was reported that Lenin
was demanding that they should leave. Trotsky also defended
1 After the October Revolution Tsereteli was one of the leaders of the Menshevik
Caucasian Republic, after the repression of which by the Soviet Government he
emigrated, eventually to New York City. (Ed.)
538 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI?
this position with great vigour. Ryazanov and Kamenev were
fighting against it. The Right wing was demanding that the
rupture with the Pre-Parliament be postponed at least until the
moment the Pre-Parliament exposed itself on some issue, for
instance refused to make some important decision in the in-
terests of the working class. They said the rupture would other-
wise not be understood by the people. But Trotsky, for whom all
questions were settled, insisted that there should be no obscuri-
ties, that the boats should be conclusively and publicly burnt.
Let both hostile armies see and understand!
In an interval, a sensational rumour circulated in the corri-
dors of the Marian Palace: Trotsky had won by a majority of
two or three votes, and the Bolsheviks would leave the Pre-
Parliament immediately. That was the least of it ; the Menshevik
and SR leaders, very disturbed, were saying that before they left
the Bolsheviks would create a tremendous row. The most un-
likely rumours passed from mouth to mouth. A kind of panic
began. One of the officials was told off to make private en-
quiries of the Bolsheviks.
'Nonsense!' answered Trotsky, standing not far off from me
in the rotunda adjoining the meeting hall, 'nonsense, a few
pistol-shots. . .'
But Trotsky looked rather nervous in anticipation of the
shots. The Right Bolsheviks, around Ryazanov, were grumbling
angrily. This whole affair was very disagreeable to me, and I
didn't go over to Trotsky.
At the end of the session Trotsky was given the floor for an
emergency statement. There was a sensation in the hall. For
most of the bourgeois the famous leader of the bandits, idlers,
and hooligans was still a novelty.
'The officially stated aim of the Democratic Conference',
Trotsky began, 'was the elimination of the personal regime that
fed the Kornilov revolt, and the creation of a responsible
Government capable of liquidating the war and promoting the
convocation of a Constituent Assembly at the appointed time.
Meanwhile, behind the back of the Democratic Conference,
directly contrary results have been achieved by way of the back-
stage deals of Citizen Kerensky, the Cadets, and the SR and
Menshevik leaders. A Government has been formed in and
around which both avowed and clandestine Kornilovites play
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 539
the leading role* The non-responsibility of this Government [to
the Council of the Republic] has been formally established, The
Council of the Russian Republic has been declared a consultant
body. Propertied elements have come into the Provisional
Council in numbers to which, as all elections throughout the
country indicate, they are not entitled. Despite this it is precisely
the Cadet Party that has made the Government independent of
the Council of the Republic. Propertied elements will un-
doubtedly occupy a much less favourable position in the Con-
stituent Assembly than in the Provisional Council. The Govern-
ment cannot help but be responsible to the Constituent As-
sembly. If the propertied elements were really preparing for the
Constituent Assembly in a month and a half, they would have
no grounds for defending the non-responsibility of the Govern-
ment now. The whole point is that the bourgeois classes have set
themselves the goal of preventing the Constituent Assembly , . .'
There was an uproar. Shouts from the Right: 'Lies!' Trotsky
tried to show complete indifference, and didn't raise his voice.
'In the fields of industry, agriculture, and supply the policy of
the Government and the possessing classes is aggravating the
havoc produced by the war. The propertied classes, who pro-
voked the uprising, are now moving to crush it and are openly
steering a course for the bony hand of hunger, which is expected
to strangle the revolution and the Constituent Assembly first of
all.
'Nor is foreign policy any less criminal. After forty months of
war the capital is threatened by mortal danger. In response to
this a plan has been put forward for the transfer of the Govern-
ment to Moscow. The idea of surrendering the revolutionary
capital to German troops does not arouse the slightest indigna-
tion amongst the bourgeois classes; on the contrary it is
accepted as a natural link in the general policy that is supposed
to help them in their counter-revolutionary conspiracy.'
The uproar grew worse. The patriots leaped from their seats
and wouldn't allow Trotsky to go on speaking. Shouts about
Germany, the sealed car and so on. One shout stood out:
'Bastard!' I make the point now that throughout the revolution,
both before and after the Bolsheviks, neither in the Tauride,
nor in Smolny, however stormy the sessions and however tense the
atmosphere, there was never once such an outcry at the meetings
540 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
of our rank-and-file. But it was enough for us to come into
the fine society of the Marian Palace, the company of polished
lawyers, professors, financiers, landowners, and generals, for the
tavern atmosphere of the bourgeois State Duma to revive
immediately.
The chairman called the meeting to order. Trotsky was
standing there as though none of this were any concern of his,
and finally found it possible to go on.
'We, the Bolshevik fraction of the Social-Democratic Party,
declare that with this Government of national treachery and
with this "Council" we '
The uproar took on an obviously hopeless character. The
majority of the Right got to their feet with the obvious intention
of stopping the speech. The chairman called the speaker to
order. Trotsky, beginning to lose his temper, and speaking by
now through the hubbub, finished :
' that we have nothing in common with them. We have
nothing in common with that murderous intrigue against the
people which is being conducted behind the official scenes. We
refuse to shield it either directly or indirectly for a single day.
In leaving the Provisional Council we call upon the workers,
soldiers, and peasants of all Russia to be stalwart and courageous.
Petersburg is in danger, the revolution is in danger, the nation is
in danger. The Government is intensifying that danger. The
ruling parties are increasing it. Only the nation can save itself
and the country. We appeal to the people: Long live an im-
mediate, honourable democratic peace, all power to the
Soviets, all land to the people, long live the Constituent
Assembly! 5
Trotsky got off the platform, and a few dozen men of the
extreme Left left the hall amidst hubbub and shouting. The
majority gazed after them disdainfully, waving their hands
good riddance! The majority saw nothing: after all, this was
only sixty specimens of a peculiar breed of wild beast who were
leaving the society of mankind. Just the Bolsheviks alone. Good
riddance! It was calmer and more agreeable without them.
But we, the closest neighbours of the Bolsheviks and their
companions-in-arms, sat there utterly depressed by all that had
happened.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 541
Despite all the power and brilliance of his speech Trotsky, as
we see, was far from having proved the necessity of the break. He
had not proved it because he didn't wish to finish what he had
to say. But from their point of view the ones who left were
logical enough. If they were on the other side of this entire order,
then there was really nothing for them to do in the Pre-
Parliament.
But this was just how the matter must be understood: if there
was nothing for them to do there and they left, consequently
they were on the other side. There was only one road for them out
of the Pre-Parliament to the barricades. If they cast away the
'electoral ballot', they must take up the rifle. And that, indeed, is
what happened. But the majority didn't understand this, didn't
see it, didn't believe it. We, their neighbours and companions-
in-arms, did understand it. But we thought it wrong.
'Just the Bolsheviks alone.' For the Pre-Parliamentary
majority they were a handful who could be liquidated by repres-
sion. For us they were an overwhelming section of a proletariat
straining into battle and nourished on class hatred, and also of
the tormented soldiery, and of the peasant depths that had
despaired of the revolution. They were a vast landslide of people.
They were millions. Repress them? And with our comic-opera
Government !
For us Internationalists the question was not posed on that
plane at all. It was not a question of its being impossible to
liquidate the Bolsheviks. The point was that the proletariat, the
soldiery, and the peasant rank-and-file, led by the Bolshevik
Party and finding themselves outside the existing 'political order',
were now taking up arms against the entire old world, to raze
the millennial bourgeois system to the ground. By the strength
of their own proletarian vanguard party alone, surrounded by
millions of casual and unreliable fellow-travellers, they wanted
to create a new unheard-of proletarian state and an unpre-
cedented social and economic order. They wanted to do this in
our ruined, half-wild, petty-bourgeois, economically-shattered
country. They wanted to do this against the organized petty-
bourgeois elements, after putting an end to the united front of
the democracy for ever.
This was a fateful mistake. It was a disastrous programme and
tactic for the revolution.
542 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
A new revolution was admissible, an uprising was legitimate,
the liquidation of the existing regime was indispensable. But all
this was so on condition of a united democratic front. That meant
an armed struggle only against big capital and imperialism. It
meant only the liquidation of the political and economic rule of
the bourgeoisie and the landowners. It did not mean the defini-
tive destruction of the old State and the rejection of its heritage.
It meant the plenipotentiary participation of the petty-bour-
geois, Menshevik-SR groups in the construction of a new State
together with the proletariat and the peasantry. These were all
unconditionally essential elements of the new society that was
springing up on the ruins of the empire of the exploiting
minority. And in the conditions of our revolution this was the
only correct formulation of the problem.
But the leaders of the Bolshevik Party were hostile to all this.
They formulated the basic task of the revolution incorrectly. And
they continually carried on, not a policy of alliance, but the
contrary policy of rupture, split, and mutual isolation.
The Bolshevik departure from the Pre-Parliament was an
important step. In flinging aside their voting papers the
Bolsheviks, in the eyes of all those with eyes to see, were taking
up their rifles. They had no chance of arousing the sympathy of
the Mensheviks and SRs by this demonstration and every
chance of repelling them far away. The Bolshevik leaders were
heading straight for this and calculating on it.
What we Internationalists were depressed by was not that the
Bolsheviks had taken to the barricades to make a legitimate
revolution. It was not the burning of the boats that disconcerted
us. What was depressing was that with the declaration of civil
war the democratic front was almost hopelessly disrupted by
the Bolsheviks, and that they were turning their weapons against
elements vital to themselves and to the realization of the tasks of
the revolution as correctly formulated.
Well, and what would have happened if the Bolsheviks had
stayed in the Pre-Parliament? What would have happened if in
liquidating Kerenskyism they had shown an inclination for a
rapprochement with the old Soviet bloc, as had happened in the
short period of the liquidation of the Kornilov revolt?
Let us note two circumstances. First of all the new Coalition,
like every product of 'Kerenskyism 3 , was quite unfit for survival.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 543
Its fate was pre-determined by the whole conjuncture, and
especially by the fact that the real power was already in the
hands of the Bolsheviks. Secondly, the Bolsheviks would have
been a very strong inspirational minority in the Pre-Parliament;
together with the Internationalists and the allied SRs this
minority could have amounted to 30 per cent; if the situation
ever became more acute and there was a split in theMenshevik-
SR bloc (as had happened in Smolny during the Kornilov
revolt), the majority of the Pre-Parliament would have been on
the side of the former Soviet Left.
All these abstract calculations would have been significant if
the Bolsheviks hadn't been Bolsheviks.
Rumours of the internal collapse of the Coalition kept grow-
ing stronger and stronger. The loyal elements were beginning to
lose patience. . . And they were egged on by various factors
from all sides.
On the one hand a Congress of Soviets was already assembling
at Smolny. Here the Bolsheviks were completely sovereign;
the Congress was a rather serious factor, while the intentions of
the Bolsheviks in any case promised unpleasantness.
On another side the Cossacks, who had been attracting atten-
tion for a long time, began to allow themselves absolutely in-
famous conduct: in Kaluga, on the 20th, a Cossack detachment
had besieged the local Soviet and demanded its surrender, but
when the surrender took place, nevertheless opened fire and
killed a few members of the Soviet. Kaluga today, Poltava
tomorrow, Moscow the day after. . .
From a third side, the internal collapse of the Coalition was
progressing before everybody's eyes.
The official Menshevik leaders, widely at variance with each
other, had been trying up to now to contrive a Left-Centre bloc,
cutting off the Martovites and the Left SRs on the Left, and
finding alliances on the Right. Now the orientation had
changed. Instead of the Left-Centre bloc Dan was fussing about
trying to concoct a Left bloc. He was stretching out a hand to
Martov. That meant he was ready to sacrifice the Centre and
was calculating on finally drawing the SRs into the Opposition.
But we didn't have time to finish our debates. The Left Centre
544 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
was creeping further and further towards the Left with every
step. Events were dragging along behind them the hopeless
interstitial ordinary people who had no class backbone drag-
ging along those who would not go along of their own free will.
We didn't have time. . . Do you miss my point, Reader? Then
Pll try to explain it all to you now, as well as I can.
January-July 1921.
Part VI
THE OCTOBER INSURRECTION
October 3rd-November ist
CHAPTER 27
THE SOFTENING-UP
IN the softly glittering halls of the Marian Palace there was no
revolution at all. It was all in Smolny, in the working-class
sections of the capital and in the provincial towns and districts.
And that revolution was racing down an inclined plane to a
denouement. . . The Bolsheviks had definitely embarked on a
violent revolutionary destruction of the Coalition and its re-
placement by Tower to the Soviets'. They had embraced the
cause of a coup d'etat.
We shall have to deal with three groups of problems, for every
coup d'etat has, in the first place, its ideology or philosophy;
secondly, its politics; and thirdly, its strategy. Perhaps this can
be expressed more concretely and less pretentiously : we shall be
dealing with the programme of the overturn, its tactics, and its
organization.
From the last days of September on, the salient points of
spoken and written Bolshevik propaganda were the following.
First of all, this last Coalition of ours was a gang of usurpers,
who had seized autocratic power through private agreement
among a couple of dozen men. This was the incontestable and
shameful truth which the Bolsheviks strove to make every
worker and soldier aware of. Apart from a resolution of the
Petersburg Soviet refusing support to the newly born Coalition,
a wave of mass-meetings swiftly poured over both capitals and
the whole country; hundreds of thousands of workers and
soldiers protested against the very fact of the formation of a
new bourgeois Government, and demanded power for the
Soviets.
Moreover, the existing Government was not only a gang of
usurpers; it was a Government of counter-revolutionary rebels.
That Kornilov was such a rebel everyone knew: it had been
officially announced. But by now, after all, the whole affair had
been sufficiently exposed. Kerensky had been in league with
Kornilov, and he himself had summoned the Third Corps to
destroy the Soviets, and agreed to enter Kornilov's Cabinet.
The Bolsheviks had raised the question of the Kornilov revolt;
548 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
and the Central Ex. Com. Bureau had supported them; but
the Ministers didn't even consider explaining themselves.
Further it followed from this that the existing Government,
Kornilovite by nature, could not help but prepare a new
Kornilov revolt. Any day now it might launch a decisive on-
slaught on the revolution, and then good-bye to everything
that had been won! It was necessary to defend oneself.
On the other hand, this Government of conspirators and
counter-revolutionaries was allowing itself a base mockery of
the working class, its press, and its representatives. In the
Kornilov affair exactly five men had been arrested, who were in
the custody of their own guard of honour, and could escape
when they saw fit, while the real gaols were full of Bolsheviks on
hunger-strike, incapable of obtaining either their release or any
coherent charges.
The shameful attempt at evacuating the Government to
Moscow was taken up with special fury. The plotters were
betraying the revolutionary capital! Incapable of defending it,
they did not even want to do so. . . The Germans were con-
tinuing their naval operations, the sailors were staking their
lives, while the Allies, not lifting a finger to help, were covering
our heroes with dirt. And the Government? It was not
only fleeing to Moscow, but preparing the surrender of
Petersburg.
The new Government had issued orders to clear the revolu-
tionary troops out of the capital; these orders were also directed
to the same aims. Things were serious at the front, and reinforce-
ments were needed. That we believed. But was there even one
worker or soldier who would believe that Kerensky was removing
these troops without any political end in view? No, after the
Kornilov revolt it would have been stupid and criminal to
believe this. We would all go to the front. But we would go when
we were sure that this would close the road to the Germans and
not open it to the counter-revolution. . .
But in that case what about defence? There was only one
solution: we must take it into our own hands. We were ready to
defend the revolution from the Germans, as our brothers, the
sailor-heroes and the Lettish Rifles, had defended it. But we could
not say to the garrison : put yourselves in the hands of Kerensky,
who will turn you against the working class. The situation was
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 549
absurd and unendurable. Yes and the only way of changing it
was to liquidate the Government of national betrayal. . .
The following fact was characteristic both of the state of
defence and of the mood of the politically active masses. Our
' comniander-in-chief ' addressed the sailors in his usual tactless
shout: the fleet was becoming disorganized, it was unreliable,
it must expiate its crimes against the revolution, and so on. In
reply the Second Congress of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet pro-
duced this resolution: 6 . . . to demand from the Central Ex.
Com. of the Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants the instant removal
from the ranks of the Provisional Government of the Socialist,
with and without quotation-marks, the anti-political adventurer
Kerensky, as a blackguard who, by his shameless political black-
mail on behalf of the bourgeoisie, is destroying the great revolu-
tion and with it the whole revolutionary people. As for you,
Kerensky-Bonaparte, traitor to the revolution, we send you our
curses, while our comrades are being slain by bullets and shells
or drowning at sea, calling for the defence of the revolution,
and while we all as one man are prepared to lay down our lives
for liberty, land, and freedom, and perish in battle against the
enemy without, or on the barricades against the enemy within,
calling down curses on you, Kerensky, and your gang. . .'
A document undoubtedly not without a certain eloquence.
These were the principal points of Bolshevik agitation during
those weeks. This agitation met with no opposition whatsoever.
But there was one special point that had to be concentrated on.
That the Coalition was unendurable and criminal had been
proved a million times, and was clear without proofs. But that
wasn't enough. . . If it was impossible to endure the Coalition,
then let the Constituent Assembly assemble sooia that would
provide salvation, and peace, bread, and land. So the worker,
the peasant, and the soldier might think. That was where all
their hopes lay.
This would not do. Faith in the Constituent Assembly had to
be destroyed. That is, it had to be proved that under a Coalition
it was impossible. It was just this the Bolsheviks were directing
their special attention to.
The bourgeoisie and the Coalition were undermining the
Constituent Assembly! Not one Bolshevik speech, resolution,
statement, or newspaper article could dispense with this. It
55O THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
might have been said that their whole agitation was being
carried on under the banner of the Constituent Assembly and its
defence.
To those conversant but not specially conversant with
affairs, this might seem somewhat odd. Lenin, after all, only an
hour after his arrival, had attacked the parliamentary republic
and rejected any Government except that of the Soviets. Nor
did the slogan of 'Soviet power', which had later become the
cornerstone of Bolshevism, suggest that the Soviet Government
would be a Provisional Government. The Constituent Assembly
seemed definitely excluded by all this. . .
But no the Bolshevik Party put the matter otherwise : down
with the Coalition and long live a Soviet regime in the name of
the Constituent Assembly !
I have noted in its place that it was actually not the Bolshevik
Party as a whole that had to keep quiet about the Constituent
Assembly, but merely its head, Lenin, who did not show his
cards within the confines of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin conspired
away from the party, and the party, not putting two and two
together, accepted the Constituent Assembly at its face value
and sponsored it whole-heartedly. That was how it had been at
first. . . But that could hardly have continued until now? What
sort of Asiatic perfidy on the part of the leader was this? And
boundless innocence of the party's 'officer-corps' ?
There was here, of course, a substantial degree of both one
and the other. But that didn't exhaust the matter. The point
was that Lenin, after first giving the Constituent Assembly a
kick, and then deciding to keep a diplomatic silence about it, had
soon arrived at the idea of exploiting it. No sooner thought of
than done. The Constituent Assembly began to conceal Tower
to the Soviets'. Lenin not only did not keep silent but shouted
with the party; in his central organ he would write about how
'to ensure the success of the Constituent Assembly'.
But could there really be people in the world who could fail to
remember Lenin's thrust at the parliamentary republic and the
Constituent Assembly? What could be done about that now,
before fighting began? Very simple: 'Our opponents maintain
that Lenin was against the Constituent Assembly and for a
Soviet republic. This assertion is obviously false. Lenin was
never "against" the Constituent Assembly. From the very first
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 55*
months he, together with our whole party, has exposed the
Provisional Government for delaying the Constituent Assembly.
Events have now demonstrated that these accusations of ours
were right/ That was all, as explained by the Rabochii Put.
Well, but how about a new constitutional theory? For after
all it's impossible to count indefinitely on everyone's being as
trusting as a child and as short-sighted as a sheep. It was
necessary, after all, to have some kind of 'theory', to conceal the
secrets of diplomacy and plaster over the yawning logical
vacuum. Of course ! And such a theory was created just as
easily as the malicious inventions about Lenin's position were
refuted* 'A Soviet republic/ said this theory, c far from excludes
the Constituent Assembly, just as, conversely, a Constituent
Assembly republic doesn't preclude the existence of Soviets. If
our revolution is destined to conquer, then in practice we shall
see a combined type of Soviet republic and Constituent
Assembly.' And that was all.
This article in the Rabochii Put of 4 October was not signed
by the modest author. But oh, gallant Zinoviev! I should
recognize your inimitable boldness of thought, your celebrated
courage in defending difficult positions a thousand miles away!
It is true that besides a central newspaper the Bolshevik Party
in those days had a draft programme. It was impossible to find in
it any signs of a 'combined type' ; what it contained was simply
the Soviet worker-peasant dictatorship, which excluded the bour-
geois-parliamentary Constituent Assembly. But that doesn't
matter. Everyone understands that a theoretical document for
oneself is one thing and a practical idea for general use is
another.
In all this both the perfidy of the shepherd and the innocence
of the sheep are evident. But we see that both the one and the
other, in spite of our initial impressions, have here not a
crudely primitive but, on the contrary, a highly qualified
character. As we see, it's not a question here of a comparatively
minor and private deception aimed at one's own friends and
companions-in-arms, or of a simple childish readiness to be
deceived. Here the deception has a general mass character and
a national scale. Mass slaughter on a national scale, of course, is
not a reprehensible action, but gallantry and heroism. Decep-
tion in such circumstances is called diplomacy or tactics, or
552 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
politics. For the subject of the deception it must be considered
in the aspect of statesmanship sui generis and for its objects
in the aspect of intellectual solidarity and party discipline
also sui generis.
* * *
So 'Down with the Coalition' and 'Long live a Soviet
regime' in the name of the Constituent Assembly ! Only when
the Soviets have the power will the fate of the Constituent
Assembly be in safe hands. Well, and what else will the power of
the Soviets give us?
A Soviet Government, it was said, is not only the guarantor of
the Constituent Assembly, but also its mainstay. First of all,
'capitalists and landowners might not only jeer at the Consti-
tuent Assembly, but also dismiss it, as the Tsar dismissed the
first two Dumas'. The Soviets wouldn't allow that. Secondly, the
Soviets would constitute an apparatus for putting into practice
the plans of the Constituent Assembly. 'Suppose that on
November 30th it decrees the confiscation of all land-holdings.
What could the municipal and rural local authorities do for the
effective realization of this demand? Practically nothing. But
what could the Soviets do? Everything. 5 (Rabochii Put,
3 October.)
Further: it goes without saying that the Soviets were called to
realize everything the masses could no longer live without, and
which the Coalition couldn't give them: peace, land, and bread.
This was so simple and obvious, and filled all the articles and
speeches of the Bolsheviks at this time so naturally, that there is
no need to dwell on it. It was simply the other side of the
struggle against 'Kerenskyism'.
The question could only lie in exactly how and when the
Soviets would give land, peace, and bread. Here the question of
land was extremely clear: the Soviets would give the land to the
peasants immediately. The question of peace was not so clear-cut:
a Soviet Government would at once propose peace to the coun-
tries at war, appealing to the ruined and destroyed nations;
with full confidence it could be expected that we would obtain a
just and general peace.
But the question of bread was completely vague : it was an
involved complex of ideas (collecting actual bread from the
countryside, raising real wages, and so on) and this demanded a
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 553
system of correspondingly various measures ; but in the process
of agitation this complexity was not without its advantages, since
it allowed everyone to chatter on and on without saying any-
thing. . . For in the last analysis, after all, to go into details and
explain just how and what would be done, was not at all
obligatory. In the given circumstances it was quite enough to
show the party's firm intention of realizing the most vital
demands of the people.
But it was quite clear that all these conditions and the whole
character of the campaign of agitation made irresistibly for the
most unprincipled demagogy, which the Bolsheviks, inflaming the
atmosphere, plunged into. Their demagogy was brazen and
unbounded. It had nothing to do with science, elementary
truth, or common sense. And it was not only the rank-and-file
agitators, who lacked all these, who proved themselves in the
demagogic arena. The leaders behaved with the same primitive
lack of self-restraint.
Lenin, by 'giving the peasants the land at once 3 and preaching
seizure, was in fact subscribing to anarchist tactics and an SR
programme. Both one and the other were pleasing and under-
standable to the peasant, who was far from being a fanatical
upholder of Marxism. But both one and the other had been
railed at night and day by the Marxist Lenin for at least fifteen
years. Now this was flung aside. To please the peasants and be
understood by them Lenin became both an anarchist and an SR.
Trotsky too in one breath resolved all supply difficulties with
the utmost boldness. The Soviet Government would send out a
soldier, a sailor, and a working girl (at dozens of meetings for
some reason Trotsky said 'working girl') into every village;
they would inspect the stores of the well-to-do, leave them as
much as they needed and take the rest gratis for the city or the
front. . . The Petersburg working masses hailed these promises
with enthusiasm.
It is obvious that all these 'confiscations' and Seizures without
payment' scattered left and right with regal lavishness were
captivating and irresistible in the mouths of the friends of the
people. Nothing could withstand them. Hence the spontaneous
and irresistible development of this method of agitation. . .
There are rich and poor; the rich have a lot of everything, the
poor have nothing; everything will belong to the poor, will be
554 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
divided amongst the have-nots. This is the message of your own
working-class party, followed by the millions of poor of the city
and country, the sole party fighting against the rich and their
Government for land, peace, and bread.
All this flooded the whole of Russia in endless waves during
the final weeks. Every day all this was listened to by hundreds
of thousands of hungry, tired, and angry people. This was an
inalienable element of Bolshevik agitation, even though it
wasn't the official programme.
But a delicate question arises was there any Socialism in this
'platform 5 ? No. I maintain that in a direct form the Bolsheviks
never harped to the masses on Socialism as the object and task
of a Soviet Government; nor did the masses, in supporting the
Bolsheviks, even think about Socialism. But in an indirect^ con-
fused form the problem of 'immediate Socialism' was never-
theless posed. In general the central leaders of Bolshevism were
evidently firmly bent on carrying out a Socialist experiment:
this was demanded by the logic of the situation. But once again
before the eyes of the masses they did not dot any of their Ts.
Socialism is, of course, primarily an economic problem. I have
indicated that the Bolsheviks were weak on this. Neither Lenin,
elaborating the programme of his party, nor Trotsky, doing the
same for the former Interdistrictites, appreciated the signi-
ficance of an economic programme as such, or gave it priority;
indeed, -they simply almost forgot about it. Even now, in
October, the new Bolshevik convert, Larin, loudly complained
that in place of an economic programme the Bolsheviks had
'almost a vacuum'. (Rabochii Put, 8 October.) He was asked to
fill it as an emergency measure. He proposed the cancellation of
the national debt, compulsory collective contracts, the exten-
sion of working-class legislation to domestic servants, annual
vacations for workers, and much more, all very fine. But there is
no question here of Socialism proper. The Soviet Government is
based on the existence of private property.
If we turn to the official statement read by Trotsky at the
Democratic Conference, the economic programme of a Soviet
Government is expounded as follows: only a Soviet Govern-
ment is 'capable of introducing a maximum of planning into
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 555
the economy at present disintegrating, helping the peasantry
and rural workers to exploit the now available means of agri-
cultural production, limiting profits, establishing wages and, in
conformity with the regulation of production, assuring real
labour discipline, based on the autonomy of the workers and
their centralized control over industry 5 . This is all very obscure
and insubstantial, but is quite alien to utopianism. The state-
ment is far from placing Socialism on the agenda of a Soviet
regime. In essence its content does not go beyond the limits of
the May i6th economic programme which was accepted by the
old Ex. Com. to be carried out by a Coalition Government.
The Coalition could not, of course, carry it out, for this pro-
gramme undermined at its root the economic hegemony of
capital. For Konovalov that was the same as Socialism, but
essentially it was a far cry from it.
This was the economic platform of the Bolshevik Party on the
eve of its decisive coup.
Nevertheless there was a point in it that has special signi-
ficance for us. This was the workers'" control over production. This
was a fighting point at all proletarian meetings. As a specifically
working-class demand it was figured equally with land. And, if
you like, it was here and only here that the Bolshevik leaders
approached a public declaration of Socialist principles. How-
ever, this 'Socialism' was extremely timid and modest: in their
theory the Bolsheviks, while moving along a different road, went
no further than the Right Menshevik Grohman, with his pro-
gramme of the 'regulation 5 or "organization of national, economy
and labour'.
So the masses were politically prepared for the liquidation of
Kerenskyism and ready for a Soviet regime. They were awaiting
the summons to technical action, but speaking generally were
not thinking about it at all. They were being told: 'Let's wait
for what the Congress 1 decides on October soth or 25th'.
I detected a different note for the first time that same
October yth, the day the Bolsheviks left the Pre-Parliament.
But this was no more than a note a suggestive one to be sure,
but not as yet burning the smallest boat or binding anyone to
anything. In a stormy article devoted by Lenin to a peasant up-
rising we read: 'There's not the slightest doubt that if the
1 i.e., the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress. (Ed.)
556 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Bolsheviks allowed themselves to fall into the snare of constitu-
tional illusions, "faith" in the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly and the "expectation" of a congress of Soviets, etc.
there is no doubt that such Bolsheviks would be miserable
traitors to the proletarian cause. 3
Lenin considered that a peasant uprising embracing all
Russia would decide matters. 'To allow the crushing of a
peasant uprising at such a moment means falsifying the elections
to the Constituent Assembly even more, and more grossly, than
the Democratic Conference and the Pre-Parliament were
falsified. The whole future of the Russian Revolution is at stake.
The whole future of the international working-class revolution is
at stake. The crisis is at hand.'
Trotsky, leading his army out of the Pre-Parliament, had
definitely set course towards a violent overthrow. Lenin had
declared that it was criminal to wait for the Congress of Soviets.
As yet nothing more. The masses were still in the same position.
But it was clear that within the party the question of how had
been placed next in order. It ought to be decided at once.
On October roth it was posed by the supreme authority. The
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party assembled in full
strength. . . Oh, the novel jokes of the merry muse of History !
This supreme and decisive session took place in my own home,
still at the Karpovka. But without my knowledge. As before I
would very often spend the night somewhere near the office or
Smolny, that is about eight versts from the Karpovka. This time
special steps were taken to have me spend the night away from
home: at least my wife knew my intentions exactly and gave
me a piece of friendly, disinterested advice not to incon-
venience myself by a further journey after work. In any case the
lofty assemblage had a complete guarantee against my arrival.
For such a cardinal session not only did people come from
Moscow, but the Lord of Hosts himself, with his henchman, crept
out of the underground. Lenin appeared in a wig, but without
his beard. Zinoviev appeared with a beard, but without his
shock of hair. The meeting went on for about ten hours, until
about 3 o'clock in the morning. Half the exalted guests had to
sleep somehow in the Karpovka.
However, I don't actually know much about the exact course
of this meeting, or even about its outcome. It's clear that the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 557
question of an uprising was put. There was evidently also a
question about its relation to the Soviet Congress: should it
depend on the time and circumstances of the Congress? The
question of the revolt was decided in the affirmative, and
evidently it was decided to raise it as quickly as possible
depending on the course of its speedy technical preparation and
on the most favourable external conditions. It was possible to
confront the Congress of Soviets with an accomplished fact;
political conditions allowed of this, and there could be no doubt
of the support and sanction of the Congress. But aside from that,
because of weighty considerations the Congress ought to be con-
fronted by an accomplished fact. For it was, after all, clear to
the enemy camp that the Congress would decide to take power
and at least make an attempt to realize that decision. It would be
absurd for a Government which was not prepared to yield
voluntarily to the Bolsheviks to await that moment. It was
clear that it would attempt to forestall the action of the Con-
gress, doing everything possible either to forbid or to disperse or
shoot down the Congress. If an uprising had been decided on,
then it was absurd to wait for this to happen. Common sense
demanded that the people in their turn forestall the Govern-
ment's offensive. This was elementary tactics and strategy.
It was decided to begin the uprising as quickly as possible,
depending on circumstances but not on the Congress.
In the Central Committee of the party this decision was
accepted by all but two votes. The dissenters were the same as
in June Kamenev and Zinoviev. . . This of course could not
confound the Thunderer. He had never been confounded even
when he remained practically alone in his own party; now he
had the majority with him. And, besides the majority, Trotsky
was with Lenin. I don't know to what degree Lenin himself
valued this fact, but for the course of events it had incalculable
significance. I have no doubt of that. . . The 'cronies' were for
the time being left to their own opinion, but without any atten-
tion from the others. The order was accepted and matters
followed their course.
The decision put events on a new footing. The boats had been
burnt. Now direct preparations for an uprising were started
558 THE RUSSIAJN REVOLUTION IQI7
politically and technically. It is clear that an uprising against
the Coalition, and its destruction, were incumbent on the
Petersburg proletariat and garrison. Hence the official agency
of the uprising was the Petersburg Soviet. The political and
technical work had to proceed from there.
But it goes without saying that the decision of the party
Central Committee was not brought to the knowledge either of
the Petersburg masses or of the Soviet. The political change was
expressed only in a few additions to the earlier agitation.
'Further delay is impossible. 5 'It's time to pass from words to
deeds. 5 The moment has come when the revolutionary slogan of
"All Power to the Soviets" must be realized at last. 5 Etc.
It was clear that an uprising was necessary. c Action 5 was plainly
imminent. The proletariat and the garrison had to be ready at
any minute to obey revolutionary orders. . . Such was the new
political phase of the movement.
It may be asked whether the Petersburg proletariat and
garrison was ready for dynamic action and bloody sacrifice,
just as it was for the acceptance of a Soviet Government and all
its blessings? Was it capable not only of passing a menacing
resolution, but also of really going into battle? Was it burning,
not only with hate, but with a real longing for revolutionary
exploits? Was its mood firm?
There are various answers to all this. It is quite fundamental.
Not because the outcome of the movement depended on it the
success of the overturn was assured because there was nothing to
oppose it. But the mood of the masses who were to act is
important because in the eyes of history this is what determined
the character of the overturn.
Personally, as a witness and participant in the events, I have
no single answer. There were various moods. The only common
ones were hatred for 'Kerenskyism 5 , fatigue, rage, and a desire
for peace, bread, and land. . . During just these weeks I, more
than ever before, made the rounds of the factories and spoke to
the 'masses 5 . I had the definite impression that the mood was
ambiguous, conditional. The Coalition and the status quo could
no longer be endured ; but whether it was necessary to come out,
or necessary to pass through an uprising, was not clearly known.
Many well remembered the July Days. What if once again
nothing came of it?
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi7 559
I'm speaking of the mood of the average rank-and-filer. That
doesn't mean that the Bolsheviks could not have assembled,
summoned, and launched into battle as many revolutionary
battalions as they wanted. On the contrary: they had a sufficient
number of advanced, active cadres ready for sacrifice. The
most reliable were the workers and their Red Guard; then the
sailors. There was enough fighting material. But good-quality
fighting material made up a small part of the Bolshevik follow-
ing at this time. On the average, the mood was strongly
Bolshevik, but rather slack and wavering with respect to action
and a rising.
So, after the decision of the Bolshevik centre on October loth,
the masses were told that it was time to pass from words to
deeds. For the time being they were told nothing else. This was
quite natural. The main results of the vote on October loth
could not be spoken of. Policy might remain almost the same;
but now it had to yield its primary position to strategy. The
direct preparation of the uprising now had to pass to the Staff.
It was impossible to work out dispositions before the whole
army, before the eyes of the enemy. The enemy was to be left in
the dark, while the army stood at the ready, working up steam.
During those days, in view of the acute situation at the front,
discussions were going on everywhere about defence; on
October gth, before the decision of the party Central Com-
mittee, this question was raised in the Petersburg Ex. Com. also.
It was, of course, provoked primarily by political considerations.
And the discussion itself was tied up with the question of
evacuating troops from the capital. It was said that the Staff
demands for troops to be sent to the front had, as always, a
political motivation, and that in general it was impossible to
trust the Government in matters of defence. Consequently it
was necessary first of all to organize control over the Staff and
determine the evacuation of troops as circumstances demanded,
and secondly to take the defence question into one's own hands
and create a special organ for it a committee of revolutionary
defence.
The Mensheviks and SRs talked of the dual power and the
inappropriateness of forming a Staff of one's own. But seeing the
560 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
weakness of their position they gave in and themselves proposed
a resolution which was accepted by the Bolshevik Ex. Com.,
demanding, in the main: (i) the creation of a board of repre-
sentatives of the Petersburg Soviet and the Central Committee
of the Fleet, to be informed of the evacuation of any given unit;
(2) extraordinary measures for the purging of the General Staff;
and (3) the formation of a committee of revolutionary defence,
which would clarify the question of the defence of Petersburg.
That same day the question was taken before the plenum of
the Petersburg Soviet. However, the Ex. Com. resolution pro-
posed by the Mensheviks was turned down. A Bolshevik resolu-
tion was passed, which spoke of the need for a Soviet Govern-
ment that would propose immediate peace; of the necessity,
before the conclusion of peace, of taking the defence of the
capital and the whole country into the hands of the Soviets;
and of the necessity of arming the workers for defence. And the
Ex. Com., the Soldiers' Section and the garrison deputies were
charged with the organization of a revolutionary committee of
defence which 'would concentrate in its own hands all data
relevant to the defence of Petersburg'.
'All data' rather happily put. But nevertheless we see that
things were still going along under the banner of military defence.
All this was before the Bolshevik Central Committee session at my flat.
On October isth a new meeting of the Ex. Com. was held to
execute the Soviet resolution. It was a closed meeting. In a
matter such as defence (sic !) the Bolsheviks thought it necessary
to violate the principles they were still continuing to fight for.
But this wasn't secret diplomacy it was a plot. However, it
must be kept in mind that it could not be fully realized; in
this closed session there could be no freedom of discussion, for
there were a few 'Social-traitors' in the Ex. Com. So one thing
was said and another meant. Nor did the published decision,
as a matter of fact, have the same inward meaning as appeared
to the world in the lines below.
This was the decision:
C A Military Revolutionary Committee is being formed by the
Petersburg Ex. Com. and is its organ. It is composed of: the
Praesidiums of the plenum and of the Soldiers' Section of the
Soviet, representatives of the Central Committee of the Fleet,
the Railwaymen's Union, the Union of Post Office and Tele-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 9 I J 561
graph Employees, the Factory Committees, the Trade Unions,
representatives of the party military organizations, the military
section of the Central Ex. Com., and the workers' militia, as
well as individuals whose presence is thought necessary. The
Military Revolutionary Committee's first tasks are the alloca-
tion of combat and auxiliary forces, necessary for the defence of
the capital and not subject to evacuation; then the registration
of the personal composition of the garrison of Petersburg and
its suburbs, and also the registration of supply sources; the
elaboration of a working plan for the defence of the city;
measures of protection against pogroms and desertions; the
maintenance of revolutionary discipline amongst the working
class and soldiery. . .'
We can see that none of this is honest or legitimate co-operation
in defence. It is, in essence, the illegal elimination from defence
affairs of the legitimate' agencies of the Government and the
transference of all their functions to the Petersburg Soviet. But
that was the least of it: under the banner of defence against the
foreign enemy the Ex. Com. concentrated in its own hands all
military power in the capital and the provinces. That is, it
officially arrogated to itself all real power whatever.
In fact, of course, this power had long belonged to the
Bolshevik Soviet. Does this mean that the decrees of October
1 2th made the overturn an accomplished fact? No, it doesn't.
But only because the Bolsheviks themselves said that there was
nothing in it but co-operation for external defence. They gave
such explanations right down to October 23rd.
But the Mensheviks, in the closed session of the Ex. Com.,
revealed the true meaning of these decrees. The Military
Revolutionary Committee was an apparatus for the overthrow
of the Government and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.
And on October i6th this 'motion' was presented to the Soviet
plenum for approval. There were heated protests from a
Menshevik orator, whose fraction, in this meeting of a thousand
men, numbered fifty people.
c The Bolsheviks won't answer the straight question whether
or not they are preparing a coup. This is either cowardice or lack
of confidence in their own strength' (laughter in the audience).
562 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy
'But the projected Military Revolutionary Committee is nothing
but a revolutionary staff for the seizure of power. . . We have
many local reports that the masses are out of sympathy with a
coup. There is a 'Provisional Military Committee' attached to
the Central Ex. Com., whose object is real co-operation in the
defence of the northern front. The Petersburg Soviet ought to
send its representatives there and reject the proposal for a
military revolutionary committee.'
Trotsky got up. In this gathering his task was not especially
difficult.
c The Menshevik representative is preoccupied with whether
the Bolsheviks are preparing an armed demonstration. In
whose name has he asked this question: in the name of Keren-
sky, the counter-intelligence, the Secret Police, or some other
body?'
This was a tumultuous success. But even without this the
resolution on the Military Revolutionary Committee would
have been passed by an overwhelming majority of the Soviet
that session of October i6th.
The Military Revolutionary Committee was created and
rapidly got to work. Both the Mensheviks and the Right SRs
refused to go into it. The Left SRs did enter it. Its principal
figures were Trotsky, Lashevich, then the leaders of the Bol-
shevik Military Organization, Podvoisky and Nevsky, Yurenev,
Mekhonoshin, the Left SR Lazimir, and others, until then less
well-known.
The camp of the bourgeoisie and the interstitial groups grew
alarmed. Outcries and complaints about 'proposed Bolshevik
coups* had actually never ceased. They were permanent. But
now, apart from 'rumours', they had real grounds. The general
atmosphere was so oppressive that the country and the masses
were plainly stifling. The crisis was manifest to everyone. The
movement of the masses was clearly overflowing its banks. The
workers' districts of Petersburg were boiling over before every-
one's eyes. Only the Bolsheviks were listened to. At the famous
Cirque Moderne, where Trotsky, Lunacharsky, and Volodarsky
appeared, you kept seeing endless queues and throngs of people
for whom there was no longer room in the enormous crowded
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi? 563
circus. Agitators were calling for deeds, not words, and pro-
mising the imminent achievement of a Soviet regime. And in
Smolny, finally, they were working on the creation of a new and
more than suspect organ of 'defence'. . . There were real
grounds for alarm.
It was not that they were afraid of a Bolshevik victory. It was
something else. Amongst the Right, in the bourgeois news-
papers, this was the basis of an agitation in favour of immediate
decisive repressions, in favour of the assumption of the 'attri-
butes of a real Government' (let us recall Guchkov's golden
words!), that is, in favour of a new Kornilov revolt. As for the
SRs and Mensheviks, the press alarm meant a real fear not
of the success of the Bolshevik enterprise, but of new July
Days.
Besides the written and spoken agitation there appeared a
series of appeals in the names of parties, a few institutions, and,
of course, the Central Ex. Com. These appeals were all in the
same spirit: street action under a separate Bolshevik banner
would play into the hands of the counter-revolution. One such
appeal was also published by a group of Martovites over a few
of our signatures. On October i8th Gorky came out with a
flaming article: 'Rumours are being spread more and more
insistently about a Bolshevik coup. The repellent scenes of
July 3~5th may be repeated. That is once again lorries tightly
packed with people holding rifles and revolvers in hands
trembling with fear, and these rifles will go off at random into
the windows of shops and at people. They will fire only because
the people armed with them want to kill their own fear. All the
dark instincts of the mob, infuriated by the destruction of life
and the lies of politics, will flare up and begin to smoke people
will kill each other, unable to overcome their own bestial
stupidity. In a word, there will be a repetition of that same
senseless bloody carnage which we have already seen and which
has undermined the moral significance of the revolution
throughout the country. It is highly likely that this time events
will take on a still more bloody and destructive character. . .
The Bolshevik Central Committee has done nothing to confirm
the rumours of a coup, though it hasn't refuted them either. . .
It is its duty to refute them, if it really is a powerful and freely
acting political organ capable of directing the masses and not
564 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
the passive toy of the moods of a savage mob, or a tool In the
hands of shameless adventurers or unbalanced fanatics. . .'
But what was the Government thinking and doing? All hopes,
after all, were on it! Moreover, it had once been entrusted with
"limitless power' and even been called the Government of the
Salvation of the revolution'.
It had had a debate on the 'disorders' on the day when the
Military Revolutionary Committee was finally approved,
October i6th. 'The most resolute measures would be taken and
were already being taken.' What these were simple mortals
didn't know. What measures our Government could take at all
was also a mystery to everyone.
However, there was no alarm. The tranquil assurance of a
powerful Government reigned there. First of all, the coup was
considered doubtful, once the plans had been disclosed.
Secondly, all these plans were very well known to the splendidly
organized Government. The Chief of Staff of the Petersburg
region reported to the head of the Government: the Bolsheviks
were preparing a 'demonstration of protest against the Govern-
ment' : the demonstration would have a peaceful character, but
nevertheless the workers would come out armed'. The Chief of
Staff reported on the measures he 'was prepared to take to fore-
stall the possibility that the demonstration would turn into dis-
orders'. The measures were evidently excellent, since they were
approved by the head of the Government.
In general only the man-in-the-street could fall into a panic,
while there was no reason at all to be distracted from serious
state affairs because of this gossip. In the last analysis this was
only the Bolsheviks, while against them was the whole country,
which was with the Government.
Speaking seriously, it is possible to explain the failure of our
comic-opera Government to attempt any serious measures of
self-defence at this time only by its complete naivete and childish-
ness. Kerensky couldn't, of course, win, but he could and ought
to have made an attempt. It was, after all, not May and not
June outside. Now he had nothing to lose. He had to take a risk,
and play all or nothing.
Kerensky wasn't making any political concessions out of
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 565
considerations of the highest statesmanship. Consequently his
only method was Kornilovism. Kerensky was of course ready for
this: wasn't he with the whole country and its democracy
against its enemies? But he was weak. The Commander-in-
Chief ' had no troops at all. He wouldn't be able to carry his
Kornilovism through. . .
Very well. But a risk had to be taken. He had a thousand
military cadets and officers in Petersburg. There were even a
few more. That was a force. An attempt could be made to
paralyse the Bolshevik centres, decapitate the party, and arrest
a hundred men in suitable conditions. That might smash the
movement. . . In May and June this method was unsuitable.
Only the man-in-the-street, wise after the event, lamented this
without understanding the point. In May and June, even in
July, repressions and violence only helped the rise of the move-
ment. But the atmosphere then was completely different, the
revolution had not yet delivered point-blank its irrevocable
ultimatum: either the total destruction of Bolshevism, or its
total victory. Now, when there was nothing to lose and it was
vital to take a risk, an attempt to smash the movement by a bold
and stormy onslaught was the only solution for those who called
themselves the Government.
But for this it was necessary to understand at least something.
The inflated puppets of the Winter Palace understood nothing.
Thinking themselves strong they felt no alarm, and busied
themselves with more important affairs of state. They told each
other that steps had been and would be taken, and composed
decrees to tell the entire nation that the most resolute measures,
including . . . etc., etc.
And nothing else.
On the grey and gloomy afternoon of October I4th there was
a session of the Central Ex. Com. in the great hall of Smolny.
During the period of the Pre-Parliament the sessions of the
Central Ex. Com. plenum had almost ceased : only the Bureau
was in session. There were very few delegates even now, and
hardly any public; the hall was empty. I remember that the
Bolsheviks for some reason were not sitting in their places but
were clustered along the left side of the platform in a small
566 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1 917
group, as though entrenched there in their camp, against the
besieging majority. But neither Trotsky nor Kamenev was there.
The group was headed by Ryazanov.
The 'defence of the capital' was on the agenda. Dan, of
course, reported to the meeting. He began quickly and resolutely
to deal with 'the dissension in the heart of the democracy'.
'Exactly at this time, in these days of danger, an agitation is
being carried on by the Bolsheviks that is sowing confusion
amongst the worker and soldier masses. We must definitely ask
our Bolshevik comrades why they are carrying on this policy.
Do they know how their agitation is being received by the
soldiers and workers? Will they take the responsibility for the
consequences? I demand that the Bolshevik Party give a
straightforward and honest reply to this question: Yes or no?'
Dan concluded his report on the defence of the capital with
this resolution: all workers, peasants, and soldiers were to
remain calm and do their duty, while any kind of coup was
completely inadmissible and could only unleash a destructive
movement and thus lead to the wreck of the revolution.
The atmosphere in the hall was very tense. Heads turned
towards the cluster of Bolsheviks, from whom protests and
contemptuous exclamations were heard. This made the Right
lose its temper. The Bolsheviks, after a two-minute consulta-
tion, sent Ryazanov to the platform to get away from, the
question of the coup and concentrate attention on defence.
There arose a long argument on procedure, which simply
infuriated the majority. The Bolsheviks saw they had to explain
themselves on this point, and asked for a break to discuss the
resolution, which they hadn't known about up to then. In the
absence of their leaders the position of the little group was not
easy. An exhausting and boring interval dragged on till evening.
Still no leaders. , .
The session was resumed and there was Ryazanov on the
platform again, agitated and pale as never before. He was the
victim of party duty, but his performance was heroic. What,
however, could he say? He was confronted, after all, with the
task of explaining himself without giving a straightforward
reply. He began:
'I'm sincerely sorry we're debating such a serious question in
an empty hall. But I have no desire to have recourse to for-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 567
malities and raise the question of a quorum. I should merely
like to recall our sessions in June and July.'
But the chairman was not to be bamboozled: he wouldn't
allow any indulgence in reminiscences and asked him to stick to
the point. Ryazanov came a little closer to it and beat about the
bush for about an hour.
'As long as the matter of defence is in the hands of the Coali-
tion it will be in the same miserable state it's in now. Starting
from this point, we set up the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee, which the Mensheviks voted against. You haven't the
resolution to say to the Government "hands off!" Consequently
don't say you seriously want to defend the revolution. We are
asked whether we want to organize an uprising, but Dan knows
that we are Marxists and do not prepare uprisings. The uprising
is being prepared by the policy you have supported for seven
months. The uprising is being prepared by those who are
creating despair and apathy in the masses. If the policy remains
the same in future, and if as a result there is an uprising, then we
shall be in the first ranks of the insurgents.'
Lenin complimented Ryazanov highly on this speech. The
audience, however, was more indignant than satisfied. But what
could they do? That was that; you can't squeeze out answers by
force.
Fraction speeches followed. Bogdanov spoke for the Men-
sheviks: 'Ryazanov hasn't given a definite reply, but in any
case it's clear the Bolsheviks are preparing an armed uprising;
the masses, however, will not go out into the streets. Only hand-
fuls will go, who will be crushed by the Government; Dan's
resolution is feeble and colourless, it counts on Bolshevik sup-
port, but it should be voted for.'
For our fraction Martov declared that he also would vote for
the resolution, though disagreeing with the Bolshevik appraisal
of the situation. He also thought street demonstrations a
hazardous undertaking. To say that in the interests of defence it
was necessary to change the structure of the regime was self-
delusion. Civil war would not help defence; for this reason it was
impossible now to regard insurgent elements as a method of
creating the regime we needed. Ryazanov was right it was the
Government that was preparing the uprising. But each party
was also a political factor. We were bound to fight against any
568 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
attempts at unleashing the elements and we ought to warn
the masses. We could not depend on the Bolsheviks' listening to
us, but to do our duty we ought to tell the masses that an
uprising would be a source of counter-revolution.
Not only the Right but also the Left SRs supported Dan's
resolution. One more resolution. . .
And the leaders of the old Soviet majority turned to current
tasks. . .
Ryazanov's speech at the Central Ex. Com. enquiry and his
references to Marxism called forth an immediate response in the
Novaya hizn, from our accredited theoretician, Bazarov. This
began what I may call a theoretical discussion of the theme of the
uprising. It was rather pathetic. But its political significance lay
in the fact that it was only here that all the Ys were crossed and it
was officially acknowledged that c going from words to deeds*
meant making an uprising. But even this acknowledgement
was at first indirect and academic, and for the masses changed
nothing. It was not until October sist that, by way of closing
the discussion, Lenin said in straightforward language that he
was calling for insurrection. It was not until then that the
political preparation was finished, and only technical instruc-
tions remained. It would seem that this was a little too late. But
no matter it came off. The fruit, after all, was so ripe it fell into
one's hand by itself.
Bazarov (in his article of October iyth) in reality produced
very little theory: 'Ryazanov', he wrote, 'declared that "we"
would lead the insurrection; if "we" means individuals, then it
is nobody's business; if "we" is the party, then it is a crime, for
the party, which embraces the entire working class, will be
crushed together with the insurrection, which will lead to the
total collapse of the revolution. Violence is inevitable because
the "despair and apathy" proclaimed by Ryazanov has never
yet been victorious, for Marxism demands an objective calcula-
tion of the chances of an insurrection. Amongst the Bolsheviks
themselves there are numerous and authoritative dissenters; it is
their duty to come out before the masses and fight against this
adventure in public, but they have done no more than issue a
manuscript leaflet that is being passed from hand to hand.'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 569
As we see, none of this was at all terrible, while the Novaya
ZJiizn attack on Bolshevik plans and methods was far from the
first. Each pin-prick from our newspaper, however, had a
greater effect on the Bolsheviks than the tempestuous fire of all
the rest of the press put together. They were enemies \ their
attacks were merely a source of clarity and strength. But up to
now we had been allies \ this was 'obfuscation' and deadly sabo-
tage. The Bolsheviks broke into a frenzy. Every effort had to be
made to trample the Novaya %hizn into the mud in the eyes of
the proletariat : our paper was read and considered their own by
many thousands of advanced Petersburg workers.
The propagandists ofRabockii Put took up the cudgels at once.
The very next day, amidst a tub of filth, they displayed an
interesting quotation from Marx, thinking it was in their favour.
Marx's pamphlet, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany,
gives two important and eloquently expressed directives:
Tirst, don't undertake an insurrection until you are fully pre-
pared to deal with the consequences; and secondly, once em-
barked on a revolution act with the greatest resolution and as
the attacking side.'
On the basis of this the Bolshevik theoreticians evidently
thought their position sound : they were preparing to attack and
to act with resolution. And that was as correct as 2 plus 2
makes 4. But the whole point was in that 'once embarked', that is,
if it was necessary. Was it necessary? When was it necessary?
When was it possible? Only when you were 'fully prepared to
deal with the consequences'.
This was not so at all. Bazarov at once seized on this the
following day in a new article. But once again, to my mind, he
did not focus attention on the heart of the matter. He spoke
again of the chances of success and failure of the insurrection;
again he indicated the inadequacy of material and moral
strength. These assertions were no more than the writer's own
pessimism, but could not serve as the theoretical ground of his
conclusions.
Nevertheless Marx's statement was at the very core of the
Bolshevik position and damaged it mortally. For you had to be
ready to deal with the consequences. The consequences of
victorious insurrections can be and have been in history extra-
ordinarily varied. The working class has not always raised an
570 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
insurrection in order to take the state into its own hands. This
time that's just what it was. In spite of all the chances of victory
of the uprising, the Bolsheviks knew in advance they could not
deal with its consequences, knew in advance that, in view of the
whole complex of circumstances, they could not perform the
consequent tasks of state.
This was shown in practice, but only later; at this time there
had been no practice. But at this time there should have been
theory] the Bolsheviks should have had clear ideas and precise
plans as to what they would do with the State they had won,
how they would run it, and how in our conditions they would
perform the tasks of a new proletarian State and satisfy the
immediate, day-to-day needs, which had produced the in-
surrection, of the labouring masses. I maintain the Bolsheviks
had no such plans. And personally, both in speeches and in
articles, I directed attention precisely to this aspect of the
matter.
I maintain the Bolsheviks had no other ideas than the
immediate handing over of the land for seizure by the peasants,
readiness to propose peace at once, the most confused ideas
about 'workers' control 3 , and the most fantastic notions of
methods of extracting bread, with the help of the 'sailor 5 and the
'working girl'. . . Lenin had more 'ideas', borrowed whole from
the experience of the Paris Commune and Marx's pamphlet on
it, and also from Kropotkin. 1 These of course included the
destruction of the system of credit and the seizure of the banks;
the thoroughgoing revision of the whole government apparatus
and its replacement by administrators from among the working
class (this in peasant, limitless, and half-savage Tsarist Russia!) ;
the liability to election of all officials; compulsory parity
between specialists' wages and the average worker's. And there
were some other fantasies, which all vanished at the first contact
with reality. But all these 'ideas' were, first of all, so dispropor-
tionately few in comparison with the immensity of the tasks,
and secondly were so unknown to anyone in the Bolshevik
Party, that you might say they were completely irrelevant.
Lenin's pamphlet, State and Revolution, was very soon to
become gospel. But first of all this gospel, as always, served
merely as something to swear by God forbid that anything
1 The celebrated philosopher of anarchism. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 571
should be done in accordance with its visionary words! and
secondly it had not yet been published.
So far only 'materials' for a programme were present. And
these materials, as Larin put it, revealed a vacuum instead of a
financial-economic plan.
The Bolsheviks didn't know what they were going to do with
their victory and the State they would win. They were acting
against Marx, against scientific Socialism, against common sense,
against the working class, when by way of an insurrection, under
the slogan of Tower to the Soviets' they attempted to hand over
to their own Central Committee the totality of state power in
Russia. The power of a single isolated proletarian vanguard,
though it was based on the confidence of millions of the masses,
obliged the new Government and the Bolsheviks themselves to
perform tasks they knew to be beyond their strength. This was
the core of the problem. The Bolshevik Party was Utopian in
undertaking to perform these tasks. It made a fateful error when
it started an insurrection without thinking about them.
But let us return to the 'discussion'. Bazarov had mentioned
the manuscript leaflet of two prominent Bolsheviks, who were
protesting against the insurrection. Bazarov surmised (quite
rightly, of course) that there was in the party a group which
dissented from the official line. But the Rabochii Put said at once
there was nothing of the sort the authors of the sheet remained
in splendid isolation. These were none other, of course, than the
well-known 'cronies', Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Once the garbage was out of the house and there was nothing
to lose, Kamenev decided to give a public explanation. For this,
of course, they didn't allow him into the Rabochii Put. The
'communication' appeared in the Novaya %hizn. He, Kamenev,
and Zinoviev appealed to the largest party organizations in a
letter, and in it they expressed themselves 'decidedly against the
party's taking on itself the initiative of any armed moves in the
immediate future. Everyone understands that in the present
situation there can be no question of anything like an armed
demonstration. The question can only be of the seizure of power by
force of arms: any kind of mass demonstration can be undertaken
only after clearly and definitely setting before oneself the task of
572 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
an armed insurrection. Not only Comrade Zinoviev and I, but
also a large group of our fellow practical workers think that
taking the initiative of an armed insurrection at the given
moment, with the given correlation of forces, independently of
and a few days before the Soviet Congress would be inadmis-
sible, and fatal to both the proletariat and the revolution. 3 The
Bolshevik Party, of course, was striving towards the realization
of its programme with the help of the state power already
achieved. It would not, of course, shrink even from an in-
surrection. But 'now it would be doomed to defeat'. 'To risk the
fate of the party, the proletariat and the revolution and rise up in
the next few days would be to commit an act of despair. And
the party is too strong, too great a future lies ahead, for it to take
such desperate steps.'
Not especially profound, but quite eloquent. In any case we
see that Kamenev's argumentation says no more and no less
than what the Socialists of the other parties were saying at that
time. Here, too, attention was focused on the chances of the
insurrection and its destruction in unfavourable conditions.
This is attested by the fact that no basic questions about what
would happen afterwards were given priority even by Bolshevik
opponents of the insurrection. But in any case this evaluation of
the chances was very convincing in the mouth of a Bolshevik.
Lenin was living in those days somewhere a few hours'
journey away from Petersburg. He received the Novaya %hizn
number with Bazarov's article that same October I7th, at
8 o'clock in the evening. At that time he was finishing a very
long 'Letter to the Comrades' to counterbalance the 'cronies' '
letter. He hadn't intended it to be printed and hence didn't
intend to pronounce the word 'uprising' publicly in connexion
with the party's plans. But Bazarov's article made Lenin in-
dignant. Seeing the reference to the manuscript leaflet, which
had fallen out of party hands into those of the Tools on the
Novqya %hizn?, Lenin made arrangements to have his letter, too,
printed at once. 'If that's how things are, we must agitate even
for an insurrection.'
The letter was printed in three long instalments (October
igth~2ist). Lenin was afraid the 'cronies' would create con-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 573
fusion in the ranks of the party, and hastened to intervene in
spite of his having been 'placed by the will of fate a little to one
side of the main stream of history 5 . Oh, of course, that could not
stop Jupiter ! But the point is that this document, intended to
clarify the minds of the comrades in the hour of destiny, adds
precisely nothing to the 'theory' of the insurrection. If we leave
aside some sour notes produced with Lenin's inherent violence,
the rest of this document is a complete vacuum. And the letter
might be ignored if it were not a document of the epoch, a
memorial to a great act of history. Just take it as it is.
'Rejection of the insurrection is rejection of the transference
of power to the Soviets and a placing of all hopes in the well-
meaning bourgeoisie who have "promised" to convoke the Con-
stituent Assembly. Either an open rejection of the slogan of "All
Power to the Soviets", or else insurrection. There is no middle
way. Either idly fold your useless arms and wait, vowing fidelity
to the Constituent Assembly, while Rodzianko & Co. surrender
Petersburg and smother the revolution, or else insurrection.'
Meanwhile these are merely menacing preliminary remarks ;
Lenin is only causing a fright with the terrible words 'There is
no middle way'. Further on, however, he comes to grips with
his opponents' arguments. Well, let's listen. It's our duty.
Lenin quotes his opponents: 'There is nothing in the inter-
national situation that actually obliges us to demonstrate at
once; we should, rather, harm the cause if we allowed ourselves
to be shot.'
Here is Lenin's reply to this 'magnificent argument, which
Scheidemann himself could not have improved on' :
'The Germans, with Liebknecht alone, without newspapers or
mass-meetings, made an insurrection in the fleet, and we, with
dozens of papers, a majority in the Soviets and so on are to
refrain from insurrection! "Let's demonstrate our good sense.
Let's pass a resolution of sympathy with the German insurgents,
and overthrow the revolution in Russia".'
Hard to resist this: it's very powerful. But it's not enough
comparaison rfest pas raison.
The following argument: 'Everyone is against us. We are in
isolation. Both the Central Ex. Com. and the Menshevik-
Internationalists, both the Novaya %hizn and the Left SRs have
published and are publishing proclamations against us.'
574 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Lenin's answer to 'this most powerful argument' :
*Up to now we have fought the vacillators, and this is what
has won us the sympathy of the people and gained us a majority
in the Soviets; shall we now exploit the Soviets we have won in
order to go over ourselves into the camp of the vacillators?
What a splendid career for Bolshevism! On account of the
betrayal of the peasant insurrection by the Martovs, the Kam-
kovs, and the Sukhanovs, it is now proposed that we betray it
too. This is what the policy of ogling the Left SRs and the
Menshevik-Internationalists boils down to.'
Evidently, for the comrades who were the objects of the
agitation, this was enough to convince them of the safety and
even utility of their isolation. Let's make a proletarian State
against the parties, that is, against the subjective will and the
objective class interests of the overwhelming majority of the
population. Well, all right, do so !
Further: 'But we haven't even firm ties with the railwaymen
and postal employees; is it possible to win without them?'
Lenin's answer: 'It's not a question of stocking up on ties
beforehand, but of the fact that only a victory of the proletarian
and peasant insurrection can satisfy the masses of railwaymen
and postal employees.'
Here the simplification is quite childish! No, it is not the
victory of the insurrection that will satisfy these masses, but the
right organization and functioning of the new State. Is that as
easy as it is to win an insurrection with dozens of newspapers
and a majority in the Soviets? Or is it somewhat harder?
Argument: There is bread in Petersburg for two or three days.
Can we give the insurgents bread?'
Lenin's answer: 'Sceptics can always doubt, and nothing but
experience will convince them; it is precisely the bourgeoisie
that is preparing the famine; there is not and cannot be any
other means of salvation from hunger than an insurrection of the
peasants against the landlords in the country and the victory of
the workers against the capitalists in the cities and the, capital.
Any delay in the insurrection is like death that is the reply
that must be made to those who have the miserable courage to
watch the growth of chaos and dissuade the workers from
insurrection. . .'
This plainly needs no comment. Let's go on.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 575
Argument: 'The situation at the front is not yet dangerous;
even if the soldiers concluded a truce by themselves it would still
be no calamity.'
Lenin's answer: 'But the soldiers are not concluding any
truce; for this the state power is necessary, and it cannot be
obtained without an insurrection. The soldiers are simply
running away. Waiting is impossible without making it easier
for Rodzianko to come to an agreement with the Kaiser.'
Now this would have been true if, instead of a Bolshevik
insurrection with Utopian aims, it had been a question of a
dictatorship of the Soviet democracy proceeding to replace the
Gadet-Kornilov Coalition in order to fulfil the real programme
of the revolution.
Argument: e And if we take power and obtain neither a truce,
nor peace, then the soldiers might not come along into a
revolutionary war. What then?*
Here the Thunderer lost patience: 'One fool', he replied,
'can ask ten times as many questions as ten wise men can
answer. , . We have never denied the difficulties of ruling, but
we 'will not allow ourselves to be frightened by the difficulties of
revolution. 5
Lenin devoted three columns to the argument we have met
with not only from the 'cronies' but also from other Soviet people
and parties: 'the masses, as everyone reports, are not belli-
gerent'.
Lenin, 'placed to one side of the stream', makes a correction:
first of all, everyone says that the mood is one of 'concentration
and expectancy' ; secondly, the workers do not want to come out
for a manifestation, but 'there is the approach of a general
struggle hovering in the air' ; thirdly, the 'broad masses are near
despair, and it is on this soil that anarchism is growing';
fourthly, 'excitement' is not necessary either, what is necessary
is just a 'mood of desperate concentration. . .'
Well, now you can take your choice. Personally I have
absolutely never agreed that the mood of the masses excluded a
successful insurrection. The only question was rather how many
of them might go to the barricades. But I see no need to linger
over Lenin's verbiage, even though it is directed towards the
same conclusion.
This was the final argument of his opponents : *A Marxist
576 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
party cannot reduce the question of an Insurrection to the
question of a military conspiracy.'
In essence this is correct. But this time Lenin too was right,
that this was quite irrelevant. To talk about a military con-
spiracy instead of a national insurrection, when the party was
followed by the overwhelming majority of the people, when the
party had already de facto conquered all real power and
authority was clearly an absurdity. On the part of the enemies
of Bolshevism it was a malicious absurdity, but on the part of the
'cronies 5 an aberration based on panic. Here Lenin was right. . .
But even on this basis I can by no means renounce the estimate
I placed on the entire document: I'm not responsible for the
fact that the 'cronies 5 said some absurd things.
So the arguments are exhausted. And the theoretical
material of this time is also, I think, all exhausted. Now we are
familiar with the whole philosophy of the insurrection at that
time. There was no other. He who has ears, has heard.
As for the 'cronies', it was as though they had simply been
waiting to be called to heel. Two days later Zinoviev published a
letter that he was 'postponing the dispute until more favour-
able circumstances', and 'closing the ranks', Kamenev an-
nounced the same thing in the Soviet, the same day his views
were published in the Novaya %fdzn.
Everyone was asking: and what about Lunacharsky? What
does he think? Wasn't he probably against 'all that'? Personally
at this time I saw him rarely. The party command had long
since forbidden him to write in the Novaya %hizn. He was
spending a lot of time in the Town Council, where he was a col-
league of the 'Governor's'. He was beginning to get involved in
cultural and municipal work, and told me he wanted to go over
to it entirely. The reason for this was primarily the fact that the
party didn't let him into 'major policy' and was treating him
badly. I don't think I ever spoke to him at this time about
Bolshevik activities and plans, and I don't know what he
thought. But because of all the newspaper rumours libelling his
position he declared in print, neck and neck with Zinoviev:
I stand with the party.
But it's time to leave 'ideas'. In those days, actually, there
was no time for them.
CHAPTER 28
THE FINAL REVIEW
THOSE were the days of the final mobilization and final review
of strength. Everywhere in the provinces at this time there were
Soviet congresses, and almost everywhere they gave pre-
dominance to the Bolsheviks, while In Moscow a movement
again began going out into the streets. On the I5th a large
manifestation took place with the most violent slogans,
especially from the soldiers : We would rather die in Moscow on
the barricades than go to the front!' In the Soviet and the Ex.
Com. it became evident that it was no longer possible to hold
back the Moscow masses. In other corners of Russia, even
where there was no peasant uprising, the movement, under the
slogans of 'Soviet power', was clearly sweeping over the
countryside.
In general there was no doubt that Moscow would lend
complete and active support; the greater part of the provinces
would give support; the rest would be 'assimilated'.
The front was more doubtful. Here party influence was
diverse, but, generally speaking, they had no time there for
politics: they refused to know or think of anything but peace.
What worked against the Bolsheviks was their not letting the
Petersburg garrison out of the capital as reinforcements. But
the Bolsheviks had every hope of immediate peace proposals. It
was scarcely possible to assemble any real force against any
Government that proposed peace. No one would have marched
against Petersburg. And nothing more was needed.
But even at the front there were substantial Bolshevik
organizations. Corps, divisions, batteries, and other units were
sending to the papers a multitude of Bolshevik resolutions.
There were also congresses that took place under the exclusive
influence of the Bolsheviks.
I should like to mention just this about the front. Once more
strings of delegations from the front were not only filing into
Sinolny, appearing at big Soviet meetings with their messages
and speeches : besides this they were stubbornly seeking intimate
conversations and authoritative direct explanations from the old
578 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
Soviet leaders. But there was no time for them. They were
almost never received. When they did succeed in getting hold
of a leader they could get no satisfaction from him. Non-party
or SR-rninded delegates., disappointed and angry, Immediately
turned to the Bolsheviks. They poured out their hearts to them
at Smolny, and at the front became conductors of their in-
fluence. Our editorial office (and others too no doubt) was
literally swamped at this time with letters from the trenches.
These were remarkable human documents. Pouring their souls
out to the dregs, the soldiers showed what the unbearable
suffering of wartime had turned them into. If only it would end :
nothing else mattered parties, politics, or revolution. Anyone
would be supported who produced even a ghost of peace.
There was nothing there to be afraid of. Though the front
might give no active support, it would not be actively hostile.
Though it might not be helpful, it wouldn't be harmful. The
non-party and SR mass would easily be assimilated by the
Bolshevik minority. And doubtless even "scratch detachments'
would not easily be turned against the Bolsheviks in this
atmosphere.
Besides the Soviet organizations there were also some
municipalities in the hands of the Bolsheviks. One way or
another in such conditions the overturn definitely did not recall
either a military conspiracy or a Blanquist experiment.
But the active and deciding role belonged to Petersburg, and
partly to its suburbs. Forces were mobilized here most of all, in
the main arena of the drama.
Trotsky, tearing himself away from work on the revolutionary
staff, personally rushed from the Obukhovsky plant to the
Trubochny, from the Putilov to the Baltic works, from the
riding-school to the barracks; he seemed to be speaking at all
points simultaneously.* His influence, both among the masses
and on the staff, was overwhelming. He was the central figure of
those days and the principal hero of this remarkable page of
history.
sje # sje
On the evening of October i8th, after a speech by Miliukov in
the Pre-Parliament, I went to Smolny. The Soviet was in
session. The great hall was glittering brightly with its chandelier
and snow-white columns. It was packed. The mood was
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 579
obviously exalted. In the stuffy, smoky air an endless mass of
excited faces was looking up at the platform from out of clouds
of tobacco smoke. The aisles and the seats behind the columns
were packed with disorderly groups.
The file of men from the trenches had already long since
passed by. When I got there Trotsky was on the platform
talking heatedly about something.
I pushed my way to the platform stage. I had something quite
special in mind. An anniversary of Gorky's was coming up on
Sunday the 22nd his twenty-five years as a writer. The
importance of this, especially to the Petersburg worker-soldier
Soviet, seemed self-evident to me, but almost no one knew
about it. I wanted the Soviet to pass a motion and send him
greetings.
But how could this be done? If I spoke in my own name
it would only produce embarrassment, and might end in a
scandal. The meeting would look questioningly at the leaders
and what would they say? The point was that the Bolsheviks
had now been subjecting our paper, and Gorky, its director, to
a particularly heavy fire. And it happened that Gorky had
picked just that day to come out with an article against the
uprising.
I knew very well what the Bolshevik traditions were, and that
this wasn't a moment when the Bolsheviks would distinguish
between the world-famous writer, the artistic ideologist of the
proletariat, and their political antagonist on a current question
of tactics.
I began looking for someone on the platform with whom I
could make arrangements beforehand. I didn't want to appeal
to Trotsky: we hadn't met for about three weeks, during which
our paths had radically diverged, and the question was rather
delicate. I looked around, and hit upon someone highly
suitable.
That was Ryazanov. I had no doubt of his sympathy. But to
my surprise he began to give me hurried evasive answers and
seemed somewhat embarrassed. He refused to speak himself,
but promised to tell Trotsky when the latter had finished his
speech. I waited. . .
But what was Trotsky so hot about? Why were the soldiers'
faces so excited?
580 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
Trotsky had exposed a scandal. He was resisting an impudent
encroachment on the soldiers' vital interests. That's why he was
so emotional and why the hall was aroused.
The Petersburg Town Council, in order to help out its totally
ruined exchequer a little and rescue its tram-cars from rapid
deterioration, had decided to ask the soldiers to pay a fare of
about five copecks instead of the twenty paid by all simple
mortals, not excepting even the workers. Up to then the com-
pletely idle Petersburg garrison had been riding around without
paying, packing the trams even for only one or two stops. Both
the populace and the municipal finances suffered bitterly.
Finally a reform was decided on, that went directly counter to
the interests of the revolution.
I saw a group of Bolshevik Town Council members, led by
Joffe, the future famous diplomat and ambassador, on the plat-
form. These council-men had already explored the question in
the Town Council and admitted that the proposed measure
was completely sensible. Nevertheless they had appeared in the
Soviet to give Trotsky authoritative backing. Everything else
had to stop for considerations of higher policy !
But Trotsky, who was carrying on this higher policy, was
describing to the soldiers the whole outrageous injustice of
the five-copeck fare in vivid colours and demanding its aboli-
tion.
In his demagogy the future ruler did not hesitate to preach
the most primitive capriciousness and anarchy. A rather miser-
able scene an episode in the softening-up.
I couldn't stay long enough to propose that Gorky be
honoured. Trotsky was obviously out of sympathy. The Soviet
passed over the anniversary of the writer who had brought down
on his head innumerable blows, filth, and slanders for his
revolutionary services.
It was already late at night when my wife and I left the
meeting. Outside we were met by pitch darkness, with a down-
pour into the bargain. We were in a bad mood. And now
another delight! How to get to the other end of the city, to the
Karpovka, with my tubercular wife, who couldn't resist going to
this meeting and missing all the trams. There was quite a crowd
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 581
in the darkness of the gardens quarrelling about a couple of
snorting motor-cars the Bolshevik Soviet had succeeded in
getting away from the Menshevik~SR Central Ex. Com. The
cars of course were out of the question : Trotsky was about to
go up to one of them, but after standing there a moment and
looking at it he laughed, splashed off through the puddles, and
vanished in the darkness.
About to start off on foot, we found out that some special
trams, standing in the square, had been supplied for the
delegates. We rushed over. Another success ! The tram for the
Petersburg Side had already left. The only thing we could do
was to ride to the corner of Sadovoy and Inzhenerny. But it was
still a good five versts from there.
Standing on the platform of the tram I was extraordinarily
irritable and gloomy. A short fellow with a modest look was
standing near us, with a pince-nez, a black goatee, and flashing
Jewish eyes. Seeing my mood he set about cheering me up, and
tried to distract me with some advice about the route. But I
answered him disagreeably and monosyllabically.
'Who's that? 5 I asked, when we left the tram.
'That's our old party worker, the Town Councillor,
Sverdlov. . .'
In my bad temper I should undoubtedly have cheered up and
laughed a great deal if someone had told me that in a fortnight
this man would be the titular head of the Russian Republic.
The Petersburg garrison was the primary and most impor-
tant factor. This was obvious to everyone. During this period
the Soldiers' Section was being 'dealt with' practically every
day. But this wasn't enough : the garrison had to be sounded out
and strengthened in every possible way.
That same day, the i8th, the Military Department of the
Petersburg Soviet had wired all units: (i) To refrain from any
unauthorized action; (2) To carry out regional Staff orders only
after their approval by the Military Department, And the telegram
carried an invitation to come to Smolny that same day for
personal explanations.
This wire was held up in the Central Ex. Com. Nevertheless
representatives of most of the units appeared at Smolny. In the
582 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
name of the Central Ex. Com. the meeting was declared incom-
petent. As you like! It took place anyhow, and of course Trotsky
took the floor. One of the Central Ex. Com. members asked for
the floor at this incompetent meeting, but didn't get it.
The unit delegates, however, had not been gathered together
to be agitated at again, but to be listened to. The 'speeches from
the floor' were in the last analysis all alike : the Izmailovskys,
Chasseurs, Volhynians, Grenadiers, Cuxholms, Semyonovskys,
Rifles, Pavlovskys, the Electro-Technical Battalion, the Moscow
Regiment, the 8gth, and others all said the self-same thing:
Power to the Soviets; they would come out at the first call;
mistrust and contempt for the Government and sometimes for
the Central Ex. Com. into the bargain. Of those present only
the cavalry units declared either their passivity or their refusal to
come out at all. This was 'neutrality' a term often used at this
time.
The next day, the igth, the Central Ex. Com. convened
another, 'competent 5 , garrison meeting. This time the organizers
obviously preferred to talk, not listen. Dan thought it necessary
to say that a Soviet Congress in his opinion was now 'unsuitable',
although no one was thinking of disrupting it. But for the most
part of course he spoke of the 'unsuitability 9 and calamitousness
of a demonstration. He was opposed by Trotsky in the cus-
tomary spirit. But the delegates themselves spoke up, showing
the Star Chamber the same scene as the evening before: we shall
obey the Petersburg Soviet absolutely and come out only on its summons.
Finally, on Saturday the 2ist there was another meeting of
the regimental and company committees of all units. Once
again Trotsky. Again the everlasting 'current moment', but
three decisions.
First of all, the Soviet Congress was assembling and would
take power in order to secure land, peace, and bread; the
garrison solemnly promised to place all its forces down to the
last man at the disposal of the Congress.
Secondly, the Military Revolutionary Committee was now
formed and in operation; the garrison welcomed it and promised
it full support in everything it undertook.
Thirdly, the following morning, Sunday the 22nd, the Day of
the Petersburg Soviet, was a day of the peaceful muster of
forces; the garrison, without demonstrating anywhere, would
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1*] 583
watch over order and in case of need resist any provocative
attempts of the bourgeoisie to carry discord into the revolu-
tionary ranks.
Some minor misunderstandings arose with the Cossack
delegates, who referred to Lenin's articles, in alarm about a
possible uprising the following day; they were actually pre-
paring for a ceremonial procession, and moreover would never
bend the knee to the Germans for peace. There was a hubbub at
first, but then a c common language' was found : an appeal was
made to the Cossack brethren inviting them as dear guests
*to our meetings on the holiday of our peaceful muster of
forces'.
No one voted against Trotsky's resolution. Only fifty-seven
people remained neutral and abstained. It seemed that one
could remain calm. Things were firm enough here.
On October 2ist the Petersburg garrison conclusively acknow-
ledged the Soviet as sole power, and the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee as the immediate organ of authority.
Two days earlier the District Commander had again re-
ported to the Premier: 'There is no reason to think the garrison
will refuse to obey the orders of the military authorities*.
One could remain calm. The Winter Palace was calm. 'Steps
had been taken.'
I spent that night in the Karpovka because I had to speak the
next day at noon at a mass-meeting in the People's House.
The decisive day came. The Cyclopean building of the
People's House was packed to the doors with a countless throng.
They filled the enormous theatres to overflowing in the expecta-
tion of mass-meetings. The foyer, buffet, and corridors were also
full. Behind the scenes people kept asking me : Just what did I
intend to talk about? I replied about the 'current moment', of
course. Did that mean against the coup? They began trying to
persuade me to speak on foreign policy. After all, that was my
speciality! The discussion with the organizers took on such a
character I absolutely refused to speak at all. But that was no
use either.
Irritated, I went out from backsv**ge, to watch events from the
hall. Trotsky was flying along the corridor towards me on to the
584 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 9 I 7
stage. He glanced at me angrily and rushed by without any
greeting. That was the first time. . . Diplomatic relations were
broken off for a long while.
The mood of the people, more than 3,000, who filled the hall
was definitely tense: they were all silently waiting for some-
thing. The audience was of course primarily workers and
soldiers, but more than a few typically lower-middle-class men's
and women's figures were visible.
Trotsky's ovation seemed to be cut short prematurely, out of
curiosity and impatience: what was he going to say? Trotsky at
once began to heat up the atmosphere, with his skill and
brilliance. I remember that at length and with extraordinary
power he drew a picture (difficult through its simplicity) of the
suffering of the trenches. Thoughts flashed through my mind
of the inevitable incongruity of the parts in this oratorical whole.
But Trotsky knew what he was doing. The whole point lay in
the mood. The political conclusions had long been familiar.
They could be condensed, as long as there were enough high-
lights.
Trotsky did this with enough highlights. The Soviet regime
was not only called upon to put an end to the suffering of the
trenches. It would give land and heal the internal disorder.
Once again the recipes against hunger were repeated : a soldier,
a sailor, and a working girl, who would requisition bread from
those who had it and distribute it gratis to the cities and front.
But Trotsky went even further on this decisive 'Day of the
Petersburg Soviet 5 .
*The Soviet Government will give everything the country
contains to the poor and the men in the trenches. You, bour-
geois, have got two fur caps ! give one of them to the soldier,
who's freezing in the trenches. Have you got warm boots? Stay
at home. The worker needs your boots. . .'
These were very good and just ideas. They could not but
excite the enthusiasm of a crowd who had been reared on the
Tsarist whip. In any case, I certify as a direct witness that this
was what was said on this last day.
All round me was a mood bordering on ecstasy. It seemed as
though the crowd, spontaneously and of its own accord, would
break into some religious hymn. Trotsky formulated a brief and
general resolution, or pronounced some general formula like *we
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 585
will defend the worker-peasant cause to the last drop of our
blood'.
Who was for? The crowd of thousands, as one man, raised
their hands. I saw the raised hands and burning eyes of men,
women, youths, soldiers, peasants, and typically lower-
middle-class faces. Were they in spiritual transports? Did they
see, through the raised curtain, a corner of the 'righteous land'
of their longing? Or were they penetrated by a consciousness of
the political occasion, under the influence of the political agitation
of a Socialist? Ask no questions! Accept it as it was. . .
Trotsky went on speaking. The innumerable crowd went on
holding their hands up. Trotsky rapped out the words: 'Let this
vote of yours be your vow with all your strength and at any
sacrifice to support the Soviet that has taken on itself the
glorious burden of bringing to a conclusion the victory of the
revolution and of giving land, bread, and peace!*
The vast crowd was holding up its hands. It agreed. It vowed.
Once again, accept this as it was. With an unusual feeling of
oppression I looked on at this really magnificent scene.
Trotsky finished. Someone else went out on to the stage. But
there was no point in waiting and looking any more.
Throughout Petersburg more or less the same thing was
going on. Everywhere there were final reviews and final vows.
Thousands, tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of
people. . . This, actually, was already an insurrection. Things
had started. . .
# # #
At about 5 or 6 o'clock, I don't remember just why, a meeting
of our Pre-Parliament fraction was scheduled in the Marian
Palace. But almost no one was there. In the reading-room I
came across two or three comrades, in deep arm-chairs, lazily
exchanging remarks. I began to tell them what I had seen and
heard that day. But I don't think it made much impression. Dr.
Mandelberg, coming to the point, began talking about what was
going to happen in the Pre-Parliament on Tuesday or Wed-
nesday.
'What?' I stopped him. e D'you think there's still going to be a
Pre-Parliament on Tuesday and Wednesday? Don't delude
yourself! In two or three days the Pre-Parliament will no longer
exist. . .'
586 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
But they ironically waved me aside. Two hours passed. The
time assigned for our fraction meeting had already gone by. I
didn't go away because at about 8 or 9 o'clock an inter-fraction
meeting was scheduled on the question of a peace formula.
While waiting I wandered about the empty half-dark rooms.
All at once a group of people from other fractions appeared
Peshekhonov, Kuskov, Skobelev, and someone else. They were
already looking for the other delegates in order to begin the
conference. Well, what had they seen and heard today? What
did they think? I went up to them and abruptly flung out: 'So
the insurrection's begun! What are your impressions?'
For a long moment the group looked at me in frowning
silence, not knowing what to say. Insurrection? No, they didn't
know a thing. Should they believe me? How should they reply?
Whether you believed it or not you shouldn't get into this sort of
conversation. After all, if the insurrection really had begun
Sukhanov of course would be in it. . .
The inter-fraction meeting began, but we didn't have time to
finish. We were interrupted by a group of people who had
rushed over from Smolny with extraordinary news.
CHAPTER 29
OVERTURE
IN actual fact the overturn was accomplished the moment the
Petersburg garrison acknowledged the Soviet as its supreme
authority and the Military Revolutionary Committee as its
direct command. Such a decision, as we know, was made at the
meeting of the garrison representatives on October sist. But in
the unprecedented setting this act may be said to have had an
abstract character. No one took it for a coup d'etat.
And no wonder. The decision, aftef all, did not really change
the situation: even earlier the Government had had no real
power or authority. The real power in the capital had already
been in the hands of the Bolsheviks of the Petersburg Soviet long
before, and nevertheless the Winter Palace had remained the
Government, and Smolny a private institution. Now the
garrison had declared officially, urbi et orbi, that it did not recog-
nize the Government and was subject to the Soviet. But did it
matter what was said in Smolny, where there was nobody but
Bolsheviks?
Nevertheless, this is a fact: by October 2ist the Provisional
Government had already been overthrown, and was non-
existent in the territory of the capital. Kerensky and his col-
leagues, calling themselves Ministers, were still completely at
liberty, busy with something or other in the Winter Palace;
in many parts of the country they were still recognized as the
Government (wherever the Soviets were not Bolshevik), and in
addition they might still have some real support outside the
capital and theoretically speaking have been able to destroy the
Bolsheviks and their Petersburg garrison together. The main
thing, however, was that no new power had been proclaimed,
and the situation was transitional. It was the same as on
February 28th, when the capital garrison turned against the
Tsarist Government but there was no new Government; when
Tsar Nicholas was at liberty and busy at Headquarters; when
his authority was still recognized in many parts of the country
and he could still find loyal troops to crush the insurgent
capital.
588 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
Nevertheless the Government was already overthrown on
October 2ist, as Tsar Nicholas had been on February 28th
What remained now was essentially to complete what had been
done first of all, to make the overturn official by proclaiming a
new government, and secondly, to liquidate de facto the pre-
tenders to power, thus achieving general acknowledgement of
the accomplished fact.
The significance of what was accomplished on October 2ist
was obscure not only to the man-in- the-street and the spectator;
it was not clear to the revolutionary leaders themselves. Glance
into the memoirs of one of the chief figures of the October Days,
Antonov-Ovseyenko, 1 secretary of the Military Revolutionary
Committee. You'll see a complete 'unawareness 5 of the internal
evolution of events. This gave rise to a lack of system and
orderliness in the external, military-technical measures of the
Bolsheviks. It might have ended for them much less successfully
if they had been dealing with a different adversary. It was luck
that the adversary was not only unaware, but completely blind ;
and not only blind, but equal to zero with respect to real power. . .
But here's what must be taken into account: neither Smolny
nor the Winter Palace could be fully aware of the meaning of
events. It was obscured by the historical position of the Soviet in
the revolution. A confusion of ideas inevitably flowed from the
fact that for half a year the totality of real power had been in the
hands of the Soviet, while at the same time there existed a
Government, and indeed an independent and sovereign one.
The Soviet, by tradition, did not acknowledge that it was a
government; and the Government, by tradition, did not
acknowledge that it was a mere sham. . . How many times, after
all, had even the garrison passed resolutions almost identical
with its vote on October 2ist? How many times had it sworn
allegiance to the Soviet, both after the July events and during
the Kornilov revolt? And this, after all, had not only not been
an overturn, but had even been made in honour of the Coali-
tion. How could one tell that now something completely
different had taken place?
1 Antonov-Ovseyenko, Vladimir Alexandrovich (1884-1938): a Bolshevik from
1903; of a military family; a leading figure in preparation of Bolshevik insurrection
in October. Member of Trotskyite opposition, 1923-28; sent to Spain by Soviet
Government during the Spanish Civil War; on his return to Russia was shot. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 589
In the Winter Palace it was quite impossible to tell. But
Smolny didn't appreciate it either. If it kadbten possible to tell
in the Winter Palace, one would have thought that a desperate
attempt to destroy Smolny then and there would have been
inevitable. If Smolny had appreciated it, one would have
thought that the inevitability of such an attempt on the part of
the Winter Palace should have been manifest; and it would have
been vital to liquidate the Winter Palace at once, at one blow,
in order to forestall it.
But no, both sides thought the business of an overturn had not
yet begun. The Winter Palace didn't care a rap for the vote of
October 2ist, while Smolny silently, gropingly, cautiously,
chaotically, moved on to something that in essence appeared to
be an overturn, but was actually only its formal recognition.
A few hours after the meeting of the garrison, on Saturday
night, October 2ist, representatives of the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee went to see the District Commander,
Polkovnikov. They demanded the right to countersign all Staff
orders to the garrison. Polkovnikov categorically refused. The
Smolny delegates withdrew.
The General Staff was the General Staff of an enemy army. The
correct tactics (according to Marx) required that the insurgents,
being the attacking side, destroy, shatter, paralyse, and liquidate
this centre of the whole enemy organization in one annihilating
onslaught. A detachment of 300 volunteers sailors, workers,
party soldiers could have done this without the slightest
difficulty; at that time the possibility of such a raid had not even
entered anyone's head.
But Smolny acted differently. The Bolsheviks went to the
enemy and said : We demand power over you.
The action of the Military Revolutionary Committee on the
night of October 2 ist was completely superfluous. It might have
proved extremely dangerous, if it had provoked a proper
response from the Staff. But it turned out to be completely safe:
the District Commander didn't understand this action and
didn't respond adequately. He could have arrested the delegates
of a 'private organization', which (like Kornilov on August 26th)
was demanding power over the highest military authority and
590 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
was definitely embarking on a revolt. Then Polkovnikov might
have collected 500 military cadets, officers and Cossacks, and
made an attempt to destroy, shatter, and paralyse Smolny. At
that moment he had more than a few chances of success; in any
case, it would seem, nothing else was left for him to do.
But the Staff understood nothing. Indeed, as a matter of fact
this was not the first time the Soviet had wished to countersign
its orders. During the April Days, after all, something similar
had been announced by the garrison without any warning:
that the commander was not to take troops out of the barracks
without the permission of certain Soviet Mensheviks and SRs.
And there was no revolt and no overturn at all there. The
matter was very satisfactorily settled with Miliukov and Guch-
kov in the Liaison Commission. So why should they think of
overturns or revolts now? Polkovnikov categorically refused : the
delegates left empty-handed. All was well.
The next day, Sunday, the District Commander gave the
journalists an authoritative explanation of the inwardness of the
conflict that had taken place. The point, you see, was that the
Government refused to confirm a Commissar sent to the Staff by
the Petersburg Soviet. The Government would not recognize a
Bolshevik in such a post. Besides, there was already a Commissar
on the Staff, sent by the Central Ex. Com. In addition, in the
units of the Petersburg garrison recently new elections for unit
Commissars had been energetically proceeding: Mensheviks and
SRs were being thrown out and replaced everywhere by
Bolsheviks. The Government protested against the elections.
That was the essence of the conflict. But it was to be hoped that
it would be smoothed over.
The whole attention of the Winter Palace and the Staff was
fixed on street demonstrations. It was in case they happened that
'steps had been taken'. But there were no demonstrations.
Hence, all was well. It was possible to occupy oneself with
current business.
On Sunday, October 22, the Council of Ministers was occu-
pied with it. Kerensky, however, also went into the question
of the preservation of order. He had an excellent command of
the essence of the conflict between the Staff and Smolny.
Polkovnikov had given him a detailed report. You can't baffle
sensible, statesmanlike people: Moscow once burned because
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 591
of a copeck candle; not so long ago, the World War had begun
because of the assassination of an Austrian Crown Prince; and
the conflict between Smolny and the Staff arose from the non-
confirmation of a commissar. . .
It was all clear enough, but all the same Kerensky, according
to reports, insisted on the definitive liquidation of the Military
Revolutionary Committee. He was determined. But Polkov-
nikov persuaded him to wait a little: he would fix things!
Kerensky began waiting.
Meanwhile the Soviet began assembling in Smolny for an
emergency session. The delegates arrived haphazardly. Most of
them had been holding mass-meetings in the factories and else-
where. But the point was not the deputies, it was the representa-
tives of the regiments, who had again been assembled as an
emergency measure. Trotsky flew to them and explained the
new state of affairs. It seemed the Staff did not agree to submit
to the control of the Military Revolutionary Committee. Very
odd, what? But one way or another it imposed a 'further
step'.
The further step was in the form of a telephone message, sent
out at once to all units of the garrison in the name of the
Soviet; it read: 'At a meeting on October 2ist the revolutionary
garrison of Petersburg rallied around the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee as its governing body. In spite of this the
Staff of the Petersburg military area has failed to recognize
the Military Revolutionary Committee, and refuses to carry on
work jointly with the representatives of the Soldiers' Section of
the Soviet. By this very fact the Staff has broken with the
revolutionary garrison and the Petersburg Soviet. By breaking
with the organized garrison of the capital, the Staff has made
itself the tool of counter-revolutionary forces. The Military
Revolutionary Committee divests itself of any responsibility for
the actions of the Staff. . .
'Soldiers of Petersburg! The defence of revolutionary order
against counter-revolutionary attacks is incumbent on you,
under the leadership of the Military Revolutionary Committee.
No orders to the garrison, not signed by the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee, are valid. All Soviet orders for today, the
5Q2 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igi7^
Day of the Petersburg Soviet, remain in full force. Vigilance,
firmness, and unwavering discipline is the duty of every soldier
of the garrison. The revolution is in danger! Long live the
revolutionary garrison P
The premises of this document are completely hollow: merely
awesome agitational words with very naive content. But the
conclusions are extremely substantial the garrison was not to
execute the orders of the legal authorities.
Now this was definitely an insurrectionary act. Hostilities had
definitely begun before the eyes of the whole nation. But, at
the same time, weren't troops moved up to occupy the Staff,
railway stations, telegraphs, telephones, and other centres of the
capital? And detachments also sent to arrest the Provisional
Government? After all, you can't declare war unequivocally
and definitely before the country and the army and not begin
combat activities, to anticipate the initiative's passing into the
hands of the enemy.
This, however, was just what had happened. War had been
declared in unmistakable terms, but combat activities were not
begun. No one attacked either the Staff or the Provisional
Government. . , This, to put it mildly, was not according to
Marx. And nevertheless this kind of conduct proved quite safe.
After receiving the declaration of war, without being either
arrested or hampered in their movements, did the Staff take the
initiative into its own hands? Did it fling itself on the mutineers
in a last desperate attempt to defend the State and the revolu-
tion against the seditious Bolsheviks? The Staff did nothing of
the sort.
Instead of combat activities Polkovnikov scheduled a Staff
meeting. Representatives of the Central Ex. Com., the Peters-
burg Soviet, and the regimental committees were invited to it.
Smolny sent the well-known Bolshevik second-lieutenant
Dashkevich with two or three representatives of the garrison
meeting that had just ended. Dashkevich tersely repeated the
decision of this meeting, that is, the content of the telephone
message given above: all Staff orders to be countersigned,
otherwise they would not be executed. . . Then the Smolny
delegation withdrew, having refused to listen to their opponents.
At the Staff they began chattering about what to do. A few
representatives from the garrison committees reported on the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 593
mood of their units. They, of course, couldn't tell the district
commander anything reassuring. But then the Staff began
reassuring itself: the conflict, after all, had arisen because of the
non-confirmation of a Commissar; that was nothing; it had
happened only because someone selected by the Central Ex.
Com. had already been confirmed. Somehow things would be
smoothed over. . . In the newspapers we read: 'After a brief
exchange of opinions no definite decisions were taken; it was
considered necessary to wait for the resolution of the conflict
between the Central Ex. Com. and the Petersburg Soviet/
(Reck, No. 250.)
Very good. But really were the Bolsheviks timid, un-
conscious, and clumsy, or did they know whom they were deal-
ing with? Was this a criminally light-minded risk on their part,
or were they acting on a certainty?
Now, what forces did Kerensky have? There was, of course,
first of all, the garrison of the capital in general. After all, all
power was in the hands of the Provisional Government; the
local army authorities were at their posts, and we are familiar
with their reports : 'There are no grounds for thinking the garri-
son won't obey orders/ Without this conviction, of course, the
entire picture of the conduct of the Winter Palace and Staff
would have been different.
But nevertheless specially reliable units, which could be de-
pended on without any risk and to any extent, might have to be
used against the Bolsheviks. This had been acknowledged, after
all, even in August, when the 3rd Corps had been called back
from the front. And since then specially reliable cadres which
might be needed against the internal enemy had been sought.
This same 3rd Corps, at the head of which Kornilov himself had
placed the arch-reactionary* General Krasnov, was stationed in
the suburbs of Petersburg. Kerensky, at the beginning of Sep-
tember, in a coded telegram in Krasnov's name, had ordered
this corps to be stationed in Gatchina, Tsarskoe, and Peterhof.
Part of the corps had recently been distributed in the nearer
parts of the province for the pacification of the rebellious
garrisons. Nevertheless Krasnov's Cossacks would have been a
grave threat to the Bolsheviks if the neighbouring Bolsheviks
594 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1J
had not done some serious work amongst them and promised
them peace and immediate departure to their beloved Don. . .
But in any case these units were considered especially reliable.
Once again, as in August, Kerensky turned to them first of all.
The Bolsheviks, however, had taken their own measures. The
northern district Soviet Congress had sufficiently strengthened
their military organization. The movements of the Cossacks met
with every possible technical obstacle. And in the course of the
next three days the Cossacks failed to reach Petersburg. But I'm
not saying that on the night of the 22nd Kerensky ordered the
Krasnov men to advance; rather, he simply told them to stay at
the ready.
Besides the Cossacks, the military cadets were of course con-
sidered especially reliable. The Bolsheviks partly through per-
suasion and threats, partly through technical means had had an
effect on them too. Not many of them came to Petersburg from
the provinces on Kerensky 's order. But in any case, from the 23rd
on the Winter Palace was guarded primarily by military cadets.
That same night Kerensky and Bagratuni 1 gave orders for a
bicycle battalion to be called to Petersburg. The battalion was
about to move, but then decided to ask Smolny: why were they
being called up and must they go? Smolny, 'with fraternal
greetings', replied, of course, that it was quite unnecessary. . .
In general this question of calling up specially reliable troops
was not easy at all. But there was nothing to be particularly
alarmed about. After all, it was only just in case. . . There might
be no demonstration. 'Soviet Day' had passed without excesses. . .
The Bolsheviks, to be sure, had executed their decision: Staff
orders really were being controlled by local unit Commissars.
Nevertheless, orders were being obeyed.
But just what orders did the Staff give that night and the
following day? Orders about sentries and uniforms. They were
checked on, but obeyed. And the sentries and uniforms in those
days may be said to have been brilliant. Hence, all was well.
In the Pre-Parliament, from the morning of Monday the 23rd
on, in a rather empty hall, boring debates on foreign policy
flowed on peacefully. There had been some alarm the day
1 A general who replaced Colonel Polkovnikov as District Commander. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 595
before it was the stormy 'Soviet Day' but everything passed
over and serious people went back to their current business. . .
Various microscopic fractions talked. Yawning deputies lazily
heckled the speakers.
I don't recall any liveliness in the corridors either. I don't
recall any special reaction to the extraordinary events. Bol-
sheviks? Oh well, after all, them. . . I attacked my fraction com-
rades and demanded a debate on the general political problem.
But in spite of the sympathy of many nothing came of it. As
before Martov thought untimely a resolute offensive and the line
of immediate and thoroughgoing liquidation of 'Kerenskyism'.
In Smolny during those hours everything pursued its course.
The Military Revolutionary Committee was in session, and the
work was ceaseless; but only the Bolsheviks worked. Smolny had
changed considerably during those days. The sections of the
Central Ex. Com. were doing hardly any work and their second-
floor rooms were shut up. But Smolny hummed with a new
crowd, quite grey in aspect. Everything was dirty and untidy
and smelt of cheap tobacco, boots, and damp greatcoats.
Armed groups of soldiers, sailors, and workers scurried about
everywhere. Grey wolves lived in Smolny now, and they were
going on with their work.
The Military Revolutionary Committee passed on to the next
point on the agenda. This was of special importance: the Com-
missar assigned to the Peter-Paul Fortress turned up with the
information that the Commandant refused to recognize him and
had threatened him with arrest. Thus the Fortress must be con-
sidered to be in the hands of the Government. This created
enormous difficulties apart from the fact that the Peter-Paul
had an arsenal of a hundred thousand rifles. To take the
Fortress by force after the beginning of military action was more
than risky; besides, the Government might hide there until
troops arrived from the front to rescue them.
It was necessary to take the Peter-Paul quickly, before the
Government stopped debating and started doing something to
protect itself. Two methods were proposed for taking over the
Fortress. Antonov proposed to bring in a reliable battalion of the
Pavlovskys immediately and disarm the garrison of the Fortress.
596 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
But in the first place this involved a risk; secondly, it was
essentially an act of war, after which it would be necessary to
attack at once and liquidate the Government. Trotsky had
another proposal, namely, that he, Trotsky, go to the Fortress,
hold a meeting there, and capture not the body but the spirit of
the garrison. In the first place there would be no risk in that,
secondly it might be that even after this the Government would
go on living in Nirvana and allow Smolny to extend its
authority further and further without let or hindrance.
No sooner said than done. Trotsky set off at once, together
with Lashevich. Their harangues were enthusiastically received.
The garrison, almost unanimously, passed a resolution about
the Soviet regime and its own readiness to rise up, weapons in
hand, against the bourgeois Government. A Smolny Com-
missar was installed in the Fortress, under the protection of the
garrison, and refused to recognize the Commandant. A hundred
thousand extra rifles were in the hands of the Bolsheviks.
What the Government thought about all this, and what they
were saying about it on the General Staff I have no idea. But
neither in one place nor the other did they do anything in the course
of that whole day, until far into the night.
After an interval, in the early evening hours, the debates in
the Pre-Parliament on foreign policy were resumed. I don't re-
call any talk in the corridors about what was going on; I don't
think anything was known about the taking of the Peter-Paul.
But in the hall it was somewhat more cheerful. There were lots
of deputies. The certified Soviet diplomat Skobelev made a
curious speech: in vulgarly threadbare, empty generalities he
'expounded 3 the diplomatic wisdom of Ribot and Bonar Law. It
was comical to listen to.
But the centre was Martov's speech. This was perhaps the
most brilliant speech I ever heard him give. Indeed, even the
Right had never heard such a speech from its golden-tongued
orators in the Duma. They got angry and interrupted. But this
poured oil on the fire; Martov got off a whole pyrotechnical
display of images welded into a firm artistic monolith. It was
impossible not to be gripped by his oratorical power. And the
audience gave it due appreciation.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 597
But what did Martov talk about? He spoke of the revolution,
and of the crisis, its cause and conditions. It was not only
brilliant, but also remarkable for intellectual grasp and pro-
fundity. The content of the speech far overflowed the confines of
foreign policy; this was the philosophy of the moment. And it was
a passionate accusation of the ruling circles. But it was not the
political act the moment demanded. It lacked the right political
conclusions. It by-passed the stupendous current events. At the
critical moment of the revolution Martov failed to find the
indispensable words or perform the indispensable act he was
capable of.
I listened, paying tribute to Martov the orator, but made
deeply indignant in the last analysis by this speech. . . Teresh-
chenko spoke a toothless polemic. But the hall was already
thinning out. It was near evening. In the ministerial seats the
white, exhausted face of Kerensky was glimpsed and vanished.
He didn't speak. About 8 o'clock the meeting closed.
'What a brilliant speech Martov made! 5 Lapinsky said to me
in the corridor, with even a note of surprise.
I angrily shrugged my shoulders.
While the Pre-Parliament was sitting in the Marian, the
garrison representatives had gathered again in Smolny. But
there was no reason for it. They had been assembled only for
liaison and contact. Those who had come were invited to the
Soviet session, which opened at 7 o'clock and was very crowded.
It began with the usual type of agitation, not at all reminiscent
of the start of the 'final decisive battle'. Only Antonov recalled
one to current events, reporting on the activities of the Military
Revolutionary Committee.
An odd scene. The chief of staff of the insurgent troops was
making a resounding report on all the measures and tactical
steps of his staff listened to not only by his own army, but also
by the enemy army and its staff. The commander of the insur-
gent troops was announcing publicly: we have begun to conquer
and disarm the enemy this way and that, and we're going to go
on as we see fit.
Antonov reported: the Military Revolutionary Committee
officially began operations on the 20th. Since then it had taken
598 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij
the following steps (of a definitely rebellious nature): (i) All
'suspect' printing orders now required its sanction; (2) there
were Commissars in all the garrison units through whom all
Staff orders had to pass; (3) there was also a Commissar in the
Peter-Paul Fortress and the Fortress arsenal was now available;
(4) arms in all the factory stores and others would be given out
only on the Military Revolutionary Committee's orders.
He went on to say: the Commissars were objected to by the
Staff, but that didn't change anything. Yesterday the Staff
suggested that the Military Revolutionary Committee start
negotiations with it, but these conversations didn't change any-
thing either. Today the Staff had demanded the cancellation of
the telephone message about the preliminary control of its
orders; besides this, the Staff proposed to form a Staff Council
without the right of veto instead of the Military Revolutionary
Committee; but the Military Revolutionary Committee had
rejected these demands. And today the Commissars had been
holding mass-meetings in all units; the garrison had reaffirmed
its adherence to the Military Revolutionary Committee.
He was asked: did he know that troops loyal to the Govern-
ment had been summoned to Petersburg from various points at
the front and from the suburbs? What steps was the Military
Revolutionary Committee taking? Antonov replied: the calling
up of the troops and their movements were known; some of
these troops would be held up, others were themselves refusing
to inarch; it was only a few military cadet detachments there
was no information about.
So everyone had heard how the insurrection was going. Did
anyone feel like expressing his opinion?. . . The Mensheviks and
SRs said that an insurrection was going on, that the Bolsheviks
were seizing power and that all this threatened disaster. The
Menshevik-Internationalist Astrov, a very bitter controversialist,
specially emphasized the disastrousness of the split within the
democracy: this was unjustified if only because the Bolsheviks
themselves were not unanimous on the question of the insurrec-
tion; nothing would come of it but a bloody skirmish. Astrov
worked up the meeting to such a point that Trotsky refused to
continue as chairman. Trotsky's success as speaker, however,
was all the greater.
'Yes,' he said, 'an insurrection is going on, and the Bolsheviks,
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 599
in the form of the Congress majority, will take the power into
their own hands. The steps taken by the Military Revolutionary
Committee are steps for the seizure of power.'
Had everybody heard? Or was it still not clear enough?
A resolution was passed: the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee's measures were approved; it was also charged with
taking steps against riots, plundering, and other attempts to
destroy order and the safety of the citizenry.
That same evening Smolny got a wire from Helsingfors, from
the Baltic Fleet. The Fleet said it was attentively listening for
every movement of both camps. At the first call from Smolny it
would move its forces against the counter-revolution. This was
not only a reliable Bolshevik force, but an active one. A decisive
blow without this force would have been risky in the extreme.
But for the time being Smolny didn't summon it.
Around n o'clock I was sitting in the newspaper office
hurriedly finishing my leading article. It was on the same theme
I had formulated an hour before at a session of the Bureau.
The overturn which was giving the power to the Bolshevik
Party was a dangerous adventure. It could only be forestalled
and the revolution corrected by a decisive change of front on the
part of the Menshevik-SR ruling circles.
An odd little incident arose from this leading article. I read it
to Bazarov and Avilov, 1 who were waiting for me to finish.
Avilov, who had long since moved far from Lenin, abruptly
objected strongly to the expression 'The Bolsheviks are pre-
paring a coup d'etat .' This still seemed to him doubtful, and such
an expression tactless. This made me lose my temper; Bazarov
supported me, but Avilov persisted. We were all tense. Bazarov
began shouting at Avilov, Avilov at Bazarov, both of them at
me, and I at both of them. I flung the article into the waste-
paper basket, but it was needed. We got it out and, continuing
to shout at each other, went to the door. Avilov and Bazarov
went home, and I to the printers' to get out the paper.
1 Avilov, Boris Vasilyevich (1874- ? ) : a Bolshevik until February 1917, later
an editor of Novaya ^hizn. (Ed.)
600 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI?
During that night of the 23rd work was going on at the
General Staff too. Kerensky again went there for the night. But
what could he do? It must have seemed time to act. Whatever
his thoughts, and however he concealed the danger from him-
self, it was evidently impossible to wait any longer. The Peter-
Paul had been taken, the arsenal had been seized, the Staff's
demand that the Commissars should be removed had been
refused, and it had been announced in unmistakable terms : %
Smolny, will certainly gobble you up, Kerenskyism, whenever I
feel like it.' He must act now or never.
The specially reliable units had now all been called up. If they
didn't come, there was nothing to be done about it. Nevertheless
detachments had been formed for the defence of the Winter
Palace; guard-duties were being performed. In the city, of
course, there were loyal elements, if not troops. It might be
possible to form a detachment of several thousands from military
cadets, the women's services, engineers, and Cossacks. A scratch
detachment like that might be quite effective. But a firm
decision to act and attack had to be made.
The Staff had made no effort to form a scratch detachment.
It was muddled and vacillating. And it began to 'act' in the
habitual way, quite safely for the adversary, and not involving
any risk whatever for itself. That night the Staff wrote a
whole pile of orders. First, to avoid the seizure of motor-cars by
the insurgents, all owners were ordered to place their cars at the
disposition of the Staff; the 'full rigour of the law' was promised
for disobedience, but it goes without saying that not one loyal
bourgeois responded to this, and during the day the Staff lost
even those cars it had. Secondly, all demonstrations were again
prohibited 'on pain of arrest for armed rebellion' ; execution by
the troops of 'orders' emanating from Various organizations' was
also prohibited. Thirdly, an appeal to company, regimental,
and brigade committees also announced that the District Com-
mander's orders had to be obeyed : 'there are Central Ex. Com.
Commissars on the Staff and therefore ( ! !) non-execution of
orders would cause the disorganization and shattering of the
revolutionary garrison'. For his part the Central Ex. Com.
Commissar 'seconded the execution of the Staff's orders',
pointing out that 'they were issued with his knowledge'.
Are you laughing, reader? Does the picture seem too pathetic?
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ii 6oi
I can't help it. The sovereign Government could emit only this
empty babbling.
But is it possible that it didn't even dare call its enemy, not by
an allusion, but by his real name? Can it be possible that it did
not even permit itself in the Cabinet confidentially, between
Kerensky and Polkovnikov to write down something with
greater real content? Paper, after all, will stand for anything,
Bolder, bolder!
Kerensky and Polkovnikov wrote: 'In view of the illegal
activities of the representatives of the Petersburg Soviet assigned
as Commissars to the units, institutions, and departments of the
War Office, I order (i) all Commissars of the Petersburg Soviet
to be removed until their confirmation by a Government Com-
missar of the district, (2) all illegal activities to be investigated
for submission to a court martial, (3) all illegal activities to be
reported to me instantly with an indication of the name of the
Commissars. Polkovnikov.'
You can see that despair gives courage. The 'court martial', of
course, was rhetoric as before. And as for removing the Com-
missars who would remove them? In the units, after all, the
order would fall into the hands of those very Commissars, who
had already removed everyone who didn't obey them. So though
it may have been bold enough, it wasn't very businesslike.
But the activity of the Staff that night was not limited to this.
Towards morning the Staff had finally grown bold, or else
desperate. And it decided to start fighting. . . What, did it send a
detachment to seize Smolny, where there was no longer the
democracy but only Bolshevik rebels? No, that would have been
too much. The Staff did something else. I emphasize: in prin-
ciple this was no less a destruction of constitutional guarantees and
liberties and no less an act of violence than the seizure of mutinous
Smolny would have been. But to make up for this the measure
undertaken was first customary, secondly facile and cowardly,
thirdly empty and futile. This was just as much as the wisdom
and efficiency of the Provisional Government were equal to.
At 6 in the morning, on Polkovnikov's order, a few mili-
tary cadets, headed by a Commissar of Militia, appeared at
the offices of the Bolshevik papers Rabochii Put and Soldat (The
Soldier) and announced that the papers were shut down. The
responsible editor met the 'legitimate authorities' with wide-
602 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
open eyes: what? did Polkovnikov still exist, or any Government
at all except the Military Revolutionary Committee? He was
assured that they did, and the cadets ruined the matrices, sealed
the printing-presses, and destroyed the numbers already printed.
This was what it was equal to! After this, to pass off its
cowardliness as democratic spirit and its simple-mindedness
as respect for freedom was impossible (as indeed it had been
before). The Bolshevik papers, you see, were calling for an
insurrection, and so were destroyed, only to revive the very next
day, while Smolny and the unit Commissars had already made
the insurrection long ago, and they didn't lay a finger on them
out of democracy and love of liberty!
Nevertheless all the data indicate that the scene in the print-
ing-shop could have been successfully repeated in Smolny too.
There too they had so little belief in Polkovnikov that a good
scratch detachment wouldn't have had much trouble. Some
resistance would probably have been shown, and the affair
wouldn't have come off without skirmishing, but the liquidation
of Smolny was possible,
And the same question again: Why didn't the Military
Revolutionary Committee attack and strike a decisive blow?
If there is some reason to believe that Smolny could have been
smashed, there can be no doubt at all that it would have been
easy to occupy the Staff and seize the Ministers. In the last
analysis there could be only one answer: from political considera-
tions they were postponing the final blow until the Congress on
the 25th. This was a tremendous risk which I think it would
have been impossible to take on a cold calculation of all
possible chances. But it reveals the most characteristic trait of
this whole unprecedented insurrection: the insurgent camp,
seeing no real strength in its adversary, acted with absolute
irresponsibility, allowing itself something that is impossible in
war, in manoeuvres, or in a chess game.
In those pre-dawn hours of October 24th, when Kerensky
started combat activities by swooping down on the Bolshevik
press, two torpedo-boats came into Petersburg from Helsingfors.
They had been sent by the Baltic Fleet to support the insurrec-
tion. Smolny for the time being hadn't called them. But the
sailors themselves had sent them, under the pretext of 'greeting
the Congress 5 .
CHAPTER 30
OCTOBER 24TH
EARLY in the morning of the 24th the Military Revolutionary
Committee learned of the destruction of its press. It im-
mediately set to work. It occupied the city, the Staff, and the
Winter Palace, didn't it? Oh no this is what it did.
First it sent a telephone message to all army units: 'The
Petersburg Soviet is threatened; during the night counter-
revolutionary conspirators (Very good!') attempted to call out
the military cadets and the shock battalions; we order a regi-
ment in battle readiness to be brought up and await further
orders. . . For the Chairman, PODVOISKY. Secretary: ANTONOV/
Then detachments of Lithuanians and Sappers were sent to
the printing-presses of the shut-down newspapers. The printing-
presses were unsealed and set in motion under the protection of
the Military Revolutionary Committee's troops.
Further, two proclamations were drawn up. One said: 'The
enemies of the people passed over to the attack during the night
and are contemplating a treacherous blow against the Soviet;
therefore the regimental and company committees and the
Commissars must meet at once; no one must leave the barracks;
firmness must be maintained, doubts avoided. The people's
cause is in firm hands.' The second proclamation spoke of the
struggle against riots and disorders: the Military Revolutionary
Committee was on guard; the criminal pogromists and agents
of the counter-revolution would be wiped off the face of the
earth; the populace was called upon to restrain hooligans and
Black Hundred agitators.
But alongside all this the Military Revolutionary Committee
thought it necessary to publish this ruling of its own on October
24th: 'In spite of all kinds of rumours, the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee states that it definitely does not exist to pre-
pare and execute a seizure of power, but exclusively to defend
the interests of the Petersburg garrison from counter-revolu-
tionaries and pogromist attacks/ A Novaya %hiz,n reporter
asserts that this motion was passed unanimously. This was a
604 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
special jibe at the Provisional Government. No one could have
believed It any longer.
Finally, together with the order to the garrison about battle
readiness, still another important step was taken. Over Sverd-
lov's signature a telegram in code was sent to Smilga, the chair-
man of the Finnish district committee in Helsingfors: 'Send
regulations.' This meant: send 1,500 picked sailors and soldiers
to our aid. But at best, if no one and nothing hindered them,
they could not be in Petersburg until twenty-four hours
later.
And it was only now, during the day and evening of the 24th,
that armed detachments of Red Army militia-men and soldiers
began to rally to Smolny to defend the staff of the insurrection.
It's impossible to say how staunch or reliable they were. As we
know their spirit was only moderate. The soldiers were well-
disposed, but scarcely reliable. The workers were reliable, but
scarcely steadfast, never having smelt powder in their lives.
However, towards the evening of the 24th the defence of Smolny
began to look like something.
And that morning the Provisional Government assembled in
the Winter Palace. They busied themselves with 'organic work',
supply, etc. Then they proceeded to the 'situation that has
arisen'. Kerensky again insisted on the arrest of the Military
Revolutionary Committee. But the Minister of Justice, Malyan-
tovich, and someone else objected. Then Kerensky decided to
appeal to the Pre-Parliament and immediately set out for it.
This was quite unnecessary and absurd. Limitless powers were
available. Practice, tradition, and custom also allowed any
arrests or attacks to be carried out : after all, hundreds of Bol-
sheviks were sitting as before in the gaols, going hungry, vainly
awaiting inquiries and the formulation of charges; as before,
people were being seized and locked up for agitation as oppor-
tunity presented itself. So why had a special question arisen
about the arrest of a few Bolsheviks who were the core of a clear-
cut revolt that had already started? Was it because there was a
risk there of fighting and bloodshed? Nonsense! After all, they
had equipped an expedition against the Durnovo villa with
devastation and bloodshed. . . No, here there was simply a lack
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 605
of resolution or boldness, just the decrepitude and impotence of
'the sovereign Government 5 .
But in any case some further combat measures were decided
on. Which ones? Those within their capacities. Orders were
given to raise all the bridges, except the Palace Bridge, in order
to hinder marchers. They had enough forces for this; it had
been tried once before on July 5th; it was futile, and even
harmful.
The raising of the bridges at once produced in the city the
circumstances of a coup d*etat accomplished and disorders begun.
The whole capital, hitherto quite tranquil, became agitated.
Crowds began gathering in the streets. Armed detachments
started moving; the bridge-raising had to be stopped, and
where it had already taken place to be reversed. For these
operations the Military Revolutionary Committee moved up
workers and Red Army men. There were some small clashes at
the bridges, or rather quarrels and friction. Neither side felt like
a serious brawl. Depending on numbers, now the Red Army
men would yield, now the military cadets. The bridges were
lowered and raised again several times that day.
Excitement and crowds were the sole result of the Govern-
ment's new measure. Nevertheless there were no disorders.
Shooting wasn't seen anywhere. To make up for that the most
alarming 'reports' flew around the city all day. On the 24th
everyone thought the coup had begun.
Between 12 and i o'clock the Pre-Parliament opened. That
too started off with 'organic work'. Nikitin, the Minister of the
Interior, was making a report on local anarchy and the seizures
of supplies in transit. But while he was speaking Kerensky
appeared and hurried on to the platform immediately after
Nikitin. White, excited, his eyes red with sleeplessness, but a
little triumphant, he said the Government had instructed him
to make a statement.
But he made a lengthy speech: the Constituent Assembly and
the consolidation of the revolution were imminent. The Pro-
visional Government was protecting the freedom and rights of
the populace. But enemies of the State Right and Left were
leading to disaster by invoking dictatorship and insurrection.
606 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
The Bolsheviks were preparing a coup d'ttat. There were incon-
testable proofs of it. Kerensky proved this at length, quoting
Rabochii Put and the articles of the political criminal Lenin-
Ulyanov we are familiar with. Then he made a diversion: and
all this while the Government, three weeks before the Con-
stituent Assembly, 'was debating in a final form the question of
transferring the land to the hands of the rural committees' and
sending a delegation to Paris where 'amongst other questions
steps for bringing nearer the conclusion of the war would be
.submitted to the attention of the Allies'. Then the Premier gave
an .account of the current conflict between Smolny and the
Staff. The Government proposed, in the form of an ultimatum,
the cancellation of the telephone message on control of the Staff.
'Even though all data were available for immediate recourse to
rigorous measures, the military authorities thought it best first
to give the people every opportunity of rectifying their conscious
or unconscious error' (exclamation from the Right: 'But that's
just what's bad!)'. 'We had to do this also because no material
consequences of this order were noticed amongst the troops the
day it was announced.'
'In general,' said Kerensky, 'I prefer the Government to act
more slowly but, to make up for that, more correctly, and at the
necessary moment more resolutely too.' But Smolny had delayed
its reply to the ultimatum. It was not until 3 o'clock that
morning that a vaguely conditional reply had been given. It was
accepted as a declaration that the 'organizers had committed an
illegal act, which they were repudiating'. (Miliukov from his
seat: 'Highly original!') But of course this was a ruse on the part
of Smolny: the cancellation of the telephone message was not
announced to the regiments. And now Kerensky discovered
that a part of the Petersburg population was in 'a state of
insurgence*. The Government had begun a 'judicial investiga-
tion'. Also, 'appropriate arrests were proposed'. 'The Provi-
sional Government prefers to be killed and annihilated, but it
will never betray the life, honour, and independence of the
State'.
Kerensky was given an ovation. The audience in the galleries
and the entire hall stood up and applauded except the Inter-
nationalists. In his enthusiasm the Cadet Adzhemov ran for-
ward, and cried, pointing his finger at us: 'Take a picture of
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 607
them sitting down. 9 Kerensky went on: 'The Provisional
Government is being reproached with . . /
'Silliness!' Martov shouted out, amidst hubbub and excite-
ment. The chairman called Martov to order. Kerensky went on:
c . . . with weakness and extraordinary patience. But in any
case no one has the right to say that for the whole time Fve
been at its head, and before that too, it has resorted to any
measures of pressure whatever until the State was threatened
with immediate danger and destruction.'
Kerensky spoke further of his firm support at the front. He
had a whole series of telegrams demanding decisive measures
against the Bolsheviks and promising support. Then Konovalov
came over and handed him the new telephone message of the
Military Revolutionary Committee, already known to us: it
demanded the immediate preparation of the regiments for
battle. Kerensky looked at the document and then read it
aloud. 'In legal language this is called a state of insurrection.'
There followed a patriotic statement about the menace of the
foreign foe, and more about the virtues of the State and
Kerensky's devotion to the principles of democracy. Finally the
Premier finished his speech a warning on the one hand, and on
the other, a demand addressed to the Pre-Parliament.
Again everyone stood up and applauded except the
Internationalists.
In general Kerensky's speech, as we see, was quite super-
fluous. From & formal point of view the Government was fully
sovereign, and its most 'decisive' steps were lawful. And in fact
contact had been achieved in the usual conversations with the
Star Chamber: there might be conflict with that on any ground,
but in the given circumstances the usual arrests of Bolsheviks
would have passed off without a hitch. Kerensky made a speech
simply because there was nothing else he could do. He made a
speech instead of doing anything real.
Nevertheless, read his speech: this man, after all, really
believed he was doing something, just as he believed that in fact
it was out of democracy and a feeling of legality and so on that
he failed to destroy Smolny. Such was his nature.
After Kerensky's speech the agenda was of course dis-
organized. It was decided to make an immediate reply to the
head of the State. But for this an interval and consultation and
608 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
agreements between the fractions were essential. Everyone got
up, amidst excitement and hubbub. I had stopped with some-
one at the end of the long middle aisle leading from the rostrum,
and from a distance saw Kerensky, pale and morose, accom-
panied by his adjutants, advancing straight towards me from
the depths of the auditorium.
Step aside and avoid a face to face encounter? For some
months we hadn't come across one another. Between us now
there were the barricades, sans phrases. I had berated him daily
in the press. He had shut down my press. From a distance
Kerensky, his eyes narrowed, caught sight of me. We looked at
each other, like Peter I and the musketeer in Surikov's famous
picture. Coming up within a couple of paces, Kerensky evi-
dently didn't know what to do. Then, rather abruptly, with a
resolute gesture, but a glum look, he stretched out his hand.
I never saw him again. 1
The interval dragged on several hours, almost till evening. I
must say I have no recollection at all of what our fraction
decided. The Mensheviks and SRs turned to us and proposed
that we should collect a majority under a Left wing. Opposition
formula. By tacit consent the former delegates, Martov and I,
were sent to this conference of Left fractions. We assembled
below, doubtless in the apartments of the SR fraction. A gloomy
rainy day of Petersburg late autumn looked into the huge
windows facing out on Isaac Square. I think Martov was
scribbling out a draft for a general Left formula. But the meeting
didn't begin. First one of us, then another, then all of us to-
gether, were distracted by the alarming rumours from the city
and outskirts. There was talk about outbreaks beginning now
here, now there.
But there were none. We know that the Central Ex. Com.
Commissar on the Staff had forbidden the soldiers to go out into
the streets. But the very same order had been given by the
Military Revolutionary Commission, and finally, by the troop
1 After the October Revolution Kerensky emigrated, eventually to New York
City. He wrote a number of articles and books, including Prelude to Bolshevism
(1919), The Catastrophe (1927), etc. He has remained a leading figure in Emigre
circles. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 609
commander too. Whichever order seemed most convincing to
the troops, they didn't leave the barracks. Personally I ascribe
this primarily to their mood. It was on the side of the Bolsheviks,
but there was no intention of demonstrating and acting, i.e., taking
a chance. Without an order in any case they would never have
come out. It would be well if volunteers could be found to come
out on Smolny orders, when armed masses were needed !
But nevertheless there was alarm in the streets. The raising of
the bridges, and the cadet patrols, provoked some panic in the
central sections of the city. There were not only groups of
cadets on guard at the bridges, arguing with small groups of the
workers' Red Guard; tiny detachments of them were posted in
the railway stations too and at various points of the city, in the
power station, the Ministries, etc. Cadet pickets were standing in
the main streets, stopping and requisitioning motor-cars and
sending them to the Staff.
As a result, at about 2 o'clock government offices and shops
began closing. The Nevsky crowd hurried home. In the midst of
the tumult some hooligans appeared and began looting with
great boldness, tearing clothing, footwear, and valuables off the
passers-by. . . Towards evening, with the onset of the early
autumn dusk, the streets were completely empty. But rumours
took on the most monstrous forms.
It was in the atmosphere of these rumours that our inter-
fraction commission met. As far as I recall, Martov proved to be
beatus possidens the happy possessor of a ready-made formula,
which naturally was the basis of the discussion. It contained
nothing like the confidence and support Kerensky demanded.
It laid it down that the movement of the Bolsheviks had been
provoked by the policy of the Government, and therefore peace
had to be proposed immediately and the land transferred to the
rural committees. As for the struggle against anarchy and
possible pogroms, this struggle had to be assigned to a special
Committee of Public Safety; it should be composed of repre-
sentatives of the municipality and the organs of the revolu-
tionary democracy, and should act in contact with the Pro-
visional Government,
This did not, of course, satisfy Kerensky's party comrades.
But it didn't satisfy me either. Gots and Zenzinov were demand-
ing at least some kind of 'support', while I was insisting on
6lO THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI?
immediate liquidation. . . As far as I recall we never came to a
final settlement.
* * *
The session of the Pre-Parliament was resumed at 6 o'clock. . .
I had just stopped by the office for a moment and then hurried
off for a bite to eat at the 'Vienna', two steps away from the
Marian Palace.
The Pre-Parliament hall wasn't crowded, but was very lively.
Kamkov was on the platform and, to an uproar from the
Right, was demanding the resignation of the Provisional
Government and the formation of a Government of the demo-
cracy. Quite sound conclusions, which no one else formulated
from the Pre-Parliament rostrum.
But the most interesting to us were the official representatives
of the Menshevik-SR groups. Dan spoke in the name of the
entire bloc :
'The bulk of the working class will not embark on the criminal
adventure the Bolsheviks are urging on it. . . But while we wish
to struggle against Bolshevism in the most decisive way, we do
not wish to be an instrument in the hands of that counter-
revolution which is trying to gamble on the crushing of this
uprising. . . It is the duty of everyone to do everything possible
for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. . . It is essential to cut
the ground away from under the feet of the Bolsheviks. First of
all, the outcry of the masses of the people for peace must be
satisfied. Not out of weakness, but out of revolutionary strength
we must say that we are demanding immediate steps towards
peace negotiations. Further, we must raise the question of the
land in such a way as to leave no one in any doubt. . . We don't
want any government crisis, and we are ready to defend the
Provisional Government, but let it make it possible for the
democracy to rally round it.'
This was the contribution of the interstitial groups at the final
hour : We don't want to be an instrument of the Kornilovites,
but we shall defend the Government (and are already doing so).
Limping on one leg Martov came on to the platform.
'Minister in the future Bolshevik Cabinet' was heard from the
Right.
C I am shortsighted', retorted Martov, "and can't see whether
that wasn't a former Minister of Kornilov's Cabinet!'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igiy 6ll
c ln no circumstances', he went on, 'shall we collaborate with
Kornilovites. The words of Kerensky, who permitted himself
to talk about a rabble, when it is a question of the movement
of a considerable part of the proletariat and the army, even
though it is being directed towards mistaken goals those words
are a summons to civil war. But I have not lost hope that the
democracy that is not taking part in the preparation of an
armed demonstration will not permit the victory of those people
who are trying to prevent the development of the revolution. . .
The democracy must tell the Government that it will receive no
support from them unless it gives immediate guarantees that the
most vital needs of the country will be realized. . . I am sure
that the senseless policy of repression and of hasty measures may
provoke a desperate attempt on the part of the masses to join an
uprising which they do not want. . . Therefore our fraction is
appealing to all elements of the democracy to force the official
circles now ruling in the name of Russia to carry on a demo-
cratic policy and thus prevent civil war.'
In essence Martov said almost everything he should. But
this 'almost* was the main point. 'Force those ruling . . .' But
was this really possible in the final hour? In form this was
parliamentary diplomacy did it have a place amidst the
flames?
The official speaker for our fraction, limping on one leg, was
not up to the occasion.
To make up for it he had a parliamentary success. . . A short
interval was announced. And the Left fractions agreed, as an
emergency, to vote for Martov's formula. In general we are
already acquainted with it. First of all, it expressed a negative
attitude to the Bolshevik uprising; secondly, it laid it down that
it was the policy of the Government that had prepared the
ground for the uprising, and called for immediate guarantees
concerning peace and the land; thirdly, it proposed that the
technical measures of combating the uprising be entrusted not to
the Government, but to the Committee of Public Safety acting
in 'contact' with the official authorities.
The other formula of the Cadets and Co-operative people
'declared confidence in 3 , 'supported', and demanded decisive
measures against the uprising.
The tired deputies were nervous, excited, and wrangling with
6l2 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
each other. . . The interval brought a whole series of alarming
rumours. The Bolsheviks had begun. . .
The voting began. Martov's formula was passed by a majority
of 122 to 102. . .
A storm of applause on the Left. The Right was thunder-
struck. First of all, that morning, after all, the Internationalists
had been completely isolated everyone else had taken part in
the ovation for Kerensky. Secondly what was to be done?
The session ended at 8.30. But the deputies did not disperse.
The hall was filled with hubbub and mass-meetings. The
Right wing fell on the Mensheviks and SRs. What had they
started? They had been asked for support, which they were
waiting for in the Winter Palace. And what they had done in
essence was to express a lack of confidence ! The Government
now ought to resign. At a critical hour it was left without sup-
port, and the country without a Government.
This view of the formula was fundamentally correct. But the
Mensheviks and SRs, under the pressure of the Cadets, lost no
time in getting confused and began hastily retreating. Come,
come ! We meant to put no such idea into the formula. We think
a crisis untimely. We just wanted well, after all, the pro-
gramme promised should be put into effect. . .
But in the Winter Palace they were waiting for a formula. It
was, after all, necessary for 'decisive measures'. . . At 9 o'clock in
the evening the Government assembled in the Malachite Hall.
The Chairman of the 'Council of the Republic' hurried there
with the formula.
The Premier, after a quick glance, expressed surprise. Why
wasn't there the usual parliamentary vote of confidence?
Avksentiev didn't have to grope for a reply: it was missing by
an oversight. The Premier, reading more carefully, exclaimed :
'Why, in a concealed form there's actually no confidence !' Every-
one in the Malachite Hall was stupefied. No one had expected a
surprise like this. No one had had any doubt that the over-
whelming majority of the Pre-Parliament would be an adaman-
tine wall around its powerful Government and would emphasize
the complete isolation of the handful of Internationalists.
Kerensky declared that in these circumstances he thought it
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 613
necessary to surrender his mandate. Let the Praesidium of the
Pre-Parliament form another Government. But by now the
Chairman of the Council of the Republic was at a loss.
'Wait/ he said, 'I'll ask for the assistance of a couple of
friends. 5
No sooner said than done. Fifteen minutes later the assistance
was in the Malachite Hall. All three began to prevail upon Boris
Godunov: the terribly able Avksentiev, the terribly influential
Gots, and the terribly cautious Dan. Come, come, we meant
nothing of the sort! Kerensky himself had declared that morning
that the Government would concern itself with the land and
with peace. We support this. We emphasized it only to steal the
Bolsheviks' thunder, and also to destroy the legend that the
Government and the Pre-Parliament were enemies of the
people. . .
Kerensky listened, but continued gently reprimanding the
mischievous schoolboys: *Yes, but these satisfactory comments
do not change the formula; the country, after all, would under-
stand it only as a lack of confidence, and the Government's
prestige would be destroyed.'
This was reasonable. Here Dan was evidently at a loss, even
though he thought a 'government crisis untimely'. Judging by
the papers, the weight of this last argument fell to the SRs.
The formula, they declared, was the result of a general mis-
understanding. Not one of the SRs could have had any thought
of a lack of confidence. It was unsuccessful phraseology the
result of haste.
Kerensky said he would consult with his colleagues. And the
colleagues assembled to consider decisive measures against the
Bolsheviks on the basis of a formula expressing support. The
Minister conferred, and by virtue of patriotic considerations
decided to forgive the Pre-Parliament this time in order not to
leave Russia without a strong Government at a perilous moment.
The Cabinet decided to remain at the helm. All's well that ends
well says the people's wisdom.
The representatives of the 'whole democracy' had barely dis-
persed from the Winter Palace when the Premier got a report
that all was well in the streets, but that a detachment of twelve
614 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
sailors, led by a very well-armed Commissar, had occupied the
Government telegraph agency. The Commissar was already
lording it there and imposing a censorship on wires to the
provinces. . .
The Government immediately took 'decisive steps', A detach-
ment of military cadets with an armoured car was sent to the
telegraph agency. Outnumbered by the enemy, the twelve
sailors surrendered without a struggle. And then another
decisive step was taken at once. On the order of the authorities
the telephone central exchange cut off all Smolny's telephones.
The Military Revolutionary Committee found itself cut off from
the garrison. Communication was only possible through
couriers a very substantial inconvenience.
As we see, these two decisive steps were highly indicative of
the course of the uprising and its character. There is no doubt
that the affair had been formulated by Smolny without sufficient
seriousness. The twelve sailors, of course, were not much, but to
relinquish such a cardinal point as the telephone exchange
meant a general delay in the development of fighting action.
It was only permissible when confronting this particular adversary.
But one way or another carelessness was manifest.
But what was happening all this time in Smolny? Smolny
now had a quite impregnable look. Detachments of sailors,
soldiers, and armed workers were posted around and inside the
enormous building. There were quite a few machine-guns in the
square, besides the cannon. Lorries, on which were crowded
people with rifles and other weapons, were making a deafening
racket. Now it was no longer possible to arrest the Military
Revolutionary Committee, or bring up a detachment of 500
men to occupy this nest of insurgents. Now Smolny could only be
besieged and stormed. This would no longer have been a simple
'measure 3 of a powerful Government, but an act of civil war.
If the Government had massed enough strength, with artillery
and the activity and skill cf Government troops, I don't think
success would have been completely excluded as yet. The
chances, however, had grown infinitely smaller. The moment
had been missed. It was probably impossible to collect forces in
the capital for a siege and storm.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 615
While the Pre-Parliament was voting on Martov's formula, a
Soviet session was opening in Smolny. There were very few
deputies, but the hall was filled with Congress delegates, repre-
sentatives of regiments, and all sorts of onlookers. The session
was declared informational only for a report on the events of
the past night and that day.
Trotsky presented the report:
Both the night and the day had been uneasy and full of events.
During the night negotiations were going on with the Staff
(already familiar from what has gone before) . Towards morning
they were broken off. In place of a definitive answer from the
Staff, information was received that shock-troops had been
summoned from Tsarskoe and from the junior officers' school
at Oranienbaum, and artillery from Pavlovsk. The Military
Revolutionary Committee had taken steps. Agitators had been
sent out in large groups of thirty to fifty men each. As a result
the shock-troops and the artillery refused to come out, and the
junior officers split, a minority coming out. The printing-presses
of the Bolshevik papers were being protected by reliable detach-
ments; the papers' publication was assured. The cruiser Aurora
was in the Neva, near Nicholas Bridge; its crew was loyal to the
revolution. The Government had ordered the cruiser to leave
the Neva waters; but the Aurora had not obeyed and was stand-
ing on guard. In the Pre-Parliament Kerensky had called the
proletariat and the garrison of the capital a rabble; he de-
manded co-operation in the decisive struggle against the Soviet.
The Bolsheviks didn't intend to strike a final blow on the eve of
the Congress. The Congress itself would do whatever it decided,
and take power into its own hands. But if the Government
used the remaining twenty-four hours to enter into an open
struggle, then the Soviet would give blow for blow and steel
for iron.
Trotsky was questioned. For how many days was there bread
in Petersburg? For three days. Were the rumours true about the
constant searches? Unauthorized searches and looting would
not be permitted, but there would be inspections of warehouses
and other places, with the aim of requisitioning the excess on
behalf of the people and the army. . .
Then the informational session was closed.
6l6 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
There was a united session of the worker-soldier and the
peasant Central Ex. Corns, scheduled in Smolny at 1 1 o'clock in
the evening. After hurrying over to the newspaper office again, I
went to Smolny around 10 o'clock. Both outside and inside this
armed camp passes were demanded. However, a determined
look and the statement 'Member of the Central Ex. Com.' was
enough to get inside. The stairs and corridors were packed with
an armed mob. In the large hall for some reason the lighting
was dimmed. But the hall was full, and there was an extra-
ordinary number of all kinds of arms.
Making our way through the unknown crowd, new to Smolny,
Martov and I found two empty seats in the second or third row.
Hardly any Central Ex. Com. members were visible amongst
the mass of newcomers, who didn't yield their seats to the
members of the 'supreme Soviet organ'. In front, at the sides,
and at the back we saw the greatcoats and grey features of the
Bolshevik provinces. The mood too was grey. Faces were tired,
dull, even gloomy. There was no enthusiasm.
The meeting began around midnight. Gots was sitting alone
at a table on the large, dimly lit platform. He gave Dan, of
course, the floor for a report on the 'current moment'. But with
his own eyes Dan saw he was not in a meeting of the united
Central Ex. Corns, at all, but amongst the direct participants
in the insurrection, and it was precisely to them that he
addressed his speech. His arguments were rather feeble. They
were more of a plea to refrain from a disastrous coup and not
obey the Bolsheviks. The audience listened without any special
objections, but also without any interest.
'Weak,' I said to Martov. 'He plainly has nothing to say. It's
impossible to convince anyone with a naked plea.'
And from the hall there rang out some lazy but angry
exclamations: 'All right! We've heard all that! We've stood it
for eight months!'
Again they spoke up through yawns : 'We've been listening for
eight months! You and your blood-sucker Kerensky! The
provocateur '!'
Dan tried to 'meet them half-way'. He was aware that the
Soviet peace policy had been dragging somewhat, and he
promised to go forward by 'another, quicker path'. Then he
tried to frighten them with hunger, and predicted an im-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 9 I 7 617
mediate Bolshevik attack, transfer of power to the unruly
elements of the populace, the triumph of the counter-revolu-
tion. . . In vain! From the hall there came an indifferent: 'Too
late! We've heard all that!'
Trotsky came out against Dan; though really brilliant, he
failed to arouse much enthusiasm in the tired audience. His
position, against the background of Dan's attempts to keep up
with the revolution, was completely tenable. After all, this was
something basic and elementary which the Bolsheviks had been
saying for ages, and which was going to realize the power of the
Soviets the very next day. This power would be genuinely of the
people. For every worker, peasant, and soldier, this was his
regime. The Soviets would continuously renew their com-
position. They could not break with the masses and would
always be the best exponents of their will. All attempts to
frighten them with civil war were in vain.
'There will be none, if you don't falter, since our enemies will
capitulate immediately and you will take the place that is
rightfully yours, the place of master of the Russian land. 5
And while in the dead of night the interstitial groups were
talking this way, neither enemy camp was asleep. One was
acting, the other trying to act. At midnight Sverdlov's wire was
received in Helsingfors: 'Send regulations.' On the instant work
came to the boil. In some two hours the echelons were made up.
In place of the 1,500 promised, 1,800 armed sailors with machine-
guns and ammunition were already on their way to Petersburg.
But in the Winter Palace around midnight Kerensky was
receiving a deputation from the Union of Cossack Troops,
headed by the chairman Grekov. The deputation insisted on a
struggle against the Bolsheviks and promised its co-operation on
condition that the struggle was decisive. Kerensky very willingly
agreed: yes, the struggle had to be decisive. Then a telegram
was written and sent at once to General Krasnov on the
northern front: to bring up his cavalry corps to Petersburg at
once. This was, as we know, the same corps that Kerensky had
once asked Kornilov for, and which was then declared insur-
gent. Kerensky was now summoning it again, but Grekov
signed the telegram as well, just in case.
6l8 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION Igl^
However, no Winter Palace signatures at all were valid.
Without the name of the Soviet, and under the banner of the
Provisional Government, no troops at all could now be mobilized
on the front for a march on Petersburg. And in this decisive
hour Kerensky had to mobilize again the forces loyal to the
Soviet. I don't know just when or how this took place. But in
view of the obvious inadequacy of his order to the corps com-
mander, on the night of the 24th a parallel order was sent from
Petersburg by the Star Chamber to Voitinsky, the Soviet
Commissar of the northern front. It was only through the name
of the Soviet and with the closest participation of an authorita-
tive Soviet personality that it was possible to organize an attack
on the revolutionary capital by front-line troops.
On the night of the 24th Gots talked to Voitinsky over a
direct line. He demanded the immediate despatch of a reliable
army against the Bolsheviks. Voitinsky was not sufficiently in-
formed about the state of affairs in Petersburg, and asked
whether the order was issued in the name of the Central Ex.
Com. Gots asked him to wait until he talked to whomever he
had to (Dan, Avksentiev, Skobelev?). A few minutes later Gots
said on the direct line that the order was issued in the name of
the Praesidium of the Central Ex. Com. Voitinsky acted at once.
But he really had no choice ; very quickly it was narrowed down
to that same Cossack corps of the loyal Tsarist servant Krasnov.
Voitinsky himself told me all about this a few years after the
events. The role of Voitinsky himself is of relatively little interest
here, but it ought to be known just who did most to attack the
revolutionary capital and the legal representatives of the
workers, peasants, and soldiers. This was the Star Chamber,
acting by means of a forgery of the name of the Soviet, which
it knew for certain was not behind it.
That night the Provisional Government left the Winter
Palace rather early, at around 2. Kerensky may have taken
a rest, but not for more than an hour. He hurried to the
Staff.
There very alarming news had been received. It was decided
on the spot to send the Cossack troops stationed in the capital
into action. But would they go? A telephone message was sent
to the ist, 4th, and I4th Don Cossack Regiments: In the name
of freedom, honour, and the glory of the fatherland come to the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I Q I J Big
aid of the Central Ex. Com., the revolutionary democracy and
the Provisional Government. 5
But the Cossacks did not obey. They got up a mass-meeting
and began bargaining. Would the infantry go with them? It was
explained at once by authoritative, competent people that in no
circumstances would the infantry move for the Government or
the Central Ex. Com. Then the regiments declared that they
refused to make a living target out of themselves, and would
therefore * abstain'.
Nor did the Staff hope for anything special from these regi-
ments. This is evident from the very text of the order : first, it is
propaganda, and secondly, the sovereign Government timidly
hides behind the Central Ex. Com. But in any case these regi-
ments were the last hope. The cadets and women's shock-troops,
taken all together, might have served for the defence of a single
point, but weren't enough to defend the whole city.
Indeed, were even the privileged, ancien-regime cadets of the
capital reliable? The Pavlovsky Academy also refused to come
out; the cadets were afraid of the Grenadier Regiment stationed
nearby (which was undoubtedly still more afraid of them) .
Not one unit came from the suburbs. There was a report that
half the armoured cars had gone over to the side of Smolny;
the others no one knew. . . The city lay undefended.
CHAPTER 31
OCTOBER 25TH
THE decisive operations of the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee started around 2 in the morning.
Three members of the Military Revolutionary Committee
were assigned to work out the dispositions : Podvoisky, Antonov,
and Mekhonoshin. Antonov says it was his plan that was
accepted. It consisted in occupying first of all those parts of the
city adjoining the Finland Station: the Vyborg Side, the out-
skirts of the Petersburg Side, etc. Together with the units
arrived from Finland it would then be possible to launch an
offensive against the centre of the capital. But of course that
was only in an extremity, in case of serious resistance, which was
considered possible.
But no resistance was shown. Beginning at 2 in the morn-
ing the stations, bridges, lighting installations, telegraphs, and
telegraphic agency were gradually occupied by small forces
brought from the barracks. The little groups of cadets could not
resist and didn't think of it. In general the military operations in
the politically important centres of the city rather resembled a
changing of the guard. The weaker defence force, of cadets,
retired ; and a strengthened defence force, of Guards, took its
place.
From evening on there were rumours of shootings and of
armed cars racing round the city attacking Government
pickets. But these were manifestly fancies. In any case the
decisive operations that had begun were quite bloodless; not
one casualty was recorded. The city was absolutely calm. Both
the centre and the suburbs were sunk in a deep sleep, not
suspecting what was going on in the quiet of the cold autumn
night.
I don't know how the soldiers behaved. According to all
reports, with no enthusiasm or spirit. Occasionally they may
have refused to move. A fighting mood or readiness for sacrifice
could not be expected from our garrison. But now this had no
significance. The operations, gradually developing, went so
smoothly that no great forces were required. Out of the garrison
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 621
of 200,000 scarcely a tenth went into action, probably much
fewer. Because of the presence of the workers and sailors only
volunteers could be led out of the barracks. The staff of the
insurgents was cautiously feeling its way you might say too
cautiously and feebly.
It was natural to try above all to paralyse the political and
military centre of the Government, that is, occupy the Winter
Palace and the Staff. First and foremost the old authorities and
their military apparatus had to be liquidated. Otherwise the
insurrection could by no means be considered consummated;
and the two powers one 'legitimate', the other merely future
would have been able to carry on a civil war, with chances
greatly favouring the former. So it had to be annihilated first of
all. The telegraphs, bridges, stations, and the rest would take
care of themselves.
Nevertheless, throughout the night the insurrectionaries did
not even try to touch either the Winter Palace, the Staff or
individual Ministers. The objection may be made that the
liquidation of the old regime is the conclusion of an insurrection.
It is very hard and hazardous, for this is the centre of the
defence. But was this so in the special conditions of our October
insurrection? Had the ground been adequately felt out by
Smolny in its cautious movements? Was even the most primitive
reconnaissance carried out by sending a courier to the Staff
and to the Winter Palace? No. For the defences of the empty
Winter Palace in those hours were absolutely fictitious; while
the General Staff, where the head of the Government was
located, was not protected at all. As far as can be judged from
the scanty data, there was not even the usual pair of sentries at
the entrance. The General Staff, together with Kerensky, could
have been taken with bare hands. For this few more people
were needed than the Military Revolutionary Committee itself
contained.
That's how it went on the whole night and the whole morn-
ing. It was not until 7 o'clock in the morning, when the tele-
phone exchange was occupied, that the Staff telephones were cut
off. There you are revenge for the same operation against
Smolny ! ... In general it was all quite frivolous. But in any case
let us recall one absolutely credible fact. Kerensky (like all the
Ministers, who were at home) might have been seized in the
622 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
Staff without the slightest difficulty. This could of course have
been done before: now I'm thinking of the period after the
beginning of decisive combat activities.
In the early morning the troops began to form lines along a
few streets and canals. But there was no artillery. And the idea
of this operation was more or less obscure. It would seem there
must have been some notion of a siege of the Winter Palace and
the General Staff nearby. But in any case this wasn't accom-
plished. The ranks, as I saw them personally, looked not so much
like a fighting as a policing force : they did not besiege, at best
they surrounded. But they performed even this police task very
feebly and without the slightest understanding of its rationale.
At 5 o'clock in the morning Kerensky summoned to the Staff
Manikovsky, the War Minister, who had to come from the
Petersburg Side.
At 9 o'clock he hurriedly summoned all the Ministers. As
before the Staff was still undefended in any way by anyone.
Whole strings of military people were going in and coming out
of the entrance. Who they were and why they had come no
one knew. No one asked either for passes or for identification
papers. The people going in might all have been agents of the
Military Revolutionary Committee, and have declared when-
ever they liked that the General Staff had passed into Smolny 5 s
hands. But this didn't happen.
The head of the Government was in the Staff, but the passers-
by didn't know where he was and were not interested in him.
The officer on duty ought to have known, but he was not at his
post.
Kerensky remained in the study of the Chief of Staff. At the
doors there were neither sentries, nor adjutants, nor attendants.
The door could simply have been opened and the Premier taken
by anyone with the energy.
Kerensky was walking around in an overcoat. He was calling
the Ministers together for final instructions. The American
Embassy had lent him a car, and he was going to Luga, to meet
the troops coming from the front for the defence of the Pro-
visional Government.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 623
Here Is the Smolny estimate of the situation. When all the
important points of the city were occupied without any resist-
ance and the ranks, so-called, were placed not very far from the
Winter Palace and the Staff, the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee struck the bell. By 10 o'clock in the morning it had
already written and had sent to be printed this proclamation :
*To the citizens of Russia: The Provisional Government is
overthrown. The state power has passed into the hands of the
organ of the Petersburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers 3
Deputies, the Military Revolutionary Committee, which stands
at the head of the Petersburg garrison and proletariat. The cause
the people have been fighting for the immediate proposal of a
democratic peace, the elimination of private property in land,
workers' control of production, and the formation of a Soviet
Government is assured. Long live the revolution of the
workers, soldiers, and peasants! . . .'
Roughly the same thing was broadcast by wireless to the
whole country and the front. There it was also added that
the c new Government will convoke a Constituent Assembly',
and that 'the workers were victorious without any blood-
shed.'
To my mind all this was premature. The Provisional Govern-
ment was still not overthrown. It still existed in the form of the
acknowledged official authority and was organizing defences
within the capital and the crushing of the rebellion outside. At
10 o'clock in the morning of the 25th the position, to my mind,
was no different from what it had been the night or the week
before. By the use of its de facto influence Smolny had brought
the troops out of barracks and distributed them at various points
in the city. The Government, having no de facto authority, could
not hinder this, either the previous night or the week before.
But it would be overthrown only when it either was captured
or ceased calling itself the Government and de facto declined to
govern. Now, on October 25th, this was more difficult to attain
than the night or a week before : the head of the Government
had left for the field army to organize a march on Petersburg,
while his colleagues were surrounded by defences they'd never
had before in their lives. . . Hence, it was too early to talk about
a victory at all, and especially about a bloodless one.
624 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
Soon after 12 o'clock I walked to the Marian Palace along the
Nevsky and the Moika. The streets were animated, but not
alarmed, even though everyone was watching the 'demonstra-
tion that had begun'. But some of the shops were shut and others
shutting down. The banks, that had hardly opened, were finish-
ing their operations. Government offices were closed. It may be
that no alarm was noticeable because the 'demonstration 9 didn't
look at all terrifying. As before there was neither fighting nor
shooting anywhere.
In the middle of the Moika I came up against a line of soldiers
barring the way. What unit it was I have no idea. There may
have been machine-guns there too : since the revolution the eye
had become so accustomed to these terrible objects it no longer
noticed them. But in any case the soldiers, bored, were standing
at ease, and for that matter not close together. This column
was not terrifying, not only to any organized military force but
to a mob either. Its activity was limited to not letting anyone
pass.
But I showed persistence. The Commander hurried over to me
one of the new ones, elected and dependable. I had various
credentials on me, including the blue members' card of the
Petersburg Ex. Com., signed by Trotsky. But I presented the
card of the counter-revolutionary Pre-Parliament, saying that
was where I was going. The Commander thought this con-
vincing. He not only willingly ordered me to be let pass, but
offered to give me a soldier as escort : he said there was another
column to stop me before the Marian Palace. I refused the
escort, and as far as I recall wasn't stopped any more. But the
Commander, in letting me go, was not averse to a chat and said :
'Incomprehensible ! The order was to march. But why no one
knows. Against one's own people, after all. All rather strange. . .'
The Commander smiled with embarrassment, and it was
evident that he was indeed rather baffled by everything. There
was no doubt about it: there was no spirit; such troops would
never fight; they would scatter and surrender at the first blank
shot. But there was no one to do any shooting.
I went over to the Marian Palace. There was a lorry standing
at the portico steps, and in the portico itself I found a group of
some fifteen to twenty sailors and workers. One of them recog-
nized me. They surrounded me and told me they had just driven
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 625
the Pre-Parliament out. There was no one in the Palace any
more and they wouldn't let me In. But they wouldn't arrest me.
No, they didn't want me. Generally speaking they weren't
touching members of the Central Ex. Com. By the way, did I
happen to know where the Provisional Government were?
They had looked for them in the Marian Palace, but hadn't
found them. They had to arrest the Ministers, they just didn't
know where they were. But just let Kerensky or anyone show his
face! The conversation, however, was quite amiable.
This is what had happened in the Pre-Parliament in my
absence. Everything went off very simply. By noon very few
deputies had assembled. They were exchanging news with the
journalists. This place was occupied, that was occupied. . .
Suddenly it was revealed that the Marian Palace telephones had
been cut off. Smolny had taken yesterday night's lesson of the
Winter Palace to heart.
But the session didn't begin. Fractions were conferring in
corners. Then there was a meeting of the expanded Council of
'Elders'. As always, the fateful question was put: What shall we
do? But they didn't have time to decide. It was reported that an
armoured car, some detachments of the Lithuanian and
Cuxholm Regiments, and the sailors of the Guards crew had
arrived at the Marian Palace. They were already lining both
sides of the staircase and had occupied the first hall. Their
commanders were demanding that the Palace premises be
cleared immediately.
The soldiers, however, were in no hurry and didn't seem
aggressive. The 'Elders' had time for a hasty debate on the new
situation and the elaboration of a resolution for the plenum.
Then the 'Elders' came to the conference hall, where there were
about a hundred deputies. The chairman proposed a motion:
that (i) The Council of the Republic had not ceased, but merely
temporarily suspended its activities; (2) The Council of the
Republic, in the form of its Council of 'Elders', would enter a
Committee of Safety; (3) The chairman was charged with
launching an appeal to the nation; (4) The deputies would
not leave and would assemble at the first opportunity. Then, of
course, there was voiced a protest against violence; and finally
626 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
it was decided by fifty-six votes to forty-eight with two absten-
tions to yield to force and go home.
The soldiers and the commanders were patiently waiting.
The deputies, having done their duty, began dispersing.
As we see there was nothing theatrical or dramatic about all
this; eye-witnesses said so too. You will say that the Thermi-
dorians showed far more energy and quality on the i8th
Brumaire. But that was a revolutionary bourgeoisie, as it had
always openly professed to be. Our bourgeoisie, however, from
the first day on, was in the camp of the counter-revolution and
had always carefully concealed this. The Right section of the
Pre-Parliament voted against the voluntary 'temporary' dissolu-
tion, but didn't undertake anything further. Those weren't its
traditions or spirit. But the Left section, for all its moral indigna-
tion, was politically in a difficult situation. On the one hand it
was impossible to submit to Smolny's order without protest. On
the other, it was impossible, with Gen. Alexeyev, to stand shoulder
to shoulder and face the Bolshevik onslaught without palaver.
Perhaps the most interesting thing was at the exit, when the
deputies went down the magnificent staircase between the lines
of sailors and soldiers. The detachment officers were requesting
the deputies' cards and examining them with unusual care
both upstairs and at the actual exits. It was thought there
would be arrests. The Cadet leaders were already prepared to go
off to the Peter-Paul. But they were let through with the most
thorough-going, indeed insulting, indifference. The inexperi-
enced new rulers were carrying out only the letter of the care-
lessly given order: arrest the members of the Provisional
Government. But not one Minister was there. What was to be
done? For it was, after all, very important to arrest them.
Releasing Miliukov, Nabokov, and other Kornilovite aces, the
commanders jumped on the Right Menshevik Dubois; his
papers read: Assistant Minister of Labour. One caught! But
then a dispute began. After all, he's a Socialist been in gaol,
etc. The soldiers insisted: it was highly necessary to catch a
Minister. But excuse me, after all it was this Dubois who
arrested Guchkov at the front during the Kornilov days ! They
couldn't hold out against that, and released this peculiar
Minister. But where were the others? They were really wanted;
and nobody knew where they were.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 627
And indeed, where were they? This was a first-class puzzle for
the Military Revolutionary Committee.
From the Marian Palace I headed for Smolny. There were no
lines of soldiers across the Morskoy. Near the Nevsky, around
the arch rising above the Palace square, it was said cadets were
holding out near the Palace and were supposed to be shooting.
I didn't hear a single shot, but small units were going here and
there. The streets seemed to be growing more and more lively.
The rifles might begin to go off of their own accord, but the
mood was not truculent. The rifles didn't go off.
I got to Smolny around 3 o'clock. It still looked much the
same. But there were even more people, and the disorder had
grown. There were many defenders, but I doubt whether the
defence could have been firm or organized.
I went straight along the dirty, sombre corridor into the great
hall. It was packed, without the slightest sign of order or
decorum. A meeting was going on. Trotsky was chairman. But
it was hard to hear from behind the columns, and armed people
were thrusting back and forth.
When I came in an unknown, bald, clean-shaven man was
standing on the platform making a heated speech. But he spoke
in a strangely familiar, loud, hoarse voice, with a throaty note
and a very typical stressing of the ends of sentences. . . Eh
Lenin! He had appeared that day, after a four-month stay
underground. So this was the final celebration of victory!
The Petersburg Soviet was once again in session. Opening it,
before my arrival, Trotsky, in the midst of applause, hubbub,
and disorder, had said this: 'In the name of the Military
Revolutionary Committee I declare that the Provisional
Government has ceased to exist. Individual Ministers are under
arrest, the others will be arrested in the next few days or hours.
The revolutionary garrison has dispersed the Pre-Parliament.
We were told that the insurrection would provoke a pogrom
and drown the revolution in torrents of blood. So far everything
has gone off bloodlessly. We don't know of a single casualty. I
don't know of any examples in history of a revolutionary move-
ment in which such enormous masses participated and which
took place so bloodlessly. The Winter Palace has not yet been
628 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7
taken, but its fate will be decided in the course of the next few
minutes. At the present time the Soviet of Soldiers 3 , Workers',
and Peasants' Deputies faces the historically unprecedented
experiment of the creation of a regime which will have no other
interests but the needs of the workers, peasants, and soldiers.
The State must be an instrument of the masses in the struggle for
their liberation from all bondage. It is essential to establish
control of industry. The peasants, workers, and soldiers must
feel that the national economy is their economy. This is the
basic principle of the Soviet Government. The introduction of a
universal labour draft is one of our most immediate tasks.'
These programmatic perspectives were not at all clear and
were no more than agitation. But don't they reflect a rather
bold and swift advance towards Bolshevik Socialism? It was as
though the nearer he got to power the more this benevolent
process was taking place in Trotsky's mind. A trivial but
accurate saying noblesse oblige. . .
Then Trotsky 'introduced* Lenin to the meeting and gave him
the floor for a speech on the Soviet regime. Lenin was given a
tumultuous ovation. . . While he was speaking I moved forward
and stood with someone I knew behind the columns to the right
of the entrance. I couldn't hear very well what Lenin was say-
ing; I think I was more interested in the mood of the crowd.
In spite of Trotsky's expansive remarks I didn't notice either
enthusiasm or a festival spirit. People may have become too
accustomed to dizzying events. They may have been tired. They
may have been a little confused as to what would come of all
this, and doubtful that anything would.
'Well, Comrade Sukhanov?' a low, effeminate voice, with a
slight lisping accent, came from behind me; c you didn't expect
the victory to be so quick and easy?'
I turned around. Behind me stood an unknown man with a
beard and close-cropped hair, with his hand outstretched. On
close examination, or rather when I remembered whose agree-
able contralto this was, I finally recognized Zinoviev. His
appearance had radically altered.
'Victory?' I answered. 'Are you celebrating a victory already?
Wait just a little longer. Just liquidate Kerensky, who has gone
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 629
off to organize an expedition against Petersburg. Besides, in
general you and I will hardly find ourselves in complete
agreement.'
Zinoviev said nothing but looked at me a moment in silence,
then walked away a couple of steps. After all, he had just ex-
pressed himself, and even tried to carry on a campaign against
the insurrection, for fear it would be crushed. And suddenly the
thing was going so smoothly ! On the other hand, he really had
forgotten about Kerensky and much else, and had been in too
much of a hurry to congratulate an outsider. Zinoviev's mind
was undoubtedly in a whirl.
e No, no, I'm not going to speak now, 5 I heard the contralto
saying, in reply to a suggestion that he speak, brought from the
Praesidium.
Meanwhile Lenin was saying:
'The oppressed masses themselves will form a Government.
The old state apparatus will be destroyed root and branch, and a
new administrative apparatus will be created in the form of the
Soviet organizations. Now begins a new era in the history of
Russia, and this third Russian revolution must finally lead to the
victory of Socialism. One of our routine tasks is to end the war at
once. But in order to end this war, closely bound up with the
present capitalist order, it is clear to everyone that our capi-
talism itself must be conquered. In this task we shall be helped
by the worldwide working-class movement which has already
begun to develop in Italy, Germany, and England. Within
Russia an enormous section of the peasantry has said : Enough
playing around with the capitalists; we will go with the workers.
We shall win the peasants' trust with a single decree which will
annihilate landed property. We shall institute a genuine
workers' control of industry. We have the strength of a mass
organization that will triumph over everything and bring the
proletariat to the world revolution. In Russia we must set to
work at once on the construction of a proletarian Socialist State.
Long live the worldwide Socialist revolution!'
The programme of the new regime, which the chief was
addressing to his guard, was not very clear, but it was very
suspicious. Suspicious because of the transparent disinclination
to take two circumstances into account. First of all, the current
tasks of state administration : utterly to destroy all the old state
630 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
apparatus in the desperate conditions of war and famine meant
to consummate the destruction of the productive forces of the
country, and not to fulfil the most urgent tasks of peaceful
construction aimed at the cultural and economic elevation of
the labouring masses. Secondly, how things stood with the
general foundations of scientific Socialism: to construct (not
merely a Soviet) but a 'proletarian Socialist State' in a vast,
economically-shattered peasant country meant taking on one-
self tasks known to be Utopian. Now, in the mouth of a Lenin
whose mind had not yet digested the jumble of Marx and
Kropotkin, this was not yet clear. But it was extremely
suspicious.
Then Zinoviev appeared on the platform to give greetings:
Lunacharsky also congratulated the Soviet. It was decided not
to debate Lenin's speech. Why cloud the triumph by Menshevik
speeches? A motion was passed directly: 'The Soviet expresses
its confidence that a Soviet Government will firmly advance
towards Socialism, the only salvation of the country. The Soviet
is convinced that the proletariat of Western Europe will help
lead the cause of Socialism to total victory.'
Capital! A long step forward towards Socialism! But mean-
while Trotsky made this statement : *A telegram has just been
received that troops are moving on Petersburg from the front.
Commissars from the Petersburg Soviet must be sent to the front
and throughout the country at once to tell the broad masses of
the people what has happened.'
Voices from the body of the hall: 'You're anticipating the will
of the Congress!'
Trotsky: 'The will of the Congress has been anticipated by the
tremendous fact of the insurrection of the Petersburg workers
and soldiers, which has taken place tonight. It simply remains
for us now to develop our victory. 3
* * *
It was getting dark when I broke away from the commotion
in Smolny and went home. I had left my Karpovka place
around then and moved to the Shpalerny, closer to the office,
Soviet-Smolny circles, and the Constituent Assembly, for
which the Tauride Palace was already prepared. I went home to
eat, anticipating another sleepless night at Smolny. A very
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI? 631
characteristic fact, this dining by the light of a candle-stub in a
room not quite ready for habitation. Formerly, amidst similar
events, this strange idea of leaving the cauldron for even two
hours to sit down to dinner couldn't have entered my head.
Now it came into my mind rather easily. It was a question, and
not for myself alone, of the blunting of perceptions. People were
very used to every kind of happening. Nothing had any effect.
But at the same time a feeling of impotence also made itself felt.
Of course something had to be done ; it was impossible not to
fight. But it meant so little ! The arena was occupied almost in its
entirety. The course of events was predetermined by the volcanic
eruption of the depths of the remote countryside and by the
monopolists of the moment.
It was around 8 o'clock when I returned to Smolny. There
seemed to be even more chaos and disorder. As I went in I met
old Martynov, of our fraction. 'Well?'
'The fraction's in session. Of course we shall leave the Con-
gress. . .'
'What? How, leave the Congress? Our fraction?'
I was thunderstruck. Nothing like this had ever entered my
head. It was thought possible that the Right Mensheviks would
apply a specifically Bolshevik tactic and subject the Congress to
a boycott. But for our fraction such a possibility seemed to me
absolutely excluded.
First of all, no one contested the legality of the Congress.
Secondly, it represented the most authentic worker-peasant
democracy; and it must be said that not a small part of it con-
sisted of the participants in the first Congress in June, the
members of the 'Corps of Cadets'. Of that grey mass of delegates
who had once followed the Menshevik patriots, many had been
enticed away by Lenin, while most of the Right SRs were
becoming Left SRs, if not Bolsheviks. Thirdly, the question was:
Where would the Right Mensheviks and the SRs leave the
Congress for? Where would they go from the Soviet?
The Soviet, after all, was the revolution itself. Without the
Soviet it never existed, nor could it. It was in the Soviet, the
combat instrument of the revolution, that the revolutionary
masses were always organized and rallied. So where could one
632 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
go from the Soviet? It meant a formal break with the masses and
with the revolution.
And why? Because the Congress had proclaimed a Soviet
regime in which the minute Menshevik-SR minority would not
be given a place ! I myself considered this fatal for the revolu-
tion, but why link this with abandoning the supreme representa-
tive organ of the workers, soldiers, and peasants? The 'Coali-
tion', after all, was no less odious to the Bolsheviks than a
'Soviet regime 5 was to the old Soviet bloc; the Bolsheviks, not
long ago, under the dictatorship of the Star Chamber, them-
selves constituted the same impotent minority as the Mensheviks
and SRs now, but they did not and could not draw the con-
clusion that they had to leave the Soviet.
The old bloc could not swallow its defeat and the Bolshevik
dictatorship. With the bourgeoisie and with the Kornilovites
yes; but with the workers and peasants whom they had thrown
into the arms of Lenin with their own hands impossible.
The sole argument heard from the Rightists was this: the
Bolshevik adventure would be liquidated from one day to the
next; the 'Soviet Government 5 would not hold out more than a
few days, and at such a time the Bolsheviks had to be isolated
in the eyes of the entire country; they had to be smitten now by
every possible means and driven into a corner with whips and
scorpions.
I too was convinced that the power of a Bolshevik regime
would be ephemeral. A majority of them themselves were at
that time convinced of the same thing. I also thought it useful
and necessary to isolate their position and oppose to it the idea of a
united democratic front. But for this why was it necessary to get
out? That was the least of it: how was it possible to achieve this
by getting out of the Soviet, away from the organized masses,
away from the revolution? It could be achieved only in the
arena of Soviet struggle.
But the point was that it was not the united democratic front
that was opposed to the Bolshevik position. The Mensheviks and
SRs at least their leaders today just as yesterday kept on
opposing the same Coalition to the Soviet regime. This of course
considerably changed matters. If yesterday it was blindness,
today it was practically definite Kornilovism. It was the pro-
gramme of a bourgeois dictatorship on the ruins of the Bolshevik
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij 633
regime. That was now the only way the Coalition could be restored.
If that was so, then of course it was not a question of the
Soviets, the revolution, or the masses. . . If that was so, then the
arguments in favour of getting out of the Congress had their
rationale and did not seem so senseless.
However, only a few Right Soviet elements, after all, former
adherents of the Coalition, could reason this way. But what con-
nexion could all this have with our fraction? Avksentiev and
Gots would leave the Soviet for wherever the bourgeoisie was.
Would even leave for that luckless Committee of Safety, which
was supposed to take on itself the liquidation of the Bolshevik
enterprise 'without the bourgeoisie, by the forces of the demo-
cracy alone'. Let us admit that out of traditional solidarity Dan
would follow Avksentiev out of the Soviet. But where would
Martov go? Where would we go partisans of the dictatorship of
the democracy -, opponents of the Coalition, close allies of the
proletariat and its fighting organization? We had nowhere to
go; torn out of Soviet soil we should perish like a snail torn from
its shell.
I didn't formulate all this after my encounter with Martynov,
in the midst of the fuss and hubbub of Smolny. But it had long
been firmly fixed in my mind. Martynov's communication
absolutely stunned me. I rushed off to look for the fraction, and
Martov especially. The fraction was not then in session, and
Martov wasn't around, but I was told that many of us wanted to
get out, and Martov, even though not very resolutely, was also
inclined to follow the example of Dan and Avksentiev. A bad
business !
My indignation was shared by many not only the Left
section of the Pre-Parliament fraction, but also the provincials.
The fraction had not yet come to a final decision. The session
had been a joint one with the Rightists. As for us, no one yet
knew which side the majority would be on. The fraction had to
be assembled.
I and some others who shared my views called together the
fraction of the Menshevik-Internationalists. It assembled in a
big unfamiliar room. Rather a large number of people crowded
around a rough table with simple rude benches. There were
634 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
probably more than a few of the official Mensheviks, of the
Novqya hizn people too, and of the Left SRs who were trying to
maintain contact with us. I think Martov arrived towards the
end. On the question of getting out he wavered and twisted.
But some of his closest lieutenants were definitely for getting out.
If I'm not mistaken, Abramovich 1 made a heated speech for
leaving. But we on the Left fought hard and didn't yield.
It was learned that the Menshevik Central Committee had
resolved that Responsibility for any completely military over-
turn be lifted from the party, that it take no part in the Congress,
and that it take steps to negotiate with the Provisional Govern-
ment on the formation of a regime based on the will of the
democracy'. Besides this, the Menshevik Central Committee had
resolved to form a commission of the Mensheviks and SRs for
joint work on questions of common security 5 . The Right SRs
had also, of course, decided to leave the Congress.
This news had various effects on the members of our con-
ference. Some recoiled Rightwards from motives of solidarity
and discipline. Others, on the contrary, clearly saw in all this
the bankruptcy of the Rightists and their complete rupture with
the revolution; any possibility of solidarity with these elements
was excluded for them, and this reinforced their Left position.
In general there was no definite decision taken on getting out.
Martov deflected matters somewhat by proposing this solution :
the fraction would demand from the Congress an agreement to
create a democratic regime from representatives of all the
parties In the Soviet; until the results of the requisite party
negotiations were clear the Congress would suspend its func-
tions. A majority of the votes settled on this. The question of
getting out was postponed : it was to be decided in due course,
depending on events.
The delegates nervously hurried through the rooms and corri-
dors, gathering in clusters, getting in the way, and packing the
buffet. Rifles, bayonets, and Caucasian fur-caps could be
glimpsed everywhere. The exhausted guard were dozing on the
stairs; soldiers, sailors, Red Guards, were sitting on the floor of
the corridor close to the walls. It was stifling, filthy. . . The Con-
gress opened in a far from triumphal setting; it opened under
1 Abramovich, Raphael (1879- ) : prominent Bundist and Right Menshevik.
Emigrated after October Revolution, eventually to New York City. (Ed.)
w
8
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 635
fire and seemed immersed in the most urgent and primitive
drudgery.
# # #
It was not until 1 1 o'clock that bells began to ring for the
meeting. The hall was already full, still with the same grey mob
from the heart of the country. An enormous difference leaped to
the eye: the Petersburg Soviet, that is, its Workers' Section in
particular, which consisted of average Petersburg proletarians,
in comparison with the masses of the Second Congress looked
like the Roman Senate that the ancient Carthaginians 1 took for
an assembly of gods. With masses like that, with the vanguard of
the Petersburg proletariat, I think it really was possible to be
enticed into an attempt to illuminate old Europe with the light
of the Socialist revolution. But in Russia this incomparable type
is an exception. The Moscow worker is as different from the
Petersburg proletarian as a hen from a peacock. But even he, as
familiar to me as the Petersburger, is not altogether benighted
and homespun. Here at the Congress, however, the hall was filled
with a crowd of a completely different order. Out of the
trenches and obscure holes and corners had crept utterly crude
and ignorant people whose devotion to the revolution was spite
and despair, while their 'Socialism' was hunger and an un-
endurable longing for rest. Not bad material for experiments,
but those experiments would be risky.
The assembly hall was filled with these morose, indifferent
faces and grey greatcoats. I pushed my way forward through the
dense crowd standing in the aisle to where a place should have
been kept for me. It was either darkish again in the hall or else
the clouds of tobacco smoke obscured the bright light of the
chandelier between the white columns. On the platform, unlike
the emptiness of the night before, there were far more people
than elementary orderliness permitted. I looked about for
Lenin, but I don't think he was on the platform. I had got to my
seat in one of the front rows when Dan came on to the platform
to open the Congress in the name of the Central Ex. Com.
Throughout the revolution I don't recall a more disorderly
and muddled session. In opening it Dan said he would abstain
from any political speech: he asked people to understand this
1 Sic. Sukhanov means Gauls. (Ed.)
636 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
and remember that at this moment his party comrades were self-
sacrificingly doing their duty under fire in the Winter Palace.
Avanesov, sent by the Bolsheviks, had a list of the Praesidium
ready. But the Menshevik and SR representatives refused to
participate in it. In the name of our fraction someone made a
statement that we were 'abstaining for the time being' from
participating in the Praesidium, until a number of questions had
been cleared up. The Praesidium was composed of the principal
Bolshevik leaders and the half-dozen Left SRs. They could
scarcely find seats, the platform was so packed and disorderly.
Kamenev was in the chair throughout the Congress. He an-
nounced the agenda: (i) the organization of a Government,
(2) war and peace, and (3) the Constituent Assembly.
Martov asked for the floor on a point of order:
First of all, a pacific settlement of the crisis must be assured.
There was blood flowing in the streets of Petersburg. Military
activities on both sides must be halted. A pacific settlement of
the crisis might be attained by the creation of a regime which
would be recognized by the entire democracy. The Congress
could not remain indifferent to the civil war now developing,
which might lead to a menacing flare-up of the counter-
revolution.
Martov's speech was greeted with tempestuous applause from
a very large section of the meeting. It was manifest that a very
great many Bolsheviks, not having assimilated the spirit of the
teaching of Lenin and Trotsky, would have been happy to take
precisely this path. But now Lenin and Trotsky were completely
at one. Of course we recall the difference between them at the
First Soviet Congress and much later, but now, in October,
Trotsky, lapsing into his 1905 ideas, flew irresistibly into Lenin's
open arms and merged with him completely. 1 The Bolshevik
mass, however, still insufficiently understood the majestic ideas
of its leaders and quite amicably applauded Martov.
Martov's motion was upheld by the Novaya %fiuyi people, by a
front-line group, and most important by the Left SRs.
Lunacharsky answered for the Bolsheviks : the Bolsheviks had
absolutely nothing against it; let the question of a peaceable
settlement of the crisis be made the first item on the agenda.
Martov's motion was voted on: against it nobody.
1 See Introduction. (Ed.)
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 637
Here there was no risk whatever for the Bolsheviks. At the
Congress, just as in the capital, they were the masters of the
situation. But nevertheless things were taking a quite favourable
turn. Lenin and Trotsky, meeting their own following half-way,
were simultaneously cutting the ground away from under the
feet of the Rightists: to leave the Congress when the majority
had agreed to a joint debate of the basic questions, which had
been considered already predetermined, was not only a blatant
rupture with the Soviet and with the revolution for the sake of
the same old, decrepit, bankrupt counter-revolutionary ideas;
it was simply the senseless stubbornness of counter-revolu-
tionaries. If the Mensheviks and SRs left now., they would
simply write finis to themselves and infinitely strengthen their
opponents. One would have thought the Right wouldn't do this
immediately, and that the Congress, though with a wavering
majority, would be set on the right road to the formation of a
united democratic front.
But the Mensheviks and SRs did do it. These blind counter-
revolutionaries not only failed to see that their 'line' was
counter-revolutionary, but also failed to realize the complete
absurdity and unworthy childishness of their behaviour. . . After
Martov's resolution was passed, but before the debate was
begun, Khinchuk, a pedant and future Bolshevik functionary,
spoke for the Menshevik fraction :
The only solution was to start negotiations with the Provi-
sional Government for the formation of a new Government that
would be based on all strata. (A terrible din filled the hall; it
was not only the Bolsheviks who were indignant, and for a long
time the speaker wasn't allowed to continue.) c The military
conspiracy has been organized behind the back of the Congress.
We divest ourselves of all responsibility for what is happening
and leave the Congress, inviting the other fractions to meet to
discuss the present situation.'
This brilliant speech immediately turned the mood against
the Compromisers. The Bolshevik mass pressed tightly around
Lenin. Indignation was expressed very stormily. You could hear
shouts of 'Deserters ! Go over to Kornilov! Lackeys of the bour-
geoisie! Enemies of the people!'
In the midst of the hubbub the SR Geldeman appeared on the
platform, and in the name of his fraction, repeated the same
638 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
statement. The temper of the hall rose still higher. Stamping,
whistling, and cursing began.
Ehrlich was on the platform: in the name of the [Jewish]
Bund he supported the SRs and Mensheviks. The hall began to
overflow. The c pure-in-heart' were going out in small groups,
but this was almost unnoticed. They were accompanied by
whistles, jeers, and curses. Even the semblance of order finally
disappeared. On the platform, where Martov remained because
it was impossible to get away or move, the mob, which soon so
completely surrounded the orator that you could not see who
was speaking, was leaning over the shoulders of the members of
the Praesidium.
The c pure-in-heart' had left. Well would Martov's resolu-
tion now be debated without them? Now it had lost most of its
sense, but it seemed there was no time for that now. 'Emergency
statements' hailed down, on behalf of every kind of organization
and of individual speakers themselves. The notorious Right
Menshevik Kuchin, always accepted as speaking for the front,
was also accusing the Bolsheviks of a military conspiracy against
the people, and with his Tront-line group' was also leaving the
Congress. As usual, he was unmasked: he had been elected to
the Army Committee eight months before and for half a year
had no longer expressed the army's opinion. The front was
going along with the Congress majority. In addition to the front-
line Menshevik, a front-line SR also spoke. But by now the
meeting was beginning to lose patience.
Abramovich came on Tor the Bund group'. First, he re-
peated what Ehrlich had said. Secondly, he reported that firing
on the Winter Palace had begun; the Mensheviks, SRs, peasant
Central Ex. Com., and Town Council had decided to go there
and face the bullets.
This was very effective and dramatic, but completely failed to
arouse any sympathy. Jeers could be distinguished amidst the
tumult, some of them coarse, others venomous. . . Up to then,
nevertheless, shooting had not been an everyday occurrence in
our revolution, and Abramovich's news made a painful im-
pression on a great many people.
It was dissipated, however, by Ryazanov, who declared in the
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1QIJ 639
name of the Military Revolutionary Committee : c An hour and a
half ago the Mayor came to us and offered to undertake
negotiations between the Winter Palace and its besiegers. The
Military Revolutionary Committee has sent its representatives,
thus doing everything to forestall bloodshed.'
Ryazanov was known to everyone as a man averse to blood-
shed, and he was believed. But when would Martov's resolution
be debated?
It was begun by Martov himself when he got the floor amidst
an endless series of emergency statements.
'The news that's just come ' he began.
But the meeting, which an hour before had passed his resolu-
tion unanimously, was now very irritated with every species of
'compromiser'. Martov was interrupted: 'What news? What are
you trying to scare us for? You ought to be ashamed of your-
self! 3
In some detail Martov analysed the motives for his resolution.
Then he proposed that the Congress pass a decree on the
necessity for a peaceable settlement of the crisis by forming a
general democratic Government and electing a delegation to
negotiate with all Socialist parties. . .
Martov's reply came from Trotsky, who was standing at his
side in the crowd that packed the platform. Now that the
Rightists had left, Trotsky's position was as strong as Martov's
was weak.
'A rising of the masses of the people', Trotsky rapped out,
'needs no justification. What has happened is an insurrection,
and not a conspiracy. We hardened the revolutionary energy of
the Petersburg workers and soldiers. We openly forged the will
of the masses for an insurrection, and not a conspiracy. The
masses of the people followed our banner and our insurrection
was victorious. And now we are told: renounce your victory,
make concessions, compromise. With whom? I ask: with whom
ought we to compromise? With those wretched groups who have
left us or who are making this proposal? But after all we've had
a full view of them. No one in Russia is with them any longer.
A compromise is supposed to be made, as between two equal
sides, by the millions of workers and peasants represented in this
Congress, whom they are ready, not for the first time or the last,
to barter away as the bourgeoisie sees fit. No, here no compromise
640 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
is possible. To those who have left and to those who tell us to do
this we must say: you are miserable bankrupts, your role is
played out; go where you ought to be: into the dustbin of
history!'
'Then we'll leave/ Martov shouted from the platform amidst
stormy applause for Trotsky.
No, excuse me, Comrade Martov ! Trotsky's speech of course
was a clear and unambiguous reply. But rage at an opponent,
and Martov's emotional state, still did not bind the fraction to a
decisive and fatal act. Martov, enraged and upset, began push-
ing his way off the platform. And I called an emergency con-
ference of our fraction, scattered throughout the hall.
Meanwhile Trotsky was reading aloud a harsh resolution
against the Compromisers and against their 'wretched and
criminal attempt to smash the All-Russian Congress'; 'this will
not weaken, but strengthen the Soviets, by purging them of any
admixture of counter-revolution'.
We assembled in the Mensheviks' room, while the futile
emergency statements continued in the big hall. Fatigue, ner-
vousness, and chaos kept growing. On our way out we heard a
statement in the name of the Bolshevik fraction of the Town
Council: 'The Bolshevik Town Hall fraction has come here to
conquer or die with the Ail-Russian Soviet Congress!'
The hall applauded. But it was beginning to be fed up with
all this it was around i o'clock in the morning.
During those same hours when the fractions and the plenum
of the Congress .were in session at Smolny, the old Provisional
Government still languished in a quiet, half-dark room of the
Winter Palace. For their part they were far from willing to die.
On the contrary, they were hoping for assistance and the
preservation of their lives and jobs. Nevertheless they were
languishing in torment.
The Cossacks had left the Palace. There were fewer defenders.
It was reported on the 'phone that some Town Councillors and
others, about 300 men, were coming to the Palace. The military
cadets were warned not to shoot at them.
Palchinsky made a report: the mob had pressed forward a
few times, but after some shots from the military cadets had
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 64!
retreated. The shots, he said, were in the air. But the clatter of
arms and booming of cannon grew more and more frequent.
Suddenly there was an uproar and shots in the Palace itself:
about thirty or forty armed men had burst in, but were already
disarmed and under arrest.
'Great cowards/ reported Palchinsky, and assured his
listeners the Palace would hold out till morning.
Again a din, shouts, tramping, and two explosions one after
the other. The Ministers leaped from their seats. Bombs ! A few
sailors had crept into the Palace and thrown two bombs from a
little gallery. The bombs had fallen on the floor near the en-
trance to Nicholas IPs rooms and slightly wounded two
military cadets. Dr. Kishkin gave them medical aid. The sailors
were arrested; but how had they been able to get in? First forty
men had burst in by force, then a few sailors had slipped in
secretly. It was obvious that things were proving a bit too much
for Palchinsky and his garrison.
It was reported that the women's shock-battalion had gone
home. They had felt like it and left, like the Cossacks. It was
clear that the besiegers were letting hostile detachments through
like water through a sieve.
There was still no real siege at all, but the cross-fire was
beginning to take on the character of an out-and-out battle. It
was unlikely that they were only shooting in the air, or that
there were no casualties. A certain amount of blood was un-
doubtedly being shed. Why, and what for? Because the Military
Revolutionary Committee had not thought of arresting the
Government before, and had even released those arrested, and
the Ministers who had run away from their posts could still
console themselves with the thought that they had not run
away.
It was reported that cadets from some academy had left.
They left as they pleased. The 'Government 5 didn't hold them
back, but gave out telephonic bulletins to the city: 'We are
beating them off, we are not surrendering, the attack was
beaten off at such and such an hour, we are waiting for re-
inforcements'. That's the kind of Government we had!
Once again a crowd burst in and was disarmed : once again
one of the defence units went off. How many were left now?
Which was there more of now in the Palace, defenders or
642 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
prisoners? But wasn't it all the same? The Ministers were un-
concerned. Outside the walls they were shooting as before; it
was after i o'clock.
Again an uproar. It kept growing, nearer and nearer, up to
the very doors.. It was clear the Palace was being stormed and
taken. A cadet rushed in to the Ministers and, drawing himself
up, reported : 'Ready to defend ourselves to the last man. What
are the Provisional Government's orders?'
'It's no use. We give up. No bloodshed! We suppose the
Palace Is already occupied?'
'Yes. Everyone's surrendered. Only this room is being held.'
Tell them we don't want bloodshed and give up. We yield to
force. . .'
'Go, hurry, hurry! We don't want bloodshed!'
You'll say: now the Ministers were beginning to understand
something and had come to a sensible decision. On the con-
trary: it was already too late for a sensible decision; but the
Ministers, having finally lost all understanding, did not see how
repellent and ridiculous their hypocrisy was.
A cadet on the other side of the door reported the Ministers'
decision to the victorious insurgent troops, who were making an
impatient racket but didn't take one step further against the will
of these single-minded cadets. The noise suddenly took on
another character.
'Let's sit down at the table,' said the Ministers, and sat down,
in order to look like busy statesmen.
The doors were flung open, and the room filled up at once
with armed men, headed by Antonov himself. . Palchinsky
adroitly hastened forward: 'Gentlemen, we've just come to an
agreement with your people on the 'phone. Just wait one
moment, you haven't heard the latest! 5
The chiefs of the detachment were within a hair's breadth
of being disconcerted, but they pulled themselves together at
once.
'Members of the Provisional Government!' shouted Antonov,
'I declare you under arrest! I'm a member of the Military
Revolutionary Committee!'
'The members of the Provisional Government yield to force
and surrender in order to avoid bloodshed,' said Konovalov.
'Bloodshed ! And how much blood have you shed yourselves?'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 643
rang out an exclamation sympathetically taken up by the crowd.
'How many of our people have fallen?'
'That's a lie!' shouted the indignant Kishkin. *We didn't
shoot anyone! Our guards simply shot back when they were
attacked.'
* * *
If there were any casualties, then our miserable last Ministers
were to blame just as much as the organizers of the insurrection.
Smolny was to blame for not avoiding bloodshed, in spite of its
having been completely possible, but it was justified by a theory
that it could not in the nature of things renounce. But what
could the statesmen of the last Coalition have said in justifica-
tion of their criminal senselessness? They preferred not to
acknowledge the very fact of the bloodshed they had caused.
But this merely makes them either cowards or fools. Louis XVI,
on August loth, set up a strong Swiss guard in the Tuileries,
ordered them to defend themselves, and caused bloodshed. He
was well aware that he was defending the monarchy and his
own throne an idea, interests, and a person. His crime has a
definite meaning, historical and logical. But as for these sage
rulers and liberal-humanitarian intellectuals of ours what did
they want?
The temper of the mob that had burst in, armed to the teeth,
was extremely high, vengeful, furious, and impetuous. Antonov
tried to calm the particularly hot-headed soldiers and sailors,
but lacked sufficient authority. They set about drawing up an
official report, while the Ministers began to 'agitate' at the victors.
Kuzma Gvozdev was especially excited, trying to persuade
everyone right and left that he was one of them a worker.
Tempers would rise, then subside. The report that Kerensky
was not around had a powerful effect. There were shouts that
the others must be slaughtered so that they wouldn't flee after
Kerensky.
After rather lengthy proceedings, with interrogations, roll-
calls, and the making of lists, the column of prisoners moved out,
in the direction of the Peter-Paul Fortress. In the darkness, be-
tween 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of a dense,
excited mob, the column moved along the Milliony and over
Trinity Bridge. More than once the lives of the former Ministers
hung by a hair. But it went off without a lynching.
644 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
After eight months of revolution the Peter-Paul was receiving
within its walls a third variety of prisoner: first. Tsarist func-
tionaries, then Bolsheviks, and now Kerensky's friends, the 'elite'
of the Menshevik-SR democracy. What more were these im-
perturbable walls destined to see?
In the great hall of Smolny the enormous meeting was clearly
becoming disorganized from muddle, crowding, fatigue, and
tension. Speakers from the fractions remaining spoke on
Trotsky's resolution. Both the Left SRs and the Novaya %hizn
people categorically condemned the behaviour of the Right
groups, but protested against the harsh resolution. Then
'emergency' speakers appeared again. But the meeting cried for
mercy. An interval was announced.
During this time our fraction, extremely tense and nervous,
was discussing the situation. Having settled ourselves in any sort
of order just inside the door, about thirty of us, some standing
up, others sitting on some kind of garden benches, were quarrel-
ling bitterly. I was vigorously attacking, very excited, and not
mincing my words. Martov, having yielded to theatricality at
the plenary session, defended himself more calmly and
patiently. He seemed to feel that he had no firm ground beneath
him, but at the same time to be aware that the whole conjunc-
tion of circumstances irrevocably compelled him to break with
the Congress and go out after Dan even though only half-
way. . .
I gave a good account of myself and did as much as I could.
Throughout the revolution I had never defended my position
with such conviction and ardour. Not only logic, political sense,
and elementary revolutionary truth seemed to be on my side,
but also a technical consideration: after all, the question put by
Martov had not yet been debated in the Congress, and we
still had only Trotsky's speech as the Congress reply. Leaving
the Congress now would not only be criminal in general, but also
dishonest and frivolous in particular.
Alas ! It was clear that Martov was a victim of Menshevik
indecisiveness. He was indeed! For the rupture with the
bourgeois Compromisers and adherence to Smolny entailed the
most decisive struggle in a definite camp. No place was left for
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 645
neutrality or passivity. This was frightening, and far from
natural to us. Martov, like Dan, but not together with him, was
'isolating' the Bolsheviks. In this Dan had a point of support
Martov could not accept, while Martov had no point of support
at all. But ... to remain in'Smolny with nobody but the
Bolsheviks no, that was beyond our strength.
The fraction divided. About fourteen votes against twelve
Martov had won. I felt that I had suffered a disaster worse than
any before in the revolution. I returned to the great hall com-
pletely numb.
* * *
There the interval was just over and the meeting had started
again. But the deputies had had no rest. There was still the
same disorder. People were standing with outstretched necks
listening to the statement of the Chairman, Kamenev, who was
speaking with special earnestness: 'We have just received the
following telephone message. The Winter Palace has been taken
by the troops of the Military Revolutionary Committee. The
whole Provisional Government was arrested there, except
Kerensky, who has fled. . .' etc.
Kamenev read the list of the arrested Ministers. When he
mentioned Tereshchenko's name at the end, stormy applause
rang out. The broad masses had evidently had time to set a
special value on this gentleman's activities.
One of the Left SRs made a statement about the inadmissi-
bility of arresting the Socialist Ministers.
Trotsky answered him at once: First of all, there was no time
now for such trifles : secondly, there was no reason to stand on
ceremony with these gentlemen who were keeping hundreds of
workers and Bolsheviks in the prisons.
Both statements were essentially correct. But what was far
more important was the political motive Trotsky didn't touch
on : the overturn had not yet been carried to a conclusion, and
every Minister left at large, representing the legitimate power,
might in the given circumstances become a source of civil
war. Nevertheless Trotsky's statement that is, mainly his tone
was far from producing, even in Smolny as it was then, a good
impression on everyone. This new ruler, on the very first day,
was showing his teeth over 'trifles'. An omen for the future.
646 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917
So the thing was done. We had left, not knowing where or
why, after breaking with the Soviet, getting ourselves mixed up
with counter-revolutionary elements, discrediting and debasing
ourselves in the eyes of the masses, and ruining the entire future
of our organization and our principles. And that was the least of
it: in leaving we completely untied the Bolsheviks' hands,
making them masters of the entire situation and yielding to
them the whole arena of the revolution.
A struggle at the Congress for a united democratic front might
have had some success. For the Bolsheviks as such, for Lenin and
Trotsky, it was more odious than the possible Committees of
Public Safety or another Kornilov march on Petersburg. The
exit of the *pure-in-heart' freed the Bolsheviks from this danger.
By quitting the Congress and leaving the Bolsheviks with only
the Left SR youngsters and the feeble little Novaya %hizn, group,
we gave the Bolsheviks with our own hands a monopoly of the
Soviet, of the masses, and. of the revolution. By our own irra-
tional decision we ensured the victory of Lenin's whole 'line 5 .
I personally committed not a few blunders and errors in the
revolution. But I consider my greatest and most indelible
crime the fact that I failed to break with the Martov group
Immediately after our fraction voted to leave, and didn't stay
on at the Congress. To this day I have not ceased regretting
this October 25th crime of mine.
Towards the end of the session Lunacharsky read out a
proclamation of the Congress to the workers, soldiers, and
peasants. It declared: '. . . Basing itself on the will of the
enormous majority of workers, soldiers, and peasants, and
relying on the achievement in Petersburg of a victorious rising
of the workers and garrison, the Congress takes the power into
its own hands. The Provisional Government has been over-
thrown. The powers of the conciliationist Central Ex. Com. have
come to an end. . . The Congress decrees that all power through-
out the country be transferred to the local Soviets of Workers',
Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, who must preserve genuine
revolutionary order.'
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 647
Thus the October revolution was politically consummated and
shaped. The 'proclamation' was passed by all the other votes to
two, with twelve abstentions. The meeting lasted until after
5 o'clock in the morning.
In a dense throng, delegates swarmed out of Smolny, after the
labours, impressions, and events of this world-historical day.
The participants in, witnesses and authors of those events
swarmed past the cannon and machine-guns standing by the
cradle of the 'worldwide Socialist revolution'. But no atten-
dants were visible near them. The Smolny guard were already
enjoying their rest: there was no discipline. But there was also no
need for a guard. No one had either the strength or the will for
an attack. . .
A cold autumn morning was already dawning on Petersburg.
CHAPTER 32
OCTOBER 2 6TH
Finale
Two or three hours later the capital awoke without realizing
who were now its rulers. From outside, the events had not been
at all impressive. Except for the Palace square, there had been
order and calm everywhere. The coup had begun rather modestly
and ended rather swiftly. But how? the man-in-the-street
didn't know. The finale in the Winter Palace had come too late
at night, and contact with Smolny was weak.
The man-in-the-street rushed to the newspapers. But he
couldn't get much light from them. In the 'Latest News' column
there were everywhere a few lines reporting the seizure of the
Winter Palace and the arrest of the Provisional Government.
The accounts of the Soviet Congress consisted solely of 'emer-
gency statements' and testified to the 'isolation* of the Bolshe-
viks; but they gave no description whatever of the political
status that had been created. The leading articles had been
written before the final news that night. In general, they were
all on one note : patriotic bowlings about our unhappy country,
accusations of usurpation and violence by the Bolsheviks, pre-
dictions of the collapse of their adventure, descriptions of the
coup of the day before as a military conspiracy.
The Mensheviks and SRs, by the way, later consoled them-
selves with this military conspiracy for several months, thrusting
it in the faces of the Bolsheviks. Incomprehensible ! It would
have been better if these sharp-witted people had looked and
said: was the Petersburg proletariat in sympathy or not with
the organizers of the October insurrection? Was it with the
Bolsheviks, or were the Bolsheviks acting independently of it?
Was it on the side of the overturn, was it neutral, or was it
hostile?
Here there can be no two replies. Yes, the Bolsheviks acted
with the full backing of the Petersburg workers and soldiers.
And they brought about an insurrection, throwing into it as
many (very few!) forces as were required for its successful con-
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 649
summation. Guilty as charged: the Bolsheviks threw into it,
through negligence and clumsiness, far more forces than were
necessary. But that has nothing at all to do with grasping the
actual conception of the insurrection.
So on October 2 6th the man-in-the-street was given into the
power of rumours. And of course he was extremely excited. In
the streets, in the trams, in public places nothing but the
events was talked of. There was, naturally, a panic at the
Stock Exchange, though absolutely no one believed a Bolshevik
regime would last. On the contrary, the man-in-the-street had
no doubt the crisis would be settled in short order.
Indeed, what sort of power had the Bolsheviks? They had,
after all, not yet created a Government. What kind of 'power of
the Soviets' was this? All the same, the shops shut tight. The
banks did not resume work. In the government offices there were
mass-meetings of the employees, and debates about what they
should do in case the Bolsheviks sent over their commanders.
Almost everywhere it was decided not to recognize their
authority, and for the time being stop work. A boycott!
But even without a boycott and without politics nobody
could work now. Was everything quiet at home? It was said
that plundering and riots would begin at any moment. It was
said that there was no bread at all in the city, and what there
had been had already been looted. It was said that sailors were
making the rounds of the houses and requisitioning fur coats
and boots. It was said. . .
But there were also facts which powerfully affected the
imagination. On the day following the victorious insurrection
the Petersburgers found several of the capital's newspapers
missing. They had been closed by the Military Revolutionary
Committee for slandering the Soviets and similar crimes. The
esteemed Podvoisky, Antonov, and others, acting on Lenin's
orders, were not inventive: they borrowed their reasons from
the lexicon of the old Tsarist police. But on the strength of their
position as revolutionaries and Socialists they allowed them-
selves the luxury of expressing themselves more crudely and less
grammatically. It would have been possible, and better, to give
no reasons at all.
650 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
Moreover, Podvoisky and Antonov were generally very ham-
fisted in carrying out their leaders' directives. For some reason
they came down on the second-rate papers and small fry, dis-
regarding the Kornilovite leading semi-official ones. This had to
be corrected. That morning some sailors were sent to the
distributing centres of Rech and Sovremennoye Slovo (Contem-
porary Word) . All the numbers they found were confiscated,
taken out into the street in an enormous mass, and set fire to
then and there. This hitherto unseen auto-da-fe collected an
enormous crowd.
In the course of that day the whole bourgeois press of the
capital was shut down. Orders were sent out, and military
patrols with them. The type-setters were allowed to stay on in
the printing-presses, on condition that they set no type for the
closed-down newspapers.
The new Government didn't reveal itself for the time being in
any other way. But this debut made a very powerful impression.
Tsarism had never practised any such mass reprisals against the
press. Was it necessary? What was the sense of it? References
were naturally made to the acute and difficult situation of the
new regime in the fire of civil war. But that was nonsense.
There was neither civil war nor any particularly difficult
situation. Now, in a single day, the insurrection was already
actually victorious. Difficulties might begin if Kerensky had
some successes at the front, but there was still no news of those.
Until now reports on this score had been completely reassuring.
Indeed, even if there had been a march on Petersburg, the
bourgeois press couldn't have played any role. The Socialist
press was, if you like, more dangerous, but that wasn't touched.
The destruction of the bourgeois press, completely senseless
from a practical point of view, was extremely harmful to the
Bolsheviks. It infuriated and alarmed absolutely all the neutral
and wavering elements, of which there were many. So this was
the start of the new regime! For the time being there was
nothing more, but there were already pogroms and senseless
violence. The debasement of revolutionary values, the trampling
into the mud of elementary democratic principles were already
present.
In the lower strata of the proletariat and soldiery, however,
this debut aroused no protests. For there, after eight months of
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 65!
revolution, these principles had not yet had time to take root.
There the matter was substantially simpler without principles :
they used to beat us and we, having seized a club, are going to
smash things right and left. That was how the elements
reasoned. That was how without principles their champions
in Smolny reasoned too.
Meanwhile work went on at Smolny. The Military Revolu-
tionary Committee was taking what steps it could to preserve
order and uphold the prestige of the new regime. But it was
even busier getting out proclamations. First of all it addressed
the Cossacks in the capital and at the front, exhorting them not
to oppose the revolution and not to march on Petersburg. This
appeal, distributed in great quantities, undoubtedly had its
effect on the strongly prejudiced but far from bellicose Cossacks.
Then the Military Revolutionary Committee appealed to the
railwaymen to pay special attention to the service; it called on
the state employees, and especially the military staff employees,
not to interrupt their work, for fear of revolutionary justice, etc.
But naturally their principal concern was defence against
Kerensky, who was marching on Petersburg. Nothing trust-
worthy was known about this march, but, to begin with, the fact
a priori was obvious. Secondly, quite definite rumours flowed from
the Right milieux about it; points were named where Kerensky
was to be found, with the number of troops at his disposal.
Petty-bourgeois and 'social' strata comforted themselves with
this and frightened Smolny. The Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee took what steps it could.
Besides written and oral agitation, splendidly organized
along the roads to the capital, a few detachments were sent out
against Kerensky's supposed hordes. But their strength was very
meagre. No volunteers who were at all reliable were found in
the garrison. Out of the army of 200,000, two or three companies
were somehow selected. The workers' militia aroused more
confidence, but only, after all, from the point of view of their
morale. For the combat fitness of this army, which had never
smelt powder or seen a rifle until the last few days, and had no
conception of military operations or discipline, was more than
dubious. To crown all this there were no officers at all.
652 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQ1J
It was only the sailors that might prove a serious force,
Kronstadt could put out 3,000 or 4,000 reliable fighters. And
besides, as we know, 1,800 sailors had come from Helsingfors;
they had got to Petersburg when everything was already over,
but they could be used at once against Kerensky.
This, as we see, wasn't much. And this 'army' also suffered
from an exceptional defect: it had no artillery only rifles and
machine-guns. Close to Petersburg itself it was proposed to use
the artillery of the ships anchored in the Neva or off the coast.
But it was essential, of course, not to allow matters to get as far
as an engagement beneath the very walls of the capital.
How unsatisfactory the position was with artillery, and how
crude the steps taken, is evident from this fact. The Putilov
Factory 'promised' the Military Revolutionary Committee an
armoured platform-car for mounting cannon, but no one knew
whether the factory would keep its promise. And this matter, in
spite of its triviality, was thought so important in Smolny that
Lenin himself, together with Antonov, in the midst of the
extravagant labours and chaos of the first days, went off to the
Putilov Factory to harangue the workers and spur them on. I
don't think it led to anything. . .
In general it was quite impossible to count on any substantial
military force. What had to be relied on was Kerensky's weak-
ness, his inability to collect and move a large army, and the
inevitable dissolution of such an army while still en route.
Agitation and the influence of ideas were an incomparably
more reliable prop of Smolny than military operations. After
all the lessons of the revolution it was possible to set one's hopes
on 'spiritual' factors with complete justification. Nicholas II,
after all, had moved against Petersburg, and then Kornilov, and
both had failed without a shot fired. During the October
Days themselves factors of 'morale' were already paralysing the
whole activity of Kerensky and the Staff in Petersburg. Why
then not hope that these same methods would liquidate the
third march on Petersburg in 1917?
An extremely graphic proclamation on Kerensky's per-
sonality, role, and campaign was also published and distributed.
In any case, in the midst of the primordial confusion of this first
day of the Soviet regime all possible measures were taken, as I
said, of spiritual as well as of military resistance.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 653
Apart from all this, the Military Revolutionary Committee
developed some activity of a purely police character. A great
many arrests had been made in the city. They were quite casual
and pointless, carried out chiefly as a result of the revolutionary
initiative of anyone who had the energy. Whole columns of
prisoners trailed into Smolny from all directions. This irritated
and repelled the passive part of the population very much. But
Smolny had become not only the seat of the new Government,
not only the General Staff, but also the supreme police institu-
tion, the supreme tribunal, and the gaol.
Finally, that day the Military Revolutionary Committee got
out one other special proclamation an order to the Army
Committees to bring General Kornilov and his accomplices to
Petersburg for imprisonment in the Peter-Paul Fortress and for
trial. . .
- Just what did that mean? Why an appeal to the Army
Committees, and not a wire to Bykhov gaol to transfer the
Kornilovites?
Because on the 2 6th a perfectly reliable piece of news had
been spread through Petersburg Kornilov had escaped from
Bykhov gaol.
Kornilov, having heard about the overturn, had quite
simply decided to leave. He had not been afraid of a Govern-
ment of his friends, and had agreed to live for the time being in
Bykhov under the protection of his reliable Tekins. But with the
Bolsheviks the affair might have turned risky; also it had no
point. Kornilov decided to leave. There had been no technical
hindrances for him previously either.
Just about this time I had asked Kamenev in passing: Tell
me, how are you going to govern? Are you going to set up
ministers and ministries, as in a bourgeois society?*
Kamenev explained what was evidently being ventilated in
the highest Bolshevik spheres :
'It'll be a Government by Boards, like during the Convention.
The chairmen of the Boards will constitute the supreme organ
of Government.'
And that is how it was formed on October' 26th. But what
could this Soviet Cabinet of Ministers be called? Though this of
654 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ
course was not very vital, nevertheless there was a strong desire
not to borrow bourgeois terminology. Let everything be quite
new and special in the new proletarian State!
They thought and cogitated, and finally Trotsky suggested a
name that gratified everyone. It was decided to call the Soviet
Cabinet the Council of People's Commissars. Personally I am
not very enthusiastic about this great reform. Breaking with
bourgeois terminology may have been very agreeable, but
philologically the word Minister sounds absolutely correct,
while Commissar, on the contrary, definitely smacks of the
police. But this, of course, is a matter of taste (and, perhaps, of
the new spirit in politics?).
But apart from the name itself, nothing had as yet been
changed in the methods of forming a new Government. For the
time being the Boards were not and could not be formed. Only
the Council of People's Commissars had been constituted, and
that had been made up just as cabinets always are.
This is how matters stood politically: The departure of the
Mensheviks and SRs had very much simplified and eased the
position of Lenin and Trotsky. Now there was no Opposition to
get underfoot in forming a proletarian Government. Only the
Bolshevik Party could now take power without hindrance and
even place all the odium for this on the Mensheviks and SRs
themselves. This was what Lenin had been striving for ever since
June.
To be sure, there remained at the Congress a rather large
group of Left SRs, who had no objection to being the sole repre-
sentatives of the peasantry. But, to begin with, the Left SRs
were in an insignificant minority. Secondly, these Left young-
sters were quite harmless as pretenders to power, in view of their
lack of anything resembling solidity and of the fact that they
could easily be twisted around one's finger. Thirdly, in view of
these qualities, bringing the Left SRs into the Soviet Govern-
ment would even have been useful, for this would have looked
like a perfectly popular 'agreement' within the Soviet and a
'broadening of the base' of the new Government at the expense
of the party of the revolutionary peasantry. Fourthly, the Left
SRs made absolutely no claim to share power with the Bol-
sheviks: what they stood for was power for the Soviet bloc, an
all-democratic Government.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ 655
Consequently the Bolsheviks took power alone. The Council
of People's Commissars was expected to act on the directives of
the Bolshevik Party Central Committee. This achieved what
Lenin had been unsuccessfully striving for *in a favourable
conjunction of circumstances' on June loth and July 4th.
It remained to plan the composition of the first Soviet
Government. One would have thought that the Bolsheviks must
meet with the greatest difficulties. Where could you get people
capable of running the State in the given circumstances? I of
course wasn't at this meeting of Bolshevik leaders, but I venture
to express my conviction that it had no special difficulty in
selecting Ministers from its own party people. It produced its
best and oldest propagandists, agitators, and organizers. For the
difficulties of state administration did not appear in their full
scope to the eye of the lofty assemblage.
Lenin was designated Premier without portfolio. Trotsky
became the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Luna-
charsky for Popular Education. The economist and writer
Skvortsov was given Finance. Shlyapnikov, the trade-unionist,
whom we know, got the Labour portfolio. Miliutin, author of a
brochure on agricultural workers, was appointed Minister of
Agriculture, Stalin Minister for Nationalities. A Board con-
sisting of Antonov, the lieutenant Krylenko, and the sailor
Dybenko for Military and Naval affairs. Rykov, whom we
haven't met up to now, was given the Interior. Nogin from
Moscow was given Industry and Commerce. Lomov, Justice.
Teodorovich, Supply. And Glebov, Posts and Telegraphs.
All these were very respected Bolsheviks, with decades of
revolutionary work, exile, and imprisonment behind them. But
as the supreme power in the Republic, as statesmen entrusted
with the fate of the revolution and of the country, this Board as a
whole must be acknowledged to be rather unconvincing. We
knew most of these new rulers as revolutionaries. Henceforth we
were to be acquainted with them as statesmen and learn, by the
way, that brilliant work on the platform, underground, and in
the emigration, in party circles and as journalists, far from
guaranteed their quality as rulers.
We fail to see two stars of the first magnitude amongst the
Bolshevik rulers the 'cronies', Zinoviev and Kamenev. Their
absence from the Government might have had a great many
656 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
valid reasons. First of all, being somewhat in opposition, they
might have declined. Secondly, for tactical reasons it was
advisable to cut down as much as possible on the number of
Ministers of Jewish origin (the sole exception was Trotsky).
Thirdly, we must remember that from now on ministerial posts
were in fact not the most important in the State: stars of the
first magnitude made all high policy in the Party Central Com-
mittee. Fourthly, Kamenev was appointed chairman of the
Central Ex. Com., which formally was the highest State body,
while Zinoviev received a high appointment as editor of the
official state newspaper: the Izoestiya of the Central Ex. Com.
Such for the time being was the new Government of the new"
proletarian State.
Martov appeared at this meeting of the Bolshevik Olympus.
He came to intercede for the release of the Socialist Ministers.
It must be imagined how absurd such a mediator must have felt
before these strange new authorities on such a matter.
Martov, their old comrade-in-arms and, for most of them,
teacher, was heard out with chilly reserve. But all the same the
Socialist Ministers were transferred to house arrest.
The second session of the Congress opened at 9 o'clock in the
evening. Chairman Kamenev, amidst stormy applause, an-
nounced the latest measures of the Military Revolutionary
Committee: abolition of the death penalty at the front, and con-
sequently in Russia generally; release of all political prisoners;
release of the members of the agrarian committees arrested by
the Coalition.
Then Lenin was given the floor to report on war and peace.
But according to him the question was so clear that he could
read without any preamble the draft of an appeal by the Soviet
Government to the peoples of all the countries at war. He read a
long document, which I shall summarize :
The worker-peasant Government, created by the revolution
of October 25th, suggests to all warring nations and their
Governments that immediate negotiations be begun for a just
and democratic peace, without annexations or indemnities.
The Russian Government, for its part, is ready to take all
decisive steps without the slightest delay. By annexations it
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 657
means the absorption by a large or powerful State of a small or
weak nationality (?) without its consent; the time of annexa-
tion, the cultural-economic level of the absorbed country and its
location are a matter of indifference. Disannexation, in the
absence of complete self-determination, is the equivalent of
annexation. But the Government doesn't put forward these
conditions as an ultimatum; it is willing to consider other con-
ditions as well, insisting only that they be proposed as soon as
possible and put clearly, openly, and unequivocally. The
worker-peasant Government abolishes secret diplomacy; it is
proceeding at once to the publication of secret treaties and
declares their contents henceforth invalid. The Russian Govern-
ment is willing to carry on open negotiations for peace in any
way desired: in writing, by telegraph, or at a conference. At
the same time the Government proposes to all countries at war
the immediate conclusion of a three-month armistice which will
be sufficient to conclude peace negotiations and ratify the peace.
In addressing the above to the Governments and peoples of the
warring countries, the worker peasant Government appeals
especially to the workers of the advanced capitalist countries,
Great Britain, Germany, and France; the victorious Russian
workers and peasants have no doubt that the proletariat of the
West will help them to achieve the cause of peace, and at the
same time the cause of the emancipation of the toilers from
every form of bondage and exploitation.
He closed with a brief epilogue. 'We address ourselves', he
said, c to the Governments and to the peoples, since an appeal to
the peoples alone might involve a postponement of the peace.
The conditions of peace as reviewed during the armistice will
then be confirmed by the Constituent Assembly. The proposal
of peace will meet with opposition from the imperialist Govern-
ments we do not close our eyes to this. But we rely on the
imminence of revolution *in all the countries at war. The
Russian Revolution of October 25th will open an era of Socialist
revolution throughout the world. We shall of course defend our
peace programme in every way, but we must make it im-
possible for our enemies to say that their conditions are different
and therefore there is no reason to start negotiations with us.
We must deprive them of this advantage and therefore must not
put our conditions as an ultimatum. We are not afraid of a
658 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQIJ
revolutionary war, but we shall not deliver ultimatums which
might facilitate a negative answer to our proposal.'
In general, the proclamation of October 2 6th was exactly
what the revolutionary Government should have done several
months earlier. The Bolsheviks, almost before they were in
power, had fulfilled this task and met their engagements of
March I4th to the proletariat of the West. And they had done it
in a correct and worthy form. But it was too late. Several
months of revolution had multiplied many times over Russia's
collapse and exhaustion. Now, at the end of October, there was
no longer even an army in Russia. Now we could no longer fight.
Those millions who had until now held back 130 German divi-
sions at the front had begun, from cold and hunger, to run away
home. Our peace move of October 2 6th was objectively no
more than a surrender to the mercy of the victor.
I got to Smolny during Lenin's 'epilogue'. The general scene
was much the same as the night before. Fewer arms, a smaller
crowd. It was easy for me to find an empty seat in the back
rows, which I think were for the public. Alas ! For the first time
in the revolution I came to such a meeting not as one of its fully
authorized members, but as one of the public. I found this
extremely sad and painful. I felt torn away and separated from
everything I had been living by for eight months that were the
equivalent of a decade. Such a situation was quite unendurable;
I knew I should change it, but didn't know just how.
Lenin finished. Thunderous applause rang out, and didn't die
down for a long time. The representatives of the Left SRs and
the Novqya %hi&t people 'backed' the decree. They merely com-
plained that up to then the text of this document of capital
importance hadn't been known to any of those present, and
they couldn't make any amendments. They wanted a lot!
These requirements of bourgeois parliamentarianism hadn't
been complied with by us even in the best of circumstances.
In general, you might say there were no debates. Everyone
simply expressed 'support 5 , while the home-spun representatives
of the nationalities gave greetings. The Teace Decree' was put to
the vote without any amendments and passed unanimously.
And now there were signs of an unmistakable heightening of
mood. Long-drawn-out ovations alternated with singing the
Internationale. Then Lenin was hailed again, hurrahs were
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917 659
shouted, caps flung into the air. They sang a funeral march in
memory of the martyrs of the war. Then they applauded again,
shouted, flung up their caps.
The whole Praesidium, headed by Lenin, was standing up and
singing, with excited, exalted faces and blazing eyes. But the
delegates were more interesting: they were completely re-
vivified. The overturn had gone more smoothly than most of
them had expected; it already seemed consummated. Aware-
ness of its success was spreading; the masses were permeated by
the faith that all would go well in future too. They were begin-
ning to be persuaded of the imminence of peace, land, and
bread, and even beginning to feel some readiness to stand up
positively for their newly acquired goods and rights.
Applause, hurrahs, caps flung up in the air. . .
But I didn't believe in the victory, the success, the 'rightful-
ness', or the historic mission of a Bolshevik regime. Sitting in the
back seats, I watched this celebration with a heavy heart. How
I longed to join in, and merge with this mass and its leaders in a
single feeling! But I couldn't. . .
Lenin again reported on the next question land. But once
again he didn't make a report, but began directly reading the
text of a proposed 'Land Decree'. This time the decree, not
having been reproduced or circulated, was not only unfamiliar
to everyone : it was so badly written that Lenin stumbled, got
confused, and finally stopped altogether. One of the crowd who
had squeezed on to the platform came to his rescue. Lenin
gladly gave up his place and the illegible piece of paper.
This was what it contained :
Private property in land was abolished immediately without
compensation. Estates, whether private, monastic, or eccle-
siastical, with all livestock and buildings, were placed at the
disposal of rural district agrarian committees and of district
Soviets of Peasant Deputies pending the Constituent Assembly.
Damage to confiscated property would be considered a serious
crime. The peasant 'model decree' written by the editors of the
'Peasant Central Ex. Com. News' 1 on the basis of 242 local
1 In August. (Ed.)
660 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
peasant decrees was to serve as guide in the detailed execution
of these measures.
This peasant c model decree' had been written by SRs, and
was nothing but an exposition of the SR agrarian programme,
Its basic propositions amounted to the following:
All property in land, not excluding small peasants', was
abolished in Russia in perpetuity, and all land within the
borders of the State was to become the property of the entire
nation.
The right to the use of land belonged to all citizens of the
State provided they worked it themselves. Hired labour was
forbidden. The land was to be divided between those working it
according to a labour or consumer's norm. The land reserves
were subject to periodic reallocation, depending on the growth
of the population and changes in agricultural methods, leaving
the basic unit untouched.
Then, in conflict with the first point of Lenin's decree itself,
the 'model decree' read: the land of ordinary Cossacks and
peasants would not be confiscated. Finally, it was twice re-
peated that the land question could be definitively settled only
by the Constituent Assembly.
Personally I had been a partisan of the SR agrarian pro-
gramme from the very beginning of my political and literary
activity. These views of mine were considered a sign of mental
confusion, and my SR-mindedness provoked irony and per-
plexity amongst my fellow- thinkers, the 'consistent Marxists'.
However, to this day I persist in them, and maintain that it was
precisely in this form that a Socialist agrarian programme in
Russia was possible and rational.
This programme laid the foundations of a petty-bourgeois
order in the countryside, but in Russia this could not be other-
wise, while on the other hand the programme preserves the
maximum of Socialist elements possible in so far as it abolishes
private property in land. It gives the proletariat a trump card
in its struggle against the reactionary class of petty landlords,
and at the same time conforms to the laws of agrarian evolution.
Finally, it ensures the conditions for the development of the
countryside's productive forces, for (according to Marx)
Socialist forms of agricultural production can be realized only
by a revolution in the means of production.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917 66l
However, in order to perceive the rational foundations of the
SR agrarian programme, it must be freed of all the Utopian and
reactionary admixtures, which give it a quite absurd and rather
illiterate look. The 'model decree' is full of such admixtures. It
attempts to change economic relations by a decree. This is vicious
nonsense.
Private property in land can be eliminated. Everyone knows
this from bourgeois practice. But it cannot be abolished by a
decree. Every literate person ought to know that too. Hence it is
impossible to say that as of a given moment leasehold (between
peasants who are neighbours) is prohibited. It is impossible to
assert that 'hired labour is prohibited'. This is a futile attack
on the fixed principles of economics, which may change
organically but cannot be subject to the State's decrees. In
addition, it undermines the productive forces of the country-
side.
A propos, the first thing I ever published happened to be an
exposure of these Utopian SR ideas abolishing leasehold and
hired labour by edict. And now Lenin, at the head of his 'Marxist 5
party, had resurrected and was putting into force this ante-
diluvian piece of SR-ism. But for Lenin in 1917 this was only the
flower, the modest beginning; the fruits would come only after
the 'Communist Party' began destroying the foundations of
capitalist trade by decree, after it began creating a Socialist
society by police power, abolitions, prohibitions, and all kinds of
violence.
At that time, in October, there was still the press. And the
berating Lenin heard from the SRs for this daylight robbery!
The SRs cried : A fine Marxist, who for fifteen years baited us
from the heights of his grandeur for our petty-bourgeois lack of
science, and then executed our programme the moment he took
power! And Lenin snapped back: A fine party, that had to be
driven out of power for its programme to be realized!
None of this had much point; it was rather like two fishwives
in the market-place cheap, but very agreeable, all the more so
since both sides were right.
Now on October 26th, Lenin gave a very interesting com-
mentary also in an 'epilogue' on the 'Land Decree' :
'Voices can be heard here saying that the decree was drawn
up by the SRs. Very well. Isn't it all the same who composed it?
662 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION I 917
As a democratic Government we could not get round a decision
of the rank-and-file, even if we disagreed with it. Life is the best
teacher, and it will show who is right. Let the peasants starting
from one end and ourselves from the other settle this question.
Life will force us to come together in the common stream of
revolutionary creativity. We must follow life, and leave the
masses of the people complete freedom of creation. . . We
believe the peasantry will be able to settle this question better
than ourselves. The point is not whether it's in our spirit or in
the spirit of the SRs. The point is for the peasantry to be firmly
persuaded that there are no more landlords in the country, and
to let the peasants settle all the problems and organize their own
lives.'
The 'masses of the people', listening to the head of the
'democratic Government', were in raptures. It took a long
time for another ovation to die down. But Lenin's words
were really interesting and important. Anyone who wants to
understand the spirit of the Soviet regime's policy during
the first period of its activity is in duty bound to remember
them.
An interval was announced. I dropped into the buffet from
the crowded corridor. There was a crush around the counter.
In a secluded corner I ran into Kamenev, hastily gulping down
some tea:
'Well, so you're getting ready to govern us alone?'
'But surely you're with us?'
'Depends how, within what limits and ideas. Just now, in a
Left SR fraction, I was trying as hard as I could to stop your
setting up a dictatorship of your party alone.'
Kamenev lost his temper: 'Well, if that's the case, what's the
use of talking to you ? You think it right to go around other
fractions agitating against us . . .'
'And you think that indecent and inadmissible?' I inter-
rupted. 'So I can't use my right to talk to any audience I like?
For after all if it's impossible in Smolny, then it's impossible at a
factory too. . /
Kamenev calmed down at once and started talking about the
brilliant progress of the coup d'etat: it was said that Kerensky had
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI^ 663
managed to collect only an insignificant and not at all dangerous
army.
*So you've definitely decided to govern alone?' I said, return-
ing to the former theme. *I think that's absolutely scandalous.
I'm afraid that when you've made a mess of it it'll be too late to
go back. . .'
'Yes, yes', muttered Kamenev irresolutely and vaguely,
looking away.
' Although . . . why should we make a mess of it?' he con-
tinued, just as irresolutely.
Kamenev was not only a now humiliated opponent of the up-
rising, but was also against a purely Bolshevik regime, and for an
agreement with the Mensheviks and SRs. But he was afraid of
being humiliated again. There were quite a few like him. . .
The session reopened.
Without amendment or discussion the Land Decree was
passed. Again the massed crowd applauded, jumped to their
feet, and threw their caps into the air. They firmly believed that
they had got the land their fathers and grandfathers had
yearned for. Spirits were mounting higher and higher. The
masses who had hesitated to 'come out' were perhaps ready now
to take up arms and defend their new conquests. For the time
being this was only in Smolny. But tomorrow the genuine
masses in the capital, at the front, and in the heart of Russia,
would learn about it.
There was only one question left that of the Government.
Trotsky spoke in defence of a purely Bolshevik regime. He was
very clear, trenchant, and largely correct. But he refused to
understand the point of his opponents' demands for a united
democratic front.
He said: Isolation was a vain threat. It wasn't terrifying. It
had been used as a bugbear even before the uprising, but that
had ended in a brilliant victory. It was not the Bolsheviks
who were isolated, for they were with the masses. Those who
were isolated were those who had left the masses. A coalition
with the Dans and Liebers would not have strengthened the
revolution, but destroyed it. Difficulties and tasks beyond their
powers? But Trotsky didn't understand how an alliance with
664 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION igij
Lieber and Dan would help the cause of peace and produce
bread. . .
The Bolsheviks, however, could not be accused of irreconcil-
ability. 'In spite of the fact that the defensists stopped at nothing
in the struggle against us, we did not cast them off. We pro-
posed to the Congress as a whole that it should take power into
its own hands. How, after that, is it possible to speak of our
irreconcilability? When the party, enveloped in powder smoke,
went to them and said, Let's take the power together, they ran
to the Town Council and joined up with obvious counter-
revolutionaries. They are traitors to the revolution, with whom
we shall never ally ourselves. . .'
Here Trotsky, while justly characterizing his enemies, ex-
plained his own position in a form that had nothing in common
with reality. The Bolsheviks had never taken a single step to-
wards an agreement with the Dans and the Liebers. They had
always rejected it. They had carried on a policy that excluded
an agreement, and attempted to take power alone. This was
quite understandable. Trotsky and the others, after all, couldn't
understand why they needed Lieber and Dan, if they had the
masses.
Trotsky was always clear and skilful. But you couldn't be
seduced by his eloquence: you had to see clearly where he left
loose ends, and maintain a critical attitude towards his diplo-
macy before the masses. He concluded with some characteristic
remarks I shall note without comment.
'Don't try to frighten us by talk about a peace at our expense.
It's all one if Europe remains a powerful capitalist society
revolutionary Russia must inevitably be crushed. Either the
Russian Revolution will lead to a movement in Europe, or else
the surviving powerful countries of the West will crush us.'
Such was the outlook of this central figure of the October
Revolution.
A rather characteristic episode took place when the repre-
sentative of the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union spoke. A
group of railwaymen had joined the Novaya %hizn people at the
Congress and were for an agreement between the Soviet parties.
A worker spoke in their name, very excitedly. He began by
saying that the railway proletariat had always been 'one of the
most revolutionary proletariats', but that didn't mean it was
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQlJ 665
going to back the Bolsheviks' risky ventures. The Railwaymen's
Union demanded an agreement and was ready to back this
demand with decisive action including a general railway
strike.
c And just take note of this, comrades. Without us you couldn't
have coped either with Kornilov or with Kerensky. I know
you've just sent some detachments of saboteurs to tear up the
lines leading to the capital. But without us, you know, you
couldn't even do that. We could fix all the damage in twenty
minutes. We tell you we're not going to help you, but will fight
you if you don't come to an agreement.'
This speech made a great sensation, like a bucket of cold
water poured over the head of the meeting. But the Praesidium
had ready their own railwayman, who was unleashed at once
with the statement that the preceding speaker hadn't repre-
sented the views of the masses. But that wasn't so, while as for
the claim by the Railway Union's spokesman that the Congress
was incompetent, that wasn't true either: even after the exodus
of the 'pure-in-heart' the Congress had a full legal quorum.
The 'Council of People's Commissars' was put to the vote and
confirmed by an overwhelming majority. I don't recall any
great enthusiasm about this. But the Congress was now be-
coming thoroughly disorganized, from extreme exhaustion and
nervous tension.
The concluding act was the election of a new Central Ex.
Com. Amidst total disorder, in a rapidly emptying hall, a long
list of unknown names was read out. About 100 men in all were
elected, of whom seventy were Bolsheviks, then some Left SRs,
Novaya %hizn people, and representatives of nationalities.
The meeting closed around 5 o'clock in the morning. Limp
and exhausted, in a hurry to get home, the depleted ranks again
filled Smolny with the discordant sounds of the Internationale,
and scrambled for the way out. The Congress was over.
I waited for Lunacharsky, who was to stay with me overnight
in the new flat close by. Picking up another delegate we set off
together towards the Tauride Garden. It was still quite dark.
Lunacharsky was extremely excited, almost in raptures, and
rattled along without a stop. Unfortunately I couldn't respond
and was a silent, and even rather glum listener.
'At first Lenin didn't want to go into the Government; he said
666 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
he was going to work in the Party Central Committee. But we
said no, we wouldn't agree. We made him take first-hand
responsibility; otherwise, everyone likes just criticizing. What?
Supplies? They're all quite safe.'
'Ah! 3 Lunacharsky went on, referring to me, s he won't work
with us! He just won't! But what a Foreign Minister he would
make! Come to us! After all, there's no other solution for an
honest revolutionary. We're going to work! These events are
epoch-making! Our children's children will bow their heads
before their grandeur!'
We arrived home. My exhausted mind was incapable of
digesting the inexhaustible material of the past days.
The Second Soviet Congress was the shortest in our history.
The local delegates had to hurry home, and the centre had no
time for meetings. Toils, troubles and difficulties were making
their appearance every hour in ever-increasing numbers, like
the heads of the Hydra. Most important was the front, where
Kerensky was scraping together mixed detachments to crush the
'rebellion 3 . Until he had been liquidated it was impossible to
have an easy mind. Indeed, the revolution could not be con-
sidered complete until the head of the old Government had
been reduced to submission and taken prisoner. After all, until
this had been achieved, the country could formally choose
which it would consider the lawful Government and which the
rebels.
On the evening of October syth, information was given at the
first session of the new Central Ex. Com. that columns of Cossack
troops with artillery were concentrated round Dno Junction
and in Gatchina. Emissaries and agitators had been sent there,
but the Cossacks had declared that they would march on
Petersburg to smash the Bolsheviks. Then the railway men told
how they had received a telegram which said Kerensky was in
Gatchina with troops and heavy artillery.
During the whole of the s8th very disquieting news of
Kerensky's offensive continued to be received. The Military
Revolutionary Committee's bulletins read: 'Tsarskoe-Selo is
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IQI7 667
under artillery fire. The garrison has decided to retreat towards
Petersburg. 3 'There is fighting in Krasnoe Selo; two of our
regiments fought heroically but retreated under the pressure of
superior forces.' 'Tsarskoe has been taken by Kerensky's troops
and we are retreating to Kolpino.'
Smolny took feverish action. On the 2 8th from morning till
night troops, mostly Red Army men, were being moved to
the front. A few armoured cars and Red Cross vehicles also
passed through the streets leading to the Baltic and Warsaw
Stations. Masses of workers were sent outside the town to dig
trenches. Petersburg was festooned with barbed-wire entangle-
ments.
In the evening the new Central Ex. Com. met again, and
again it was only the news that was interesting. According to
Smolny the revolution had taken place painlessly in a whole
series of towns : Minsk, Kharkov, Samara, Kazan, Ufa, Yaro-
slavl, and also Mogilev, the Army Headquarters.
On the 30th it was decided to finish with Kerensky at one
blow. The Kronstadt and Helsingfors sailors' detachments were
moved en bloc to the front. Trotsky himself went too; from now
on he was invariably to be present at the most critical points all
over the country. . . And by the end of that night Trotsky was
already reporting to Petersburg from Pulkov: The night of the
3Oth will go down in history. Kerensky's attempt to move
counter-revolutionary troops against the capital has received a
decisive setback. KERENSKY IS IN RETREAT we are
advancing. The soldiers, sailors, and workers of Petersburg have
shown that arms in hand they can and will assert their will and
the power of the democracy. . .'
Kerensky and his counter-revolutionary troops had been
broken. If now, after four days of advance and gathering of
troops he had been rolled back, he had evidently shot his bolt.
It remained only to finish him. . . And the new Government
would be the sole lawful Government in Russia.
The liquidation of Kerensky consummated the October
Revolution. Moscow was still an arena of bitter struggle, and the
enemies of the Bolsheviks were still far from laying down their
arms. Now, however, there was in Smolny a unified and
668 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
indivisible Government of the Republic, and its armed enemies
had become rebels and nothing more.
The revolution that had placed a proletarian party at the
head of a first-class world Power was accomplished. A new
chapter had opened in the working-class movement of the world
and in the history of the Russian State.
June-August 1921.
INDEX
Abramovich, R., 634, 638
Admiralty: Tsarist Ministers barricade
themselves in, 66, 67, 75; deserted by
troops, 88
Adzhemov, 35, 606
Agrarian problems, 185, 186, 230, 278,
283, 426, 533; grow more pressing,
308; policy of Coalition with respect
to, 371, 426, 539
programme of SRs, 660
revolution, 451
Alexander Theatre, 336
Alexandrovich (Dimitrevsky), 59, 128,
305; elected to Ex. Com., 71, 79
Alexeyev, General, 198-199, 361, 626
Alexinsky, G. A., 457458
Alexis, Tsarevich: proposed as Nicho-
las IFs successor, 121, 146, 152, 159,
Air 73 ' I74
Allies, 5, 1 02, 103, 144, 241, 250, 261,
310, 312, 314, 360, 361, 364, 365, 366,
43 1 > 548, 607; obligations to, 247,
249, 363; refuse passage to Emigre's,
271; arrest Trotsky and others at
Halifax, 309; demonstrations in
favour of, 318
American Embassy, 622
Amnesty, 107, 121, 142, 179, 180
Anarchism, 282, 287, 289, 300, 390,
418, 526, 530, 553, .575
Anarchists: in April-May, 325; at
Durnovo Villa, 386-388, 412-414,
469; in 'official Soviet* demonstra-
tion, 418
Anarchy, 48, 57-58, 60, 77, 78, 85, 116,
118-119, 300, 369, 517, 523, 533
Andreyev, Leonid, 28
Anisimov, 465; accompanies Suk-
hanov to Peter-Paul Fortress, 407-
411
Anna Mikhailovna (Nikitsky's old
nurse), 134, 182
Antonov (Ovseyenko), V. A., 588, 595,
597> 59 8 > 603, 620, 642, 643, 649, 650,
652 ; member of first Soviet Govern-
ment, 655
April Days, 315-321, 324, 326, 329,
330, 346> 349* 397> 423 528, 590
Archangel, 30, 199, 305
Armoured Division, 64; mood of on
June 10, 404
Army, 20, 22, 29, 48, 105, 126, 130,
179, 201, 215, 232, 242; its role in
revolution, 19; disorders in, 1 16, 123,
215; conversion to civil status off
duty, 1 20, 122123; acknowledges
new order, 163164; Kornilov ques-
tioned on state of, 216; Soviet and
bourgeoisie struggle for, 220-222,
232-234, 239, 276, 293, 294; un-
satisfactory morale at front and in
rear, 247, 249; Ex. Corns, of send
representatives to Conference of
Soviets, 255; disorganization of, 295;
supports Soviet rather than Pro-
visional Government, 301302, 330;
Kerensky's proclamation to, 361
362; demands peace, 369, 534; de-
feated at front, 477; Committees and
Soviets of, 506, 653 ; representation in
Cabinet demanded by Cadets, 514;
Army Committee, 638; no longer
exists, 658. See also SOLDIERS.
Astrov, 531, 598
Aurora, Cruiser, 615
Austria, 256; reactions to Coalition's
attitude to war, 364365
Avanesov, 636
Avilov, B. V., 599
Avksentiev, N. D., 469, 612, 613, 618,
633; Minister of Interior in third
Coalition, 487, 516, 517
Axelrod, P. B., 322, 350, 351, 354 n.
Bagratuni, 594
'
Baltic Fleet: revolution in, 178, 179;
passes resolution against Lenin, 298;
sailors and anarchism, 325; Second
Congress of Sailors of denounces
Kerensky, 549; supports Bolsheviks,
599, 602
Station, 667
Factory, 442, 578
Banks: reopen, 136, 170; closed in
October, 624, 649
Barricades, 23, 45, 514, 541, 542, 575,
577, 608
Basil Island, 224, 390, 395, 442, 524
Batursky: member of Ex. Com., 01
Belenin (Shlyapnikov) : see SHLYAP-
NIKOV
Bazarov, 24, 599; indignant with Pro-
visional Government's Note to
Allies, 314-315; discusses Bolshevik
670 INDEX
preparations for October in Novqya
Zhizn, 568-569, 571, 572
Bessarabov, 387
Bicycle Battalion, 594
Black Hundred, 6 n., 47, 70, 84, 98, 298,
455, 458, .4^1, 462, 4^8, 469, 475,
603 ; leading counter-revolutionary
mobs, 57-58, 78; goes 'underground*,
164; newspapers, 207-208
Black Sea, 362
Fleet, 237
Bleichman : spokesman of Anarchists in
Soviet, 325; and 'official Soviet' de-
monstration, 413
Bogdanov, B. O., 40, 59, 107, 165-166,
216, 336, 435, 436, 465, 567; member
of Ex. Com., 8 1 ; member of Labour
Commission, 169; proposes remedy
for excessive size of Soviet, 223, in
charge of organization of Congress of
Soviets, 254; protests violently against
a speech of Lenin's, 286; proposes
'official Soviet' demonstration, 401-
402
Bolsheviks, 10 and passim', role of in
February, 24, 44; do not oppose
Provisional Government, 191; Bol-
shevik headquarters in Kshesin-
skaya's palace, 211, 275, 277-279;
Bolshevik woman orator attacked,
222; position in March, 226-227;
resolution on war, 257; meet Lenin in
Finland, 269; welcome Lenin, 272;
Bolshevik party organization and
'way of life*, 279-280; hear Lenin's
speech on his return, 280-285; and
slogan of 'Power to the Soviets', 283 ;
joint meeting of with other Social-
Democrats, 285-288; converted to
Lenin's ideas, 289-292; violently
attacked in Press, 296-299, 365;
and April Days, 320-321; Ail-
Russian Conference of, 324; plan for
Bolshevik newspaper, 377; at Con-
gress of Soviets, 378; ready to take
power, 380, 403, 409; control Fac-
tory Committees, 389; Bolshevik
Military Organization, 389, 403, 508,
562; and June 10, 390, 391, 392, 393,
394, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401,
402-406; and 'official Soviet' de-
monstration, 416-418; and July
Days, 428, 429, 430, 431, 436, 437-
439, 440, 441, 443, 454, 456, 458, 459,
460, 462, 463, 464, 466, 467, 468, 469,
470, 471, 473, 479, 481, 488, 501,
502 ; arrested and in prison, 462, 463,
464, 467, 470, 471, 478, 486, 604,
644; Bolshevik Congress, 490-492;
and Kornilov revolt, 505, 506, 507,
508, 511, 512, 513, 520; and Pre-
Parliament, 535-543, 555; and pre-
liminaries of October coup, 547~*576*,
577-583; and defence of Petersburg,
560, 561, 562; in October Revolu-
tion, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 593,
594, 595> 59 6 , 59 8 , 599, 60 1, 602, 604,
606, 607, 609, 610, on, 612, 613, 615,
616, 617, 618, 626, 631, 632, 636, 637,
638, 640, 645, 646, 649, 650, 654;
take power alone, 655, 658, 659, 663.
664,665,666,667-668
Bolsheviks, Central Committee of, 43,
1 28, 240, 279 n., 288 n., 297, 298, 372,
395, 399, 403, 405, 4i/, 429, 486, 563,
571, 655, 656, 666; controls majority
of Workers' Section, 389; issues pro-
clamation calling for demonstration,
390; cancels June 10 demonstration,
394, 398; and July Days, 437-439,
440, 447, 456-457, 461, 463, 464, 479,
480; meets at Sukhanov's flat and
decides on uprising, 556-557, 558,
559, 56
Bolshevik Revolution: see OCTOBER
REVOLUTION
Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, 494
Bonar Law, 596
Bonch (Bruyevich), V. D., 487; seizes
printing-works, 89, 90
Bourgeois Government, 6, 8, 1 1 , 12, 15,
1 8, 56, zoo, 1 01, 107, 358; Lenin
acknowledges necessity of, 326. See
also PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Bourgeoisie, 9 and passim; attitude to
revolution, n, 12, 13, 18, 19, 50, 77;
aims in power, 101-102; united with
Tsarism against democracy, 104;
split on question of monarchy, 154;
struggles with Soviet for army,
220222, 232-234, 239, 276, 293,
294; necessity for compromise with,
258; willing to destroy revolution at
price of military disaster, 265; at-
tacks on Lenin, 270, 297-299; and
Coalition, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333,
337, 338, 339, 345; many join SRs,
347; struggle against proletariat,
357; supports continuance of war,
363; dictatorship of, 399, 400, 508,
531; behind Kornilov, 501
Bramson, L. M., 336; member of Ex.
Com., 81; member of Financial
Commission, 166
Branting, K. H., 309
Braunstein, M. A., 57; member of
Supply Commission, 62; proposes
appointment of Commissars and for-
mation of militia, 62
Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Y. K. (Grand-
ma) : fails to arrive when expected,
23 1 ; arrives in Petersburg, 255256
Brest-Litovsk, 23
Brouckere, Louis de, 309
Buchanan, Sir George (British Am-
bassador): watches funeral of 'vic-
tims of the revolution', 246
Bulkin, 397
Bund, Bundists, 80, 168, 229, 634 n.,
638
Bureau of Central Ex. Com., 459, 460,
464, 474, 476, 500, 502, 516, 532, 548,
By]
565, 599
fkhov, 653
Cachin, 309, 366; member of French
delegation, 261; speaks to Ex.
Com., 262; speaks to Conference of
Soviets, 263; reports on Russia on
return to France, 295
Cadets (Constitutional Democrats),
4x1., 1711., 53, 11411., 146 n., 174,
203, 216, 228, 249, 338, 364, 379,
487, 489, 496, 497, 508 n., 514, 535,
536, 538, 539>. 575, on, 612; be-
come predominant party among
bourgeoisie, 213-214, 252; and Coali-
tion Government, 345-346, 358;
leave Coalition Government, 422,
424, 425, 445
Cadets (military), 26, 58, 179, 486, 487,
494, 501 n., 507, 518, 565, 590,
594, 598 ? 601, 602, 603, 605, 609, 614,
619, 620, 627, 640, 641, 642
Cappa, A., 366
Catherine Canal, 28-29
Catherine Hall (of Tauride Palace), 46,
48, 50, 52, 58, 97, 127, 153, 225, 226,
443, 445, 448, 453, 455, 459; crowds
in, 64, 65, 71, 73, 84, 91, 92, 431;
Miliukov addresses crowds in, 144-
148; filled with soldiers, 219
Caucasians, 512
Cavalry Division, i4th: brought back
from front, 468
Cecil, Lord Robert, 363, 364
Central Ex. Com., 424, 425, 426, 431,
436, 440, 443, 445, 448, 449, 455, 459,
461, 463, 464, 471, 472, 474, 475, 476,
477 > 478, 479> 48o, 487, 488, 491, 492,
493, 498, 499; 5o, 52, 504* 505> 56,
508, 510, 512, 517, 523, 524, 535, 549,
561, 573, 581, 5&2, 590, 592, 593, 595,
600, 608, 6 1 6, 6 1 8, 619, 625, 635, 646,
656, 666, 667; set up by Congress of
Soviets, 384-385; meeting in July
Days, 433-436, 447; moves into
Smolny, 498; Provisional Military
Committee of, 562; debates defence
of Petersburg, 565-568; new Com-
mittee elected by Second Congress of
Soviets, 665
INDEX 671
Chaikovsky, N. V., 371, 418
Chaliapine, F., 28
Champ de Mars, 28, 1 34, 1 94, 209, 246,
316, 415, 416, 418, 442
Chasseurs: send representatives to first
meeting of Soviet, 61 ; in October, 582
Gheievanin, F. A., 15
Chernolussky : member of Ex. Com., 81
Chernomazov: in list of Secret Police
agents, 197
Chernov, V. M., 305-307, 336, 348,
383, 389? .412, 4 J 7, 4i.9>. 480, 487;
joins Liaison Commission, 310;
Minister of Agriculture in first
Coalition Government, 347, 370;
arrested by Kronstadters, 444-447;
member of third Coalition Govern-
ment, 489
Chief of Staff (Petersburg), 564
Chkheidze, N. S., 7, 15, 35> 37. 58, 1 1 1,
115, 117, 134, 169, 177-178, i94> 240,
243, 256, 259, 322, 330, 336, 389, 390,
396, 433-434. 435. 45* 452, 453, 460,
461, 473, 497, 519; member of
Provisional Committee of Duma, 35 ;
member of Provisional Ex. Com. of
Soviet, 40; Chairman of Soviet, 60,
140, 150-151, 265, 349, 359; in-
cluded in Ex. Com., 71, 79; position
in Ex. Com., 82; makes speeches to
crowds, soldiers, etc., 83-84, 93, 431;
afraid of taking power, 107; reports
to Soviet on resumption of work, 192,
194-195; discusses Manifesto to the
Peoples of the World, 205-206;
argues against licensing Black Hun-
dred newspapers, 207208; intro-
duces Gorky to Ex. Com. and Soviet,
209; speaks to demonstrating regi-
ments, 219220; included in
'Swamp', 229; one of 'new majority'
in Ex. Com., 245; member of
Liaison Commission, 247; his son's
accidental death and funeral, 251,
256 ; answers foreign delegates at Ex.
Com., 262; meets Lenin on his
arrival, 269-273; denounced by
Lenin as 'revolutionary defensist',
279, 281; disperses demonstration
against Provisional Government, 316;
ignores Trotsky on his appearance in
Ex. Com., 340; ceases to be Chair-
man of Soviet, 528
Chudnovsky: arrested on journey to
Russia, 309
Cirque Moderns, 500, 562
Civil Governor of Petersburg, 49,
112-113, 115-116,170, 183,437,576
Civil war, 273, 281, 287, 314, 318, 319,
320, 412, 509, 529, 536, 567, 611, 621,
636
672 INDEX
Coalition, 6, 97, 101, 106, 107, 138, 139,
555
Government, first, 329-341, 345-
352, 356, 35B-36I, 363> 364, 369* 37i>
376, 3?8, 3833 3% 390, 39i, 392. 395,
396, 398, 400* 402, 403* 404* 4<> 6 , 407.
408, 41 1, 412, 416, 41 7, 432, 435, 436,
441, 442, 443, 445, 447, 453, 454, 45 6 ,
457, 458, 460, 463* 472, 473. 474,
485 ; programme and composition of,
336-339; official statement on peace,
360-361, 362; relations with Soviets,
380, 394; splits, 384, 395; collapse of,
421-423, 424-425; reconstruction of,
425-426; recovers after July Days,
468,470,477,482
Government, second, 474, 476, 478,
485-488
Government, third, 488-489, 491,
492, 495* 496 5 498, 52, 53, 55,
506, 508 n., 510, 511, 514, 517, 519,
522, 525; proposed transfer to Mos-
cow, 515, 539, 548
Government, fourth, 527, 528, 529,
53, 533, 534, 535, 538, 539, 54, 54 1 ,
542, 547, 548, 549, 550, 55i, 552, 557,
"4 567* J
558, 559, 561, 564, 567* 575, 582, 587.
588, 592, 593, 595, 596, 598, 601, 602,
604, 605, 606, 607, 609, 610, 6 1 1, 612,
613, 614, 615, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622,
623, 625, 626, 627, 632, 633, 634, 637,
646, 656, 666; besieged in Winter
Palace, 640643 ; arrested and sent to
Peter-Paul Fortress, 642-644, 645, 648
Commissars, 107, 136, 490, 510, 590,
59 * 593, 594, 595, 59$, 598, 600, 60 1,
603, 608, 614, 618, 630, 654, 655,
665; needed for defence of revolution,
58, 62-63 ; appointed by Ex. Com., 72
Committee of Public Safety, 607, 611,
625, 633, 646
Committee of Revolutionary Defence,
^ 559, 56o
Compromisers, 358, 378, 522, 637, 639,
640, 644
Conference of Soviets, Preliminary
Ail-Russian, 255, 257, 258-259, 378;
receives Allied delegations, 263; re-
sults of its work, 262-265
Congress of Soviets, First All-Russian,
255, 378-385, 389, 390, 39 J , 392, 393,
394, 395, 398, 4 01 , 43> 44, 46, 4">
415, 418, 424, 476, 525, 543, 631, 636;
sets up Central Ex. Com., 384, 425;
and Anarchists, 387, 388; performs
police functions, 388
, Second All-Russian, 499, 555, 556,
572, 582, 599, 602, 615, 630, 631, 632,
633, 634, 635-640, 644-647, 648, 656,
663, 664, 665, 666
, northern district, 594
Constituent Assembly, n, 68, 107, 120,
121, 122-123, 147, 153, 154, 176,
187-188, 198, 202, 218, 282, 320, 333,
37i, 383, 481. 53 1 , 532, 538, 539, 540,
549, 550, 55 1 , 552, 556, 573, 605, 606,
623, 630, 636, 657, 659, 660
Co-operative movement, 58, 321, 346,
471 n., 534, 611
Cossacks, 6, 26, 510, 533, 590, 660;
show sympathy with revolution, 15;
patrolling streets, 19; some regiments
adhere to revolution, 64; false
alarm of attack on Tauride Palace,
93; Cossack Congress, 255; Cossack
Regiments expected to support Coali-
tion on June 10, 404; 'loyal' in July
Days, 442; Don Cossacks brought
back from front, 468; 3rd Cossack
Corps marches on Petersburg, 511;
attack Kaluga Soviet, 543; in Octo-
ber, 589, 593, 594, 600, 618-619, 640,
641, 651, 666; Union of Cossack
troops, 617
Council of Ministers, Council of State :
See TSARIST GOVERNMENT, PRO-
VISIONAL GOVERNMENT, COALITION
GOVERNMENT
Council of People's Commissars, 654,
^55, 665
Council of the Russian Republic, 539,
540, 612, 613, 625
Counter-revolution, 57-58, 78, 85, no,
164, 176, 215, 346, 395, 398, 455, 456,
4^9, 473, 474, 475, 485, 49 1, 54, 57,
517, 529, 539, 547, 548, 568, 591, 603,
610, 617, 626, 636, 637, 640, 646, 664,
667
Coup d'etat, 141, 399, 468, 479, 480, 548,
561, 562, 563, 564, 566, 583, 587, 599,
605, 606, 648, 662
Credentials Committee (of Soviet), 61
Crimea, 198
Cuxholm Regiment, 625; represented
at first meeting of Soviet, 6 1 ; re-
garded as doubtful on June 10, 404;
in October, 582
Czech Socialists, 367
Dan (Gurvich), F. I., 256-257, 262, 322,
352, 356, 357, 394, 397, 398, 401, 426,
443, 449, 455, 459~46, 461, 473, 474,
479, 490, 543, 566, 567, 568, 582, 6 10,
613, 616, 617, 618, 633, 635, 636, 644,
645, 663, 664; editor oflzvestiya, 299
Dashkevich, Second-Lieut., 592
Defensism, Defensists, 3, 8, n, 15, 19,
20, 81, 165, 167, 168, 202, 206, 221,
235, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 258 n.,
261, 278, 279, 281, 282, 287, 338 n.,
357, 664
Delo Naroda, 224
Democratic Conference, 524, 527,
532 n., 538, 554, 556
Demonstrations, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 37, 40-
41, 419, 422, 498, 501, 523, 571, 573;
fired on, 22, 430, 442; of war-
wounded, 299, 455; for and against
Miliukov and Provisional Govern-
ment, 315-319; temporarily for-
bidden in April, 319-320, in June,
393; of 'over-forties', 370, 391; in
favour of Anarchists, 387; against
Coalition Government, 389-394;
proposed for June 10, 389-394, 396-
401; 'official Soviet', 401, 406, 411-
418; of July Days, 427, 428, 429,
430-43 1 > 433, 436, 438, 439, 44> 442,
443, 444, 451, 454, 456, 459, 481; in
Moscow, 494, 577; in October, 564,
567, 590, 600, 609, 611
Denikin, 510
Detention Prison: attacked by crowds,
36; set on fire, 42
Directory, 508, 514-515* 523
'Disorders' (rioting, fires, looting, etc.),
3, 5, 6, 16, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56,
57-58, 78, 84, 92-93, 149, 157-158,
183, 308, 368-369, 386, 474-475. 5">
513; Gorky grumbles at, 95-96;
discussed by Duma Committee,
118-119; in Baltic Fleet, 1 78-1 79 ; of
April Days, 315-319; of July Days,
430, 431, 433, 439-440, 442, 443, 444,
451-452, 454, 455, 459, 462, 464, 468;
at end of September, 533 ; in October,
563, 564, 580, 599, 603, 605, 608, 609,
636, 649, 650
District Commander (of Petersburg),
214, 564, 583, 589, 590, 593, 594 n.,
600
District Court : on fire, 42, 45
Dno (junction), 100, 109, 112, 511, 512,
5x3, 666
Dobrovolsky, 97
Don Cossacks, 468, 618-619
Dual power, 215, 295, 333, 559
Dubois: arrested and released, 626
Duma, 4n., 12 n., 67, 71, 73 n., 433,
532, 535> 546, 596
, First, 14 n., 552
, Second, i5n., H7n., 457, 552;
Second-Duma exiles, 142, 231,
240
, Third, 4 n., 7 n., 35 n., iisn.,
117 n.
, Fourth, 4, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 27, 28,
30, 36, 49, 53, 57, 67, 113 n., ii7n.,
145, 151, 153, 201, 218, 219, 275,
390; attitude to revolution of, 18, 35;
dissolution of, 30, 34; elects Pro-
INDEX 673
visional Committee, 34-35; receives
mutinous regiments, 37; Military
Committee of, 40; in right wing of
Tauride Palace, 50; ready to co-
operate with Tsar, 1 10
Duma Committee: see PROVISIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA
Steering Committee, 13, 1 8
Durnovo (Tsarist Minister) : his villa as
Anarchist base, 386-388, 412-41^,,
469, 604; workers' delegates in his
villa, 390, 394, 395
Dvinsk, 362, 454
Dybenko: member of First Soviet
Government, 655
Dyen, 168
Economics: problems of, 60, 185-187,
212-213; Lenin's and Bolsheviks''
neglect of, 284, 421, 525, 571;
debated by conference of Factory
Committees, 373; economic pro-
gramme of Soviet Government,
Ehrlich, 638; member of Ex. Com., 80;
supporter of Coalition, 138; member
of Ex. Com. Propaganda Commis-
sion, 165, 1 68
Eight-hour day, 211-213, 218, 220, 232,
233
'Elders', 532, 625
Electro-Technical Battalion, 64; in
October, 582
Emelyanova, L., 444
Engelhardt, Colonel, 69, 71, 125
Engels, 291, 292
England (and Great Britain), 361, 629,
657 ; as model for bourgeois Govern-
ment, 1 02, 301; British officers at
Soviet meeting, 144; asked to re-
ceive Tsar, 198-199; French and
British delegates to Russia, 260-263,
266; Ex. Com.'s protest to against
arrest of Trotsky and others, 309;
Chernov's conversations with British
statesmen, 310; Government releases
emigres, 311; questions in Parliament,
363, 364; Labour Conference, 366
367
Ex. Com. (Executive Committee of the
Petersburg Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies), 24 and passim,
elections to, 70-71, 79; relations with
Military Commission, 71; holds
first session, 72 ; urges troops to obey
officers, 76-77; in Room 13, 78, 113;
hears Gorky's appeal for preserva-
tion of artistic treasures, 209;
composition and characteristics of
first, 79-83; work of constantly
674 INDEX
interrupted, 83-86, 176-177; organ-
izational and routine work of, 86,
135-136, I39> HD-W 164-170;
signs orders for arrests, 96-97;
proclamations of, 100, 124, 1127;
debates political problems of revolu-
tion, 107108; refuses Rodzianko a
train, 108-112; attitude to war of,
IOQ, 239-245; appoints Nikitsky
assistant to Civil Governor, 113;
confers with Duma Committee on
Provisional Government, 114-126;
suppresses SR~Interdistrictite leaflet,
129-130; will not enter Provisional
Government, 137; deals with sol-
diers* tram-fares, 171172; and
Tsar's abdication, 172-173; and
revolution in Baltic Fleet, 178;
asked by Grohman to reorganize
national economy, 186; refuses to
allow Nicholas to leave Russia, 198-
201; regarded as 'openers of the
front', 203; debates licensing of news-
papers, 207; clashes with Inter-
district Committee, 208; discusses
proposed offensive with Kornilov,
215-216; discusses representation in
Soviet, 222-224; composition and
characteristics of in middle of March,
227-230; receives many military
delegations, 234236; new petty-
bourgeois majority in, 245, 260, 304,
313; debates proposed statement of
Provisional Government,, 251-253;
out of touch with Soviet, 259-260;
Allied delegations visit, 261-263;
hears of Lenin's impending arrival,
265; sanctions the 'sealed train',
272; split in, 300-301, 359; recog-
nized by Conference of Soviets as
All-Russian Soviet organ, 304; re-
organization of, 307; hears report of
Liaison Commission, 312-313; and
Miliukov's note to Allies, 314; for-
bids demonstrations in April Days,
319-320; Internationalist group in,
323; and Coalition, 329~33<>> 334>
335> S3 6 , 358; Henderson speaks in,
365-366; and Anarchists, 38$, 387;
discusses cancelled demonstration of
June 10, 396-401; and 'official
Soviet' demonstration, 411, 414; new
elections to, 529-53 1 ; discusses de-
fence of Petersburg, 559-561
working conditions in, 211-213;
soldiers demand control of, 232;
Factory Committees, an, 373,
389* 561; soldiers visit, 233, 234,
294; morale in, 247; Lenin calls
for armed workers in, 284; resolu-
tion calling for power to the Soviets,
300; in April Days, 316, 317; re-
elections to Soviets in, 324; Nevka
resolution on Coalition, 358; dis-
orders among factory workers, 368;
on Vyborg Side on strike, 387 ; Central
Bureau of Factory Committees issues
proclamation, 390; delegates from
Congress of Soviets sent to, 393, 394,
395; pass resolutions against Bol-
shevik demonstration, 396; in July
Days, 427, 429, 430, 435, 436, 442,
449~45 3 459? 47 1 \ second Conference
of Factory Committees, 492 ; in Mos-
cow on strike, 494; in October, 578,
59i, 598
Fedorov, 491
Financial Commission of Ex.
164, 1 66, 167
Com.,
Factories, 9, 86, 170, 177, 194, 212, 294,
300, 400, 412, 488, 507, 529, 558,
662; meetings in, 5, 14, 233; elec-
tions in, 15; at a standstill, 16;
occupied by troops, 23, 25; new
Finland, 179, 305, 362, 513, 620;
Lenin met by Bolsheviks in, 270
Finland Station, 430, 513, 620; scenes
at Lenin's arrival, 269-274; Chernov
arrives at, 307; Martov and the
Mensheviks arrive at, 351
Finnish District Committee, 604
Finnish Regiment: represented at
first meeting of Soviets, 61 ; threatens
to arrest Provisional Government,
316-317; regarded as doubtful on
June 10, 404
Finns, 204
First Theses of Lenin, 289, 324
Fleet, Central Committee of, 508, 549,
560
Fontanka (Canal), 45
Foreign policy, 9, 120, 314, 360, 583,
594> 596; of Provisional Govern-
ments, 227, 247, 249, 539; Miliukov's
disavowed by Kerensky and Nek-
rasov, 248
'Former' people, 83, 349
France, 295, 657; Socialists in, 19; as
model for bourgeois government,
1 02, 301; French and British dele-
gations to Russia, 260-263, 366;
Chernov's conversations with French
statesmen, 310; representatives at
mass-meetings, 361; Tereshchenko's
telegram in Chamber of Deputies,
364; and Stockholm Conference^
Frankorussky, 39, 40, 62; talks
to Sukhanov of agrarian troubles,
Funeral of 'victims of the revolution' :
Soviet decides on, 193; opposition
to burial-place in Palace Square,
194, 197, 209; takes place on Champ
de Mars, 246-247
Gatchina, 136, 513, 593, 666
Geldeman, 637
General Staff, 218, 454, 455, 458, 463,
464, 487, 513, 517, 559, 560, 589,
590> 59 * > 592, 593. 594> 596, 59$, 600,
60 1, 602, 603, 606, 609, 615, 6 1 8, 619,
621, 632, 652, 653
Germany, Germans, 178, 206, 215, 218,
220, 238, 243, 276, 360, 366, 367, 504,
534, 539> 548, 583* 629, 657,
658; German provocation, 12, 475;
Socialists in, 19, 243; rumoured
revolution in Berlin, 151 ; German
offensive, 215-216; appeal to Ger-
man proletariat in Manifesto to the
Peoples of the World, 217; Lenin and
others travel to Russia via, 270, 271,
272, 297, 311, 351; Platten's re-
lations with German Government,
311-312; reactions to Coalition's
attitude to war, 364-365; German
yoke, 366; Germans ready to go to
Stockholm, 367; Lenin's supposed
relations with General Staff, 453, 454,
458-459; Kornilov surrenders Riga,
to, 503; 'Bolshevik German agents',
511; threatening Reval, 537; revolt
in Fleet, 573
Glebov: member of first Soviet Govern-
ment, 655
Godnev, 117, 152, 156; in *Left Seven'
group, 249
Goldenberg, I. P., 287
Golitsyn, Prince, 51
Gorky, Maxim, 3, 8, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28,
29, 42, 43, i68n., 205, 303, 519; at
Tauride Palace, 78-79; disillusioned
with revolution, 95-96; and the
Manifesto to the Peoples of the
World, 197, 203, 206; speaks to Ex.
Com. and Soviet on preservation of
artistic treasures, 208-209; asked to
negotiate for separate peace, 365;
and 'official Soviet* demonstration,
415; on rumours of Bolshevik coup,
563-564; 25th anniversary as a
writer, 579, 580
Gots, A. R., 336, 436, 461, 469, 478,
609, 613, 6 1 6, 6 1 8, 633; sent by Ex.
Com. to welcome Chernov, 305
Governor-General of Petersburg, 6 n. ;
Savinkov appointed, 509; Palchinsky
as 515,517
Grekov, 017
INDEX 675
Grenadiers: fraternize with revolu-
tionaries, 27; represented at first
meeting of Soviet, 61; follow Bol-
sheviks, 389; expected to aid revolt on
June 10, 404; demonstrate in July
Days, 429; in October, 582, 611
Grinevich (Schechter), 40, 58, 67, 69;
elected to Praesidium of Soviet, 60;
elected to Literary Commission, 64;
included in Ex. Com., 71, 79, 82
Grohman, V. G., 39, 50, 555; member
of Supply Commission, 62, 507;
consults Sukhanov on economic
problems, 185-189
Guchkov, A. I., 12, 133, 153, 563,,590,
626 ; Minister of War in Provisional
Government, 76, 85, 102, 103, 126,
145, 249, 295, 313, 3.18, 327; objects
to terms of agreement with Ex. Com.,
130-132; travels to Pskov to obtain
Tsar's abdication, 152, 158-159, 172,
177, 178; supports Michael as Tsar's
successor, 174, 175-176; resigns, 335
Gvozdev, K. A., 643 ; freed from prison
by crowds, 38; member of Provisional
Ex. Com., 40, 58; elected to Praesi-
dium of Soviet, 60; chairman of
Credentials Committee, 61; included
in Ex. Com., 79; member of Finan-
cial Commission, 167168; member
of Labour Commission, 169; chosen
to arrest Tsar, 200-201
Headquarters, 36, 38, 125, 493, 506,
509, 5H, 523> 587
Helsingfors, 362, 604, 617, 652, 667;
Baltic Fleet in, 178, 179, 599, 602;
Kerensky's illness in, 204
Henderson, A., 365366
Hindenburg, 215, 365
Homogeneous Bureau of Ex. Com., 315,
316
Hungary: Socialists in, 367
Interdistrict Committee, Interdistric-
tites, 8 1, 128, 208, 213, 231 n., 377,
392, 399> 4?4, 406, 436, 439, $54,*
Trotsky joins, 359; join United
Internationalists, 379; conference
of, 419-421, 422, 448; programme of,
420, 421; leave Central Ex. Com.
meeting, 434; and return to it, 435;
formally merge with the Bolsheviks,
691
International, 101, 265, 306, 331, 349;
Communist, 279 n.; First, 291, 536
Internationale) 142 n., 658, 665
Inzhenerny Street, 581
Irkutsk, 203
676 INDEX
Isaac Square, 608
Iskra, 1 02 n., 256 n., 258 n., 278,
322 n., 353, 354
Italy, 366, 629; Socialists in oppose
war, 11, 305; Socialists willing to
attend Stockholm Conference, 367
Izborsky Regiment : brought back from,
front, 468
Izmailovsky Regiment: mutinies, 36;
decides to join Bolshevik demon-
stration, 391 ; regarded as doubtful on
June 10, 404; in July Days, 455; in
October, 582
Izvestiya, 59 n., 89, 127-128, 195, 211,
213, 300, 444, 516, 656; publishes
real names of Soviet leaders, 80;
reorganized, 1 64- 1 65 ; protests
against attacks on Lenin, 299
Joffe, 580
July Days, 278, 365, 424, 425-470, 475*
479-482, 485, 486, 489, 490, 491, 492,
500, 501, 502, 508, 513, 514, 520, 521,
525> 527, 558, 563> 565* 588, 655
June 10, 389, 390, 393, 394, 402-406,
4 11 , 432>525 655
Kaiser, 151, 206, 215, 243, 365, 502, 575
Kaledin: supports Kormlov, 510
Kaluga, 543
Kamenets-Podolsk, 362
Kamenev (Rosenfeld), L. B., 225-226,
240, 263, 279, 280, 285, 292, 336,
377, 391, 393, 4'4> 4*7, 4*8, 4*9, 43<>>
438> 445, 4635 464, 466, 467, 470, 492,
520, 532, 538, 557, 566, 571-572, 576,
636, 645, 653, 655, 656, 662; dis-
cusses Bolshevik position with Suk-
hanov, 226-227; on Bolshevik re-
solution on war, 257-258; attacked in
press, 297; leader of Bolsheviks in
Soviet ana Ex. Com., 324; speaks for
Bolsheviks on June 10 demonstration,
398, 399; against seizure of power on
June 10, 405; arrested in July Days,
486
Kamenno-ostrovsky Prospect, 16, 26,
34,415,442
Kamkov, 347, 434, 574, 610
Kapelinsky, N, Y., 40, 58, 531 ; member
of Ex. Com., 71, 79, 82; secretary of
Ex. Com., 177
Karakhan, 516
Karpovka, 34, 179, 197, 276, 319, 500,
533, 556, 580, 583, 630
Kartashev: Procurator of Holy Synod
in third Coalition, 489
Kazan, 667
Kazansky Square, 22
Keksholm : see CUXHOLM
Kerensky, A. F., 6, 17, 18, 21, 22, 29,
30-33, 37, 47, 48, 65, 91-92, 93, 106,
116, 117, 118, 120, 135, 148, 179, 180-
181, 197, 209, 210, 224, 240, 282, 321,
327-329, 344, S^i, 383, 43i, 450, 472,
473, . 74, 528, 542 ; member of
Provisional Committee of Duma, 35;
forms Military Commission, 40;
declares Shchegloyitov under arrest,
52; at first meeting of Soviet, 59;
elected to Praesidium of Soviet, 60;
leaves Soviet for right wing of
Tauride Palace, 81 ; speaks to crowds,
9<$ ; taken in by false alarm, 94; in-
vited to join Government, 101;
hysterical over refusal of train to
Rodzianko, 111-112; showing signs
of strain, 114-115; offered Ministry of
Justice in Provisional Government,
127, 137; denounces SR~Interdis-
trictite leaflet, 129-130; objects to
Sokolov's draft proclamation, 130-
132; appeals to Soviet for support,
140-144; Minister of Justice in first
Provisional Government, 145, 149,
363; leads anti-monarchists in
inet, 175-176; declares Tsar may
leave for England, 199; announces
reorganization of officers' corps,
204205; disavows Miliukov's foreign
policy statement, 248; in 'Left Seven'
group, 249; supports demand for
Coalition, 329-330, 335; proposed as
Minister of Justice in Coalition
Government, 336; Minister of War in
first Coalition Cabinet, 339, 340, 347,
361-363, 458; proclamation to army,
361-362; visits front, 363, 370; at
peak of popularity, 374; included
in Central Ex. Com., 384; denies
rumours of troops brought from front,
392-393, 460; Premier in Coalition
Governments, 474, 476, 485, 486,
487, 488, 489, 490, 493, 494, 495,
498, 516, 522, 533, 538, 548, 552,
555, 558, 562, 564, 565, 583, 587,
595; and Kornilov revolt, 502, 503,
505, 507* 508-509, 547; at Pre-Parlia-
ment, 537, 597, 605-608, 611, 612,
615; and October Revolution, 590,
59 r , 593, 594, 600, 60 1, 602, 604,
609, 612, 616, 617, 618, 621, 622,
623, 625, 628, 629, 643, 644, 645,
650, 651, 652, 662, 665, 666, 667
Kerensky, Olga Lvovna, 22, 27, 131,
179, 1 80
Khabaloy, General, 6, 17; his pro-
clamations torn down, 16, 25
Kharkov, 533, 667
Khinchuk, 637
Khrustalev-Nosar, 59
Kiev, 198, 362
Kishkin, N. M., 508, 641, 643
Klembovsky, General : supports Korni-
lov, 510
Kokoshkin : Comptroller of Finances in
third Coalition, 489
Kolontai, A. M.; supports Lenin at
Social-Democratic joint meeting,
288; arrested, 486
Kolpino, 667
Konovalov, A. I., 35, 53, 55, 65, 382-
383, 555, 607, 642; in 'Left Seven'
group, 249, 535 . , , ,
Kopeika printing-shop : seized by Bonch,
Kornilov, General, 33, 319, 493, 498,
535, 542, 563* 565., 575. 593, 610,
617, 637, 646, 653, 665; demands Ex.
Com.'s co-operation in war, 2 1 5-2 1 6 ;
greets Volhynian Regiment, 218;
leads troops against Petersburg, 500,
652; arrested, 513
revolt, 66, 345, 500-513, 514, 517,
5i9 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 527,
53 1 538, 543, 547, 54, 5^8, 589, 626
Kornilovites, 501, 508, 509, 510, 511,
512, 513, SHi 517. 538, 610, 611,
626, 632, 650, 653
Kozlovsky: member of Ex. Com., 81
Krasikov, 108, 112; member of Propa-
ganda Commission, 165
Krasnoe Selo, 404, 420, 448, 479, 667
Krasnov, General, 593, 594, 617, 61 8
Krasny, 513
Kresty Prison: attacked by crowds, 36
Kronstadt, 498, 517, 652, 667; joins the
revolution, 66; hears Trotsky and
Lunacharsky with approval, 372;
sends representatives to workers*
meeting, 390; expected to support
Bolsheviks on June 10, 404; and July
Days, 438, 440-448, 451, 462-464,
465-467, 468, 469, 479, 480, 486;
and Kornilov revolt, 508
Kronvergsky Prospect, 23, 44, 276
Kropotkin, 570, 630
Krylenko, N. V., 392, 394; member of
first Soviet Government, 655
Krymov, 511, 512
Kshesinskaya : protests against seizure
of her house, 209-2 1 1 ; her house as
Bolshevik headquarters, 211, 275,
276, 277-279, 280, 282, 298, 324,
404, 416, 441, 451, 462, 469, 479
Kuchin, 454, 638
Kuhlmann, R. von, 302, 365
Kulaks, 308, 321
Kurayev, 491
Kurlov, P. G., 88
Kuskov, 586
INDEX 677
Labour Commission of Ex. Com., 167
Labriola, A., 366
Ladyzhnikov, I. P., 42, 43; produces
list of Secret Police agents, 196-197
Lafont, 261, 361
Land, 201, 202, 230, 426, 479, 555, 584,
606, 609, 610, 6n, 613, 623, 629;
for the peasants, 185, 213; and Free-
dom, 218, 347, 363; Peace, Bread,
and, 264-265, 327, 396, 422, 456,
549? 552, 558, 588, 6 59; seizure and
distribution of, 283, 300, 371, 426,
533, 552, 555, 57o; speculations in,
308, 327; Lenin's 'Land Decree',
659-662, 663
Lapinsky, 597
Larin (Lurye), M. A., 230, 336, 496,
570; part-author of resolution on
defence and peace, 244; joins
Bolsheviks, 524, 554
Lashevich, 562, 596
Lazimir, 562
Lebedev; member of Third Coalition
Government, 488
Leeds: Labour conference in, 366
'Left Seven* in Provisional Government,
249, 250, 339
Lenin (Ulyanov), 15 n., 33, 178, 226,
227, 265, 305, 306, 311, 318, 323,
324> 338, 345, 353, 354, 35$, S^o,
369, 373, 374, 375, 37^ 377, 383,
3% 389, 392, 393, 396, 397, 403,
404, 405, 406, 418, 419, 451, 478,
490, 49 1 , 501, 522, 523, 524, 525,
529, 537, 55i, 553, 554, 555, 55$;
arives in Petersburg, 263, 269-285,
338; travels via Germany, 270-271,
276, 297, 2983 309, 351; speaks 'to
the people', 274, 275, 276, 277, 278;
meets Sukhanov, 278279; as orator,
280; first speech to Bolshevik leaders,
281285; his 'constitutional system',
282284; calls for Power to the
Soviets, 282-283; has no economic
programme, 284, 289; speaks at
Social-Democratic joint meeting,
285288; discussed by Skobelev, Su-
khanov, and Miliukov, 288-289; the
First Theses, 289, 324; Bolsheviks con-
quered by his ideas, 289-292; arrival
of unnoticed by the masses, 293;
attacked by press, 297-299, 371 ; and
April Days, 320-321; speaks at
Peasant Congress, 371; speaks to
Soldiers' Section of Soviet, 371-372;
declares that Bolsheviks are ready to
take power, 380-381; outlines pro-
gramme of a Bolshevik Government,
381-382; included in Central Ex.
Com., 384; draft of Bolshevik pro-
gramme, 420 421; and July Days,
678 INDEX
437, 438, 440, 44 1 , 442, 4^i, 464,
479, 480, 481 n.; accused of relations
with German General Staff, 453, 454,
457-459, 4 6l -4 62 > 472J disappears to
avoid arrest, 470-472, 484, 487; in
hiding, 516, 525, 536, 550; in Octo-
ber, 556, 557, 567, 568, 570, 572, 573,
574, 575, 576, 583, 606, 627, 628-
630, 631, 632, 635, 636, 637, 646,
649, 652, 654, 655, 656, 658, 659,
660, 66 1, 662, 665-666; State and
Revolution, 570
Lerda, G., 366
Letopis, 3, 4, 17, 21, 24, 32, 46, 96, 98,
224, 225, 256, 303, 339, 374, 410,
415, 419
Liaison Commission of Ex. Com., 245,
246, 255, 281, 288, 300, 329, 335,
590; proposed by Sukhanov, 188
190; not in being on March 6, 200;
meets in Marian Palace, 217; asks
Provisional Government for state-
ment of war aims, 247-248; 249-251 ;
work increasing, 309 ; demands Plat-
ten's admission to Russia, 310-312;
reports to Ex. Com., 312313; ceases
to function, 359
Lieber (Goldman), M. L, 391, 411,
412, 461, 463, 464, 465-466, 663,
664; member of Ex. Com., 81, 229;
invites Sukhanov to join Homo-
geneous Bureau, 3i5n.; praises
Coalition Government, 380; attacks
Bolsheviks, 400-401
Liebknecht, Karl, 273
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 273 n., 291, 573
Ligoyka, 89
Liquidators, 15
Liteiny Prospect, 23, 36, 41, 42, 45,
430, 442, 443, 464
Literary Commission of Soviet, 63;
elections to, 64; begins work in Duma
Chairman's office, 6465, 67, 68-69;
moves to another room, 69
Lithuanian Regiment: mutinies, 36;
received by Duma, 39 ; represented at
first meeting of Soviet, 61 ; marches to
Tauride Palace, 218; regarded as
doubtful on June 10, 404; in October,
603, 625
Lloyd George, 261, 302
Lomov: member of first Soviet Govern-
ment, 655
Luga, 511, 622
Lunacharsky, A. V., 81 n., 350, 353,
359, 372, 374-376, 377, 379, 381,
384, 392, 394, 4*9, 420, 421, 433,
439, 445, 452, 453, 460, 464, 467-
468, 471, 478-479, 48o, 481, 486, 491,
500, 502, 504, 513, 562, 576, 630,
636, 646, 665, 666; leads Kron-
stadters to Tauride Palace, 440-443;
arrested, 489; People's Commissar
for Popular Education in first Soviet
Government, 655
Lvov, G. E., Prince, 117, 118, 152, 248,
?93, 300, 335, 338, 432; Premier
in Provisional and First Coalition
Governments, 145, 175, 309, 364,
403, 453, 456, 457, 470; 'appointed'
Premier by Tsar, 172; confers with
Grand Duke Michael, 176; in 'Left
Seven' group, 249; receives peasants'
and soldiers' delegations, 327-328;
negotiates with Ex. Com. on question
of Coalition, 336, 337; resignation of,
473, 474, 476
Lvov, V. N., 35, 117, 152, 338; in
'Left Seven' group, 249
MacDonald, R., 367
Machine-gun Regiments: expected to
aid revolt on June 10, 404; in July
Days, 428, 429, 442
, ist: adheres to Bolsheviks, 372,
389? 419; decides to take part in
Bolshevik demonstration, 391
Maklakov, 509
Malachite Hall (of Winter Palace), 612,
613
Malinovsky, R. V., 296-297
Malyantovich, 604
'Mamelukes', 228, 243, 260, 313, 366,
380, 424, 441, 452, 454, 455, 471,
475, 477, 496, 505
Mandates Commission, 84, 86, 223,
228
Mandelberg, Dr., 585
Manifesto to the Peoples of the World,
197, 203, 205-207, 216-217, 222, 235,
240, 241, 242, 254, 281
Manikovsky, 622
Manufacturers' Association: agrees to
new working conditions in factories,
211-213
Manukhin, 1. 1., Dr., 95, 177, 189, 204,
375, 437, 367, 378; prison doctor at
Peter-Paul Fortress, 407, 408-411,
462
Marian Palace, 158, 217-218, 585;
seat of Provisional Government, 200,
213, 216, 224, 234, 247, 249, 251,
252, 288, 300, 309, 310, 315, 317,
322, 327, 335, 359, 403, 406, 424,
428, 432, 493, 541, 547; Pre-Parlia-
ment meets in, 535, 537, 538, 540,
597, 610, 624, 625, 627
Marseillaise, 142, 218, 219, 222, 272,
274, 295, 455
Martov, J. O., 82, 250,
352-356, 374, 376, 379, $3, 393?
82, 256, 278, 305, 322,
399, 4, 4 OI 424, 434? 448? 452>
455, 48o, 490, 5^9, 534, 656; warns
against Allied parliamentary Social-
ists, 261; obliged to travel through
Germany to reach Russia, 271, 351;
arrives in Petersburg, 350, 351;
opposes Coalition, 352; leader of
Menshevik-Internationalists, 356-
358, 378, 460, 478, 49 1 , 523, 524, 530,
53i, 532, 543, 563, 567, 574, 595, 607,
608, 609, 6 10, 615, 6 1 6, 623, 634;
speaks in Pre-Parliament, 596-597,
610-611, 612; at Second Congress
of Soviets, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640,
644, 645, 646
Martynov, 531, 631, 633
Marx, Karl, 291, 292, 569, 592, 630,
660
Marxism, Marxists, 102, 201, 258 n.,
283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 291, 292,
321, 322 n., 323, 324, 379, 426, 473,
526, 530, 553, 568, 575, 660, 66 1
Maximalists: see ANARCHISTS
Mekhonoshin, 562, 620
Mensheviks, Menshevism, 7 n., 15,
Son., 57, 58, 60, 81, 82, 102 n., 151,
1 68, 229 n., 230 n., 231 n., 245,
269 n., 288 n., 322, 323, 336, 338 n.,
354 n., 359, 373, 381, 395, 396, 397,
405, 411, 412, 454, 473, 474, 481 n.,
487, 489, 490, 492, 496, 497, 504, 508,
523, 524, 525, 530, 531, 532, 535, 538,
542, 543, 555, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563,
567, 581, 59, 598, 608, 6 10, 612, 626,
630, 631, 632, 633, 636, 637, 638, 640,
644, 648, 654, 663; Petersburg meet-
ing of on war question, 252 ; obliged
to travel via Germany to reach
Russia, 271 ; joint meeting with other
Social-Democrats, 285-288 ; and
Coalition Government, 348-352, 356,
358; All-Russian Conference of, 350,
35 * -352, 356; split in, 356-358, 490,
526; at Congress of Soviets, 378-379;
Provincial Conference of, 470
, Central Committee of, 256 n., 356,
357, 473, 634
Menshevik-Internationalists, 82, 165,
323, 357, 358, 373, 378-379, 424, 46o,
478, 486, 490, 491, 523-524, 530, 535,
541, 542, 543, 563, 573, 574, 585, 595,
598, 606-607, 608, 61 1, 612, 631,
633-634, 636, 640, 644, 645, 646
Merezhkovsky, D. S., 189, 290
Michael, Grand Duke: proposed as Re-
4 gent after Tsar's abdication, 121, 147,
152, 159; is refused special train,
136; named by Tsar as his successor,
1 59, 1 73 ; supported by Miliukov and
Guchkov, 1 741 75 ; refuses to succeed
Nicholas, 176
INDEX 679
Michael Artillery School: adheres to
Bolsheviks, 389; expected to aid re-
volt on June 10, 404
Michael Castle, 416
Michael Theatre: used for sessions of
Soviet, 216; too small for Soviet, 224
Mikhailov: attacked as provocateur, 296
Military Academy, 396, 411; arrested
Anarchists in, 387; Congress of
Soviets meets in, 392, 406, 407
Military Commander of Petersburg
District: see DISTRICT COMMANDER
Military Commission, 40, 47, 57, 58, 60,
62, 71, 72-73, 75, 87, 93, i*4> !3; in
right wing of Tauride Palace, 50, 65 ;
sends troops to storm Admiralty, 66 ;
Colonel Engelhardt becomes head of,
69
Military Revolutionary Committee,
504, 505, 506, 507, 5i3, 517, 560, 561,
562, 564, 567, 582, 583, 586, 588, 589,
59 *, 595, 597-599, 602, 603, 604, 605,
614, 615, 620, 621, 622, 623, 627, 639,
641, 645, 649, 651, 652, 653, 656, 666
Military Revolutionary Committees,
Local, 522
Militia, 475, 561, 60 1, 604, 651; for
defence of Petersburg, 58, 62-63, 72 ;
keeping order, 98, 159-160, 181; in
Durnovo Villa, 388
Miliukov, P. N., 4, 35, 37, 65, 68, 78,
in, 157, 173, 177,214,217,241,252,
293, 3!0, 3" 3i9, 33*> 345, 34 6 , 362,
364, 369, 381, 498, 501, 512, 514, 578,
590, 606, 626; at Tauride Palace, 48-
49; discusses revolution, 53-57;
announces that Provisional Govern-
ment is 'taking power', 68-69;
'Guchkov-Miliukov Government',
76, 85, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 295,
313; at conference with Ex. Com.,
117126; defends monarchy, 121,
146-147; revises Ex. Com. proclam-
ation, 132-133; speaks in Catherine
Hall on Provisional Government,
1441^.8; discusses programme of
Provisional Government with Su-
khanov and Steklov, 152-157; sup-
ports Michael as Tsar's successor,
1 74-1 76 ; sends message on revolution
to other countries, 184; refuses Ex.
Com.'s demand for document on war
aims, 248; opposition to in first re-
volutionary Cabinet, 249, 250; dis-
cusses Lenin with Sukhanov and
Skobelev, 288-289; talks with Su-
khanov on general situation, 300-
303; meets Thomas at station, 309;
and Provisional Government's Note
to Allies, 310, 314-315, 316; demon-
strations against, and for, 316, 317,
680 INDEX
318; not in Coalition Government,
336, 337. 338-339 ,
Miliutin: Minister of Agriculture in
First Soviet Government, 655
Milliony Street, 643
Minister of Justice: (Dobrovolsky)
arrested, 97; Kerensky as, 145, 149,
2 95, 363; (Pereverzev) orders An-
archists to leave Durnovo villa, 386-
387, 454; Zarudny as, 489; Maly-
antovich as, 604; Lomov as, 655
Minister of Supply, 16
Minister of War, 622
Ministry of Agriculture, Turkestan
section, 3, 16, 34, 98
Minsk, 667
Mogilev, 198, 201, 667
Moika, 624
Mokhovoy Street, 496
Molotov (Scriabin), 130; member of
Ex. Com., 80; introduced to Ex.
Com. by Shlyapnikov, 108; argues
that power should be in hands of the
people, 191
Monarchy, 100, in, 121, 123,124, 138,
144, 149, 153, 158, 159, 173, 174-175,
178, 214; Miliukov in favour of re-
taining, 121, 146-148; last effort to
preserve, 152
Monetny Street, 17
Morskoy Street, 627
Moscow, 305, 486, 489, 492, 494, 500,
515, 556, 576, 590* 635, 667; joins the
revolution, 95 ; Kerensky in, 199, 374;
Populist-Socialist Conference in, 252 ;
Soldiers 5 Soviet passes resolution
against Lenin, 298; disorders in
caused by Miliukov Note to the Allies,
317; Mensheviks in, 349; Sukhanov
in Taganka, 354, 410; proposed trans-
fer of Government to, 515, 539, 548
Conference, 492, 493~495> 5OO> 5*4
5i5> 523 527
insurrection of 1905, 16, 43, 45, 63
Regiment : threatens to arrest Pro-
visional Government, 517; follows
Bolsheviks, 389; expected to aid
revolt on June i o, 404; in October, 582
Soviet, 193, 369, 486, 576; Ex. Com.
of proclaims freedom of the press,
208 ; calls for calm in April Days, 317;
Workers* Section of filling up with
Bolsheviks, 373; passes Bolshevik
resolution, 515
Moutet, 261, 366
Mtsensk, 368
Muslims, 512
Nabokov, 626; Principal Secretary of
Provisional Government, 300
Nationalists, 535
Naval Academy :
used for Soviet
sessions, 224, 337
Nekrasov, N. V., 113, n 6, 312; at con-
ference with Ex. Com., 117-126;
disavows Miliukov's foreign policy
statement, 248 ; in 'Left Seven' group,
249; Minister of Finance in third
Coalition, 488
Neva river, 23, 415, 615, 652
Neva embankment, 246
Nevka Factory, 358
Nevsky, 562
Nevsky Prospect, 6, 22-23, 25, 26, 224,
299> 3^, 318, 320, 370, 404, 430, 431,
433, 442, 464, 609, 624, 627
Nicholas II, 8, 78, 101, 110, 251, 586,
587, 652 ; dissolves Duma, 34, 37; por-
trait of torn down, 74, 99, 1 93 ; arrest
of ordered by Ex. Com., 97 n.; his
train detained at Dno, 100; sends for
Rodzianko, 109; abdication of, ni-
112, 122, 126, 134, 135, 158-159,
172-176, 177; moves to Pskov, 112,
125; is not allowed to leave for Eng-
land, 198-200; sent to Tsarskoe-Selo,
20 1 ; his rooms in Winter Palace, 641.
See also TSAR
Nicholas Bridge, 613
Nicholas Embankment, 441, 451
Nicholas Station, 468, 475, 499, 502;
occupied by Tsarist troops, 66
Nikitin, 508, 605
Nikitsky, A. A. ; assistant Civil Governor
of Petersburg, 112-113, 134, 170, 171,
43 7 j 439 507; talks of situation in
Petersburg, 182-184
Nogin, 486; member of First Soviet
Government, 655
Novaya Zhizn, 168, 169, 339, 340, 360,
665; in preparation, 224, 253,
302-303; in publication, 313; in
April Days, 317; prints Rizov's letter
to Gorky, 365; conference of editors
with Lunacharsky, Ryazanov and
Trotsky, 376-377; offices seized in
July Days, 459; shut down, 515-519
Obukhovsky Works, 578
October Revolution, 6, 7 n., i2n.,
14 n., 47, 59 n., 78 n., 88 n., 97 n.,
108, ii3n., 146 n., 168, 223, 226,
229, 231 n., 256 n., 258 n., 288 n.,
296 n., 305 n., 322 n., 350 n., 352,
356, 37i n., 375, 392 n., 461, 469 n.,
488 n., 505, 508 n., 547-668
Octobrists, 12 n., 69, 123, 379, 535
IN0EX
68i
Odessa, 362; hunger riots in, 533
Officers, 19 and passim; take no active
steps against crowds, 15; at Military
Commission, 71, 72, 91, 114; return-
ing to their regiments, 75, 87, 88;
oner to 'restore order*, 183; soldiers
demand election of, 204-205; Keren-
sky promises reforms in appointment
of, 205; join SRs, 347; enthusiastic
for continuance of war, 363; attacks
on, 368; Congress of demands Lenin's
arrest, 371; at Congress of Soviets,
379, 381; Bolshevik, in i8oth Regi-
ment, 404
O'Grady, 309; member of British
delegation, 261 ; speaks to Ex. Com.,
262 ; speaks to Conference of Soviets,
263
Okhta, 182
Oldenburg; Minister of Education in
third Coalition, 489
Old Nevsky, 134, 181, 437
Oranienbaum, 015
Order No. i : see PROCLAMATIONS
Orel : hunger riots in, 533
Organization of National Economy and
Labour, Committee for: proposed by
Grohman, 186
Over-forties : demonstrate, 370, 391, 431
Palace Bridge, 605
Palace Square, 463, 468, 481, 627;
proposed site of graves of 'victims of
the revolution', 193-194, 197, 209,
648
Palchinsky, 515, 516, 517, 519, 640, 641,
642
Pankov : elected to Praesidium of Soviet,
60; member of Ex. Com., 79, 82
Pankratov, 457, 458
Paris, 225, 278, 339, 353, 354, 606
Commune, 570
Patronny plant, 529
Pavlovich (Krasikov) : member of Ex.
Com., 79
Pavlovsk, 513, 615
Pavlovsky Academy, 619
Pavlovsky Regiment: joins the revolu-
tion, 28, 29, 36; represented at first
meeting of Soviet, 61; marches to
Tauride Palace, 218; adheres to
Bolsheviks, 389; in October, 582, 595
Peace, 9, 11, 109, 202, 206, 249, 254,
264-265, 314, 317, 364, 381, 390, 402,
4i5> 479, 54<>> 57<>, 575, 577* 583, 006,
609, 610, 61 1, 613, 616, 623, 636, 656,
657, 658, 664; policy, 9, 245, 254,
281, 381, 497, 560; struggle for, 188,
222, 240, 242, 243, 244, 253, 257, 340,
352; appeal to peoples of Europe to
strive for, 217; Bolshevik view of in
March, 227; Land, Bread and, 264-
265, 327, 396, 422, 456, 549, 552,
558, 585, 659; 'separate*, 271, 338,
360, 365, 370, 391, 458; Coalition
Government's statement on, 360-
361, 362; soldiers* attitude to, 369-
37i
Peasants, 19, 102, 106, 193, 202/223,
254, 283, 284, 291, 300, 321, 332, 333,
338, 381, 383, 402, 4*6, 422, 435, 43^,
437, 45 i* 456, 485* 495, 522, 5*3, 54>
54i, 549, 555, 55^, 5^6, 570, 574, S7 6 >
585, 617, 623, 628, 629, 631, 632, 639,
646, 654, 656, 657, 660, 661, 662; and
land, 185, 213, 264, 300, 308-309,
327, 368, 426, 533, 552, 555, 570; in
uniform, 19, 201-203, 220, 221, 232,
233, 347, 437; greedy for land, 201-
202; adhere to revolution, 213; add-
ress Soviet or its sections, 236-237;
dominated by SRs, 321, 346-347,
426; All-Russian Congress of, 321,
327, 371; send deputation to Pro-
visional Government, 327-329; Cen-
tral Ex. Com. of, 426, 427, 434, 443,
478, 6 1 6, 638, 659; Soviets of Peas-
ants' Deputies, 659
People's House, 258-259; 327, 419, 583
Pereverzev: Minister of Justice in Co-
alition Government, 339, 404
Peshekhonov, A. V., 16, 107, 383, 393,
406, 586; elected to Literary Com-
mission, 64; member of Ex. Com.,
81; Minister of Supply in Coalition
Governments, 339, 340, 488; speaks
at Congress of Soviets, 382
Peski, 98, 159, 262
'eterhof, 404, 593
14, 146 n.,
282, 451, 469, 598, 600, 626, 643, 6;
Peterhof, 404, 593
Peter-Paul Fortress, 26, 44, i
200,
firing from, 42 ; falls to revolution, 66,
75, 95 J garrison ready to aid revolt
on June 10, 404; Tsarist prisoners in,
407, 409; Sukhanov visits, 407-411;
seizecf by Kronstadters, 462-464;
supports Bolsheviks in October, 595-
Petersburg garrison, 36, 60, 191, 193,
240, 260, 293, 368, 389, 392, 393, 441,
475, 498, 506, 513, 529, 558, 561, 577,
580-583, 587, 588, 589, 590, 59i, 592,
593, 597, 598, 003, 604, 608-609, 615,
621-622, 623, 627, 646, 651
Petersburg Side, 23, 26, 40, 73, 107,
275, 276, 341, 404, 500, 533, 58i,~6ao,
622
Petersburg Soviet: see SOVIET OF
WORKERS* DEPUTIES
Petersburg Soviet of 1905, 38 n., 59,
85, 58
682 INDEX
Petersburg Town Council, 5, 181, 433,
437, 576, 58? 638, 640, 664; meets
to consider supply problem, 13; and
restoration of tramway-service, 170,
1 72 ; elections to, 496-497
Petrogradsky Regiment: marches to
Tauride Palace, 218; regarded as
doubtful on June 10, 404
Petrbv (Zalutsky) 108, 112; member of
Ex. Com., 79
Philippovsky : member of Liaison Com-
mission, 247; chairman of Military
Revolutionary Committee, 517
Platten: refused entry to Russia, 309-
312
Plekhanov, G. V., 278, 322 n., 324,
353, 354, 356; welcomed to Peters-
burg, 258, 259; takes little part in
events, 260; speaks to Conference of
Soviets, 262-263, 265
Podvoisky, 562, 603, 620, 649, 650
Police, 17, 22, 46, 112, 178, 183, 318,
478, 486, 649, 653, 66 1 ; disperse
meetings, etc., 6, 26 ; impotent against
revolution, 15; vanish from the
streets, 16, 26; cordon off streets, 17;
increasing demoralization of, 19; fire
on crowd, 29; under arrest, 57, 64,
87, 97; leading counter-revolutionary
mobs, 57-58; firing from houses, 78;
abolition of accepted by Miliukov,
122; Soviets perform duties of, 387,
388; troops act as, 622
Polkovnikov, 589, 590, 591, 592-593,
60 1, 602
Poltava, 543
Populists, 14 n., 16 n., 17, 81, 135, 285,
306, 321, 322, 323, 358, 379; support
demand for Coalition Government,
^ 329, 335 . ,.
Populist-Socialists, 213, 321 ; conference
of in Moscow, 252
Potemkin Garden, 440
Potresov (Starover), A. N., 102, 354 n.
Potyomkin Street, 95
Praesidium: of Central Ex. Com., 433,
434, 445, 453, 618 t
: of Conference of Soviets, 256
: of Congress of Soviets, 391, 392,
401
: of Petersburg Soviet, 59, 71, 87, 240,
245, 259, 334, 337, 407, 499, 528, 560,
629; elections to, 60; included in Ex.
Com., 71, 79; sent to meet Lenin,
265, 270; negotiates with Marian
Palace on Coalition, 335; usurps
functions of Ex. Com., 359
: of Pre-Parliament, 613
: of Second Congress of Soviets, 636,
638, 659, 665
: of Soldiers' Section, 372, 560
5^5,
548,
Praetorian Guard, 371, 372, 379, 400,
468, 528
Pravda, 197, 207, 324, 402, 439, 462,
471, 525; unsatisfactory character of
in March, 224, 226; reorganized by
Kamenev, 227, 285; prints Lenin's
First Theses, 289; opposes coalition,
33 1 ; offices of wrecked, 454-455,
456
Preobrazhensky Regiment; adheres to
revolution, 68-69; expected to sup-
port Coalition Government on June
10, 404; in July Days, 436-437, 455
Pre-Parliament, 532, 534, 535-544, 555,
55 6 , 5^5, 578, 5^5, 594, 596, 597, 604,
605, 607, 6 10, 612, 613, 615, 624, 625,
626, 627, 633
Press, 1 6, 70, 3*7, 3*8, 437, 443, 459,
477, 47^ s 487, 493, 495, 49^, 49$, 499,
, 5i6, 518, 523, 525, 527, 534, 537,
, 55i, 563, 569, 573, 574, 578, 590,
93, 599, 602, 603, 608, 615, 628, 648,
649, 650, 66 1 ; attacks Soviet leaders,
79-80; immobilized, 86; attacks
( Order No. i', 114; Ex. Com. Com-
mission for licensing, 1 64 ; prints list of
Secret Police agents, 197; hails the
revolution, 198; Ex. Com. debates
freedom of, 207-208 ; reports prepara-
tions for offensive, 215; chauvinism of
Tsarist, 221, 222; praises funeral of
victims of the revolution, 246; attacks
Lenin and others for travelling via
Germany, 271, 297; reports Social-
Democratic joint meeting, 287;
* worker and soldier' question in, 294;
question of dual power in, 295;
violent attacks of on Soviet person-
alities, 296-298; prints Miliakov's
Note to the Allies, 316; supports de-
mand for Coalition, 329, 358; opposes
Coalition, 331; supports continuance
of war, 361; attacks Bolsheviks and
Gorky, 296-299, 365; reports many
disorders, 368; and 'official Soviet'
demonstration, 418-419; and Lenin's
relations with German General Staff,
453, 457~459, 46*; at Moscow
Conference, 494. See also under
names of various newspapers.
Gallery (Duma) : used for first session
of Ex. Com., 72
Licensing Commission of Ex. Com.,
164, 169
Proclamations: of General Khabalov,
6, 1 6, 25 ; of Soviet to people of Peters-
burg, 63, 67, 68; of Provisional Com-
mittee of the Duma, 85, 100, 124; of
Ex. Com., 100, 124, 128, 130, 131,
132, 133; 'Order No. i', 113-114,
128, 140, 204; of Interdistrictites
and SRs demanding working-class
Government, i 28- i 30 ; of Provisional
Government, 150, 155, 156-157, 164;
Gorky's appeal for preservation of
artistic treasures, 208-209; of Pro-
visional Government on war aims,
249-253, 310, 314; of Ex. Com. to
workers and soldiers in April, 319; of
Provisional Government on recon-
struction of Government, 329; of
Bolsheviks calling for demonstration,
390~39 1 ; of Congress ojf Soviets, 393;
of Central Ex. Com. in July Days,
459-4,60; of Central Ex. Com. in
relation to Komilov revolt, 506; of
Kornilov to commanders at front,
510; of Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee, 603, 623, 652, 653 ; of Second
Congress of Soviets, 646-647; of
Soviet Government to peoples of the
world, 656-658
Procurator, 387-388, 407
Progressive Bloc, 4, 7, 29, 38, 53, 56, 57,
85, no, H7n., 122, 174; forms Pro-
visional Committee of the Duma, 35
Progressive Party, 51, 53
Prokopovich : Minister of Industry and
Commerce in third Coalition, 489
Proletariat, n, 12, 19, 20, 102, 191,
196, 203, 212, 229, 241, 253, 264, 265,
29i> 307, 32i s 323. 33 1 * 332, 340, 349>
352, 358, 380, 383, 384, 4oo ? 4 1 !> 422,
446, 450, 469, 478, 492, 496, 498, 513,
515. 5i6, 526, 530, 541, 542, 555, 570,
572, 57ft> 579> 629, 630, 650, 660,
664, 668; dictatorship of, 9, 10, 106,
283, 284, 332, 421 ; of Petersburg, 12,
62, 191, 192, 193, 240, 260, 293, 345,
373, 388, 389, 390* 399> 421, 44^ 497>
5*5* 55.8, 615, 623, 635, 648; of other
countries, 178, 217, 263, 264, 630,
D 6 ; 57 -
Proletam, 525
Promyot Factory, 427, 430
Propaganda Commission of Ex. Com.
164, 165, 1 68
Protopopov, 78, 88 n. ; under arrest,
97, 99; in Peter-Paul Fortress, 410
Provisional Committee of the Duma,
36, 49> 53> 56, 57, 68, 69, 75, 84, 100,
101, 107, no, iii, 112, 130, 131, 132,
*55> *59> *745 elected, 34; no thought
of taking power, 35, 38; in right wing
of Tauride Palace, 50, 100; talks with
Prince Golitsyn, 51; urges troops to
obey officers, 76-77; has no real
power, 85-86; proclamations of, 85,
ipo, 124; holds conference on Pro-
visional Government with Ex. Com.,
113; tactless dealings of with troops,
114
INDEX 683
Provisional Ex. Com. of Soviet, 58;
formed to convene Soviet, 39; organ-
izes supplies for troops, 39, 49; forms
military organization, 40
Provisional Government, 48, 50, 68-69,
76, 85, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107,
ii3n., 131, 149, 170, 172, 207, 218,
219, 220, 240, 244, 245, 255, 258, 295,
312, 314, 329, 336, 337, 338, 550;
conference of Duma Committee and
Ex. Com. on, 114, 116-126; debated
in Soviet, 136-144; programme of,
150-157, 179; discusses abdication,
174-176; relations with Ex. Com.
and Soviet, 170, 187-191, 215, 312,
313; agrees to allow Tsar to leave
Russia, 198-199; yields to Ex. Com.,
201; asked to reorganize appoint-
ment of officers, 205 ; continues war
policy of Tsarism, 217; military de-
legations to, 234; discusses war aims
with Liaison Commission, 247-248,
249-251; split in Cabinet, 248, 249;
'Left Seven' group in, 249, 250; pro-
clamation of on war aims, 249-253 ;
peaceful compromise with, 254;
Lenin speaks of, 282 ; opposes Lenin,
300, 302; more and more dependent
on Soviet, 308; inactivity of in
agrarian affairs, 308-309; refuses
Flatten entry to Russia, 309-312;
Note to Allies of, 310, 314-315;
demonstrations for and against, 315-
319; completely powerless, 326-327,
328; and coalition, 329, 330, 335;
liquidation of inevitable, 331. See
also COALITION GOVERNMENT
Provocation, Provocateurs, 5, 13, 98, 131,
178, 196, 296, 298, 314, 318, 388, 427,
446, 512, 516, 616; German, 12, 475;
Bolsheviks accused of, 296-297, 299
Pskov, 112, 125, 152, 153, 158-159, 172,
177, 178, 198, 5^3
Pulkov, 667
Putilov Works, 449-450, 451, 469, 513,
578, 652
Rabochaya Gazeta ; opposes Coalition,
53 1
Rabochii, 516, 517, 525; shut down, 515
RabochiiPut,^^ 551, 552, 554, 569, 571,
606; shut down in October, 601-602
Rafes : member of Ex. Com., 80
Raimondo, O., 366
Raskomikov 275, 441, 444, 445, 447,
448, 451, 462, 463, 464, 465-467, 486
Rasputin, 4, 7, 29, 54, 102, 364, 532
Rech, 364, 368, 387, 487, 498, 514, 535,
593 j 650; attacks Sukhanov as pro-
German, 365
684 INDEX
Red Army, 604, 605, 667
Red Guard, 486, 513, 559, _
Reserve Regiment: ist, adheres to Bol-
sheviks, 389; expected to aid revolt
on June 10, 404
, 9th Cavalry, expected to support
Government on June 10, 404
, 3rd, expected to aid revolt on June
10, 404
, i76th, 404, 448-449
Reval: Germans threatening, 537
Revolution of 1905, 193, 528
Ribot, 261, 302, 364, 596
Rifle Regiment; 3rd, marches to
Tauride Palace, 218
Riga, 362, 512, 515, 523: surrendered
to Germans by Kornilov, 503
Rizov, D. : asks Gorky to negotiate for
separate peace, 365
Rodzianko, M. V., 35, 36, 50, 52, 88,
152, 154, 155, 175, 220, 234, 288, 295,
372, 498, 501, 573, 575; talks with
Prince Golitsyn, 51, 67; invited to
see Tsar, 108-112; sends for Chk-
heidze, in; at conference with Ex.
Com., 117-126; speaks to Tsar's
headquarters, 125-126, 159; negoti-
ations with Tsar, 135; confers with
Grand Duke Michael, 176; greets
marching regiments, 219; speaks to
demonstration of war-wounded, 299
Romanovs, 100, in, 121-122, 146, 147,
148, 152, 153, 154, 175, 193, 198, 199,
200, 211, 498; liquidation of, zoo,
129, 164, 172
Roshal, 441, 444, 447, 448, 451, 462,
463, 464, 465-467; arrested, 486
Rusanov, N. S.: member of Ex. Com.,
81
Russkaya Volyai printing plant of seized
by Anarchists, 386
Russkoe Slovoi prints rumour of German
revolution, 151
Russo-Japanese war of 1905, 8
Ruzsky, General, 126, 159
Ryazanov (Goldendach), D. K., 81 n.,
Ryk.
ment, 655
Rzhevsky, V. A., 51
Sadovoy Street, 416, 419, 430, 442, 581
Sailors, 108, 109, 178, 179, 273, 325,
5i7> 548, 549, 553. 559> 57, 584, 595>
604, 614, 617, 621, 624, 625, 626, 627,
634, 641, 643, 649, 650, 652, 667;
adhere to revolution, 178-179; send
representatives to Soviet, 237; pass
resolution against Lenin, 298; at pro*
war meetings, 361 ; in July Days, 441,
442, 4^6, 455, 464, 465; Central
Committee of Fleet, 508; .occupy
Telegraph Agency, 614
St. George, Crosses of: brought to
Soviet, 237; flung at Kerensky's feet,
362-363
Samara, 667
Sampson Bridge, 275
Sanders: member of British delegation,
261
Sappers, 603 ; represented at first meet-
ing of Soviet, 6 1
Savage Division, 511, 512, 519, 520
Savinkov, B. V., 508, 513; member of
third Coalition Government, 488;
resigns, 493; appointed Governor-
General of Petersburg, 509
Scheidemann, 573
Schliisselburg Fortress, 457
'Sealed train', 270, 271-272, 281, 309,
351, 539
Sebastopol, 362, 363
Secretarial Commission of Ex. Com.,
164, 165-166
Secret Police, 5, 31 n., 129, 296 n.,
297, 410, 459, 562; 'shadows', 31, 43;
headquarters, 46, 48; under arrest,
57, 87, 184; leading counter-revolu-
tionary mobs, 57; firing from houses,
78; abolished, 95; Gorky discovers
list of agents of, 196
Semashko, 2nd Lieutenant, 372; ap-
pointed Commander-in-Chief of in-
surrectionary forces of June 10, 404
Semkovsky, 531
Semyonovsky Regiment: adheres to
revolution, 63; marches to Tauride
Palace, 218; expected to support
Government on June 10, 404; 'loyal'
in July Days, 442, 455; in October,
582
Sergiyevsky Street, 10, 16, 17, 22, 95
Shatrov (Sokolovsky) : see SOKOLOVSKY
Shcheglovitov, I. G., 51; details of
arrest of, 52
Shidlovsky, 117
Shingarev, A. I. : member of first Pro-
visional Government, 146, 300
Shlyapnikov, 43, 44, 59, 134, 211, 224,
272, 274, 428; elected to Ex. Com.,
71, 79; introduces Molotov into Ex.
Com., 1 08; member of Propaganda
Commission
Labour in
Shpalerny Street, 23, 444, 448, 532,
Shulgin, V. V., 35, 117, 174, 177;
travels to Pskov to obtain Tsar's
abdication, 152, 172, 177, 178
on, 165, 168; Minister of
first Soviet Government,
Siberia, 240, 241, 256, 434; Kamenev
returns from, 225; Tsereteli returns
from, 231; Breshkovskaya returns
from, 256; 'Siberian Zimmerwald-
ism*, 252, 257
Skobelev, M. I., 30, 37, 58, 169, 190,
222, 251, 335, 4*7, 4 6 8, 473, 56, 596,
618; member of Provisional Ex.
Com. of Soviet, 40; member of
Praesidium of Soviet, 60, 265, 359;
member of Ex. Com., 79; position in
Ex. Com., 82; sent to Baltic Fleet,
179; forms part of *Swamp% 229;
one of 'new majority' in Ex. Com.,
245; member of Liaison Com-
mission, 247; meets Lenin on his
arrival, 269-274; discusses Lenin with
Miliukov, 288; speaks to demon-
stration of war-wounded, 299; per-
suades demonstrating regiments to
disperse, 317; Minister of Labour in
Coalition Governments, 337, 339,
340,349,488
Sjsvortsov: member of first Soviet
Government, 655
Slogans and formulas, 14, 219, 235, 239,
245, 270, 295, 297, 402, 403, 415, 417,
422, 423, 424, 444, 524, 526; Bread,
4; Down with the Autocracy, 4, ir ;
War to the End (to Total Victory), 4,
5, 12, 102, 218, 235, 240, 247, 295,
299, 361 ; Down with the War, 1 1, 12,
19, 20, 222, 317, 391; Constituent
Assembly, n, 402; Ministry respon-
sible to the Duma, 13; Loyalty to our
Gallant Allies, 102; the Land for the
Peasants, 185, 213; Land and Free-
dom, 218, 347, 363; Soldiers to the
Trenches, Workers to the Benches,
218, 220; Peace, 240, 416, 540; No
Annexations or Indemnities, 241,
245, 360, 361, 402; Peace, Land and
Bread, "
INDEX 685
Smolny, 23, 492, 498-499, 5, 5i,
502, 503, 508, 509, 513, 516, 517, 519,
520, 529, 530, 531, 534, 535, 537, 539,
543, 547, 555, 5^3, 5^5, 577, 578, 581,
586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 594,
596, 597, 599, 60 1, 602, 604, 606, 607,
614, 615, 616, 619, 622, 623, 625, 626,
627, 630, 631, 633, 640, 643, 644, 645,
8, 651, 652, 653, 658, 662, 663,
, 264-265, 327, 396, 422, 456,
549, 552, 558, 585; (AH) Power to the
Soviets, 283, 300, 320, 338, 358, 380,
381, 384, 390, 402, 403, 416, 417, 422,
423, 429, 450, 481, 491, 523, 550, 540,
547, 550, 558, 57i, 573, 577-5B2, 649;
anti-Soviet, 295; Down with Lenin,
297, 299; Down with the Provisional
Government, 316; Down with Miliu-
kov, 316, 317; Workers* Control,
373; Down with the Tsarist Duma,
390; Down with the Ten Capitalist
Ministers, 390, 416, 417, 429, 481;
Bread, Peace, Freedom, 391; A
Revolutionary Dictatorship of the
Workers and Peasants, 491 ; All Land
to the People, 540; Long Live the
Constituent Assembly, 540
Smilga, 604
Snowden, Philip, 363
Social-Democracy, Social-Democrats,
4n. } 7n., 15 n., 38 n., 81, 82, 221,
252, 256 n., 269, 283, 284, 285, 291,
322 n., 323, 349, 351, 354, 457 n.,
489, 540 ; Second Duma exiles brought
back from Siberia, 142, 231; joint
meeting of all, 285-288; oppose
Coalition, 331, 332, 335
Socialism, Socialists, 8, 9, 10, u, 13, 20,
21, 24, 33, 83, 101, 104, 168, 191, 198,
224, 237, 257, 261, 263, 271, 284, 289,
293, 307, 309, 323 33i, 332, 347, 349,
366, 367, 376, 379, 421, 425, 554, 555,
57i, 572, 585, 026, 628, 629, 630, 635,
639, 649, 657, 660, 66 1 ; of other
countries, n, 19, 261, 284, 366, 367,
368; world-wide Socialist revolution,
103, 104, 227, 257, 273, 274, 281, 282,
284, 647, 657; Socialist Ministers,
33i, 396, 441, 444, 476, 626, 645, 656
Social-patriotism, Social-patriots, 206,
264, 281, 457 n.
Social-traitors, 324, 340, 441, 560
Sokolov, N, D., 10, 13, 16, 17, 27, 58,
101, 116, 125, 150, 169, 531; meeting
of representatives of Left wing at
flat of, 17-21; leads regiments to
Duma, 37; elected to Praesidium of
Soviet, 60; elected to Literary Com-
mission, 64; argues for temporary
suppression of press, 70; member of
Ex. Com., 79; joins Menshevik group
in Ex. Com., 82; composes 'Order
No. i j , 113-114; at conference with
Duma Committee, 117-126; writes
Ex. Com. proclamation, 127, 128,
^o, *3i ?32; raises question of
funeral of victims of the revolution,
1 93- r 94 ; receives military delegations
on behalf of Ex. Com., 234
Sokolovsky, 53 1 ; member of Ex. Com.,
Soldat, 60 1
Soldiers, 16 said passim; fail to restrain
disorders, 15; cordon off streets and
bridges, 17, 25; increasing demoral-
ization of, 19, 34; fire on demon-
strations, 22; join revolutionary
crowds, 26, 40-41, 42; mutiny, 36-
37; clashes between 'loyal' and
686 INDEX
revolutionary, 28, 29, 41; in and
around Tauride Palace, 50, 57, 70,
113; adhere to revolution, 50/213;
move on Petersburg, 58, 66, 145, 500-
513, 622, 623, 629, 630, 651, 652,
666; representatives of speak at first
meeting of Soviet, 61, 63, 64; in
Catherine Hall, 65, 72, 91, 92, 127;
tear down Tsar's portrait, 74, 99; one
'loyal* regiment of enough to destroy
revolution, no; 'Order No. i' ad-
dressed to, 113, 119, 128; no longer
wandering in streets, 160; tram fares
of, 170-172, 580; march to join
revolution, 181-182; peasants in uni-
form, 20 1-203, 232, 233, 347 ; opposed
to talk of peace, 202 ; in Soviet demand
election of officers, 204-205; attempts
to stir up against workers, 212, 220-
222, 232, 234, 294; regiments march
to Tauride Palace, 218-220, 232;
reactions to speeches opposing war,
222, 276, 277; greet returning exiles
at railway stations, 231; send dele-
gations to Ex. Com. and Soviet, 234-
236, 237, 238 ; at Finland Station and
in procession on Lenin's arrival, 269,
272-276; completely won over to
Soviets, 293-296; Ex. Commission of
passes resolution against Lenin, 298;
Ex. Commission of sends representa-
tives to Ex. Com., 304; in April Days,
316, 317, 318; subject to command of
Ex. Com. only, 319; support Bolshe-
viks, 324, 389, 400, 403 ; rioting, loot-
ing, deserting, 368-369; sent to deal
with Anarchists, 387; delegates from
Congress of Soviets sent to, 393, 395;
pass resolutions against Bolshevik
demonstration, 396; attitude of on
June 10, 404; in July Days, 427, 429,
43<>> 435, 436, 438, 44, 44*, 44*, 443,
448-449; question of evacuation of
from Petersburg, 559, 560, 561 ; want
only peace, 578. See also under
names of various regiments.
Soviet of Workers' Deputies (Peters-
burg), 47 and passim; elections to, 15,
38; convened by Provisional Ex.
Com., 39; first session in Tauride
Palace, 52, 55, 57-64, 7, 7* 5 be-
comes overcrowded, 84-87, 216,
222; holds all real power, 85, 258,
294-296, 326, 328, 331, 422, 451;
scenes at second session, 87, 193;
debates question of government, 136-
144, 150-151; daily meetings cease,
176-177; meets in White Hall, 192-
193; greets delegates from Moscow
Soviet, etc., 193; arranges funeral of
victims of the revolution, 193; dis-
cusses resumption of work, 194195;
members included in list of Secret
Police agents, 196-197; regarded
'openers of the front 3 , 203, 206, 22
Secret
as
22 1
235; debates election of officers, 204-
205; relations with Provisional
Government, 215, 255, 312, 313;
meets in Michael Theatre, 216;
struggles with bourgeoisie for army,
220-222, 232-234, 239, 276, 293, 294;
question of representation in, 222-
224; holds sessions in Naval Acad-
emy, 224; attitude of to war, 235,
239-240, 242, 249, 250, 255, 281 ; acts
by 'peaceful conciliation', 254; petty-
bourgeois, conciliationist majority in,
254, 294, 296, 308, 326-327, 330; out
of touch with Ex. Com., 259-260;
French and British delegations visit,
262-263; split in, 301, 321; growing
power and popularity of, 307-308 ; in
April Days, 317, 318, 319-320;
political groupings in April-May,
321-325, 359; and Coalition, 330-
334, 335, 336, 337, 33$, 34, 358;
leaders of discuss cancelled demon-
stration of June 10, 396-401 ; 'official'
demonstration, 402, 406, 411-418;
Military Department of 53 1 ; Day of,
>2> 594, 595,
) : Soldiers
Section
5?2, 583-586, 592,
Soviet (Petersburg) :
82, 201, 205, 451, 560, 581, 591;
representatives of in Ex. Com., 82;
meets in White Hall, 87, 236, 371,
443; in patriotic mood, 369; Lenin
speaks to, 371 372 ; forms 'Praetorian
Guard' of Coalition, 371; withWork-
* ~ ' i Ex. ~
616
ers* Section, controls Ex, Com., 443,
: Workers' Section, 323, 373, 431, 438,
515, 635; meets in White Hall, 87,
236, 429; hears Gorky's appeal, 209;
filling up with Bolsheviks, 373;
majority controlled by Bolshevik
Central Ex. Com., 443, 616; elects
Praesidium 491492
Soviet Government, 282, 550, 551, 552,
553, 554, 558, 560, 563, 571, 574, 584,
596, 617, 623, 628, 629, 630, 632, 636,
639> 649, 650, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656,
657, 662, 663, 665, 668; composition
of, 655, 656
Soviets, 276, 381, 397, 420, 443, 487,
491, 494, 495, 522, 523, 525, 527, 540,
55i> 552, 5^o, 573, 574, 586, 617, 633,
640, 646, 649; district, 181, 507; set
up all over Russia, 213; All-Russian
Congress of: see CONGRESS OF SOVIETS;
All-Russian Conference of: see CON-
FERENCE OF SOVIETS; send delegates
from eighty-two cities to Conference,
255 J (AH) Power to the, 282-284,
300, 320, 338, 358, 380, 381, 384, 390,
402, 403, 416, 41 7, 422, 423, 429, 450,
481, 491, 523 540, 525, 547, 55, 558,
57*, 573, 577, 5 8 2, 649; origin of m
1905, 282-283; Kerensky speaks to,
362; Congress of discusses relations
with Coalition Government, 380;
Congress performs functions of police,
387, 388; of Yaroslavl, 489; of army,
506; of Kronstadt, 508; of Luga, 511,
512; Soviet Russia, 522 ; congresses of,
577; of Peasants' Deputies, 659
Sovremennik, 3, 21, 31, 43, 134, 225, 240,
256, 278, 374, 410
Somemennoye Slovo, 650
Spiridonova, 434
SRs (Socialist-Revolutionaries), 14,
22 n., 51, 59, 71, 81, 82, 103, 138,
195, 211, 228, 231 n., 278, 305, 306,
307, 321, 322, 325, 349, 351, 353, 359,
381, 395, 396, 397, 4", 412, 426, 434,
435, 444, 457, 4^7, 473, 474, 4^1 n.,
487, 488, 492, 493, 496, 497, 508, 523,
525, 530, 535, 538, 542, 543, 555, 559,
562, 563, 568, 573, 574, 578, 581, 590,
598, 599, 608, 610, 612, 613, 631, 632,
634, 636, 637, 638, 644, 645, 648, 654,
658, 660, 66 1, 662, 663, 665; in Soviet
demand Coalition Government, 329;
and Coalition Government, 346-348,
350, 358; at Congress of Soviets, 378-
379; Central Committee of, 473
Staff Council: rejected by Military
Revolutionary Committee, 598
Stalin (Dzhugashvili), 393, 486, 501 ; as
member of Ex. Com., 80, 229-230,
240; in favour of seizing power on
June 10, 405; Minister for National-
ities in first Soviet Government, 655
Stankevich, 336; member of Ex. Com.,
8 1 ; suggests review of troops on
Champ de Mars, 135
Star Chamber, 315 n., 359, 364, 391,
394, 39^, 397, 4 OI 42, 46, 4 r 5, 4 r 8>
424, 425, 426, 428, 432, 433, 435, 439,
443, 45i, 454, 46i, 4^8, 472, 473, 474,
487, 493, 505, 5<>9, 520, 528, 582, 607,
6 1 8, 632
Stasova, 405, 486
Steklov (Nakhamkes), Y. M., 59, 108,
127, 128, 133, 229, 377, 379, 420, 434,
486-487, 524, 53 1 ; elected to Liter-
ary Commission, 64; elected to Ex.
Com., 71, 79; supports Menshevik
group in Ex. Com., 82 ; joins Bolshe-
viks, 82; supposed author of 'Order
No. i 1 , 1 14; at conference with Duma
Committee, 117-126; reports to
Soviet, 139140, 150; discusses pro-
gramme of Government with Su-
INDEX 687
khanov and Miliukov, 152-154; en-
trusted with reorganization of
Izvestiya, 165; one of 'new majority'
in Ex. Com., 245, 246; member of
Liaison Commission, 247; denounced
by Lenin as 'revolutionary defensist',
279, 281; speaks against Lenin at
Social-Democratic joint meeting, 287;
attacked in press, 297
Stockholm, 307, 458, 486; proposed
Socialist Conference in, 168, 366, 367
Slolypin, 240, 532
Strikes, 167, 170, 171, 191-192, 387,
460, 467, 665; in Moscow, 494
Stuchka: member of Ex. Com., 81
Sturmer, B. V., 88, 145; in Peter-Paul
Fortress, 410
Sukhanov (Himmer), N. N.: in Peters-
burg illegally, 3; speaks against alli-
ance of workers' movement with
Duma, 4; reviews political situation,
programme and progress of revolu-
tion : (problem of government to suc-
ceed Tsarism) 6-10, 11-14, (state of
army) 7576, (tendencies in first Ex.
Com.) 81-83, (aims of bourgeois
government and tasks of democracy)
101-107, (relations of Soviet with
Provisional Government) 187-190,
(the 'political spectrum') 321-325,
(Coalition Government) 330-334,
345-352, .(Mensheyiks) 356-357, (re-
lations within Soviet and Ex. Com.)
359360, (Government to succeed
Coalition) 383-384, (June 10) 402-
406, (beginning of July) 422-423,
(July Days) 456, 479~482, (Lenin's
disappearance) 471-472, (Kornilov
revolt) 501-502, 503, (parties after
Kornilov revolt) 522-526, (Bolsheviks
and Pre-Parliament) 541-543, (pro-
gramme, tactics, and organization
of October Revolution) 547-556,
(mood of masses in October) 558
559, (Kerensky's position in October)
564-565, (October Revolution) 587-
589, 593~5943 (Menshevik- Inter-
nationalists in October) 631-633,
(Lenin's Land Decree) 660-661 ;
attends meeting at Sokolov's flat,
16-22; at Gorky's, 23-24, 25, 27-
30, 42, 43; sees conditions in
streets, 26-27, 40-41; estimate of
character and political potentialities
of personalities of the revolution:
Kerensky 30-33, Miliukov 53-55,
Steklov 165, Bogdanov 165-166,
Gvozdev 167-168, Chkheidze 177-
178, Kamenev 225-226, Lieber 229,
Stalin 229-230, Dan 256-257, Lenin
280, 289-292, Chernov 305-307,
688 INDEX
Martov 352-356, Lunacharsky 374-
376; makes his way to Tauride Pal-
ace, 44-46; discusses situation with
Rzhevsky, 51, and Miliukov, 53, 55-
57; at first meeting of Soviet, 59-64;
elected to Literary Commission, 64;
elected to Ex. Com., 71, 79; sleeps in
White Hall, 73; supports Mensheviks
in Ex. Com., 82; joins Menshevik-
Internationalists, 82, 358; arranges
guard, supplies, etc., for printing-
shop, 89-92; offends Kerensky, 94;
at dinner at Manukhin's, 97; walks
through streets at night, 98-99, 159-
160, 181-182; advises Kerensky on
joining Government, 101, 137-138;
opposes meeting between Rodzianko
and Tsar, 110-112; at conference
with Duma Committee, 114-126;
spends night at Nikitsky's, 134, 179,
182-184; speaks to crowd outside
Tauride Palace, 148-149, 157-158;
confers with Miliukov on Provisional
Government's programme, 150-157;
arranges for printing of Provisional
Government's proclamation, 156-
157; editor of Novqya gkizn, 168, 169;
member of Ex. Com. Press-Licensing,
Labour, and other Commissions, 169;
talks to Frankorussky on agrarian
problems, 1 85 ; consulted by Grohman
on economic situation, 185-187; ex-
amines list of Secret Police agents,
196-197; asks Gorky to write Pro-
clamation to the Peoples of the
World, 197; re-drafts Gorky's Mani-
festo to the Peoples of the World, 203,
205-206; champions freedom of
speech in Ex. Com., 207-208; Kshe-
sinskaya appeals to, 209-2 1 1 ; cross-
examines Kornilov on proposed offen-
sive, 216 ; talks to Kamenev about
Bolshevik position, 225-227; invited
by Tereshchenko to help in reorgani-
zation of national finances, 230; agi-
tates for ending of war, 239-241 ;
clashes with Tsereteli, 241-243, 401;
accepts combined resolution on de-
fence and peace, 244; quotes Nicholas
IFs manifesto, 251; feels unsuited to
be official speake'r for Ex. Com., 258;
at meeting in People's Hall, 259;
meets Lenin at Finland Station, 265,
269-274; follows Lenin's procession,
275-276; talks with Lenin, 278-279;
hears Lenin's first speech to Bolshevik
leaders, 280-285; attends Social-
Democratic joint meeting, 285-288;
discusses Lenin with Skobelev and
Miliukov, 288-289; talks to Miliukov
about general situation, 300-303;
sent by Ex. Com. to welcome Cher-
nov, 305; speaks in defence of Flatten,
311-312; reports unsatisfactory pos-
ition of Liaison Commission, 312;
member of Homogeneous Bureau,
315 n.; with peasants' deputation in
Marian Palace, 327-329; votes in
favour of Coalition, 334; member of
Ex. Com. delegation on Coalition
Government, 336-337, 338, 339; in
Taganka, 354, 410; visits Peter- Paul
Fortress to remove Vyrubova, 407-
411; suggests propaganda in favour
of 'official Soviet' demonstration,
412; is sent to Durnovo villa, 412-
414; attends Interdistrict Conference,
419-421; protests at Central Ex.
Com. meeting, 434; with Preobraz-
hensky Regiment in July Days, 436-
437; writes appeals to workers not to
demonstrate or strike, 460; takes a
holiday, 489-490; loses his boots,
493-494; electioneers for Mensheviks,
496-497; called representative of
'petit-bourgeois democracy* by Lenin,
516; visits Palchinsky at General
Staff, 517-519; loses seat on Ex.
Com., 530, and is co-opted, 531; at
meeting of 'Elders', 532-533; Bolshe-
vik meeting held at house of on
October 10, 55.6-557; accused by
Lenin of betraying revolution, 574;
and Gorky's twenty-fifth anniversary
as a writer, 579, 580; at mass-meeting
in October, 583-585; last meeting
with Kerensky, 608; tries to keep
Menshevik-Internationalists from
leaving Congress of Soviets, 640, 644-
645
Sukhanov (Himmer), Mme., 419, 500,
556, 580, 581
Sukhomlinov, V. A., 97, 145
Supply: problems of, 3, 5, 7, 13, 14, 18,
49, 62, 185, 186, 187, 358, 507, 552-
553 574> 584, 666; Supply Com-
mission, 39, 62, 89, 164, 185, 507;
Peshekhonov speaks at Congress of
Soviets on, 382 ; Central Supply Com-
mittee, 507, Government policy in
relation to, 539
Suvorovsky Prospect, 181, 442
Sverdlov, 581, 604, 617
'Swamp', 82, 228-229, 245, 304, 307
Taganka (Moscow prison), 354, 410
Tambov : hunger riots in, 533
Tauride Gardens, 17, 22, 666
Tauride Palace, 23 and passim; scene of
first session of Soviet, 39, 47; crowds
inside and outside, 46, ,50, 64-65, 78,
84,87, 89-93, ioo, 131, 148-149; 1 73.
176, 431, 433, .440, 443, 444, 448, 453,
459; Ministerial Pavilion and White
Hall galleries of used for political
prisoners, 65, 72, 87, 97, 99; un-
guarded, 98, 133; almost empty, 114,
127, 157, 177; filled with parading
regiments, 219
Tauride Palace : left wing as seat of Soviet
and its organs, 50, 70, 111-112, 174
: right wing as seat of Provisional
Government, etc., 50, 59, 69, 70, 91,
100, 111-112, 114, 117, 140, 144, 150,
151, 153, i57-*58, 172, 178, 204
Tauride Street, 100, 181
Tenishevsky School, 497
Teodorovich: member of first Soviet
Government, 655
Tereshchenko, M. I., 6, 152, 327, 335,
379, 38i, 4, 459., $08, 509, 520, 597,
645; Finance Minister in first Pro-
visional Government, 126, 146; at
Ex. Com., 230; in 'Left Seven' group,
249; 'insulted' by Sukhanov, 251;
direct relations with Allied Govern-
ments, 364; member of Coalition
Governments, 488
Terioki, 256
Third Estate, 7 n., 75, 332, 346, 503;
flocks to Soviet, 86
Thomas, A.: received at station by Mi-
liukov, 309; visits Ex. Com., 361;
at Moscow Soviet, 369-370
Thorne, Will: member of British dele-
gation to Russia, 261
Tikhonov, 24, 43, 44, 58, 128
'Timokhin, Captain' : put in command
of printing-shop by Sukhanov, 91-92
Tolstoy, Leo: War and Peace, 91, 465;
'not intelligent enough for his own
genius', 290
Torneo, 199
Trade Unions, 39, 43, 105, 373, 388,
507, 536, 5^0, 561 ,* spring up all over
Russia, 213; All-Russian Railway-
men's, 664, 665
Trams, 232, 369, 581; not running, 16,
86, 439, 459 ; used for barricades, 23 ;
restoration of service, 170; soldiers'
fares on, 170-172, 580; reappear in
Petersburg streets, 206-207; in Mos-
cow not running, 494
Trepov, 6, 17,51
Trinity Bridge, 23, 26, 42, 44, 21 1, 415,
500, 643
Trinity Square, 462
Trotsky, 59, 81 n., 290, 305, 353, 354,
355, 35 6 > 359-3 6 o 372, 374? 375, 37,
383* 39* 393, 395 396 399> 4*8, 419,
420, 42 1, 445, 452, 460, 466, 467, 479,
480, 481 n., 486, 491, 531, 532, 537
INDEX 689
538, 553, 554, 624; misinterprets
slogan of 'Power to the Soviets , 283;
arrested en route to Russia, 309; re-
leased, 311; arrives in Petersburg,
339; speaks in Ex. Com., 340; cor-
rects Sukhanov's recollection of
Novqya %hizn conference, 377; speaks
at Congress of Soviets, 382-384; r61e
of on June 10, 406; and July Days,
432, 434, .435, 439; rescues Chernov,
445-447, 480; arrested, 481 ; released,
527; Chairman of Petersburg Soviet,
528, 529, 598; at Pre-Parliament,
536, 538-54<>> 54i, 556; in October,
55 6 , 557, 562, 566, 578, 579, 580, 581,
582, 583-585, 59i, 596, 598, 615, 617,
627, 628, 636, 637, 639, 644, 645, 646,
654, 656, 663, 664, 667; People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs in
first Soviet Government, 655
Trubetskoy Bastion, 408, 409
Trubochny Factory, 442, 578
Trudoviks, 4n., I4n., i7n., 81, 85,
135, 1 66, 206, 213, 321; demand
Coalition Government, 329
Tsar, 411., 8, 36, 66, 99, 101, 121, 181,
184, 3 14, 364, 407, 552 ; waiting-room
of at Finland Station, 269, 270, 272.
See also NICHOLAS n
Tsarina, 407
Tsarism, 4, 6, 8, n, 12, 13, 22, 40, 41,
45, 46, 48, 54, 57, 63, 76, 80, 85,
95, 98, 104, 171, 186, 217, 219,
136, 593, 615,
uly
75, 99, 10 3, r ^4J without organized
force in Petersburg, 45, 88; possible
return of, 123
Tsarist generals, 516
Government, 46, 51, 80, 145, 587;
barricades itself in Admiralty, 66, 67,
88; Ministers under arrest, 52, 64, 88,
97, 142; war policy of, 217, 240
officers, 65
troops, 45, 66, 501
Tsarskoe-Selo, 100, 124, _
666, 667: Tsar and his family de-
tained in Palace, 200, 201
Tsereteli, H. G-, 6, 168, 203, 257, 258,
285, 300, 301, 322, 323, 335, 336, 352,
357, 359, 364, 37i, 372, 379, 380, 383,
389, 401, 403, 404, 4H> 4*5, 4^7> 4*8,
425, 426, 427, 432, 435, 449, 453, 457,
472, 473, 474, 497, 52, 513, 520, 524,
528, 532, 536-537; arrives from
Siberia, 231; appears in Ex. Com.,
240; attacks Sukhanov's speech on
peace, 241-243; proposes and carries
combined resolution, 243-245; one
of 'new majority* in Ex. Com., 245,
690 INDEX
246 ; joins Liaison Commission, 247-
251; supports Provisional Govern-
ment document in Ex. Com., 251-
252; refuses to meet Lenin, 265; de-
nounced by Lenin as "revolutionary
defensist', 279, 281; speaks in op-
position to Lenin at Social-Demo-
cratic joint meeting, 286-287; speaks
to demonstration of war-wounded,
299; reports to Ex. Com. on Liaison
Commission, 312-313; supports Co-
alition in Soviet, 337, 3385 Minister
of Posts and Telegraphs in Coalition
Government, 339, 340, 349; speaks
against Bolsheviks in discussion of
June 10, 398-399, 400; Minister of
Interior and of Posts and Telegraphs
in second Coalition Government,
474, 476, 478, 487, 488, 490, 492
Tversky Street, 22, 23
Ufa, 667
United Internationalists, 379, 524
University of Petersburg: rumoured
destruction of, 157, 158
Uritsky, M. S., 230-231, 420, 421, 434,
439, 49i
Vandervelde, E. : at Ex. Com. meetings,
361
Vecheslov, Dr., 58
'Vienna' restaurant, 419, 500, 610
Vissarionov, 410
Vitebsk, 513
Voitinsky, V. S., 338, 618
Volhynian Regiment: mutiny of, 36;
received by Duma, 37; represented at
first meeting of Soviet, 61 ; marches to
Tauride Palace, 218; regarded as
doubtful on June 10, 404; in July
Days, 442; in October, 582
Volodarsky (Goldstein), M. M., 491,
529, 562
Vperyod, 377
Vyborg Side, 23, 316, 386, 387, 388,
390, 429, 496, 497, 620; all Bolsheviks
and Anarchists, 395
Vyrubova: transferred from Peter-
Paul Fortress, 407-41 1
War, 3, 7, 8, 104, 123, 183-184, 206,
216, 217, 219, 221, 227, 239, 244, 331,
345, 502, 503, 522, 537, 539, 548, 549,
552, 574, 578, 584, 59 J , 593, 629, 630,
636, 656, 657; to the End (to Total
Victory), 4, 5, 12, 102, 218, 235, 240,
247, 295, 299, 361; liquidation of, 8,
9, 202, 213; Down with the, n, 12,
19, 20, 222, 317, 391; opposition to,
11-12, 19, 20, 107, 264, 276, 369-371,
534; support of, 102, 103, 109, 215-
216, 218-220, 318, 361-366; threat-
ens to cause collapse of national
economy, 186; Russian offensive,
215-216, 372, 431; workers' attitude
to, 221, 358; can only be ended by
world revolution, 227, 257, 281;
Soviet and Ex. Com. attitude to, 109,
2 35, 2 39~ 2 45, 255; Provisional
Government's proclamation on aims
of, 249-253, 310, 314; Bolshevik
resolution on, 257; revolution as
reaction against, 265; loan, 288;
Russian offensive defeated, 477;
debts, 525; acute situation at front,
559
War- wounded : demonstrations of, 299,
455
Warsaw Station, 468, 667
Weinstein, 504
White Hall (Duma chamber) of Tau-
ride Palace, 185, 236, 237, 263, 373,
394, 433, .445, 45?; galleries used to
house political prisoners, 65, 72, 87;
Soldiers' and Workers' Sections of
Soviet meet in, 87, 236, 371, 429, 443;
Tsar's portrait torn doxvn, 74; gal-
leries cleared of prisoners, 177; scene
of meetings of Soviet, 192, 193, 205;
too small for Soviet plenum, 216
Wilson, 241
Winter Palace (seat of Kerensky's
Governments), 106, 168, 200 n., 492,
498, 506, 508, 509, 516, 517, 520, 528,
534, 565, 583, 587, 588, 589, 590, 593,
594, 603, 604, 612, 613, 617, 618, 621,
622, 623, 625, 627, 636; besieged and
taken, 638-639, 640-643, 648
Workers, 4 and passim ; Workers' Group
of Central War Industries Com-
mittee, 38-39; attempts to stir up
soldiers against, 212, 220-222, 232-
234, 294; workers' control of industry,
555, 570, 623, 629
Worldwide (Socialist) revolution, 103,
104, 227, 257, 273, 274, 281, 282, 284,
647, 657
Yaroslavl, 489, 490, 492, 667
Tedinstvo, 260
Yefremov, I. I., 35, 53, 55; Minister of
Public Welfare in third Coalition,
489
Yermansky, 151
Yermolenko, Lieutenant, 458
Yurenev, I., 336, 434, 562; member of
Ex. Com., 81; Minister of Com-
munications in third Coalition, 489
Yurevich, 49, 113; Civil Governor of
Petersburg, 112, 115-116
Zakharevsky Street, 436
Zalutsky: see PETROV
Zarudny: Minister of Justice in third
Coalition, 489
Zemstvo, 7, 85, 123, 383
Zenzinov, V. M., 22, 23, 131, 609;
member of Ex. Com., 81; Kerensky's
faithful attendant, 137, 140, 204
Zhitomir: hunger riots in, 333
*Zimmerwald position', Zimmerwald-
ites, 3, 8, ii, 12, 14, 18, 81, 82, 106,
131, 167, 168, 206, 221, 2265 227, 228,
INDEX 691
229, 240, 242, 243, 252, 253, 256, 257,
258, 261, 264, 265, 301, 302, 305, 307,
321, 322, 345, 349, 489, 495; 'Left
Zimmerwald bloc', 227, 230, 240,
241, 245; in minority in Ex. Com. s
246; Siberian Zimmerwaldism, 252,
257
Zinoviev (Radomyslsky), G. E., 279,
280, 324, 373, 377, 391, 393, 396,
460-461, 463, 470, 471, 472, 486, 501,
525, 526, 551, 556, 557, 571, 572, 576,
626, 627, 630, 655, 656; opposes Co-
alition on behalf of Bolsheviks, 337
338; against seizure of power on
June 10, 405
Znamensky Square, 19, 66, 430
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